



GEOFFREY PARKER

IMPRUDENT
KING

A NEW LIFE OF
PHILIP II

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'A masterpiece of historical biography.'

—*Spectator*

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A NEW LIFE OF PHILIP II

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Contents

List of illustrations

Conventions

Preface

PART I. THE THRESHOLD OF POWER

Apprenticeship, 1527–1543

1

A Renaissance prince, 1543–1551

2

The changing face of empire, 1551–1558

3

PART II. THE KING AND HIS WORLD

The king at work

4

The king and God

5

The king at play

6

PART III. THE FIRST DECADE OF THE REIGN

Getting a grip, 1558–1561

7

‘I would rather lose a hundred thousand lives if I had them’:
keeping the faith, 1562–1567

8

Family life – and death

9

The enigma of Don Carlos

10

PART IV: THE KING VICTORIOUS

Years of crusade, 1568–1572

11

Years of adversity, 1573–1576

12

The crisis of the reign, 1576–1577

13

Murder most foul?

14

Years of triumph, 1578–1585

15

‘The most potent monarch in Christendom’

16

PART V: THE KING VANQUISHED

The ‘Enterprise of England’, 1585–1588

17

Philip at bay, 1589–1592

18

Towards the tomb – and beyond, 1593–1603

19

Epilogue

Abbreviations

Note on sources

Notes

Bibliography

Acknowledgements

Index

Illustrations

Plates

1.

Proposed frontispiece for Antonio Herrera y Tordesillas, *General history of the world in the age of Philip II, the Prudent*, 1599. AHN *Consejos* 4416/101.

2.

Antonio de Honcala, Philip as a baby and as a boy, 1546. Antonio de Honcala, *Pentaplon christianae pietatis* (Alcalá de Henares, 1546): Library of the University of Granada, A-029-170.

3.

Jan Vermeyen, Charles V watches 'a cane game' with his wife and family, 1539. Jan Cornelius Vermeyen, 'Carolus Quintus imperator, rex, charissime conjugii Isabella auguste gravide in agro Toletani'. Photographic Survey, The Courtauld Institute of Art, London. Private collection.

4.

Philip defaces his books, 1540–1. *Emblemata et instrumenta bellica* and *Crónica del sancto rey don Fernando tercero*, Patrimonio Nacional, Biblioteca del Monasterio de San Lorenzo de el Escorial, Y-II-21 fo 3v. and 29-V-7, fo. V.

5.

Philip writes to his aunt, Mary of Hungary, December 1544. HHStA Belgien P.A. 60 Konvolut 4 fo. 132v, Philip to Mary of Hungary, 12 Dec. 1544.

6.

A joust in a city square, c. 1549. Miniature from *Les heures de Notre Dame*, Bibliothèque Royale Albert 1er, MS II, 158, fol. 6v.

7.

Image of Triumphal Arch erected to welcome Philip to Antwerp, 1549. Cornelius Schryver, *Spectaculorum in susceptione Philippi* (Antwerp, 1550), 53r, 'Arcus Publicus, ad Divi Michaelis'.

8.

Jacques le Boucq, Charles V, 1555. Bibliothèque Municipale, Arras, France, Ms 266/72.

9.

Anthonis Mor, Philip, victor of St Quentin, c. 1560. Patrimonio Nacional: Monasterio de San Lorenzo de el Escorial.

10.

and 11. Philip corrects his paperwork, 1576. © The British Library Board. All rights reserved (BL Addl. 28,357/136); HSA *Altamira* 1/III/22, courtesy of The Hispanic Society of America, New York.

12.

Marco Vercellio, Philip grants an audience to Leonardo Donà, ambassador of the Venetian Republic, c. 1600. Pinacoteca, Palazzo Donà dalle Rose, Venice.

13.

Pierre Perret, frontispiece of Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, *History of Philip II, king of Spain*, 1619. Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid.

14.

Reliquaries at the Escorial. Patrimonio Nacional: Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial.

15.

and 16. The first and second title pages of the 'Royal Bible'. *Biblia Sacra Hebraice, Chaldaice, Graece & Latine* (8 vols, Antwerp, 1569–73), vol. I. The Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library.

17.

Wouter Crabeth, The King's Window, at St John's church, Gouda, 1557–9. Sint Janskerk, Gouda, Holland.

18.

Hieronymus Wierix, Christ invests Philip with the insignia of kingship, 1585. BRB, Cabinet des Estampes, A.1511.

19.

Sofonisba Anguissola, Philip surprised with his rosary, c. 1575. Museo del Prado. White Images / Scala, Florence.

20.

Philip corrects the plans of his architects, 1561–2. AGS *MPD* XL-1.

21.

Fabrizio Castello, ‘The king of Spain’s Howse’, 1576. Hatfield House, England.

22.

Pompeo Leoni, the funeral effigies of Philip and his family at the Escorial, 1597–1600. Patrimonio Nacional: Basilica del Monasterio de San Lorenzo de el Escorial.

23.

Philip excises an offending passage from a document about the Escorial, 1571. AGS *CC* 409/26.

24.

Jehan Lhermite, ‘The philosopher’s tower’ and the distillery at the Escorial, c. 1600. BRB Ms II.1028: Lhermite, *Le Passetemps*, in *Revue d’histoire de la pharmacie*, 1933, vol. 21, issue 84, p. 207.

25.

Hans de Evalo, a clock from Philip’s office, 1583. Patrimonio Nacional, Colecciones Reales, El Candil.

26.

Philip answers under oath the questions posed by Archbishop Carranza, 1560. RAH Ms. 9/1804, Proceso Carranza vol. XII fo. 83v. © Real Academia de Historia, Madrid.

27.

Anton van den Wyngaerde, Philip’s rooms with a view at the Madrid Alcázar, c. 1565. Anton van den Wyngaerde, ‘El Alcázar de Madrid’, Österreichisches Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, Austria, Cod. Min. 41.

28.

Philip II acts as his own cipher clerk, 1567. AA 5/69, Philip to Alba, 7 August 1567. Archivo de los Duques de Alba.

29.

Sofonisba Anguissola, Isabel of France, queen of Spain, 1565. Museo Nacional del Prado.

30.

Anonymous, The baptism of Prince Fernando on 16 December 1571. Courtesy of the Khevenhüller Collection at the Burg Hochosterwitz Museum, www.burg-hochosterwitz.com

31.

Titian, ‘The offering of Philip II’, 1572–3. Museo Nacional del

Prado.

32.

Anonymous, Philip II, his daughters Isabella and Catalina, and Prince Philip, 1583–4. Courtesy of the Hispanic Society of America, New York.

33.

Alonso Sánchez Coello, Sor Margarita de la Cruz, 1585. Patrimonio Nacional: Convento de las Descalzas Reales.

34.

Philip sentences to death Gabriel de Espinosa, the ‘baker of Madrigal’ who pretended to be King Sebastian of Portugal, 1595. AGS *Estado* 173/271.

35.

Don Carlos orders the Spanish ambassador in Rome to acquire part of the sacred prepuce, 1567. IVdeDJ 38/4.

36.

‘Finance for dummies’: trying to explain fiscal problems to Philip, 1574. IVdeDJ 76/491.

37.

Alonso Sánchez Coello, Philip at his coronation as king of Portugal, 1581 De Agostini Picture Library / G. Costa / Bridgeman Images.

38.

Niccolò Granello and Fabrizio Castello, Philip’s navy defeats its adversaries off the Azores. Patrimonio Nacional: Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial, Sala de Batallas.

39.

The logo of Philip’s Monarchy after the union of crowns: ‘The world is not enough’. Museu Numismático Português, Lisbon, Inv. 2918.

40.

Alonso Sánchez Coello, Philip II, 1587. Galleria Palatina, Pitti Palace, Florence. Photo Scala, Florence courtesy of the Ministero Beni e Att. Culturali.

41.

A ‘Saturday Statement’: Philip tries to balance his cheque book, 1589. AGS *CJH* 219.

42.

Jehan Tarazona, ‘Journey to Tarazona’. BRB Ms II.1028: Lhermite, *Le Passetemps*.

43.

Alonso Sánchez Coello, Philip II, 1588. Patrimonio Nacional:

Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial.

44.

Jehan Lhermite, Philip's 'invalid chair'. BRB Ms II.1028: Lhermite, *Le Passetemps*.

45.

Bartolomé Esteban Murillo, 'The Vision of Friar Julián de Alcalá', c. 1645. Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, Williamstown, Massachusetts, USA / Bridgeman Images.

Figures

1.

The Spanish Monarchy at its apogee, 1585.

2.

The family of Charles V.

3.

Books acquired by Philip, 1535–47. Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, *La 'Librería Rica'*, 55.

4.

Philip's voyage to the Netherlands in 1548–9 and back in 1550–1. Based on Calvete de Estrella, *El felicísimo viaje del muy alto y muy poderoso Príncipe don Phelippe* and Gachard, *Voyages des souverains des Pays-Bas*, IV, 4–7.

5.

Philip's tour through the Netherlands in 1549. Based on Calvete de Estrella, *El felicísimo viaje*, 'Itinerario breue del príncipe'.

6.

Executions for heresy by burning in England, 1555–8. Duffy, *Fires of faith*, 129, based on data collected by the John Foxe Project.

7.

Philip II's Wars.

8.

The councils of Philip II.

9.

Philip's country retreats.

10.

The family of Philip II.

11.

Don Carlos and his absentee ancestors.

12.

The limited fertility of Philip II.

13.

The cost of war on two fronts, 1571–7.

14.

Requests for copies of documents received by the archive of Simancas, 1548–99. Rodríguez de Diego, 'Un archivo', graph 6.



1. Proposed frontispiece for *General history of the world in the age of Philip II, the Prudent*, by Antonio Herrera y Tordesillas, 1599. When Herrera requested permission to publish his *General History* in 1599, he sent a sketch of Philip that combined Classical and Christian virtues – like Hercules, the late king strangles a serpent (heresy), while the symmetry and composure of his body reflects the perfection of God's creation. The title at the top includes the epithet 'the Prudent' for the first time (page



2. Philip as a baby and as a boy, Antonio de Honcala, 1546. A devotional treatise, dedicated to Philip, used the Greek letter upsilon to show the choice between vice and virtue faced by the prince as he journeys through life. The changing clothes reflect his progress from baby, through infant to young adult and provide the earliest known images of the prince. In one, he holds a song bird on a string (page 11).



3. Charles V watches 'a cane game' with his wife and family, by Jan Vermeyen, 1539. Philip, almost 12 years old, and his sisters, watch the spectacle intently from the booth second to the left of centre in the arena erected outside Toledo in March 1539 in honour of the empress's

pregnancy. Six weeks later she was dead (page 12).



4. Philip defaces his books, 1540–1. At age fourteen, Philip used his pen, brush and paints to doodle in the margins of a chronicle describing the heroic acts of his predecessor, St Fernando, king of Castile (page 18).

azer algun. Sezen ier fues Comen
 del dno y azer nos oblige a lo f. mas
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5. Philip writes to his aunt, Mary of Hungary, December 1544. At age seventeen, Philip's distinctive spidery script was already recognizable, with some lines overlapping others and heavy abbreviation of many words (such as the last phrase 'de v[uest]ra al[teza], de V[a]ll[adoli]d, a xij de dez[iembr]e 1544': page 28).



6. A joust in a city square, c. 1549. The furious public joust may well show Prince Philip (with the white plume) in Brussels in May 1549, running against Don Luis de Requesens, whose lance 'knocked him to the ground' stunned. The spectators, like those at a modern bullfight, eagerly awaited any error or mishap as well as any act of unusual courage or cunning (page 35).



7. Image of the Triumphal Arch erected to welcome Philip to Antwerp, 1549. In the main display, God himself crowns the young prince (page 37).



8. Charles V, by Jacques le Boucq, 1555. Le Boucq, a herald of the Order of Golden Fleece, attended the last chapter of the Order at which Charles V presided – one of the few occasions in 1555 when the emperor appeared in public – and probably made this striking sketch immediately afterwards (page 49).




9. Philip, victor of St Quentin, by Anthonis Mor, c. 1560. The king holds his general's baton and wears the full armour, decorated with the cross of Burgundy and an image of the Virgin Mary, which he wore while storming St Quentin in 1557. This served for over a decade as an 'official portrait' from which numerous copies were made (page 53).

San Juan de los Rios en cada y septen. dhas. congregaciones y poblaciones dhas. conde dhas. conde. Por
 mandado que el qual quise mis de Vro. cargo dhas. dhas. congregaciones y poblaciones dhas. conde dhas. conde.
 castillo y conde que se congregaron dhas. dhas. y pueblis dhas. conde dhas. conde. A la
 conde y conde que se congregaron dhas. conde. A la conde y conde que se congregaron dhas. conde.
 le fagades mis de Vro. cargo dhas. conde. A la conde y conde que se congregaron dhas. conde.
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 conde y conde que se congregaron dhas. conde. A la conde y conde que se congregaron dhas. conde.

[Handwritten signature]

bien sero el conde a la rey
 y el conde el conde de la
 a la conde y ponerse en orden
 por conde a la conde



al conde y conde de la conde. A la conde y conde que se congregaron dhas. conde. A la conde y conde que se congregaron dhas. conde.

Repres a fin me eside
 En la forma de conde
 Ando a segun el nombre
 deuch. mylana yeben
 hestent myo en milon es
 de mundo puentemense
 pnes grata de en fusa
 loo dan doos es de all
 hreen de bode a nece ab
 monos lo obereuen finto
 mpoa de tiempo, en pnel
 de italin tengo Jo ote
 nap a no de la mngmo
 en fiteya yall no y hgn a
 para e quere para de
 hdo yall de este es de all de
 dea ota nante a daf no conbre

10 and 11. Philip corrects his paperwork, 1576. One day in 1576, after the king had affixed his *estampilla* (the equivalent of a rubber stamp) to a routine order to reimburse 1,000 escudos to an official, he noticed that the reason for the payment had been omitted. He therefore crossed out his signature, wrote out the phrase to be added, and returned it to the secretary for revision. Perhaps more remarkable, after signing a warrant

that authorized a reward in Milan to Enrique Visconti, 'it occurred to me that, judging by his name, he's Milanese' and 'if we do that for him, everyone there will want the same'. The king therefore instructed that 'If he is from there, he should receive a reward somewhere else.' Hundreds of documents like this required the king's signature every week – sometimes every day – and it seems astonishing that he managed to spot such errors and ambiguities (page 66).



12. Philip grants an audience to Leonardo Donà, ambassador of the Venetian Republic, by Marco Vecellio, c. 1600. Donà became Venetian ambassador in Spain in 1570, at the age of 33, and served for over three years. According to court protocol, Philip stands while he listens to the ambassador (who commissioned this picture); but Donà, who subsequently wrote down the king's every word, rarely received more than a non-committal sentence in reply – perhaps because, on his own admission, Philip tended to tune out during audiences (page 78).



13. Frontispiece of Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, *History of Philip II, king of Spain*, by Pierre Perret, 1619. The author, who attended on the king from 1575 and saw him frequently, placed El Escorial in the background of the confrontation between Philip, in armour and with sword drawn to protect the Virgin Mary, and the enemies of the Catholic church. A motto stating that ‘The first priority is religion’ separates the protagonists (page 80).



14. Reliquaries at the Escorial, containing some relics from Philip II's collection. The 'keeper of relics' at the Escorial claimed that the royal collection included at least a fragment of the bones of every known saint except three. Although only a fraction of the original collection has survived, the golden caskets containing various certified body parts of the saints remain (page 84).

BIBLIA SACRA

HEBRAICE,
CHALDAICE,
GRÆCE, &
Latine

PIETATIS CONCORDIA. *Imago.*

PHILIPPI II. REG. CATHOL. PIETATE
ET STUDIO AD SACROSANCTÆ
ECCLESIA. VSVM


CHRISTOPH. PLANTINVS EXCVD. ANTVERPIÆ.



15 and 16. The first and second title pages of the 'Royal Bible'. The magnificent *Biblia Regia*, printed at Antwerp under the king's direction in 1569, began by proclaiming Philip's desire to produce Scripture that *all* Christians – Protestant and Orthodox, as well as Catholic – could accept as definitive (page 88).




17. The King's Window celebrating the victory of St Quentin, St John's church, Gouda, by Wouter Crabeth, 1557–9. When the church of St John in Gouda was rebuilt after a fire, local artists created a spectacular series of stained glass windows, each between 10 and 20 metres high. In the central register of 'the King's Window', Philip and Mary Tudor observe the Last Supper. The accuracy of the king's likeness suggests that Wouter Crabeth, the glass engraver who supervised this massive operation, may have sketched him 'from life' (page 93).




18. Christ invests Philip with the insignia of kingship, by Hieronymus Wierix, 1585. In this triumphalist Netherlands engraving, Jesus blesses Philip as He hands him an oversize globe, together with sword, olive branch, crown and cross. Angels prepare palms and laurels of victory while the pope, ignored by everyone, looks on malevolently (page 96).



19. Philip surprised with his rosary, by Sofonisba Anguissola, c. 1575. Radiography shows that when Sofonisba painted the original of this royal portrait in 1564, the king had his hand on his sword. A decade later she completely changed it, substituting a rosary for the sword (page 96).



20. Philip corrects the plans of his architects, 1561–2. The king had a clear idea of what he wanted, in architecture as in other things – in this case an additional floor in the Madrid Alcázar – and did not hesitate to convey his views in both words and drawings (page 102).




21. 'The king of Spain's Howse', by Fabrizio Castello, 1576. A detailed drawing of the progress of construction at the Escorial shows the south wing of the convent and the royal apartments largely complete while cranes help to erect the Basilica and the library. The temporary accommodation for the labour force is on the right (page 105).




22. The funeral effigies of Philip and his family at the Escorial, by Pompeo

Leoni, 1597–1600. Although Philip died before Leoni installed these huge bronze statues to the left of the main altar, he approved the design and therefore the decision to portray him as aged, bald and weary (though resplendent in the suit of armour he had worn on campaign forty years before). His fourth wife Anne kneels beside him, with her predecessors María Manuela and Isabel behind, while Don Carlos looks over the king's shoulder – at last the loyal son for whom Philip had yearned (page 106).



23. Philip excises an offending passage from a document about the

Escorial, 1571. Something he read led Philip to reach for a pair of scissors and excise half a sentence in this letter. To clarify what he had just done, before returning the defaced document to his secretary the king wrote in the margin 'Está bien. Yo corté lo demás [This is fine: I cut out the rest]' (page 107).



24. 'The philosopher's tower' and the distillery at the Escorial, by Jehan Lhermite, c. 1600. Throughout his life, Philip showed great interest in alchemy and he filled a suite of eleven rooms at the Escorial with distilling equipment, including a tower made of tin some seven metres high, which stood on a brick oven. Experts affixed numerous glass receptacles to collect the 'essence' of special herbs (grown in the royal gardens) released as the tower heated up. According to Jehan Lhermite, the tower distilled about 10 kilos of 'essence' every day, which the experts then used to produce chemical compounds (page 110).



25. One of the clocks in Philip's office, by Hans de Evalo, 1583. According to his valet, Jehan Lhermite, Philip always had two clocks in his office, each one illuminated by an oil lamp, which 'gave an unusual and powerful impression' to all who visited the king. The clocks 'regulated and

measured his life, dividing it by the minute, determining his daily actions and occupations'. This timepiece, made by Philip's Dutch clockmaker Hans de Evalo, is still on display in the royal apartments at the Escorial (page 114).

[illegible]

26. Philip answers under oath the questions posed by Archbishop Carranza, 1560. The king wrote out answers to each of Carranza's questions regarding his relations with Inquisitor-General Valdés. Then on 12 January 1560, the secretary of the council of the Inquisition, Pedro de Tapia, certified that the king had 'promised as a Catholic' to tell everything he knew, and that his testimony 'was written in his hand and authenticated with his royal rubric' (the 'J' at the end of his deposition). This probably marked the first interrogation that Philip endured since his father grilled him about his sex life in 1543 (page 134).



27. Philip's rooms with a view at the Madrid Alcázar, by Anton van den Wyngaerde, c. 1565. Philip made Madrid his capital in 1561 and work began almost at once to expand its Alcázar, especially the 'Gilded tower' (on the far left), with three high-windowed floors beneath a pointed slate

28. Philip II acts as his own cipher clerk, 1567. The king's holograph letter to the duke of Alba on 7 August 1567 began just like other similar letters: verbose, rambling and untidy. Then Philip started to encode his thoughts – although he soon revealed his unfamiliarity with the elementary rules of cryptography: he enciphered only crucial words rather than whole passages, and entered the symbol for each character of every word rather

than using additional symbols to represent frequent combinations (page 151).



29. Isabel of France, queen of Spain, by Sofonisba Anguissola, 1565. The


queen, aged 20, posed for this portrait just before she left Spain to meet her mother at Bayonne. Perhaps to emphasize her role as the king's representative, she holds a miniature of Philip – probably based on Antonis Mor's 'St Quentin' portrait (plate 9; page 156).



30. The baptism of Prince Fernando on 16 December 1571, anonymous. A procession of courtiers and ambassadors escort Prince Fernando from the Madrid Alcázar into the church of San Gil to be baptized by Cardinal Espinosa (in red, upper left). The painting was commissioned by Imperial Ambassador Hans Khevenhüller (18), standing right behind the infant. The painting includes images of other prominent members of Philip's Court, including French Ambassador Fourquevaux (19), Portuguese ambassador Pereira (20), the marquis of Ladrada (23), Princess Juana (24) and Archduke Wenceslas (25) (page 165).




31. 'The offering of Philip II', by Titian, 1572–3. At the king's command, Alonso Sánchez Coello sent a portrait of Philip as a model for Titian to use, and he may also have sent a sketch to suggest juxtaposing the birth of Prince Fernando (to whom a rather clumsy angel offers an olive branch, and promises 'More for you'), with the defeat of the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto (seen through the window, and symbolized by the bound Turk in the foreground) (page 165).




32. Philip II, his daughters Isabella and Catalina, and Prince Philip, anonymous, 1583–4. This intimate (if unbalanced) family portrait of Philip and his surviving family was done after Prince Philip became a knight of the Golden Fleece (whose insignia he wears) in 1583 and before Catalina left the family circle for ever with her husband, the duke of Savoy, in 1585 (page 168).



33. Sor Margarita de la Cruz, by Alonso Sánchez Coello, 1585. Having rejected Philip's offer of marriage, his niece Margarita entered the convent of Las Descalzas Reales in 1585 and spent the remaining 48 years of her life as a Franciscan nun close to her mother, Empress María, who lived in a special royal apartment there until her death in 1603 (page 171).



35. Don Carlos orders the Spanish ambassador in Rome to acquire part of the sacred prepuce, 1567. Even at age 22, the handwriting of Don Carlos was not only virtually illegible (which might simply reflect the consequences of forcing someone left-handed to write with his right hand) but also virtually illiterate: a worrying characteristic for the heir to a global empire (page 191).



36. 'Finance for dummies': trying to explain fiscal problems to Philip, 1574. A page of the 'Treasury Statement' sent by Juan de Ovando to Philip in April 1574, using very big letters and very simple words to explain the financial crisis to a king who did not understand – or did not want to understand – the problem (page 221).



37. Philip at his coronation as king of Portugal, by Alonso Sánchez Coello, 1581. Although he governed a global empire, Philip only took part in one coronation ceremony: at Tomar as king of Portugal in 1581. According to a courtier, 'clothed in brocade, with the sceptre in his hand' he looked like King David (page 271).



38. Philip's navy defeats its adversaries off the Azores, by Niccolò Granello and Fabrizio Castello. The frescoes commissioned for the Hall of Battles at the Escorial included a view of prisoners taken by the Spanish fleet in a battle off the island of São Miguel in 1582, bound back to back as their captors prepare to execute them by drowning. They also depicted the shot damage inflicted on the victorious fleet, including its flagship (both in this battle and in the Armada campaign six years later): the *San Martín* (page 276).



39. The logo of Philip's Monarchy after the union of crowns: 'The world is not enough'. This medal of gilded bronze, probably cast in 1583, celebrated the successful annexation of Portugal with a phrase used by the Roman poet Juvenal about Alexander the Great – NON SUFFICIT ORBIS –

and placed Bucephalus, the horse that only Alexander could ride, atop the globe. The 'cloud' that separates the word SUFFICIT represents God and reminds viewers that even world conquerors have limitations (page 276).




(less than the cost of the Armada for one day). Small wonder that he struggled to find ways of delaying some payments (page 314).



42. The 'Journey to Tarazona', by Jehan Lhermite. In 1592 the king, his children, and his courtiers left the Escorial for Segovia, Medina del Campo and Tordesillas before passing through Simancas to Valladolid. The royal party then travelled through Navarre and Aragon (where Prince Philip was recognized as heir apparent) before returning to Madrid. Lhermite showed the exact route taken, 500 miles in all, and thus provided the first example of a Spanish 'tour guide' (page 339).



43. Philip II, by Alonso Sánchez Coello, 1588. Although formerly attributed to Pantoja de la Cruz, María Kusche has convincingly argued that Sánchez Coello painted this portrait, perhaps in 1588 when the king was 61. Compare his exhausted countenance with that of Charles V at age



44. Philip's 'invalid chair', by Jehan Lhermite. Philip lived longer than any other member of his dynasty, but after 1595 arthritis forced him to wear loose-fitting garments to ease the pressure on his joints, and to spend his days in an ingenious chair with various settings that enabled him both to sit and doze without having to stand. From this contraption – in which he also travelled between his various palaces – Philip continued to govern his world-wide empire until his last illness in 1598 (page 342).



45. 'The Vision of Friar Julián de Alcalá', by Bartolomé Esteban Murillo, c. 1645. The Franciscan friar and five witnesses from the village of Paracuellos de Jarama observe the soul of Philip ascend from Purgatory to Paradise in September 1603. Murillo's painting (one of a series of done between 1645 and 1648 for the cloister of San Francisco of Seville) followed meticulously the description of the vision published by Fray Antonio Daza in 1611 (page 362).

Conventions

When a name exists (Antwerp, Corunna, Geneva, The Hague, Vienna) I have used it, ^{HERE} otherwise I have preferred the style used in the place itself today (Mechelen, not Malines; Aachen, not Aix-la-Chapelle). Likewise, where a standard English version of the style and title of an individual exists (William of Orange, Don John of Austria), I have used it, otherwise I have preferred the version used by the individual. One exception is Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle (1517–86). Although he used the style ‘bishop of Arras’ between 1540 and 1562 and thereafter ‘Cardinal Granvelle’, he appears throughout this book as ‘Granvelle’.

To avoid confusion and facilitate comparisons, all sums of money mentioned in this book have been given in Spanish ducats, each one roughly equivalent in the later sixteenth century to one escudo (or crown) and to two florins. About four ducats made up one pound sterling.

On 24 February 1582 Pope Gregory XIII ordered all Christians to advance their calendar by ten days, but different countries adopted the ‘new style’ at different times: in Spain 15 October 1582 immediately followed 4 October; in most of the provinces of the Netherlands in rebellion against Philip, 25 December immediately followed 14 December 1582; in the ‘loyal’ provinces 22 February 1583 immediately followed 11 February; and so on. All dates in this book after 4 October 1582 appear in New Style unless otherwise stated, even for states (like England) that rejected the Gregorian Calendar; and throughout I have assumed that each calendar year began on 1 January (and not on 25 March, as in the

Old Style or Julian Calendar).

Preface

Mthirty-five years, once wrote, 'I have spent more time with Philip II than with any other man; indeed one could say that I have devoted the best years of my life to him.'¹ I could say the same. I began documentary research for a biography of the king in the 1960s, taking as my core source the holograph memoranda he exchanged with his leading advisers: documents once in the 'Altamira collection' but now divided between repositories in New York, Madrid, Geneva and London. In 1978 Little, Brown of Boston published *Philip II* in their series, 'The Library of World Biography', but since then thousands more holograph memoranda formerly in the archive of the counts of Altamira have entered the public domain. Those in the Biblioteca de Zabálburu, in Madrid, remained closed to researchers until 1987 because of a disputed inheritance, while no one saw those in the vaults of the Hispanic Society of America, in New York, between the time they were filed away by the king's secretaries and 2012, when they were identified and catalogued.

The Altamira documents are unique. The king transacted as much business as possible in writing, and his messages to senior ministers – often scribbled in the margins of their reports to him – addressed information, petitions and problems that came to his desk from all over the world. He resolved some matters in a single document, others in a series of exchanges spread over several days, and still others in several exchanges on the same day. In many cases Philip lapsed into a logorrhoea that not only revealed the thought processes that underlay his decisions but also shared

details on his personal life – when and where he ate and slept; what he had just read; which trees and flowers he wanted to plant in his gardens (and where); how problems with his eyes, his legs or his wrist, or a cold or a headache, had made him fall behind with his paperwork. Many messages also dealt with what his ministers disparagingly called trivia (*menudencias*): decisions which they considered unnecessary. Should a Morisco boy who claimed he could divine water go to the Pardo palace, where the gardens needed irrigation? (Yes: but he would get only one chance.) Where should his builders locate the toilets (*necesarias*) at the Escorial? ('Let these toilets be situated in a place where the kitchen staff can't smell them', although 'to make the right decision, I would like to see the plans of the water conduits'.)²

The king's addiction to 'trivia' irritated and sometimes infuriated his ministers – in part because the same document that commented on water diviners or locating toilets might also convey a decision vital to the fate of the Monarchy: how to persuade Don John of Austria to go to the Netherlands and become governor-general; whether or not to sign a ceasefire with the Ottoman sultan; when and how to invade England (to take three examples from a single year: 1576). In most of his rescripts, the king shifted between public and private affairs without warning, as different ideas entered his mind. His overworked ministers therefore needed to read every word he wrote. So must historians.

Even with this wealth of personal material, writing the king's biography is not easy. Philip boasted that 'I began to rule in the year 1543', the year in which his father, Emperor Charles V, named him regent of Castile and Aragon; and between 1554 and 1556 he became in succession king of Naples and England, ruler of the Netherlands, and monarch of Spain, Sicily and Spanish America. In 1565 Philip's subjects began the conquest of the Philippines, which they named in his honour, and between 1580 and 1583 he acquired Portugal and all its overseas possessions. Thereafter, he ruled the first global empire in history until he died in 1598, aged 71.

The extent of his Monarchy, combined with the long duration of his reign, present Philip's biographers with the first of four major interpretive obstacles: an excess of data. As the distinguished Hispanist Pascual de Gayangos observed in the mid-nineteenth century, as he transcribed some of the hundreds of thousands of

documents written and read by the king, 'The history of Philip II is in a way a history of the world'; and William Hickling Prescott, the historian for whom Gayangos prepared those transcripts, began his three-volume study of the king with a claim only slightly more modest: 'The history of Philip the Second is the history of Europe during the latter half of the sixteenth century.' Although Gayangos and others compiled over fifteen fat volumes of transcripts for Prescott, these constitute only a fragment of the surviving documentation: on one occasion, the king claimed he had signed 400 letters in a single morning, and a well-informed ambassador asserted that on some days 2,000 documents passed across the royal desk. 'Philippizing', as Prescott termed his work on the king, is a lifetime commitment.³

Paradoxically, the second major interpretive obstacle facing Philip's biographers seems to contradict the first. Even if a diligent historian managed to consult all the relevant papers that survive, many of the king's decisions would remain impenetrable. Although Philip committed more of his thoughts and decisions to paper than almost any other ruler, he deliberately left others in obscurity, and at all times he urged his ministers to proceed 'with secrecy and dissimulation' ('con secreto y dissimulación': one of the commonest phrases in his vocabulary). Sometimes he deliberately laid down his quill, because 'this is a matter to talk about, not to write about', and at other times he tried to destroy all written evidence specifically to conceal what he had done and why. In addition, as Philip's father once warned him, some political decisions 'are so impenetrable and uncertain that I do not know how to describe them to you' because 'they are full of confusions and contradictions, either because of the state of affairs or because of conscience'.⁴ Like his father, Philip took some decisions for reasons that neither he nor his closest advisers could fully explain. Thus in 1571, Philip's irrepressible enthusiasm for a totally unrealistic plan to 'kill or capture' Elizabeth Tudor left his councillors mystified. 'It is remarkable to see how committed His Majesty has become to this English business,' wrote Dr Martín de Velasco, a pragmatic legal expert who had served the king for over twenty years, and he marvelled 'how the news that the Queen [Elizabeth] knows all about his plan has scarcely cooled his ardour'. Therefore, Velasco concluded, 'His Majesty is so hot for this venture that it seems to be God's work', and so everyone else

must also suspend their scepticism and instead ‘assist and advance such a Holy resolve’.⁵

How can modern historians understand matters that seemed ‘impenetrable and uncertain’ even to the protagonists? One obvious resource is the testimony of contemporary observers of Philip and his court; but here we encounter a third interpretive obstacle, memorably described by the French intellectual Voltaire in the mid-eighteenth century: ‘To understand Philip II, one cannot state too often that we must mistrust the descriptions of contemporaries, who were almost always motivated by either flattery or hatred.’ And, indeed, as Robert Watson (Voltaire’s contemporary and the king’s first Scottish biographer) observed, ‘No character was ever drawn by different historians in more opposite colours than that of Philip’.⁶ But one important exception exists: the dispatches of the dozen foreign ambassadors who resided at the court of Spain. They dedicated their time, their money and their energy to removing the veil of ‘secrecy and dissimulation’ with which the king sought to conceal his decisions and his plans from others. The diplomats’ sources ranged from Ruy Gómez de Silva (Philip’s Portuguese Favourite who regularly shared state secrets with his uncle Francisco Pereira, the Portuguese ambassador) to Queen Isabel’s French dwarf (who, as everyone except the French ambassador forgot, was in almost constant attendance on her and overheard absolutely everything). Diplomatic dispatches founded on such well-informed sources provide crucial insights into decision-making.

The final obstacle to understanding Philip II is the hardest to overcome: his exalted status. A daring friar once teased the king: “‘Oh, Sire, very few kings go to heaven”: a statement that startled those who heard it. Then the king asked: “And why is that, Father?” He replied: “Because there are very few kings!” There are even fewer kings in the twenty-first century, which makes it more difficult for us to empathize with a monarch – especially one like Philip who spent all but six months of his reign at war, often fighting on several fronts at once. In his brilliant study, *Supreme Command*, Eliot Cohen emphasized ‘the difficulties writers have in putting themselves in the place of a wartime political leader’ (whether king or commoner), because those leaders bear ‘manifold responsibilities and carry stresses’ that very few historians have experienced. Cohen deemed this ‘the greatest obstacle to sound

historical judgment on wartime statesmanship'.⁷

In his celebrated biography *Philip of Spain*, published in 1997, Henry Kamen circumvented this obstacle by arguing that the king somehow managed to escape these 'manifold responsibilities'. 'Philip was never at any time in adequate control of events, or of his kingdoms, or even of his own destiny,' Kamen wrote. 'It follows that he cannot be held responsible for more than a small part of what eventually transpired during his reign ... He was "imprisoned within a destiny in which he himself had little hand". He could do little more than play the dice available to him.'⁸ I reject such extreme determinism. Certainly some 'events', and even some 'kingdoms', occasionally escaped from Philip's control, just as they occasionally escape from the control of every wartime leader; but Philip spent almost every day of his long life taking decisions intended either to retain or to regain the initiative. One night in 1557 we find him writing out orders in his own hand 'at one o'clock in the morning'; in 1565, he toiled at his desk although 'I am so preoccupied and starved of sleep because I need to spend most nights reading the papers which other business prevents me from seeing during the day – and so I am just beginning to look at what you have sent me now, which is after midnight'; in 1575, 'it's 10 o'clock, I feel shattered and I'm dying of hunger'; and, in 1583, 'I have spent the whole day reading and writing, and on many other things that I needed to do today, but all of it paperwork; and so I am writing this after 10 o'clock, very tired and very hungry.'⁹

Many of the decisions taken by Philip during the long, lonely days and nights at his desk had momentous consequences. In 1566 his refusal to renew the concessions (*Mandatos*) granted by his father to the Moriscos (Christians of Moorish descent) of Granada forty years before, and instead to enforce religious conformity on them, produced a civil war that led to the death of some 90,000 Spaniards, both Christians and Muslims, and the forced resettlement of some 80,000 Moriscos. The king's determination in 1571 to 'kill or capture' Elizabeth Tudor turned her into an implacable enemy who inflicted enormous damage on Philip's subjects and on his prestige for the rest of her reign. More costly still, the king's decision to renew the war in the Netherlands in 1577 initiated hostilities that would last for thirty years, causing the death of tens of thousands of men, women and children, and costing over a hundred million ducats. In these and countless other

cases, Philip was certainly in ‘control of events’, as well as ‘of his own destiny’: he could have chosen differently – to renew the *Mandatos*; to leave Elizabeth Tudor alone; to preserve the peace just concluded in the Netherlands – but he did not.

In 1599, Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas completed the draft of a history of recent times commissioned by Phillip II. He noted that ‘all the kings of the world, and especially those of Castile and Aragon’, had used an epithet (such as ‘the Catholic’ or ‘the Wise’), and he thoughtfully supplied to the royal council a list of titles he considered appropriate for the late king: ‘the good, the prudent, the honest, the just, the pious, the modest, the constant.’ He also supplied a heroic image that featured one of these epithets (see plate 1).¹⁰ The council approved, and Herrera entitled his book *General History of the World in the age of Philip II, the Prudent*, giving the king the title that has since become universal.

Although *Imprudent King* argues that Herrera erred in his choice of epithet, I agree with St Augustine that *Nemo nisi per amicitiam cognoscitur* – ‘You cannot know someone except through friendship’. This does not mean that biographers should implicitly trust their subjects: on the contrary, we must be ready for them (whether living or dead) to mislead us, both deliberately (through the falsification or destruction of compromising documents) and inadvertently (through our own limited ability to comprehend their world, or by considering future developments that the protagonists could not have known). But St Augustine’s precept does require biographers to extend to their subjects the same openness of mind, the same readiness to listen, that one would extend to a friend. It is in that spirit, gentle reader, that I will use Philip’s own words as much as possible to portray his long life, from his conception in the Alhambra at Granada in August 1526 until September 1603, five years after his death, when a group of amazed witnesses near the village of Paracuellos de Jarama watched the king’s soul ascend from Purgatory to Paradise.

PART I

THE THRESHOLD OF POWER

Apprenticeship, 1527–1543

On 10 March 1526 Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, and ruler of Spain, Mexico, the Netherlands and much of Italy, rode into the bustling city of Seville for the first time. Still in his travelling clothes and covered in dust, he dismounted in the courtyard of the royal palace and strode into the room where Princess Isabella of Portugal, his cousin, was waiting. The pope had already sent a dispensation to permit the two cousins to marry in Lent, and their representatives had already signed the marriage contract; so, after 15 minutes of polite conversation with the fiancée he had never seen, Charles changed into his finest clothes, attended a nuptial mass and danced. Then at 2 a.m. the couple went to bed and consummated their union.

The first weeks of married life for the imperial couple proved idyllic. They stayed ‘in bed until 11 or 12’ each morning and gave ‘every sign of contentment’ after they emerged.¹ They and their retinue then travelled slowly to Granada to pay their respects to their common ancestors buried in the cathedral, planning to continue their stately progress to Barcelona whence Charles would depart to lead a crusade against the Ottoman Turks, leaving his wife to govern Spain; but then news arrived that King Francis I of France had declared war on him. This precluded the emperor’s departure from Spain. He and his wife therefore spent the next six months in Granada, hoping that the international situation would improve, and in the Alhambra high above the city the future Philip II was conceived. The English ambassador was the first to find out. ‘The empress is with child, at which all the people are delighted,’

he wrote on 30 September 1526 – the first known mention of the future king. The empress remained in Granada, resting, until early the following year when she travelled slowly to join her husband in Valladolid, then the administrative capital of Castile.²

As is often the case with a first child, the empress was in labour for many hours. She asked for a veil to be placed over her face, so that no one would see her agony; and when a midwife urged her to give full vent to her feelings the empress replied sternly: ‘I would rather die. Don’t talk to me like that: I may die, but I will not cry out’. Philip entered the world around 4 p.m. on 21 May 1527. Many Spaniards had expected the prince to receive one of the traditional names of the peninsular dynasties, such as Fernando or Juan, but Charles insisted on calling his firstborn after his own father, and so at the baptism ceremony two weeks later the royal heralds shouted three times: ‘Philip, by the grace of God prince of Spain!’ But Philip was heir to far more than Spain.³

The inheritance

Dynastic accident had brought together in the person of Charles V four separate inheritances. From his father’s father, Emperor Maximilian of Austria, Charles received the ancestral Habsburg lands in central Europe; from his father’s mother, Mary of Burgundy, he inherited numerous duchies, counties and lordships in the Netherlands and the Franche-Comté of Burgundy. From his mother’s mother, Queen Isabella the Catholic, Charles received Castile and its outposts in North Africa, the Caribbean and Central America; from his mother’s father, Ferdinand the Catholic, he inherited Aragon and the Aragonese dominions of Naples, Sicily and Sardinia. Charles soon added more territories to this impressive core of patrimonial states: several provinces in the Netherlands by treaty; the duchy of Lombardy in Italy when its native dynasty died out; and Tunis in North Africa by conquest. Most spectacular of all, in the Americas, about 2,000 of his Spanish subjects destroyed the Aztec empire and occupied an area eight times the size of Castile, whence fewer than 200 of them began the conquest of the Inca empire in Peru. In 1535, as he entered the city of Messina in Sicily, Charles V saw for the first time the felicitous phrase coined by the Roman poet Virgil for the possessions of the Emperor Augustus, fifteen centuries before: A

SOLIS ORTU AD OCCASUM, 'from the rising to the setting of the sun' – or, as his 'spin doctors' would put it, 'an empire on which the sun never set'.

No European ruler had ever controlled such extensive territories, and the absence of precedents helps to explain the apparently haphazard nature of decision-making by the Spanish Habsburgs: they had no choice but to improvise and experiment, to test different techniques of government as they went along, to learn by trial and (sometimes) error. In any case, prior experience might not have helped, because for most of his reign Charles faced an unpre-cedented combination of enemies: two religious, the Protestants and the Papacy, and two political, France and the Ottoman empire.

A dangerous synergy between these enemies occurred after Maximilian died in January 1519, leaving two important items of unfinished business. The late emperor had failed to silence Dr Martin Luther, a professor at the University of Wittenberg in Saxony who wrote pamphlets and speeches to mobilize public support for his claims that the Papacy was corrupt and required urgent reform. Maximilian had also failed to arrange for Charles to succeed him as Holy Roman Emperor, paramount ruler of Germany, and throughout the spring and summer of 1519, Charles and Francis I paid huge sums of money to the seven Electors (*Kurfürsten*) who would choose the 'king of the Romans' (emperor-elect, pending papal coronation). Eventually, Charles won the contest, so that his territories now surrounded France to the north, east and south. In 1521 Francis declared war, and for over a century the kings of France would strive to end what they saw as Habsburg encirclement by the various territories inherited or acquired by Charles.



1. The Spanish Monarchy at its apogee, 1585. The annexation of Portugal and its overseas possessions made Philip the ruler of the first global empire in history. Although its core remained the Iberian peninsula, issues


concerning Africa, Asia and America regularly flowed across Philip's desk and required him to make countless decisions.

The popes, too, felt threatened by the Imperial election because Charles now ruled not only Sardinia and Spain to the west, and Naples and Sicily to the south, but also the Empire (and, after 1535, Milan) in the north. Moreover, Rome depended on grain exports from Sicily, while its entire commerce by sea and land lay at the mercy of the surrounding Habsburg bases. Papal support for the 'crusades' by Charles (and later by his son) against both Muslims and Protestants therefore tended to remain muted for fear that any further success would tighten their grip on Rome. The Ottoman sultans also saw Charles as their natural enemy. In the course of his long reign (1520–66), Suleiman the Magnificent led his troops up the Danube five times, on each occasion gaining lands either from the Habsburgs or from their allies. Only his need to deal with other foreign and domestic enemies prevented further advances.

Domestic enemies periodically distracted Charles, too. To begin with, the death of his grandfather Ferdinand of Aragon in 1516 left a contested inheritance. Although Ferdinand's marriage to Isabella of Castile had created a dynastic union, it left intact the institutions, laws, currency and judicial structure of each of their possessions – Castile, Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia and Navarre (annexed by Ferdinand in 1512) – and the powers and policies of the crown differed in each area. Above all, although Ferdinand had been king consort of Castile during Isabella's lifetime, when she died in 1504 his title lapsed and the crown passed to the couple's oldest child, Juana, and her husband Philip of Habsburg, ruler of the Netherlands, Charles's parents.

Juana, unlike her mother, showed neither desire nor aptitude for government and so Ferdinand and Philip vied for control of Castile. Philip won – but almost immediately died, whereupon Ferdinand dismissed the officials appointed by his son-in-law, most of whom (later known as 'Philippists') fled to the court of the young Charles in the Netherlands, where they spent the next decade plotting revenge. Ferdinand also placed Juana, although 'queen proprietress' of Castile, in preventive custody and acted as 'governor' of the kingdom. In his last testament he named Charles his sole heir and in 1517 the prince and the 'Philippists' arrived

from the Netherlands to take charge. Two years later Charles's election as Holy Roman Emperor obliged him to return to northern Europe to restore order in Germany, and in his absence major anti-Habsburg uprisings broke out in Mallorca, Sicily, Valencia and, above all, Castile, where rebels known as the *Comuneros* sought to make Juana queen in fact as well as name. The emperor's return to Spain in 1522 restored order there, but four years later Habsburg military and financial support failed to prevent Suleiman from advancing into Hungary. In desperation, Charles offered the Lutherans of Germany toleration in return for military assistance against the Turks. The spread of Protestant ideas now accelerated both within and beyond Germany.



2. The Family of Charles V. The House of Habsburg tended to produce either huge families or none at all. Thus of the fifteen children of Charles V's daughter Maria (only eight of whom appear in the figure, for reasons of space) only Anne had offspring, of whom only one, the future Philip III, produced heirs. The rest apparently married too late to reproduce or did not marry at all. (Dashed lines in the chart indicate illegitimacy.)

‘Little Phil’

Charles was powerless to halt these developments because his war with France and several Italian states kept him confined to Spain, so instead he orchestrated displays of rejoicing for the birth of *Felipito* (‘Little Phil’) as the emperor’s jester called him. According to an ambassador, ‘the Emperor is so happy, delighted and proud of his new son that he does nothing but order celebrations’. ‘Felipito’, of course, remained oblivious to this, and also to the ceremony in Madrid in 1528 at which his future subjects swore allegiance to him as prince of Castile. Instead, his attention focused on those who looked after him.⁴

Charles and Isabella continued to appear in public as ‘the happiest spouses in the world’, but although the empress doted on her husband, he saw his wife primarily in terms of administration and procreation.⁵ Thanks to the wet-nurses, the empress swiftly recovered her fertility and, three months after the prince’s birth, Charles left his newly pregnant wife as regent of Castile while he went to Aragon to meet its Cortes (the representative assembly), intending to travel on to Barcelona and thence to Italy; and when hostilities with France once again prevented his departure, he went to Valencia instead of returning to his wife’s side. Charles was therefore not present when Isabella gave birth to their second child, María, in June 1528. He returned a few weeks afterwards, but departed nine months later – once again leaving his pregnant wife to serve as regent. This time an advantageous peace with his enemies enabled Charles to sail across the Mediterranean to Italy. Although his new son, Ferdinand, died in infancy, the emperor did not return to see his wife and his surviving children again for four years.

‘Felipito’ therefore passed most of his infancy without a father. At age two he was weaned, and the following year he and his sister ‘spend their time competing to see who has more clothes’. An obsequious courtier informed Charles that his son ‘and his crossbow are such a threat to the deer that I fear that when Your Majesty returns [to Spain] you will have nothing left to kill’. Like all small children, the prince had his ups and downs. In 1531, when he ‘organized the children’ at court for a mock joust ‘using lighted candles as lances’, everyone laughed. They laughed again when Philip tried to persuade a courtier to accept one of his page boys ‘because he had lots of them’, and when the courtier refused

he offered ‘the page to his sister, who had none; and they replied that it was not so easy to find pages. To this he replied angrily “Then find another prince: you will find lots of them in the streets”’ (Philip’s first recorded dialogue). At other times, however, ‘His Highness becomes angry when he does not get to eat what he wants. He can be so tiresome’ that his mother ‘becomes really annoyed and sometimes smacks him’.⁶

At age four, Philip refused to travel with his mother in her carriage; instead ‘he wanted the Infanta [María] to travel in it with him, because he enjoys her company so much – which suggests that he will be quite a lady’s man’. The prince also refused to ride his mule side-saddle: ‘He would only ride if he had his feet in the stirrups’.⁷ On the feast of St James, 1531, for attending a ceremony in a convent at which three young women became nuns, the prince discarded the long robes then worn by infants of both sexes and appeared for the first time in the doublet and hose worn only by boys. Henceforth, although still accompanied everywhere by his mother, her ladies and his sister, the prince began to attend tournaments, festivals and other public activities. He had begun to move from the private to the public stage.

The empress’s decision to hold this rite of passage in a convent reflects not only her own devotion but also the pious zeal of the two other women who oversaw the young prince’s welfare: Doña Inés Manrique de Lara and Doña Leonor de Mascarenhas. The former, from an eminent Castilian family, had served Isabella the Catholic and then retired to a nunnery, where her exemplary piety earned her the reputation of a holy woman (*beata*). No doubt it was this that led the empress to summon Doña Inés to court to serve as her son’s governess (*aya*), responsible for his physical and moral welfare. Doña Leonor, who was much younger and had migrated from Portugal to Castile in the empress’s entourage, also lived as a *beata*. Although lacking the official title, she acted as informal governess to the prince. The religious zeal of these two women mirrored that of the empress: practical, ascetic and intense. Before Philip’s conception, Isabella ordered special masses to be said to ensure her fertility and made a vow to the church of Santa María la Antigua in Seville that she would give a silver statue of a child as an ex-voto for every child that she conceived (her testament stipulated that five silver statues should be made and delivered to the church). She gave birth surrounded by the

collection of relics she had brought with her from Portugal and clutching ‘St Elizabeth’s girdle’, which the mother of John the Baptist had reputedly held during her labour; afterwards she sent the garments that her son had worn before and after his baptism to be blessed by another *beata*, who sent back some of her own garments so that, according to a chronicler, ‘the prince should be swaddled in them and thus protected from attacks by the Devil’.⁸

Philip survived not only ‘attacks by the Devil’ but also the normal hazards of childhood. One day he strayed outside the railings on the edge of an upper floor of the palace, and such traumatic events, coupled with the death of the empress’s second son Fernando, profoundly affected Isabella. Henceforth, she panicked at the slightest illness in her surviving children, especially Philip, and her spirits sagged whenever Charles was away. According to a foreign ambassador, ‘her depression stems from the loss of the Infante, who enjoys God’s glory, and from the ailments of the prince, but above all from the absence of her husband’.⁹ Then, in spring 1533, news arrived that Charles would come to Barcelona, and Isabella set off with her two surviving children to meet him. Philip was by now tall enough and strong enough to ride a horse, but his intellectual development lagged: he still had not learned to read, and his principal exposure to written culture remained oral. He listened to *The song of El Cid* so often that he knew parts of it by heart: when one of his companions importuned him one day, Philip replied ‘You really annoy me, so-and-so; but tomorrow you will kiss my hand’, a rebuke clearly based on a passage from the medieval epic, in which King Alfonso tells El Cid

You really annoy me, Rodrigo; Rodrigo, you treat me badly,
But tomorrow you will swear allegiance, and then you will kiss my
hand.¹⁰

Back in Spain, the emperor decided that his son – now aged seven – needed a tutor, and in 1534 he appointed Juan Martínez del Guijo, normally known by the Latinized version of his surname, *Silíceo*, a 48-year-old priest of humble origins who had studied at Paris and published books on philosophy and mathematics before becoming a professor of philosophy at the university of Salamanca. For the next five years, under Silíceo’s direction, the prince struggled to learn from the *Short Grammar* by

Marineo Sículo (apparently the first book that he owned) and the devotional works of Ludolf of Saxony, known as ‘The Carthusian’.

In March 1535 Charles once more abandoned his son and left his wife pregnant: three months later, she gave birth to another daughter, Juana. Shortly afterwards Charles decided to remove the prince from ‘the control of women’ and created a separate household for him, headed by Don Juan de Zúñiga y Avellaneda, a ‘Philippist’ who had served him for almost thirty years. Significantly, Charles declared that he wanted his son to be raised in the same way as his uncle, Prince Juan of Trastámara, son and heir of Ferdinand and Isabella. The creation of a separate household in 1535 meant that henceforth Philip’s entourage would include only male servants (the emperor appointed about forty of them) and that Zúñiga (or his deputy) would sleep in his chamber at night and keep him under constant surveillance by day. ‘I am only absent’, Zúñiga assured Charles, ‘when I write to Your Majesty’ or when his charge was ‘at school, or somewhere with his mother that I am not allowed to enter’.¹¹ Philip’s world would never be the same.

Prince of Spain

Don Juan’s absence when the prince was ‘at school’ reflected the Castilian tradition that ‘a prince should have two people to instruct him in different matters: a tutor [*maestro*] to teach him letters and good manners, and a governor [*ayo*] to impart military and courtly exercises’.¹² Silíceo therefore had sole charge of teaching the prince and his principal pages how to read, write and pray; but progress was slow. By November 1535, Charles learned that ‘two months have passed without any reading or writing’ because the prince had been ill; while three months later Silíceo announced that he had again suspended the prince’s study of Latin for some days ‘because starting is so difficult’: small wonder that at age thirteen the prince ‘has only just started to write Latin’.¹³

By contrast, Philip showed precocious religious devotion. The stern and godly Zúñiga noted that ‘the fear of God comes so naturally to the prince that I have seen nothing like it in someone of his age’; but, he continued, the prince ‘learns much better after he leaves school’ – adding mischievously ‘and in this he somewhat resembles his father at the same age’. The frequent purchases of

crossbows, arrows and javelins by his household treasurer testify to Philip's growing ability to slaughter animals in the royal parks, and eventually Charles had to establish a weekly quota of each species that Philip was allowed to kill.¹⁴ To make up for this disappointment, the prince's valet received 'thirty ducats every month with which to buy things that please His Highness'. These included 'a silver knight with full armour, and a silver horse for the said knight'; 'a small bronze artillery piece, mounted on a carriage'; and 'six very small gilded artillery pieces'. These items were all supposed to develop the young prince's martial spirit. Other items were simply 'for His Highness to enjoy', such as 'a bell from America with a sweet sound'. Philip also owned a deck of cards with which he and Zúñiga's oldest son, Don Luis de Requesens, 'spent a whole day building a church made of cards'. He also liked caged birds, some of them deliberately blinded because sightless birds were thought to sing better, and one of the earliest surviving images of the young prince shows him playing with a bird controlled by a cord (see plate 2). He later acquired other pets, including a dog that slept in his bedroom, a monkey, six guinea pigs and a parakeet.¹⁵

Philip also learned how to behave appropriately in public. He danced with his sister and he marched in the processions that preceded bullfights and tournaments, and in 1535, for the first time, he appeared in public in armour at the opening ceremony for a joust. The emperor was seldom present at these events. He left Spain in March 1535 and only returned in January 1537; afterwards, as soon as the empress had conceived again, Charles left for Aragon and the empress gave birth alone to another boy, named Juan (after Charles's Trastámara uncle). He, too, died soon afterwards. This brought the emperor hurrying back to Spain – perhaps concerned that his wife was approaching the end of her fertility when he still only had one heir – and soon Isabella became pregnant for the fifth time. Once again, she miscarried. A painting in March 1539 shows the royal family, intently watching a tournament together, but their happiness would not last: the empress gave birth to another stillborn infant, fell ill and died on 1 May 1539, three weeks before Prince Philip's twelfth birthday (see plate 3).

Philip never forgot the years spent with his mother. When in 1570 the majordomo of his new wife, Anne of Austria, asked what

protocol her household should follow, the king answered curtly 'let everything be the same as in the time of my mother'; and when specific questions arose, he again referred to 'what I remember happened in the time of my mother'. Philip also remembered events and people from his early years. One day in 1594, at the age of 67, memories from those years overwhelmed him as he read a letter proposing candidates for the post of Inquisitor-General. When Cardinal Juan de Tavera got the post, Philip mused, 'he had been archbishop of Toledo since the year 1534, when don Alonso de Fonseca died. I also knew him, and saw him the night before he died: we had just arrived at Alcalá de Henares, and he died that night'. The king went on to recall his first meeting with the father of one of the candidates, 'which was early in the year 1533, with my lady the empress, who is in glory, when we went to Barcelona to await the arrival of the emperor'. He added: 'I turned six in Barcelona that year.'¹⁶

Father and son, 1539–43

Upon the death of his wife, the emperor retired to a monastery for seven weeks to grieve, and he ordered both his daughters to move to the town of Arévalo, where they could grow up away from the bustle of the court – and away from their brother. Philip therefore presided alone at the funeral obsequies for his mother, held in the church of San Juan de los Reyes in Toledo. It was his first appearance on the public stage as a solo actor.

When he emerged from his monastic retreat, Charles resolved to take personal charge of grooming his heir and to this end he significantly increased the size of Philip's household, appointing Zúñiga as its majordomo (while remaining the prince's governor); but almost at once, news arrived of a tax revolt in the Netherlands. This presented Charles and his advisers with an agonizing dilemma, because the taxpayers of Castile also seemed restless. In 1538 the nobles assembled in the Cortes of Castile refused to vote any more funds for the emperor's wars, and he dismissed them with angry reproaches. Leaving Spain therefore represented a major risk: everyone remembered that the last time Charles left without naming a regent of the blood royal, the Comuneros revolt almost cost him his throne. Now, without the empress, he lacked any adult relative who could govern Spain; but he dared not stay

because, according to his regent in the Netherlands, ‘what is at stake here is whether Your Majesty will be master or servant’.¹⁷

In November 1539 Charles departed for the Netherlands, leaving Philip as his nominal regent but with executive power invested in Cardinal Tavera, primate of Spain and Inquisitor-General, assisted by Francisco de Los Cobos, the de facto head of Castile’s administrative and financial bureaucracy, whom Charles appointed as Philip’s secretary. Just before he left Spain, Charles prepared two sets of Instructions. Those addressed to his ministers concentrated on their administrative duties and responsibilities (both towards the emperor and towards each other), while the document for Philip dealt with policy. The emperor composed it so that, in case ‘God may choose to call me’ before he had achieved his policy goals, ‘the said prince will know our intentions’ and follow the correct religious, dynastic and political strategies ‘so he can live and reign in peace and prosperity’. It was the first of many detailed papers of advice that would decisively shape the prince’s political outlook. Philip would follow the goals set out by his father for the rest of his life.¹⁸

After enjoining the prince to love God and defend His Church, the emperor urged him to place his trust above all in his relatives.

Create and continue a true, sincere and perfect friendship and understanding with the king of the Romans, our brother [Ferdinand], and with his children, our nieces and nephews; with the Queens of France [his sister Eleanor] and Hungary [his sister Mary]; with the king and queen of Portugal [his sister Catherine], and their children, and with the said king’s brother, as you are obliged to do through your family ties, and continue the friendship and understanding that exist between them and me.

Charles next considered how best to deal with three contentious issues: France, the Netherlands and Milan. He saw them as linked, because although he was currently at peace with the king of France, this would continue only if the parties agreed ‘to end and extinguish all quarrels and conflicts of interest’ concerning the Netherlands and Milan and sealed the deal with ‘marriage alliances’. The emperor revealed that he had promised King Francis that his second son would marry the Infanta María, with Milan as the dowry. In spite of this promise, however, both Charles and the empress had stipulated in their testaments that ‘if we

should have no other son than the prince, as has occurred', then María would marry a son of Charles's brother Ferdinand, and that together they would rule the Netherlands. This issue had become critically important with the 'unrest and rebellion' in the Low Countries. The emperor feared that 'the diversity of its inhabitants and the multitude of sects opposed to our holy faith and Church, established under the pretence of liberty and self-government, may cause not only their total loss and separation from our House, but also their alienation from our holy faith and Church'. He therefore proposed to renege on his previous undertakings to both Francis and Ferdinand, so that 'the prince our son shall inherit the Netherlands' – but, he warned Philip, since this outcome involved serious risks, he might after all decide to 'bequeath the said Netherlands to our daughter [María] and her future spouse, in order to avoid the said risks, to benefit Christendom and our son, and to assure the well-being, security and tranquillity of the kingdoms and other territories that he will inherit'.

The emperor's Instructions also laid out the policy Philip must follow towards three other states: Portugal, Savoy and England. The Infanta Juana must marry the heir to the Portuguese throne, Prince John; the French must evacuate Savoy, seized from Charles's brother-in-law the duke; and Philip must 'take great care not to agree carelessly to anything that might adversely affect our faith and Church' in England by allowing the Protestants to make gains. Moreover, family ties also obliged the prince 'to watch over' his cousin Mary Tudor 'and to assist and advance her cause as much as may conveniently be done'.

This remarkable document, laying bare secrets that Charles had revealed to no one else, testifies to great confidence in his heir; but since Philip was too young to implement any of its policies, we must wonder about the intended audience. Since the surviving Instructions to Tavera contain nothing about foreign policy, and since the document addressed to Philip contains nothing about keeping it secret (as the emperor's later Instructions would do), no doubt Charles intended his son to share it with Tavera, Cobos and Zúñiga. If Charles should die abroad, this triumvirate would guide all the prince's dealings.

Although these Instructions never took effect (because Charles survived), they identified several issues that would dominate Spanish foreign policy for the rest of the century: the paramount

need to maintain good relations with the Austrian branch of the family, and to intermarry with the Portuguese royal family; the possibility that either Milan or the Netherlands might need to be abandoned; the responsibility to restore Savoy to its duke; and the obligation to protect the Catholic faith, and the Catholic claimant to the throne, in England. In addition, the document exhibited three defects that would undermine Spanish foreign policy for a century: excessive secrecy, contempt for solemn promises and reluctance to surrender any territory. Charles's Instructions of 1539 thus highlighted in striking fashion both the strengths and the weaknesses of the possessions that his only son would inherit.

For the next two years, Zúñiga had sole control of Philip's upbringing, and his detailed reports to the emperor enable us to follow the prince's progress. To begin with, his religious life changed radically. After his mother's death, the prince turned his devotional attention increasingly to his namesake, St Philip, on whose feast day he became a knight of the Golden Fleece (1533) and recovered from smallpox (1536) – events which showed that the saint was 'looking out' for him. On that same day in 1539 his mother died, a coincidence that further reinforced Philip's devotion to his patron, because it suggested that the saint had intervened to escort his mother to heaven. Henceforth he would combine celebration of his saint's day with commemoration of his mother's death. In 1541, Philip took his first communion, and Zúñiga proudly assured the emperor that 'Your Majesty should thank Our Lord that he has a Christian son, who is also virtuous and intelligent.' As an example of the former, Zúñiga noted that of the thirty ducats that Philip received each month 'to buy things that please him' he gave 'fifteen to God'.¹⁹

The prince also excelled at outdoor exercises. In 1541 he began to go hawking, and Zúñiga reported that 'although he greatly enjoys shooting his crossbow, when he cannot do that he enjoys hawking – and indeed any outdoors activity'. Philip also learned how to fight. His household treasurer bought 'two fencing swords' and 'four lances so that His Highness could run at the ring', and by 1543 Zúñiga declared that 'His Highness is the best swordsman in this court', adding a little later 'he fights very well on foot and on horseback'.²⁰

Zúñiga remained less enthusiastic about the prince's studies. In June 1541 he noted that 'for the past two months, I have been


more optimistic than I used to be that he will like Latin, which pleases me very much because I believe being a good Latinist is an important part of being a good ruler, for knowing how to govern oneself and others', – but that precise modifier 'two months' was not accidental.²¹ At Zúñiga's suggestion, earlier that year Charles removed Silíceo as his son's tutor and appointed the Aragonese humanist Juan Cristóbal Calvete de Estrella, 'a very learned man' who was 'of pure blood' (that is, without any Jewish or Moorish ancestors), 'as master of grammar to teach all the present and future pages of the prince'. The new instructor immediately exposed his young charges to the best scholarship available.²²

Although Silíceo despised humanism, he had not entirely shielded Philip from its influence. For example in January 1540, during a visit to Alcalá de Henares to hunt, Cardinal Tavera decreed that the prince should visit the Complutense University and for three hours Philip toured the classrooms, listening to lecturers in Latin, and sitting in the audience while a bachelor of theology graduated. But full exposure to the new learning began only when Calvete took over, soon assisted by three other instructors: Honorato Juan to teach him mathematics and architecture; Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda to teach him history and geography; and Francisco de Vargas Mexía to teach him theology. All four preceptors had travelled extensively outside Spain and boasted a cosmopolitan outlook that would broaden the prince's horizons.

From the first, Calvete implemented a clear pedagogical vision. In 1541, he purchased 140 books, and had them specially bound for the prince, more than doubling the size of his library. Almost all these works were written in Latin, either by classical authors (such as Caesar, Cicero, Plautus, Seneca, Terence, Vergil) or by modern humanists including Erasmus (*Adages* and *Enchiridion*), Juan Luis Vives (*Of the soul and life*) and – surprisingly – Philip Melanchthon, Luther's principal lieutenant (*On the art of speaking*). Moreover, although works in Latin predominated, Philip became the first Spanish monarch to read Greek (he could eventually manage works by Homer in the original) and he also learned some Hebrew and Aramaic so that he could study the Bible in its original languages. He acquired an Arabic grammar and 'a book about the Qu'ran that His Highness ordered to be bought'.²³ Philip acquired the last item during a visit to Valencia in 1542, perhaps

because Honorato Juan (a Valencian) thought it might help his pupil to understand his future Morisco subjects. The visit formed part of a Grand Tour during which the emperor took his heir to Navarre, Aragon and Catalonia as well as Valencia, to be recognized as 'heir apparent', and en route Calvete, Juan and Sepúlveda – all of whom accompanied Philip – seized every opportunity to provide instruction about the different languages, cultures and histories of his new vassals. Finally, when news arrived that the French had laid siege to Perpignan, the second city of Catalonia, Sepúlveda led a debate among courtiers on the best way to save it – Philip's first exposure to military strategy.

When the court returned to Castile, Calvete purchased more books in Latin to support his ambitious pedagogic strategy. Works of history – written by classical and medieval authors as well as modern humanists – constituted the largest single category (25 per cent of all books purchased between 1535 and 1545), closely followed by theology (15 per cent of the total), but most disciplines were represented. As he and his pupil finished each volume, Calvete seems to have added a 'hashtag' (#) before moving on, and by the time his formal education ceased in 1545, Philip had studied several hundred books on a wide variety of topics. Calvete also exposed the prince to learning in other ways. Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas, who had lived in America for decades, presented him with a dedicated manuscript copy of his *Very brief account of the destruction of America*; and during a visit to Salamanca in 1543, aged sixteen, he spent his first afternoon 'inspecting the classrooms and hearing some lectures' by a university professor. The following day 'His Highness listened to all the other professors and attended an oral examination in Law ... He left very late.'²⁴



3. Books acquired by Philip, 1535–47. Prince Philip's household treasurer recorded the title and date of purchase of every book acquired by or for his master, and the pace of purchases reveal the immediate impact of the advent of Juan Cristóbal Calvete de Estrella as the prince's principal tutor late in 1540.

Calvete's pedagogic plan nevertheless left considerable gaps. The prince's library boasted few books on either law or warfare, and even fewer in any modern language except Spanish. Moreover, Philip received no formal instruction in French, Italian or any of the other languages spoken by his subjects, an important lacuna that reflected a deliberate choice: since Latin was a universal language, Zúñiga believed, 'it is useful to know one language well and thus avoid having to learn them all'. The emperor agreed: 'See how many territories you must rule, and how many components there are, and how distant they are from one another, speaking so many languages,' he reminded his son in 1543. Therefore,

You must understand them and be understood by them, and to that end nothing could be more necessary or universal than the Latin language.

That is why I strongly encourage you to work to learn it so that later on you are not afraid to speak it fluently. It would do you no harm to know some French too, but I would not want you to abandon one in order to study the other.²⁵

As a result, Philip never entirely mastered French. He rarely spoke it, and when in 1576 the French ambassador read out a letter from his king, Philip later confessed to a minister ‘to tell the truth, I understood little of it’ because ‘I do not understand French well’.²⁶ Conversely, Philip’s broad and deep exposure to humanist learning explains not only his facility with Latin but also his forceful style when writing Spanish, as well as his self-confidence (not to say arrogance) when discussing almost every aspect of intellectual endeavour: architecture with architects, geography and history with ministers and academics, and even theology with popes.

The adolescent prince took part in more complex recreations than before. His household accounts record the purchase of chess sets, playing cards and ‘gloves to play *pelota* [an early form of tennis]’. He also enjoyed the humour of fools and jesters: between 1537 and 1540, the prince’s treasurer made several payments to ‘Jerónimo the Turk’, the prince’s first jester, and in 1542 he bought two candles ‘to replace the two in His Highness’s chamber that Perico the Fool broke in pieces’.²⁷ Philip also enjoyed music. His chapel included a choir consisting of two trebles, two countertenors, two tenors, four counter-basses and two organists; and in 1540 he had the organs in his chapel repaired and always took them with him on his travels. The compositions and performances of Antonio Cabezón delighted the prince so much that he took the blind organist with him to northern Europe in 1548–51. He also employed the composer Luis de Narváez, who taught him and his sisters to play the vihuela.²⁸ Philip’s household included a dancing master, who taught all the royal children, and a painter who instructed the prince as he filled ‘a book of large sheets which His Highness requested for his paintings’. Some early paintings have survived in the margins of one of Philip’s own books, probably done in 1540–1 – the same time that he acquired his ‘book of large sheets’ (see plate 4).²⁹ Thanks to these various activities, the cost of the prince’s household almost doubled between 1540 and 1543, by which time it numbered some 240 persons, and it required 27 mules and six carts to transport his possessions whenever Philip moved between the royal residences

in Madrid, Toledo, Aranjuez, Segovia and Valladolid.

Everywhere Philip went, he was now preceded by his personal standard, a mark of the elevated status that distinguished him from others at court, and he sported his own coat of arms and his own seal (prominently displayed on the rich leather bindings of his books). He had his own motto: *Nec spe nec metu* ('With neither hope nor fear'). In March 1541, he donned armour for the first time and 'ran at the ring' at the head of a team of five knights 'wearing a mask, and although many others competed, he won the prize outright'. Five months later, Zúñiga reported, 'His Highness is doing very well, and with great desire (if he receives permission) to serve with his father' on the emperor's amphibious expedition against Algiers ('permission' that Charles denied).³⁰ Three months later, the emperor announced that his son would marry Princess María Manuela of Portugal, the daughter of Charles's sister and Isabella's brother, and so Philip's first cousin on both sides of the family.

The prince had been thinking about procreation since he was a boy of eight: when Doña Estefania de Requesens, the wife of his governor, gave birth to a daughter, Philip told her that he wanted all her daughters 'to become ladies-in-waiting to his wife'.³¹ After the death of the empress, Charles began to spend more time with his son, instructing him in the art of government both as they toured the crown of Aragon and after their return to Madrid. The emperor no doubt intended to make these lessons a regular fixture, but when Francis I declared war on him again in 1543 Charles left Spain to take personal charge of operations. This time, unlike in 1539, he overrode the laws of the kingdom (which forbade anyone under the age of 20 to rule):

By virtue of our own certain knowledge, will, and absolute royal authority, which in this matter we wish to use and do use as king and sovereign lord, not recognizing any temporal superior, we choose and select, constitute and nominate Prince Philip to be our lieutenant general and governor of our kingdoms and lordships [of Spain].³²

The threshold of power

Because he would not be able to provide any more lessons in person, just before he left Spain Charles wrote three sets of Instructions to assist his son to discharge his arduous new

responsibilities. A 'General Instruction', dated 1 May 1543, listed Philip's powers and duties as governor of Castile. It required him to perform some of his devotions in public; to 'take his meals in public; to reserve some hours of the day to hear those who come to speak to him; and to receive the petitions and memorials that they give him'. It also stipulated that the prince must only take decisions with the approval of a triumvirate composed of Tavera, Cobos and Fernando de Valdés, president of the council of Castile. That same day, the emperor signed another document entitled 'Restrictions on the powers of the prince', which listed numerous matters which Philip could *not* decide, despite the apparently full powers conceded in the General Instruction. Most of them related to the royal patronage – 'you must not issue certificates legitimizing the children of clerics'; 'I reserve for myself matters arising from ecclesiastical vacancies' – but some were broader: 'Do not promise rewards, because I do not do so'; 'Do not grant anyone jurisdiction over native Americans without my express permission'.³³

On 4 May Charles prepared more personal Instructions for his son, writing out in his own hand 'what I know and understand about how you must comport yourself in governing these kingdoms'. The emperor began by noting that 'although you are very young for such a demanding position, there have nevertheless been people no older than you whose courage, virtue and good judgment were such that their deeds surpassed their scant years and experience'. He continued:

Above all else you must be resolute in two things. First and most important: always keep your eyes on God, and submit to Him all the tasks and concerns that face you, and sacrifice yourself. Be very ready to do this. Second: believe and accept all good advice. These two resolutions will enable you to overcome your lack of maturity and experience, and you will undertake things in such a way that you will soon be capable and experienced enough to govern well and wisely.

Charles then provided a series of specific injunctions. 'Never order justice to be done if you feel anger or partiality, especially in criminal matters.' 'Avoid being angry and never do anything in anger.' 'Be very careful not to promise anything, either orally or in writing, or to raise expectations for the future.' 'Grant audiences when required, and be affable in your answers and patient when

listening; and appoint fixed hours during which people can see and talk to you.’³⁴

The emperor next turned to personal matters, and his tone became sharper. ‘You need to change your way of life and your relations with other people,’ he bluntly stated. ‘As I told you in Madrid’ (an allusion to earlier intimate conversations between father and son),

you should not think that your studies will prolong your childhood. Instead, they will make you grow in honour and reputation so that, despite your youth, you will be taken for a man. Becoming a man early is not a matter of thinking or desiring it, or of being fully grown, but solely of having the judgment and knowledge necessary to act as a man, and as a wise, sane, good and honourable man. For this to happen, everyone needs education, good examples and discourses.

‘Until now,’ the emperor continued relentlessly,

your only companions have been children and your pleasures have been those enjoyed in their company. From now on, you must only keep these people around you in order to tell them how they are to serve you. Your principal company must be that of older and mature men who have virtues, good conversation and deportment; and let the recreation you take be with such people and in moderation, because God created you to rule and not to relax.

In particular, Charles chided his son for ‘spending so much time with jesters’ and ordered him to ‘pay less attention to Fools’ (a counsel that Philip either could not or would not obey).

Finally, the emperor turned to the subject of sex. ‘You will soon be married’ and, Charles warned,

Inasmuch as you are of young and tender age and I have no other son, and I do not wish to have others, it is very important that you restrain your desires and do not make excessive efforts at this early stage, which could lead to physical damage, because apart from the fact that it can be dangerous both for the body’s growth and for its strength, it can often lead to such weakness that it interferes with conceiving children and even causes death, as it did with Prince Juan [of Trastámara], which was how I came to inherit these kingdoms.

The emperor shared the common (but erroneous) belief that the heir of Ferdinand and Isabella, who in all other respects should

serve as Philip's role model, had died as a result of immoderate sexual activity with his young wife; and he had no intention of letting Philip follow suit. Charles had evidently established that his son was still a virgin and also extracted a promise from him to remain that way: 'I am certain that you have told me the truth about the past, and that you have kept your word to me [to be celibate] until you are married'. Now he demanded that the prince show equal moderation after his marriage.

You must be very restrained when you are in your wife's company, and since that is somewhat difficult, the solution is to keep you away from her as much as possible; and so I require and request that once you have consummated the marriage, you plead some illness and keep away from her and do not visit her again so quickly or so often. And when you do return, let it be for only a short while.

Charles backed up this remarkable demand by instructing his ministers to compel the young couple's compliance.

In order to make certain there are no shortcomings in this matter, although from now on you no longer need a tutor, in this matter alone I want Don Juan [de Zúñiga] to continue [in this capacity.] According to what I told you in his presence, in this matter you must do only what he tells you. By these instructions, even though it may anger you, I order him not to refrain from saying and doing all he can to see that you comply.

To make absolutely sure that his son would obey, Charles also ordered the duke of Gandía (the future St Francis Borgia) to keep his son's future wife 'away from you except for the times when your life and health can stand it'. It is hard to imagine a situation more likely to create a serious complex about sex in a fifteen-year-old boy.

On 12 November 1543, dressed 'entirely in white, so that he looked like a dove', Philip met his bride-to-be and for some hours they danced and dined; afterwards they rested until 4 a.m. when Tavera married them; and only then did they retire to the princess's chamber. But not for long: 'after being together for two and a half hours Don Juan de Zúñiga entered the room and hauled the prince off to another bed in his own chamber'. Moreover, after less than a week of carefully rationed time together, the couple travelled to their separate beds in Valladolid where, 'after a few

days of sleeping apart, His Highness developed a most painful rash'. Zúñiga oscillated between relief that this meant 'he will not be sleeping with his wife' and concern that 'the rash continues, and it is something he has never had in his life'. After his rash abated, Philip showed coolness – some said aversion – towards his bride: 'When they are together, His Highness makes it seem as if he is there against his will, and as soon as she sits down, he gets up again and leaves'.³⁵ Both Charles and Zúñiga reproached the prince about this: it never seems to have occurred to them that the humiliating regime they had imposed made María Manuela seem like a lethal weapon to her young husband.

Charles increased his son's embarrassment even further by the way he communicated his 4 May instructions: 'Don Juan de Zúñiga will present this document to you. Read it in his presence so that he can remind you of its contents whenever he deems it necessary.' The emperor also suggested that his son might show the document to Silíceo, whose judgement and experience he extolled. It seems unlikely that Charles insisted on this procedure simply to humiliate his son (although that would have been the inevitable outcome); rather it was meant to deceive the two ministers named into thinking that he had opened his heart to them, as well as to Philip. In fact Charles had much more information to impart, and on 6 May he signed a further holograph letter to his son: 'I am writing and sending you this secret document which will be for you alone. You must therefore keep it secret, under lock and key where neither your wife nor any other living person can see it'. It was the most remarkable piece of political advice ever committed to paper by an early modern ruler.

This time Charles began with an apology: 'I am so sorry to have placed the kingdoms and dominions that I will bequeath to you in such extreme need'. Worse, if he died, 'my finances will be in such a state that you will encounter many problems because you will see how small and encumbered my revenues are just now'. Nevertheless, the emperor added defiantly, 'Bear in mind that what I have done has been necessary to safeguard my honour, because without that I would be less able to sustain myself, and I would have less to leave you.' Philip's first secret lesson from his father was that 'honour and reputation' were far more important than money: if he should lose his life in their defence, Charles declared grandiloquently, 'I will have the satisfaction of having lost it while

doing my duty and helping you'. Next, the emperor shared the military strategy he intended to follow against France and its allies, and where he planned to find the troops and treasure to put it into effect – once again so that his son would know what to do 'if I should either be taken prisoner or detained on this journey'.³⁶

Charles recognized that political affairs 'are so confused and uncertain that I do not know how to express them', because 'they are full of confusion and contradictions, either because of the state of affairs or because of conscience'. Therefore, in all matters of policy, Philip should 'always hold on to what is most certain, which is God'. Next came a most remarkable passage, preceded by another injunction that it 'must be for you alone and you must keep it very secret': a searing analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each of the ministers on whose opinions the prince would have to rely 'if God should call me to Him during this journey'.

The emperor again referred his son to 'what I told you in Madrid' about 'the animosities, alliances and almost cabals that were forming or had already been formed among my ministers' – but now he provided more detail because although each of his senior ministers 'is the leader of a faction, I still want them to work together so that you will not fall into the hands of any one of them'. Therefore, Charles insisted, 'do not place yourself, now or ever, in the hands of any individual. Always discuss your affairs with many, and do not become tied or obliged to any of them, because while it will save you time it is not in your interest.' He then reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of each councillor in turn, starting with Don Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, duke of Alba. Although the emperor considered Alba 'the best we currently have in these kingdoms' when it came to military and diplomatic matters, he had deliberately excluded him from the prince's committee of advisers:

It is best not to involve grandees in the government of the kingdom, and so I did not want to include the duke, which has left him not a little aggrieved. Ever since I have known him, I have found that he has great aspirations and seeks to become as powerful as possible, even though at first he came on the scene genuflecting, all humble and modest; so just think how he will behave around you, my son, because you are younger. You must avoid involving him or other grandees in the inner circles of government because they will try to take advantage of you by

any means they can, and that will cost you a great deal later on.

Philip followed this advice throughout his reign: he never admitted Alba or any other grandee to 'the inner circles of government'.

The emperor next evaluated the other ministers to whose care he had entrusted the prince. Cobos 'does not work as hard as he used to do', Charles complained, but nevertheless, 'he has experience of all my affairs and is very knowledgeable about them' so that 'you would do well to deal with him as I do, never alone and not giving him more authority than is contained in his Instructions'. The emperor devoted several pages to Cobos, including some detailed suggestions on how to 'manage' him – how to reward him yet still keep him hungry for more – before turning to Zúñiga. Although he 'may seem somewhat harsh to you', Charles advised his son, 'do not hold it against him'.

You must realize that since all the people who have surrounded you in the past and who currently surround you are indulgent and want to please you, this may make Don Juan seem harsh; but if he had been like the others, everything would always have been the way you wanted, and that is not good for anyone, not even older people, let alone youths without the knowledge or self-control that come with age and experience.

And yet, the emperor continued, no one was perfect. 'I have two concerns about Don Juan. One is that he is somewhat biased, mainly against Cobos but also against the duke of Alba ... His other fault is this: he is somewhat greedy.' Nevertheless, the emperor concluded, 'you will not find anyone who can advise you better, and more to my liking than these two': Cobos and Zúñiga.

Charles was far more critical of the other ministers who would advise his son. For example, contradicting what he had written two days before, he now had little good to say about Silíceo: 'We all know him to be a good man; but he was certainly not – nor is he now – the most suitable person for your education, because he has been too anxious to please you.' Now, he is 'your confessor, and it would not be good if he wanted to indulge you in matters of conscience as he has done in your education. So far there have been no problems,' Charles continued, 'but from now on there could be some very considerable ones.' The emperor therefore

recommended that his son 'should appoint a good friar to be your confessor'.

Charles's holograph instructions – so direct, so personal, so perceptive – made a tremendous impression on his son. 'I remember a lesson that His Majesty [Charles] taught me very many years ago,' he explained to a councillor in 1559, when he refused to promise future promotion to a supplicant, 'and things have gone well for me when I followed it and very badly when I did not' – a clear reference to Charles's advice sixteen years before: 'Be very careful not to promise anything, either orally or in writing, or to raise expectations for the future.' In 1560, when interrogated by the Inquisition, he explicitly cited 'the instructions that my lord the emperor, who is in glory, gave me when he left these realms in 1543, in which (among other things) he ordered me to make sure that prelates resided in their dioceses'. Again, in 1574, when Philip thought he might leave Spain and leave his wife as regent, one of his ministers suggested basing his Instructions for her on those Philip had drawn up when he had left for England twenty years before; but the king preferred 'those from the time when I began to govern, in the year 1543' because 'the papers of advice that the emperor gave me then, written in his own hand' contained so much useful information.³⁷

'His Highness received the Instructions that Your Majesty sent him,' Zúñiga reported to the emperor in June 1543, 'and has begun to follow them with great care and diligence in everything he needs to do'; while Tavera assured his master that 'the prince has begun to exercise the powers that Your Majesty sent him, and in what we have seen so far he shows far more care and expertise in public affairs than one would expect of someone his age'. Although Charles had intended his son to sign in his own name only 'the orders and warrants that concern his own household', Zúñiga discovered 'that Prince Juan [of Trastámara], when he dealt with his estates and when he signed other documents, wrote *Yo, el príncipe* ["I the prince"]', and he showed Cobos 'many documents signed by Prince Juan' to demonstrate 'that this was the normal style of the princes of Castile'. Without waiting for imperial approval, the two ministers resolved that Philip 'should henceforth do the same'.³⁸ 'Felipito' had come of age.

A Renaissance prince, 1543–1551

Governor of Spain

A his absent father filled with commands and supplications. Thus in October 1543, at the end of a letter pleading for money to sustain his war with France, Charles added a postscript in his own hand that came close to blackmail: ‘My son: I’m sure that when you see what I have written here, and see how much it affects me, you will do everything that a loyal son is obliged to do so as not to abandon your father in this situation ... You must not fail to send me the soldiers and money that I have requested.’ Barely two weeks later the emperor picked up his quill again to maintain the pressure: ‘My son,’ he crooned after another long plea for soldiers and money from Spain, ‘once again I beg you to show me what a loyal son you are.’¹

No doubt encouraged by his Spanish advisers, who worried that too much fiscal pressure might provoke unrest, Philip deployed the defence used by servants of Habsburg monarchs everywhere: ‘I obey but I do not execute [*Obedezco pero no cumpló*]’. First the prince procrastinated, sometimes letting several weeks pass before answering his father, ‘because it was necessary to consult the councils and other advisers’ appointed by his father ‘in my presence’ where they debated the best response; and when he eventually addressed the emperor’s request of October 1543

(quoted above) after four months' delay, for the first time he defied his father:

I beg Your Majesty as earnestly as I can to take what I say in the same spirit as I write it. I do not seek to circumscribe Your Majesty's ambitious plans, which are the fruit of your Imperial valour, but to remind you of the current state of affairs, the misery in which Christendom finds itself, the exhaustion of your kingdoms, the harm that follows from major wars (however justified they may be), and the danger in which we find ourselves, with enemy fleets at hand and few resources with which to resist them.

The only realistic strategy in the current situation, 'if Your Majesty wishes to avoid an irreparable disaster', Philip boldly concluded, was to make peace on all fronts.²

By the time this defiant letter arrived, Charles had already put his 'ambitious plans' into action and invaded France, and within a few months he succeeded beyond his wildest dreams: by September 1544 his army had advanced to within fifty miles of Paris, forcing Francis I to make a hasty peace. The emperor was generous in his moment of triumph: to secure a lasting settlement he offered to cede to his adversary one of the territories that caused contention between them. He promised the French king that his younger son, the duke of Orléans, could marry either Ferdinand's daughter, with Milan as her dowry, or Philip's sister María, with the Netherlands as her dowry; and asked his son to discuss these alternatives with both María and his Spanish advisers.

The prince was well placed to conduct both sets of negotiations. Cobos had recently praised the prince's administrative and diplomatic skills in a letter to the emperor. 'His knowledge and capacity have improved,' he observed, so that Philip achieves what to others might

seem impossible, thanks to his great understanding and exalted comprehension. His pastimes are a complete and constant dedication to work and the important affairs of your kingdoms. He is always contemplating and discussing matters of good government and justice, without leaving room for favouritism, or idleness, or flattery, or any vice. His normal dealings and conversations are always on such subjects, with mature advisers.

Nor, Cobos continued, did Philip allow his 'mature advisers' to dominate him. For example, at a council meeting, he had 'asked the duke of Alba something about the war with France and the duke, with his habitual impetuosity, replied that as long as he and the emperor were alive, they would soon take care of France'. At this (no doubt recalling his father's advice never to let the duke gain the upper hand), Philip 'very quietly, but with all his majesty, said to Alba "Apart from the emperor, I take second place to no one. In my opinion, anyone who does not understand that, and boasts in my presence, either does not know me or is trying to displease me."' And with that His Highness turned his back.'³ The duke spoke no more.

As soon as he received his father's charge to discuss the alternative of sacrificing either Milan or the Netherlands, Philip made himself the sole conduit between Charles and his sister because, he noted smugly, 'she will confide in no one more than she does in me', and he spent the next two weeks alone conversing with her. Afterwards he convened the council of State, where he adopted a 'divide and rule' procedure that would form a hallmark of his subsequent administrative style: 'I ordered that everyone should give his own opinion' in the meeting.⁴ Five ministers (including Zúñiga) favoured retaining the Netherlands for a combination of economic, strategic and above all dynastic reasons: the Netherlands formed part of Charles's patrimony (whereas the duchy of Milan had been acquired only recently), and therefore Charles must not surrender them. Instead, the duke of Orléans should marry Ferdinand's daughter and rule Milan. Five other ministers (including Alba and Cobos) argued the opposite: 'The duchy is essential not only for the defence and preservation of Naples and Sicily, but also for the security and tranquillity of these kingdoms, and to leave the way clear for Your Majesty to travel to Germany and the Netherlands, and to raise and send troops and other resources from Spain and Germany' to defend any other part of the Monarchy in case of attack. These ministers saw Milan as the hub and heart of the empire, and they convinced the prince, who urged his father to sacrifice the Netherlands and allow Orléans to marry his sister. In the event, Charles rejected his son's advice and instead declared that Orléans would marry Ferdinand's daughter and acquire Milan: only the duke's death a few months later allowed him to avoid this concession, thereby perpetuating

the strategic overstretch inherent in his empire.⁵

Although overruled on this issue, Philip soon established his independence in lesser matters. Scarcely three months after the emperor left Spain in 1543, his tutor reported that the prince ‘understands everything he reads in Latin, although his studies go more slowly both because of the administrative tasks Your Majesty has entrusted to him and because he devotes a lot of time to weapons drill and horsemanship’. Perhaps the early end of his formal education explains Philip’s immature handwriting: even his earliest letters are written in a regular but ill-formed script (see plate 5).⁶ Philip’s weapons drill and horsemanship also brought their share of disappointments. In spring 1544 the prince and a group of companions went to an island in the river Pisuerga near Valladolid to take part in a tournament based upon an episode from the popular chivalric novel *Amadis of Gaul*; but the boat carrying one of the teams sank under the weight of all the armoured warriors. Although the boat was refloated and the bedraggled warriors set forth for the island tryst once more, it sank once again and the tournament had to be abandoned. Two years later, in another attempt to replay the adventures of Amadis on an island near Guadalajara, Philip injured both his legs in combat and for a time had to walk with a cane. In the words of one of his jousting companions, ‘Where posture in the saddle is concerned, no man ever outclassed my master King Philip’ – but, he added waspishly, ‘he never used to break many lances’.⁷

Despite the time spent in administration and chivalric deeds, Philip became a voracious reader. His household treasurer had to purchase extra candles expressly for ‘His Highness’s quarters, on the days when he studied there intensely’ and for ‘the nights when he studied intensely in his chamber’.⁸ The fact that the treasurer repeated ‘intensely [*apretadamente*]’ to justify the heavy expenditure on candles testifies to the prince’s uncommon zeal in reading. Thanks to some eclectic purchases – such as the political and military treatises of Machiavelli (all of which would later bear the inscription ‘prohibited by the Index’) and the works of distinguished European humanists such as Pico de la Mirandola (on the immortality of the soul), Marsilio Ficino (on faith) and Johannes Reuchlin (on Cabalism) – and to presentation copies of books dedicated to him, the prince’s library grew to over 800 volumes in 1548 and it included works written and published all

over western Europe.

Youthful defiance

Although such praise of the prince's precocious erudition pleased his father, in one of his letters to Zúñiga in 1544, Charles noted warily that 'You do not tell me anything about what else my son is doing. If that is because there is nothing to say, I would be delighted; but if it is because you fear it would bore me, please do not hesitate to tell me about any matter that I should know about, and how I should correct it.'⁹ This invitation seems to have provoked an avalanche of complaints, because two months later Charles sent Zúñiga a comprehensive reply that reviewed 'the little things that have started in my absence'. The emperor wisely decided to overlook some of these 'little things'. Thus although 'it would be better if he did not return so late when he goes hunting', or neglect his studies,

Seeing that he is now married, and busy with affairs of state, and past the age where it might be worth urging him to do more than he wishes to do of his own free will, it seems to me that he should be allowed to do what he wants, and not nag him so much that he becomes irritated with everything.

The emperor nevertheless decided to nag his son about four 'little things': 'the disorderly manner and the time wasted in getting up and going to bed, and in getting dressed and undressed'; 'the lack of attention he shows in devotions and confessions'; 'the coolness he shows to his wife in public'; and above all 'what happened at the house of Perejón', the prince's jester, 'and going out late at night'. Charles ordered that 'if this gets worse', Zúñiga must immediately report it.¹⁰

In his brilliant study of Philip's early years, José Luis Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero plausibly suggested that the 'little things' that preoccupied Charles and Zúñiga formed part of a 'youthful defiance' by the prince against their intrusive and humiliating attempts at control. For example, Castilian law clearly stated that marriage brought with it independence from paternal authority, and yet Charles compelled his son to live apart not only from his wife but also from his beloved sisters. The effects were the exact opposite of what the emperor intended, because the prince

apparently began an affair at precisely this time with Isabel Osorio, a lady-in-waiting first of his mother and then of his sisters.¹¹

The entry for the year 1589 in the chronicle of the king's reign compiled by the well-informed courtier Luis Cabrera de Córdoba stated: 'This year Doña Isabel de Osorio, who claimed to be the wife of King Philip II, died'. Some years later a political treatise composed by another well-informed courtier praised Ruy Gómez de Silva, Philip's most trusted adviser, for 'his great efforts to free the king from the love of Doña Isabel Osorio' and bringing the affair to an end.¹² Philip certainly showed Doña Isabel remarkable favour (especially given that her ancestors included a rabbi and a leading Comunero). In the early years of his reign he signed several warrants granting her money and jewels, and at her death Doña Isabel boasted possessions worth 60,000 ducats. Above all, Philip sold her at a low price some royal villages near Burgos (her home town), which she turned into a landed estate – Saldañuela – where she built a fine palace known locally (surely not by accident) as 'The whore's house [*la casa de la puta*]'. Carvings in every external window frame show an unmistakable likeness of Philip gazing at Isabel. The surviving evidence thus suggests an affair with the prince, probably beginning in 1545 and lasting at least until he left Spain in 1548.

Despite all this, and despite Charles's complaint about his son's 'coolness' towards his wife, in July 1545 Maria Manuela gave birth to a son, named 'Carlos' in honour of his grandfather. Four days later, she died. Her death left Philip devastated, and he retired to a monastery to mourn. He did not write to his father for a month 'because the anguish and regret caused by such a great loss did not allow me to do so'. He only returned to public life, he told Charles, 'to avoid abandoning the affairs of these kingdoms that Your Majesty entrusted to me'; and even then 'although I returned to the palace I have kept myself to myself, although always attending to all pending business'. There is no reason to doubt the depth of Philip's 'anguish and regret': his wife was just seventeen and she died bearing his child – the direct consequence of the sexual intimacy that his father had urged him to moderate. His only consolation was that 'I find the Infante [Don Carlos] well, and I understand he is improving every day'.¹³

Philip, too, found his situation 'improving every day', as the

‘older and mature men’ whom his father had appointed to guide him disappeared. Tavera, the senior councillor, died in August 1546, followed ten months later by Zúñiga, his most ‘faithful councillor’ and moderator of his sex life. Alba left to join the emperor in Germany, while illness forced Cobos to retire to his estates, where he died. In June 1546 Charles formally recognized the inevitable: as a prelude to investing Philip as duke of Milan, an Imperial fief, he signed a declaration that henceforth the new duke ‘would be emancipated and free from our paternal control’.¹⁴

The prince lost no time in exploiting his ‘emancipation’. His letters to Charles became more outspoken. Thus in December 1546 he informed his father that all revenues from Castile for the next four years had been anticipated and spent, so that ‘we have reached the end of the line. We do not know from where nor how to find ways and means of finding money. The problem has immersed us all in a far greater anxiety than you can imagine.’¹⁵ Philip also now created his own administrative cadres, seeking to fill vacant positions by promoting men whom he knew personally even though this created tensions in the central government between those whose first loyalty was to the emperor and those who owed everything to him. The prince also took an important institutional initiative: he created an archive for the crown of Castile in the castle of Simancas, a royal fortress close to Valladolid, and also ordered the transfer there of all books belonging to his royal ancestors, apparently with the intention of creating there a royal library. His ‘youthful defiance’ was over.

A blueprint for empire

In 1547, Philip returned to Aragon where for six months he presided over the Cortes General of Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon. Since each assembly met separately, the prince had to pass from one building to another in order to hear the grievances, and to request taxes, from each. It took him until Christmas and, according to a member of his entourage, ‘I saw His Highness spend whole nights without sleep until he had concluded all items of business.’¹⁶ No sooner had the Cortes ended than the emperor decided that both his older children, Philip and María, should leave Spain and join him in Germany and he dictated a long document – subsequently known as his Political Testament – that

contained his thoughts on the states and rulers Philip would meet on his travels, and on their place in the Habsburg world. It offered the prince a veritable blueprint for empire and, as with the Instructions he had received five years before, for the rest of his life Philip strove to attain the goals laid out by his father.

The emperor began, as he had done in his papers of advice in 1539 and 1543, by urging the prince to 'submit all your desires and actions to the will of God' and to make the defence of the Catholic faith his primary responsibility. He then regretted the cost of 'the wars that I have been forced to fight so many times and in so many places' to defend the empire – even though, he noted with a trace of smugness, 'with God's help (for which let Him be thanked) I have conserved, defended and added others of great quality and importance'. The primary need, therefore, was to assure them a period of peace in which to recover. However,

avoiding war and keeping it at bay is not always in the power of those who want it ... especially of those who rule realms as great and as numerous and as far-flung as God, in His goodness, has given me and which, if He pleases, I shall leave to you. Rather this depends on the good or ill will of neighbours and other states.

So Philip must be ready to fight, if necessary, to preserve what was his.

Charles therefore proceeded to survey the prevailing international situation, and especially the challenges that his son could expect to encounter. 'Common sense and experience,' he began,

show that unless you watch and take the trouble to understand the actions of other states and rulers, and maintain friends and informants in all areas, it will be difficult if not impossible to live in peace, or to avoid, oppose, and remedy anything that is attempted against you and your possessions ... especially since (as I have already noted) they are separated one from another, and the object of envy.

Therefore, 'your first and most secure friendship and trust' must be with Ferdinand, Charles's brother and designated successor as Holy Roman Emperor. On the one hand, his uncle Ferdinand would be a valuable councillor; on the other, as emperor, his support would prove essential for Philip's control over northern Italy and the Low Countries – both Imperial fiefs – and for the

maintenance of easy and secure communication between them.

Next, Philip must always maintain good relations with the pope – although, as in his earlier papers of advice, the emperor recognized that this was easier said than done. ‘You already know how the present pope, Paul III, has treated me,’ Charles complained; and although he expressed the hope that a change of pontiff would improve matters, he identified two areas that would continue to produce conflict: papal claims to suzerainty over Naples and Sicily, and royal patronage of the Spanish Church. He therefore advised his son to ‘behave with the submission of a good son of the Church’ towards future pontiffs, ‘and without giving them any just cause for offence with you. But do this without any prejudice to the pre-eminences, prosperity and peace of the said kingdoms.’ Philip must give nothing away, not even to the head of the Catholic Church.

As in his previous papers of advice, Charles presented the French as the greatest potential security threat and claimed that, although he had always tried to live in peace with them, their kings had ‘made many peaces and truces with me, none of which they kept – as is well known – except during the periods when they could not renew the war or wanted to wait for an opportunity to harm me clandestinely’. No doubt, he mused, they would continue to do so, trying to regain the territories and rights he had compelled them to renounce – both in the Low Countries and in Italy – by earlier treaties; but Philip must stand fast. The emperor could see only one lasting solution: Philip must marry a French princess in return for a commitment to drop all contentious claims and evacuate all the territories that they had occupied, including those of allies such as the duke of Savoy.

In relation to Spain’s overseas empire, Charles repeated his concerns about the manner in which the native Americans had been subjugated by their conquerors and urged his son to find a balance between ‘your royal pre-eminence, and the best interests of the said native Americans’. Finally, Charles admitted that he did not know what to do about the Netherlands: should he bequeath them, along with Spain, to his son or should he give them to María and her future husband, Maximilian, his brother Ferdinand’s son? He promised Philip that he would not make a final decision ‘until you can come here, and see the country for yourself’.

Charles remained silent about one other relevant item. Although

he showered Philip with directives on how to treat other members of the dynasty, he failed to mention that the prince had a brother. In 1546 the emperor had an affair with the daughter of an official of the city of Regensburg, Barbara Blomberg – a teenager exactly Philip's age – who gave birth to his son. The emperor's officials bought her silence and spirited the boy away to be brought up in secrecy by foster parents – but Philip knew nothing of all this until after the emperor died (see chapter 7).

Even as Philip read and digested this complex document, his father changed his plans in one vital respect. Although 'we had resolved that the Infanta María should come here with you', he explained to his son, now he thought that 'it would be better if Prince Maximilian, my nephew, goes to Spain and consummates the marriage that has been agreed upon', and then stays on as regent. Philip must remain in Spain until his cousin could arrive and receive instruction in 'whatever you think he should know', and to 'meet and learn about the grandees and other gentlemen who come to court, and about the councils and ministers with whom he will have to deal' – in other words, Philip must provide the same sort of intimate advice to Maximilian that he had himself received in the emperor's Secret Instructions five years before.¹⁷

The Grand Tour

In October 1548, having initiated his new brother-in-law into the mysteries of government, Philip was free to leave Spain for the first time. Naturally he did not travel alone: his entourage included many who would be prominent during the first half of his reign. Some older men, like the duke of Alba, had already made their mark but others belonged to a younger generation that now appeared on the public stage for the first time: the duke of Sessa, who would govern Milan and command the Mediterranean fleet; the count of Olivares, future ambassador in Rome and viceroy of Naples and Sicily; the count of Feria, later ambassador in England and Philip's leading adviser on English affairs; and the count of Luna, later Spanish ambassador at both the Imperial court and the council of Trent. These men forged a close bond with each other as well as with the prince while they toured Europe together; and many also became part of the patronage network being built by Ruy Gómez – a Portuguese gentleman born in 1516 who had

served the empress as a page and would become, according to contemporaries, 'the greatest Favourite the world has seen' until 'eventually he handled all business of war and peace'.¹⁸

On 1 November 1548, after considerable delays due to bad weather, the prince and his distinguished entourage, which numbered almost 500, left Catalonia on a fleet of galleys. According to Calvete de Estrella, who accompanied the prince and later published a detailed account of what he called *The most fortunate journey*, Philip proved to be 'a good sailor' throughout his first sea voyage, which lasted a month, until he and his exhausted entourage landed near Genoa. All eyes were now upon Philip. As the ambassador of the duke of Mantua put it, 'he cannot move, eat, drink or speak without the whole world noticing and writing about it'; and initially his habits created an unfavourable impression. The prince spoke little and so softly that few could hear his words. Worse, as he rode majestically through the streets of Genoa on his way to worship in the cathedral, the city's leading ladies crowded the balconies of the houses along his route, dressed in their finest clothes, waving and curtsying, 'but His Highness made a very poor impression because he failed to acknowledge them by raising his hat or inclining his head, as is the custom'. Even the normally obsequious Vicente Álvarez, a member of the prince's household who also wrote an eyewitness account of the Grand Tour, noted that the prince's behaviour during his tour of northern Italy 'displeased the local people' so that stories spread that 'His Highness was too formal and tongue-tied'.¹⁹

Philip's popularity began to improve when he reached Trent, a small city-state on the border between Italy and Germany whose prince-bishop had recently hosted a General Council of the Catholic Church. Although the German delegation sent to greet Philip included many Lutherans (his first contact with Protestants), the prince took it in his stride and on each of the following five days participated with both Lutherans and Catholics in prolonged eating and heavy drinking followed by hours of unbridled dancing – albeit Vicente Álvarez affirmed primly that 'the prince did not behave as wantonly as the Cardinals of Augsburg and Trent, who danced and whirled with several ladies'. It was a memorable moment: although he lived for another half-century, during which he met most of the Roman Church's most eminent prelates, including half a dozen future popes, Philip would never again see


two cardinals ‘dance and whirl with several ladies’.²⁰

The problem of the Netherlands

The prince and his companions now hastened to Brussels, where on 1 April 1549 the emperor welcomed the son he had not seen for six years. Although Charles had promised that he would decide nothing concerning his successor in the Netherlands ‘until you can come here, and see the country for yourself’, while waiting for the prince to arrive, he transformed their constitutional position by persuading the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire to recognize the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands that he ruled, both those he had inherited and those he had acquired, as a single Imperial Circle (*Reichskreis*). This measure enhanced the powers of the central government in Brussels in three important respects: it excluded Imperial jurisdiction except for a handful of small semi-autonomous lordships in the eastern provinces; it granted exemption from the religious compromises that had allowed Lutheranism to flourish in Germany; and it obliged the German members of the Diet to defend the Low Countries should they be attacked. Having united all his Netherlands possessions, new and old, Charles took the momentous – and disastrous – decision that Philip would succeed him as ruler there as well as in Spain.

Philip’s arrival in Brussels in April 1549 occasioned pageants and jousts, in which the prince took part – although with some discomfort. On one occasion he ran against Don Luis de Requesens, his former page, who failed to recognize his master ‘in the mêlée, and since he wore little padding the prince was knocked out and fell to the ground’. Charles hurried anxiously to his son’s side, but ‘when they freed him from his armour and found he was not injured, they took him to his bed’. After a brief rest there, Philip returned to the fray (see plate 6).²¹ After pleasure came business: the emperor now persuaded the Estates (representative assemblies) of each of the seventeen provinces he ruled not only to recognize his son as heir apparent, but also to agree that, notwithstanding their particular privileges, they would henceforth all follow the same succession protocols and choose the same sovereign in order to remain forever united. To cement this innovation, Charles and Philip set out on a tour of the most prosperous provinces – Flanders, Artois, Hainaut and Brabant – where in the presence of

the emperor and his sister (and regent), Mary of Hungary, the local authorities of one town and province after another solemnly swore to accept Philip as their next sovereign. The royal party received a rapturous welcome and spectacular entertainment everywhere they went, and Philip repeatedly showed his prowess in jousts.



4. Philip's voyage to the Netherlands in 1548-9 and back in 1550-1. Charles V signed the order for his son to join him in December 1547, but Philip lingered in Spain for ten months, and then travelled in leisurely

stages by galley to northern Italy, over the Alps to Austria and south Germany, and joining his father only in April 1549. The prince spent over a year in the Netherlands before accompanying his father to Augsburg, where he lived for ten months before returning to Spain.

The prince also encountered allegories – in both triumphal arches and plays – that made extravagant claims. Some compared him and his father to David and Solomon, or to Atlas and Hercules; others stressed that although powerful enemies surrounded him, divine and worldly weapons would allow him to prevail. One even showed

the prince realistically depicted kneeling before God the Father, who took the sword of justice and placed it in his right hand, and then gave him the sceptre held by an angel. He then took a royal crown of gold, adorned with rich pearls and precious stones, and placed it on the prince's head. The prince, very happy with these gifts from the Divine hand, arose and gave Him infinite thanks.²²

It was heady stuff for someone only just 21 (see plate 7).

The protracted festivities exhausted Charles, who returned to Brussels to recover, but the prince spent the next two months visiting the northern provinces of Holland, Utrecht, Overijssel and Gelderland. As he travelled from city to city, he met hundreds of his future subjects and engaged in endless sightseeing. In Rotterdam, the royal party toured Erasmus's house ('something worth seeing, since such a notable scholar was born there', Calvete noted) and they admired the wooden statue of the great humanist (in 1557 Philip would pay to replace it with one made of polychrome stone). During this stage of *The most fortunate journey*, the prince's constant companions included not only Alba, Feria, Ruy Gómez and other familiar courtiers from Spain, but also important new faces: Prince William of Orange, the marquis of Bergen, Counts Egmont and Hornes, and Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle, bishop of Arras. Almost all the leading protagonists in the opening phases of the Dutch Revolt travelled around the Netherlands together in the summer of 1549, getting to know each other as they got to know both their prince and his future subjects.

Philip spent the winter of 1549/50 in Brussels, receiving instruction from his father in how to govern effectively, as well as feasting, dancing, hunting and jousting. He also had time to appreciate the cultivated lifestyle of the Low Countries, where his

father, Mary of Hungary and Granvelle had all amassed impressive art collections. Mary maintained several palaces, where the prince admired her library, her tapestries, her gallery of family portraits by distinguished Italian and Dutch artists and her other works of art (all of which he would inherit). Although at this stage Granvelle lacked the resources to accumulate works of art on this scale, he introduced Philip to the artists he patronized, including Antonis Mor (known in Spain as Antonio Moro), to whom Philip paid 200 ducats in 1549, perhaps for the dashing portrait of him done at this time. When, four years later, Philip wanted a portrait of Mary Tudor, he sent Mor to do it, and when he returned to Spain in 1559 he took Mor with him.



5. Philip's tour through the Netherlands in 1549. Prince Philip visited the southern provinces of the Netherlands with his father Charles V in July and August 1549, accompanied by courtiers from all parts of the

Habsburg Monarchy, and in September and October the northern provinces swore allegiance to him as heir apparent.

On 1 May 1550, Charles and Philip solemnly commemorated the eleventh anniversary of the empress's death and at the end of the month they left Brussels to meet the Imperial Diet, which Charles had summoned to Augsburg, and to discuss with his relatives an important succession issue. Realizing that a ruler based in Spain would never be able to defend even a united Netherlands effectively, Charles decided to secure for Philip the Imperial title, demanding that Ferdinand name Philip as his successor. This was grossly unfair: Charles had repeatedly assured Ferdinand, 'King of the Romans' (or Imperial heir apparent), that his son Maximilian would succeed him. Deeply hurt by Charles's brusque demand, yet reluctant to offend the elder brother whom he revered, Ferdinand suggested that Philip and his successors could become Imperial Vicar (deputy) in Italy instead – a sensible suggestion that offered Philip far more than he eventually received – but Charles rejected this and instead repeated his demand that Ferdinand recognize Philip, not Maximilian, as his immediate successor.

Matters came to a head one evening in November 1550, when Ferdinand's obstinacy led Charles to exclaim angrily 'we need to establish who is emperor: you or me'.²³ For several weeks after this, the brothers refused to speak to each other. The deadlock was broken by the arrival of Maximilian, who had travelled from Spain to enforce his Imperial claims leaving his pregnant wife, María, as sole regent, and of Mary of Hungary, whom Charles summoned to persuade Ferdinand to change his mind. After weeks of heated discussion, in March 1551 the different parties accepted a series of agreements brokered by Mary. The Imperial succession would alternate between the two branches of the family: Ferdinand would succeed to the title but promised to delegate Imperial powers over Italy to Philip and to work for his nephew's election as King of the Romans; then, once he succeeded to the Imperial title, Philip would secure Maximilian's election as his successor. The prince also undertook to support Ferdinand and Maximilian in the Empire and in Hungary; not to intervene in the government of the Empire except when requested by Ferdinand; and to marry one of Ferdinand's daughters. Although Maximilian grudgingly gave his verbal consent to this succession pact, he refused to sign it; and

although Ferdinand signed it, he remained resentful.

Philip seems to have remained oblivious to these tensions, perhaps because Charles and his siblings spoke in French, a language the prince could not understand. When, almost forty years later, a secretary sent him a document praising the piety of his late uncle, 'because I thought Your Majesty would like to read it,' the king replied enthusiastically, 'I knew the Emperor Ferdinand. We spent almost a year together, in 1551, at Augsburg in Germany, in the company of the emperor my father, and I saw a lot of him because we got on very well.'²⁴ Philip omitted the fact that he also 'saw a lot of' German Protestants then because they thronged the streets of Augsburg while the Diet was in session. For almost a year, Philip ate and drank, danced and jousted, hunted and talked with Lutherans, and his surviving letters to Lutheran rulers from this period exude warmth.

The prince did not set off for Spain until May 1551, largely retracing his earlier route. In June he reached Trent, where he met those who had gathered for the second session of the General Council of the Church. Spanish delegates were numerous, and many of them later entered his service: Dr Martín de Velasco became his leading legal and fiscal adviser; Bishop Alvaro de la Quadra went to Germany and England as his ambassador; the theologians Fray Alonso de Castro and Fray Bartolomé Carranza helped him to re-Catholicize England; and Fray Diego de Chaves would serve as confessor to his wife, his eldest son, and finally to him.

Philip now travelled back through Italy, which he would never see again, and boarded a galley in July 1551 that carried him and his brother-in-law, Maximilian, to Spain. His cousin hastened to join María, who had served as sole regent during her husband's absence, while Philip stayed for three weeks in Barcelona and two weeks in Zaragoza with María, Maximilian and their children – including their daughter Anne, then a toddler, who would become Philip's fourth wife. They then returned to Germany, while Philip travelled to Toro to join his sister Juana, his six-year-old son Don Carlos, and perhaps Doña Isabel Osorio after almost three years of separation.

The prince had become accustomed to the good life during his triennium of travels and he was eager to prolong it. He informed Maximilian from Toro, 'I hope to relax for eight or ten days here,

before I go to Madrid to work', and shortly afterwards he boasted that 'so as not to be lazy, we have decided to stage a tournament'. The jousts duly took place on 27 September 1551, with 60 knights on each side, followed by a spectacular banquet. Philip, however, did not participate because he had just received two pieces of dreadful news: the Ottoman fleet had captured Tripoli, one of the last Christian outposts in North Africa, and the French had declared war. Never again would he find time 'to relax for eight or ten days'.²⁵

The changing face of empire, 1551–1558

Nemesis

Perience and authority than before. When one of Charles's nominees to represent him at the council of Trent declined to go, PRINCE Philip returned to govern Spain in 1551 with far more Philip casually informed his father 'we have given some thought to a replacement, and Your Majesty will be advised of our decision'; and when demands for more troops and treasure arrived from his father, the prince first procrastinated and then refused on the ground that 'everything here [in Spain] is exhausted'. He even reproached the emperor for wasting money: 'I beg Your Majesty most humbly to put your affairs in order so that you can reduce expenses, because we have no manner or means to meet them.' This shift in the balance of power did not go unnoticed. As a Spanish courtier wrote crudely to Philip in 1552: 'I beg your Highness to authorize a response to the memorial that I gave you in Madrid, because we all know that you can transact all affairs of state without awaiting permission from [the emperor in] Germany'.¹

The prince spent most of the winter of 1551–2 in Madrid, which he already seems to have preferred to Valladolid as his administrative base, negotiating with the Cortes of Castile for funds to defend Spain and Spanish Italy. But in April 1552 Henry II invaded Lorraine and seized three Imperial Free Cities (Metz,

Toul and Verdun) while a Protestant army challenged Charles's authority in Germany. Ferdinand and Maximilian, alienated by the emperor's bullying at Augsburg the previous year, declared themselves neutral, leaving Charles dangerously isolated and without troops and money. He desperately appealed to his son that 'without losing an hour' he should raise and send as many Spanish troops as possible. 'And above all,' he added, 'take special care to raise money, because you can see and appreciate how it affects our honour and reputation, and the retention of the dominions that God has given us and that we have acquired' (an unsubtle reference to the fact that whatever Charles lost, Philip would lose too).²

The emperor's appeal seems to have stunned (and perhaps shamed) the prince. 'Since these revolutions have made Your Majesty need Spanish troops for what you have to do,' he wrote, he would now raise the men and money that he had so recently claimed could not be found. He dispatched Alba to lead troops from Spain to the emperor's rescue; and, as he had done in 1541 during the Algiers campaign (chapter 1), he begged for permission to join his father in his moment of need. 'I want to be there in order to serve Your Majesty in this campaign,' he pleaded, and he ordered the galleys carrying Alba's troops to return to Spain at once so that they could transport him too, 'because it does not seem right, nor does it redound to my honour, to abandon Your Majesty at this time.'³

While he awaited Charles's answer, Philip said farewell to his sister Juana before she left to marry their cousin Prince John, heir to the Portuguese throne; then he travelled to Aragon to be closer to the Mediterranean coast when permission arrived for him to join his father. He soon found himself 'in greater confusion than anyone has ever been, because I have been so long without a letter from His Majesty, and without orders on what I must do'; and when one eventually arrived, while praising his spirit and support, Charles forbade his son to leave Spain. Philip's contribution would be to raise and dispatch the funds needed to sustain Alba's army while it recaptured Metz, the largest of the three Imperial cities in Lorraine seized by France.⁴

Although at one point Charles and Alba commanded 55,000 men – perhaps the largest concentration of troops ever seen in sixteenth-century Europe – Metz held out. Just before Christmas

1552 the emperor decided he must abandon the siege, and he retreated to Brussels. There he suffered a physical and psychological collapse, refusing for three months to hold audiences, appear in public or sign documents. Mary of Hungary took charge of the Monarchy's day-to-day affairs while Philip continued to administer Spain and Ferdinand ran Germany. This situation could not last, and in April 1553 (at Mary's insistence) Charles summoned Philip back to Brussels – but on one condition:

Not only must you come here, but you must also bring with you such a large sum of money that it will serve to sustain these provinces adequately. This is the only remedy for the present situation, and the only way to ensure that ... you will not be compelled, as soon as you arrive, to ask [the provinces] for new taxes which, since they are so exhausted, in addition to gaining you no affection, will rather cause them to resent twice as much (as subjects often do) the sacrifices you ask of them.

As soon as Philip arrived with the funds, Charles proposed to return to Spain 'so that these provinces will not be left at a time like this without the presence of one of us'.⁵

This was totally unrealistic. As Philip reminded his father, Castile had just provided the unprecedented sum of over 4.5 million ducats for the defence of Italy, Spain and the Mediterranean, as well as for Charles's rescue from his German enemies: the kingdom could provide no more now – especially since a joint French and Turkish fleet had just captured Corsica from its Genoese garrisons, jeopardizing communications between Spain and Italy. Without consulting his father, Philip at once sent 3,000 troops (and the money to sustain them) to regain Corsica, and authorized other defensive measures, further reducing the cash available for Charles.

The 'English Match'

Almost immediately, the death of Edward VI, king of England and Ireland, on 6 July 1553 changed the diplomatic situation. After a few days of uncertainty Edward's half-sister Mary Tudor, a 37-year-old spinster, ascended the throne and turned to her cousin Charles for advice. The emperor knew exactly how to exploit this windfall: he offered her the hand of his son. Charles carefully

calculated the advantages to both parties. It would allow Philip to rule both Spain and the Netherlands effectively, even without becoming Holy Roman Emperor; and it would provide Mary with a 'husband who could command in wartime and carry out other functions that are unsuitable for women', perhaps allowing an invasion of Scotland that would 'make it subject to the kingdom of England'. In addition, creating a new Anglo-Netherlands state to be ruled by the heir of Philip and Mary would secure Habsburg domination of the Channel and North Sea, and thus 'keep the French in check and reduce them to reason'. Although Charles claimed unconvincingly that 'I do not seek to do more than put this idea before you so you can think about it and tell me as soon as possible how it seems to you', in effect the die had been cast: the advantages that the 'English match' would bring, Charles wrote, 'are so great and so obvious' that it was not necessary to explain them.⁶

Even with a kingdom as dowry, the prospect of marrying a cousin twelve years older left Philip unenthusiastic, but he accepted the inevitable. 'Your Majesty already knows that, as your most obedient son, my wishes are the same as yours, especially in a matter of such importance,' he wrote to Charles, and granted his father full powers 'to negotiate on my behalf' to secure 'an English match'. Hard bargaining began on the terms between Mary and her Privy Council, on the one hand, and Charles's envoys (led by Simon Renard and Count Lamoral of Egmont) on the other. The first stumbling block was whether the marriage would be finalized by proxies and take immediate effect, as Charles wanted, or whether (as the English preferred) 'the wedding should be concluded and solemnized in the presence of both spouses'. Charles therefore demanded that his son send 'two powers of attorney, drawn up like the attached minutes, so that we can use whichever one is needed without wasting any time'.⁷ Once again, the prince complied.

Charles and his advisers nevertheless concealed conditions added to the marriage treaty by Mary's ministers to safeguard England's independence: that the queen must not leave her hereditary realms except in exceptional circumstances; that any child of the couple would inherit not only England and Ireland but also the Netherlands; and that, if Mary should predecease her husband without leaving any heirs, Philip's authority in England

would end. Moreover, although the treaty specified that Philip ‘shall during the said marriage have and enjoy jointly together with the said most gracious queen his wife, the style, honour and kingly name of [her] realms’, and provide ‘aid’ to his wife in governing them, it went on to insist that ‘the said most noble prince shall permit and suffer the said most gracious queen his wife, to have the whole disposition of all the benefices and offices, lands, revenues and fruits of the said realms and dominions, and that they shall be bestowed upon such as shall be naturally born in the same’. Philip would not be able to ‘bestow’ any English assets on his subjects elsewhere. As if these restrictions were not humiliating enough for Philip, Mary’s advisers also stipulated ‘that the realm of England, by occasion of this matrimony, shall not directly or indirectly be entangled with the war that is betwixt the most victorious lord the emperor, father unto the said lord prince, and Henry, the French king; but he, the said lord Philip, as much as shall lie in him, on the behalf of the said realm of England, shall see the peace between the said realms of France and England observed, and shall give no cause of any breach.’⁸

Although the Imperial negotiators either omitted or minimized the significance of these developments in their letters to Philip, the prince knew all about them. On 4 January 1554, even before his father’s agents signed the original treaty, the prince executed before a notary a deed stating that he would ‘approve, authorize and swear to the said articles so that his marriage to the most serene queen of England may take place, but this does not bind or oblige him and his possessions, or his heirs and successors, to execute or approve any of them’.⁹ Such duplicity became central to Philip’s administrative style: when constrained to take actions that he disliked, he made a declaration before a notary that he did not regard concessions made under duress as binding.

Philip remained in Spain for another six months, despite warnings not only from his father but also from Mary of Hungary, who wrote ‘I can assure you that if these dominions in the Netherlands are not succoured, you will lose them’.¹⁰ The prince lingered in part because he lacked papal dispensation to marry a close relative (initially, Philip referred to his future bride as ‘my beloved and very dear aunt’, since her mother was the sister of Charles V’s mother), but at last permission arrived and in March 1554, with Philip’s permission, Egmont stood as his proxy beside

Mary Tudor while England's Lord Chancellor blessed the marriage.

Still the prince remained in Spain. Instead of travelling to Corunna, where a fleet waited to take him to England, he rode to the Portuguese frontier to meet his sister Juana, now a widow, whom he had persuaded to act as regent during his absence. As he had done with María and Maximilian, Philip provided her with detailed instructions in person on how she should act. He also accomplished another important task. He had received a confidential message from his father, asking that he choose his retirement home. Philip recommended Yuste, in the foothills of the Sierra de Gredos in Extremadura, site of a convent built by the Jeronimite Order, whose dedication to prayer had appealed in the past to members of Spain's royal family who wanted to retire from the world. After visiting Yuste in June 1554, Philip signed warrants to cover the cost of building a modest palace complex adjacent to the monastery.

Now at last Philip moved to Corunna, and while he waited for a favourable wind to take him to England, he issued his final orders for the regency government. During his absence Juana and her ministers must send him copies of all correspondence with Charles and also consult him before taking any major decisions concerning Spain, Spanish Italy or Spanish America. Although his Instructions claimed to relay 'the arrangements that His Majesty and I want', they explicitly ignored or overrode his father's earlier dispositions.¹¹ Having thus secured his inheritance, with a fleet large enough to deter any attempt by the French to intercept him, on 13 July 1554 Philip left Spain to marry the queen of England.

'I left Corunna on Friday,' the prince wrote, 'and that day I was so sea sick that I had to spend three days in my bed to recover.'¹² Luckily for him, the entire voyage from Spain to England took only seven days (a happy circumstance that may have distorted Philip's strategic thinking three decades later when he planned the invasion of England). He found both English and Netherlands envoys awaiting him at Southampton, where his fleet dropped anchor: the former brought him greetings and presents from his bride-to-be; the latter brought Charles's renunciation of his title to Naples in favour of his son, who thus became a king in his own right on the eve of his wedding. It was a gracious gesture. Less gracious was the message that followed. Originally, Charles had intended his son to remain in England only long enough to

consummate his marriage before coming to the Netherlands to take command, so that the emperor could return to Spain. Now, instead, Charles ordered Philip to send only the troops and treasure: he had decided to take personal command of his forces, once more relegating his son to an ancillary role.

England's summer weather proved uncooperative: torrential rain soaked Philip and his entourage as they made their ceremonial entry into Winchester, where the betrothed couple had their first formal meeting. According to Juan de Barahona, a member of the royal entourage, 'His Highness was very courteous with the queen for more than an hour, speaking to her in Spanish while she spoke French, which is how they understood each other.' Then Philip spoke the only words of English he is known to have uttered: 'Good night, my lordes all'. On 25 July, Philip and Mary were married in Winchester Cathedral and, after a banquet, the 'dukes and nobles of Spain' danced with 'the most beautiful English virgins' until 9 p.m., when 'the king went to bed with the queen. And as for the rest of the night,' wrote Barahona (probably with the same lack of enthusiasm as his master), 'those who have endured the same can judge.'¹³

Her first sexual encounter left Mary exhausted and, according to Andrés Muñoz, Philip's valet, 'she did not appear in public again for four days'.¹⁴ While she recovered, her new husband went hunting and sightseeing with a large entourage that included not only established courtiers like Alba, Feria and Ruy Gómez but also a number of others who would soon rise to high office, including the duke of Medinaceli, the counts of Chinchón and Olivares, friars Bernardo de Fresneda and Bartolomé Carranza, and secretaries Pedro de Hoyo and Gabriel de Zayas. Few relished the experience: 'Although we are in a beautiful country, we live among the worst people in the world,' wrote Muñoz. 'These English are great enemies of the Spanish nation.'¹⁵

What did Philip think of his new bride? 'The queen is a very good creature,' Ruy Gómez confided to a colleague the day after the wedding – 'though rather older than we had been told.' Later that week his attitude hardened: Philip 'strives to give [Mary] every possible proof' of his affection and 'omits no part of his duty', but 'to speak frankly with you, it will take a great God to drink this cup'. Luckily, Ruy Gómez concluded, Philip 'fully realizes that the marriage was not concluded for the sake of sex,

but to remedy the disorders of this kingdom and to preserve the Low Countries'. Spanish opinion became harsher still after Mary's death. In 1559, when Philip married again, a minister wrote unkindly that this time with young Isabel of France 'His Majesty will have no cause to complain that he has been forced to marry an ugly old woman'.¹⁶

In November 1554 the queen asserted she had felt the 'quickenings' of her child, and the following month she informed Charles that 'as for that which I carry in my belly, I declare it to be alive'. The couple moved to Hampton Court 'where it was thought the queen would give birth' and there assembled midwives, a cradle 'very sumptuously and gorgeously trimmed' and a wet-nurse. Meanwhile chancery clerks prepared multiple documents announcing the birth that left only the date and the sex of the infant blank.¹⁷

Although Mary experienced many of the signs normally associated with pregnancy – swelling of the abdomen and breasts, milk secretion – she never gave birth, and the assembled cradles and nursery staff dispersed. Charles now urged his son to join him, and in late August Philip left his wife at the palace of Greenwich and boarded a waiting ship. As it moved slowly down the Thames, Philip stood 'on the poop deck, and waved his hat to greet the queen and show his affection for her', but his distraught wife sat by a window and cried her eyes out. The two monarchs exchanged letters 'not only every day but every hour' until 3 September, when Philip crossed the Channel.¹⁸


The new king nevertheless continued to provide 'aid' to his wife in governing their realms. Mary's Privy Council had made this easier by issuing an order two days after the wedding that circumvented the restrictions imposed in the marriage treaty on Philip's participation. Thenceforth 'a note of all suche matters of state' debated by the council was 'made in Laten or Spanyshe' to be 'delivered to suche as it shuld please the kinges heighnes t[o] appoint to receyve it. It was also ordred that all matters of Estate passing in the King and Quenes names shuld be signed with both thier handes.'¹⁹ This meant that Philip, although unable to speak or understand English, could take an active role in English affairs; and after he left for the Netherlands he communicated his wishes in letters written in Latin or Spanish to Mary and her principal adviser, Cardinal Reginald Pole. Three days after Philip's

departure, Pole informed him that Mary took great pleasure ‘from writing to Your Majesty and reading his letters’ and in learning what ‘the king has devised and ordered’. Two weeks later, Pole reported that ‘the queen passes the forenoon in prayer, after the manner of Mary, and in the afternoon admirably personates Martha, by transacting business, so urging her councillors as to keep them all incessantly occupied ... in following the course pointed out by’ her absent husband.²⁰ The king also indicated his preferred ‘course’ through orders to a new administrative organ created just before his departure: the Select Council, composed of English ministers. This body met several times a week to discuss important domestic and foreign affairs, and at the end of each meeting it sent a Latin summary of its recommendations to Philip for comment. In most cases the king approved the recommendations, but sometimes in a marginal comment he raised objections. Thus in September 1555, the Select Council reported that most vessels in the Royal Navy were unseaworthy and should be brought to the Thames dockyards for repair, but Philip objected:

The king understands that England’s chief defence depends upon its navy being always in good order to serve for the defence of the kingdom against all invasion, and so it is right that the ships should not only be fit for sea, but instantly available. But, as the passage out of the river Thames is not an easy one, the vessels ought to be stationed at Portsmouth, from which they can more easily be brought into service.

The councillors duly complied.²¹

Philip helped to shape English policy through appointments to offices of state, assisted by the Spanish clerics who accompanied him on his voyage, above all Carranza. Thus upon the death of the Lord Chancellor, England’s most senior minister, Carranza suggested the appointment of the pious archbishop of York and Philip himself sent a letter instructing Mary ‘that the said office should be given to the said archbishop’, and it was done. English courtiers immediately recognized Philip’s decisive role in the outcome: ‘the king’s majesty hath appointed the bishop of York Lord Chancellor,’ one of them noted.²²



6. Executions for heresy by burning in England, 1555–8. At least 284 Protestants (56 of them women) were burned for their faith while Philip was king of England, starting in February 1555. Although the king's presence in England does not seem to have affected the rhythm of executions, the Privy Council oversaw the policy and sent copies of their deliberations to Philip, so he could monitor the totals – right up to his last month as king of England.

Philip also took a keen interest in religious matters. According to Carranza, royal officials imprisoned and burned more than 450 English heretics between February 1555 and November 1558, while at least 600 more fled abroad. An eminent modern historian has suggested that Philip and Mary oversaw 'the most intense religious persecution of its kind anywhere in sixteenth-century Europe'.²³ Philip intervened openly in at least one heresy case. On Easter Day, 1555, William Flower, a married ex-monk, stabbed a Dominican friar while he was saying Mass. Outraged by such sacrilege, Carranza (now 'vicar and commissary general' of the Dominican Order in England) urged Philip and Mary

to order that exemplary justice be done immediately, saying that this was essential because any delay would cause a scandal. His Majesty promised to do this, and it was done within three days: they cut off the right hand with which he committed the crime and then burned him

alive.

The king had no regrets. He later boasted that ‘many heretics had been burned and many others converted’ in England during his reign, including Thomas Cranmer, archbishop of Canterbury, burned at the stake in 1556.²⁴

The transfer of power

Meanwhile, in May 1555, Gian Pietro Caraffa, an avowed enemy of Charles and his son, was elected Pope Paul IV and immediately laid plans for a coordinated attack with the assistance of France, the Turks and several sympathetic Italian states. This forced the *Rey Príncipe* (as Philip now styled himself: ‘the king and prince’) to take two pre-emptive steps. In the hope of winning the support of his Austrian relatives, he formally renounced all his claims to the Imperial title (chapter 2); and he took the reins of power from his father.

Charles’s efforts to defend the Netherlands in the summer of 1554 had left him exhausted, and as soon as the French withdrew he retired to a small cottage in the royal park in Brussels and refused to see anyone except a few trusted household servants. A sketch of the emperor at this time shows a broken man with no teeth or hair, whose hollow eyes stare vacantly into the distance (see plate 8). On 25 October 1555 Charles walked slowly into the great hall of his Brussels palace, supported by a cane on one side and by Prince William of Orange on the other, followed by Mary of Hungary and his son Philip.

The proceedings began with a speech by a councillor explaining the emperor’s reasons for wanting to abdicate and retire to Spain (mainly because ‘the intense cold greatly undermined’ his health). Then Charles rose unsteadily to his feet, ‘put on his glasses and read what was written on a piece of paper’ before making an eloquent and emotional speech reminding his audience of all the enterprises he had undertaken in their name. He then urged everyone to uphold the Catholic faith as the sole religion.²⁵ After he had finished, Philip fell to his knees and (in Spanish) begged his father to stay and govern a little longer so that he might ‘learne of him by experience soich qualetyes as to soch a gouvernment are most necessary’; then he sat down again and, turning to the

assembly, spoke the only words of French he is known to have uttered: ‘Gentlemen, although I can understand French adequately, I am not yet fluent enough to speak it to you. You will learn from the bishop of Arras [Granvelle] what I want to say.’ As in England, Philip’s failure to learn the languages of his subjects – and his decision to sit while addressing them, instead of standing as Burgundian protocol demanded – caused needless disappointment, but Granvelle offered some reassurance by promising, on Philip’s behalf, that the new ruler would stay in northern Europe as long as required to secure their peace and prosperity and that he would return whenever needed – a wise promise which the king would not keep.²⁶

Despite all the pomp and emotion, the Brussels ceremony only marked the transfer of the emperor’s territories and titles in the Low Countries. Charles intended to travel back to Spain before ceding his rights over Castile and Aragon and their overseas dependencies (the Americas, Sardinia and Sicily), but lack of money to pay off his household and assemble a fleet prevented this; and so, while still in Brussels, in January 1556 Charles transferred his Spanish kingdoms, together with the title ‘Catholic King’, to his son – henceforth styled Philip II. At Ferdinand’s request, Charles also drew up and signed a secret renunciation of his Imperial title, leaving his brother to determine the optimal moment to convene a meeting of the Electoral College to choose his successor. Meanwhile, Charles appointed his son as Imperial Vicar (deputy) in Italy.

Right up to the moment when he signed each of these solemn transfers, Charles continued to issue orders and make appointments. For example, three days before the abdication ceremony in Brussels, Charles wickedly made a host of irrevocable appointments to ecclesiastical, military and civil posts in the Netherlands, thereby depriving his son of the chance to promote his own men. Father and son seem to have held proper consultations on only one matter: who should succeed Mary of Hungary as regent of the Netherlands – but although they agreed on Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy, for as long as the two monarchs remained in the Netherlands the creation of a third centre of power merely increased the confusion over who was in charge and how to allocate the sparse funds available for defence.

This situation was not sustainable. As the duke of Alba, charged

with defending Spanish Italy, bluntly observed: 'We need money or peace, one or the other, or everything will collapse.'²⁷ In February 1556, lacking sufficient money to carry on fighting, Philip swallowed his pride and signed the truce of Vaucelles with Henry II of France. Since each side remained in possession of its conquests no one expected the ceasefire to last long, and Philip therefore resolved to remain in Brussels while his father set sail for Spain, where Philip expected him to take an active role in government; but the emperor had other plans. He headed straight for his new palace at Yuste, where he kept even his own family at bay (not even his daughter Juana received permission to visit) and utterly refused to discuss public affairs. But much though the emperor may have wanted to ignore the world, the world refused to ignore him. In July 1556 Paul IV excommunicated both Charles and his son, placing their lands under interdict.

Given his role in bringing England back into obedience to Rome, Philip complained bitterly that the pope's actions

lacked justification, reason and cause, as all the world has seen, because I have not only given him no cause for this, but rather His Holiness owes me favour and honour because of the way I have served and revered him and the Holy See, both in bringing England back to the Faith and in everything else I could do.²⁸

Philip did not merely complain: he also ordered Juana to convene a special committee of Spanish theologians and lawyers to advise him on how best to respond to the pope's declaration of war. They proposed a radical solution, suggesting that a 'National Council should be held in Spain to reform ecclesiastical affairs'. Indeed, the committee suggested, 'it should be held for all Your Majesty's dominions, and those of your allies' – in other words, for half the Catholic world.²⁹

The burden posed by simultaneously fighting the pope, France, the Turks and some Italian states seems to have shaken the king's confidence, and he sent Ruy Gómez to persuade Charles to leave Yuste and take charge of Spain once more.

Begging Your Majesty with all humility and insistence to agree to act, helping and assisting me in this crisis not only with your advice and council, which is the greatest asset I could have, but with your own presence and authority, leaving your monastery and going to whatever

place would be best for your health and for dealing with public affairs.

In addition, he instructed Ruy Gómez to ‘ask His Majesty to send me his opinion concerning the war, and about where and how I can best undertake and participate in this campaign in order to achieve the greatest results’.³⁰

The warrior king

While he impatiently awaited answers, Philip tried to obtain a declaration of war by England against France. The marriage treaty with Mary expressly prohibited the king from involving his new subjects in the war then raging between Charles and France, but Philip argued that the conflict unleashed by Paul IV was a new conflict and, to sell this argument to his subjects, in March 1557 he returned to England, where he spent the next three months. He then returned to Brussels to take charge of the war.

Despite his dexterity in tournaments and jousts on foot and horseback, Philip had never been exposed to mortal combat and he hoped that the 1557 campaign would change this. From the outset, he kept a tight control over strategy, military operations and logistics, and at the end of July (still in Brussels) he notified Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy, who commanded his field army, that ‘We have decided that you should set forth on Thursday and lay siege to St Quentin’, adding ‘I will travel straight to Cambrai, where I hope to be on Saturday. I will be in Cambrai on Saturday without fail’ (a strange repetition, perhaps a sign of uncertainty). From there, he concluded, ‘I expect to join you on Tuesday,’ 3 August.³¹

Such micromanagement revealed Philip’s lack of military experience. While Emmanuel Philibert’s troops dug trenches around St Quentin the king and the siege train remained marooned at Cambrai, twenty-five miles to the north, unable to move until the 7,000 English troops sent by his wife arrived to escort them. ‘I greatly regret that I cannot leave today, as I planned,’ he wrote to Savoy on 6 August. In a holograph letter the following day he again lamented ‘I am very angry that I have not been able to leave, nor can I leave soon, because the English tell me that they will not arrive here until Tuesday [10 August], although I have told them to hurry up.’ When the English had still not arrived on 9 August,

Philip became frantic with worry that a battle would take place without him, urging Emmanuel Philibert somewhat incoherently:

If you cannot avoid fighting before I can be there, which will be without fail when I have said, I cannot emphasize too much – since you can see that nothing could be more important to me than that this matter turns out as I want – that you should send me news of it by sending three or four messengers here, flying at top speed, so that there will be time and opportunity for me to get there in time. I know that you would not want me to be absent in such a situation, and you know how important it is to me, so I do not want to stress it any more, although I would like to tell you about it at length.³²

It was not to be. The next day, 10 August, St Lawrence's Day, the French tried to relieve St Quentin, and Emmanuel Philibert gave battle. Perhaps 5,000 French troops perished in combat and thousands more fell prisoner, including numerous nobles. Carranza, now in Brussels, marvelled that 'we are distributing French dukes and counts among the local castles'; adding, 'the day before yesterday three hundred French soldiers passed through, and cartloads of prisoners constantly arrive'. Fourteen years later, one of Philip's councillors still remembered with satisfaction the day when 'we knocked the French for six'.³³

The stunning victory of his forces at St Quentin led the absent king to commission two memorials. First, he commissioned a magnificent stained-glass window in the church of St John of Gouda, as did several of those who had commanded troops in the battle (see plate 17). Second, he founded a monastery and mausoleum at the village of El Escorial north-west of Madrid, dedicated to St Lawrence, because 'he realized that such an illustrious commencement of his reign came through the Saint's favour and intercession in heaven'.³⁴ But that lay in the future. A few days after the battle, he entered the trenches around St Quentin at the head of his English troops, including several exiles and former rebels anxious to win the king's trust (Lord Robert Dudley, later Queen Elizabeth's Favourite, among them) and took personal charge of operations. 'His Majesty was on horseback, holding his commander's baton in his hand,' wrote an eyewitness, and that is how he appears in a famous portrait by Antonis Mor (see plate 9). Two weeks later, after battering the walls of the town 'with great fury, His Majesty was at the head of his troops',

ready to lead an assault, but he resolved 'to wait, to see if the French inside the town, seeing their predicament, would surrender'. They did not, and so after another artillery bombardment the next day, according to Philip's own account: 'We entered St Quentin on all sides, killing all those whom we could find during the fury of the first assault.' 'Our Lord in His goodness has desired to grant me these victories within a few days of the beginning of my reign,' he crowed to his sister Juana, 'with all the honour and prestige [*reputación*] that follow from them.'³⁵

The king also tried to micromanage the duke of Alba's campaign in Italy. Having forced the French army to retreat from Naples, on 28 August 1557, the same day that Philip's forces sacked St Quentin, Alba's artillery began to fire on the walls of Rome and his troops looked forward to 'a little plunder'. But the duke restrained them 'because the king had forbidden him to enter' the city, 'ordering him to cause only fear, not damage'.³⁶ This strategy worked: two weeks later, Pope Paul IV solemnly swore that he would never again make war on Philip or assist others who did, and that he would never rebuild the razed walls of the captured towns returned by the duke. The pope's ignominious surrender delivered control of all Italy to Spain, and Paul's reckless Italian allies hastened to make peace with Philip on the best terms they could.

These great victories came at a high cost, however. In May 1557 Philip had issued a decree forcibly converting the capital and interest of all outstanding short-term loans assigned for payment from his Castilian revenues into bonds bearing fixed interest of 7.14 per cent: the first default on sovereign debt in Spanish history. For a time Philip managed to raise more money from a few firms, exempting them from the terms of the decree provided they made new loans. He also exploited his father's sense of pride in the victory of St Quentin to plead once more with him 'as emphatically as I can, to take a hand in raising money for me'; and this time, after almost a year as a recluse, Charles dictated and signed a stream of forceful letters to his former ministers urging them to help his son immediately.³⁷ These funds allowed Philip and his troops to capture and sack several more French towns, and in October 1557 he returned to Brussels to plead with the States-General for more money, but they refused. As Philip explained to Emmanuel Philibert, 'we will have to demobilize the army at the

end of this month, because that is when the money runs out. The army has grown in size, and it costs more than we expected. I can see no way to support it.’³⁸ Meanwhile Henry II recalled his troops from the Italian peninsula.

Far away in Yuste, the dangers inherent in these two developments caught the emperor’s experienced eye. ‘If the enemy finds that you have demobilized,’ he warned his son in November, ‘he may decide to concentrate his forces and make an attempt this winter to recapture some of the places he has lost – or to gain some new ones.’ He therefore advised Philip to maintain a large force in the vicinity of Metz, so that ‘with those troops you can with greater assurance challenge the enemy to prevent him from achieving any of his goals’. This, the emperor concluded, would not only strengthen Philip’s own forces but also enable him ‘to assist your allies’ – a veiled reference to the need to protect Calais. But Philip never saw the letter! He had decided some time before that he did not have time to deal with his father’s numerous, verbose and often self-centred missives: instead he read the summaries prepared by his secretary, Francisco de Eraso. This time, Eraso totally omitted Charles’s strategic insight from ‘The points and items that the emperor raises with Your Majesty’ and endorsed the letter itself: ‘Nothing to respond to here’.³⁹

Events soon revealed the wisdom of the emperor’s warning. On 31 December 1557, some 30,000 French troops invaded the English enclave around Calais and captured one outpost after another. In Brussels, Philip recognized the danger and invited the English commandant to let him know ‘if you need anything from us to improve your security and defence, because we would be happy to oblige’.⁴⁰ The French captured the entire Pale within three weeks, transforming the strategic situation. For Spain, ‘it has created great confusion in our affairs, because just as we thought that the wars were over, it seems that they are starting again’. The ‘confusion’ for England was even greater, and Mary was devastated: according to a popular story, she claimed that when she died the word ‘Calais’ would be found ‘engraved on her heart’.⁴¹ Her only consolation at this time was a new pregnancy.

Cardinal Pole informed Philip of the pregnancy in January 1558, and the king responded that he had experienced ‘more delight and pleasure than he could express on paper, because there is nothing on this earth that he had wanted more, and because it is so

important for the well-being of the faith and of our realm'. So sure was Mary of her condition that on 30 March, 'foreseeing the great danger which by Godd's ordynance remaine to all whomen in ther travel [travail] of children', she made a new testament that named Philip as regent 'during the minoryte of my said heyre and issewe'. She also kept the Royal Navy on standby at Dover and 'smartened up all lodgings between here and the coast' lest her 'gentle prince of Spain' should 'come again'. The count of Feria, Philip's personal representative to the queen, advised his master that 'all she can think of is that Your Majesty should come'.⁴²

Philip agreed: the key to the future lay in whether Mary, now aged 42, was pregnant or not – and as early as February 1558 he lamented that 'the queen writes nothing to me about the pregnancy, which I take as a bad sign'. A month later he repeated that 'in the matter of the queen giving birth, it would be best to believe someone who actually saw it, and until then not to get our hopes up'; and in April, nine months after he left England, 'News that the queen has given birth is now long overdue, and so it seems we may have been mistaken'. The thought so depressed him that 'I have now become the enemy of speaking and writing to anyone, and so I don't want to say any more.'⁴³

Whether or not she was pregnant, Mary's expectation that her husband would visit her again was entirely realistic – couriers regularly travelled between Brussels and London in four days, and Philip himself had once crossed the Channel in two and a half hours – but it never happened. First, the king fell ill. In February 1558 he was laid low by a fever 'which has left me very weak and weary' and 'right now I cannot eat anything'; worse, 'everything has gone to my chest and so I can't sleep at night'. Feria must tell the queen all this to explain why he could not visit her. The next week brought new complaints. 'My chest still troubles me, and I'm in such a state that until now I have not dared' to leave the palace. And then, when 'I went riding for a while' on horseback 'I had to rest two or three times on the way out and the same on the way back'.⁴⁴

In a letter dated 1 May 1558, Feria advised his master that even Mary had now accepted that she was no longer pregnant, and that 'she sleeps very badly, and is weak from melancholy and illnesses'. This made it imperative for Philip to 'speak and write' to his wife about recognizing her half-sister Elizabeth as her heir. Philip

complied. 'I am writing to the queen,' he assured Feria, 'praising the way Elizabeth is behaving', adding that the queen 'must realize that if she should die, she will leave behind a kingdom that is hostile to me'.⁴⁵ To avoid this, he decided to pay a flying visit to see both his wife and his sister-in-law – but at the last minute he had to abandon his plan because French forces launched a surprise attack. Philip had just forfeited his last chance not only to see his wife but also to place her successor in his debt: persuading Mary to recognize Elizabeth's rights would have greatly increased his influence in England.

Instead, Philip concentrated on organizing opposition to the French troops who invaded Flanders and captured several ports until, on 13 July 1558, Egmont transformed the situation by ambushing the invaders outside Gravelines, killing or capturing most of them. Two weeks later, Philip ('who seemed very happy') visited his army, congratulated Egmont, and accompanied his troops over the next two months as they invaded France again. Although he himself did not participate in any more military operations, a task he left to the duke of Savoy, he did hold regular meetings to decide strategy. Sometimes Philip summoned Emmanuel Philibert to report in person 'because it is easier to understand these matters in a conversation than in a letter'; at other times he went to the duke's headquarters and listened as his generals and civilian advisers debated the options. In September 1558, as the campaign season drew to a close, at a special meeting of his principal ministers – Dutch, Italian and Spanish – a consensus emerged in favour of Granvelle's proposal that Philip should conclude a ceasefire that left his troops in control of much of northern France and use that advantage to negotiate a lasting settlement.⁴⁶

At first this goal seemed unattainable because the French wanted Naples and Milan; the English insisted on the return of Calais; the duke of Savoy expected all his lands back; and Philip demanded Burgundy and Picardy. The French argued that the most effective way to settle all their disputes with Philip was for his son, Don Carlos, to marry Henry II's eldest daughter Isabel, but they insisted on settling outstanding issues with England first. Philip shrewdly warned the English negotiators that 'The nature and custom of the French (as you doubtless know) is to be harsher and less tractable at the beginning, but the passage of time renders

them more pliant and tractable', and he generously proposed that they 'asked for Calais as the dowry' for his French bride, which he promised to give back to England; but the English angrily (and, it soon emerged, foolishly) rejected this because it called into question their sovereignty over the area. The impasse only ended when news arrived of Mary Tudor's death on 17 November 1558.⁴⁷

Ex-king of England

Rumours concerning the queen's ill health had circulated for some time, leading Philip to discuss with his advisers the best way to keep England Catholic should Mary die. In October 1558, on learning that the queen's 'life was at risk', he ordered Feria 'to go and see the Lady Elizabeth, and treat her as [my] sister and ensure that she accedes to the crown without disturbance'. It was too late: Mary's councillors had already persuaded her to recognize Elizabeth as her successor. Mary died a week later, and her husband's title 'king of England, Ireland and France' died with her.⁴⁸

Philip had achieved much in England, especially in the matter of religion. In October 1554, three months after Philip married Mary, a Spanish visitor lamented that 'The friars who have come here [from Spain] are always confined to their convents and only go to say Mass. They do not dare to go into the streets, unless accompanied by many Spaniards, because they would be stoned.' What a contrast with the situation five years later, when even Protestants expressed grudging amazement at the success of Philip's efforts:

Our universities are so depressed and ruined, that at Oxford there are scarcely two individuals who think with us, and even they are so dejected and broken in spirit, that they can do nothing. [Some] despicable friar[s] ... have reduced the vineyard of the Lord into a wilderness. You would scarcely believe that so much desolation could have been effected in so short a time.⁴⁹

Soon after her accession, Elizabeth had to replace the heads of almost every Oxford college, almost all the bishops and two-thirds of the deans and officials who had served her sister because they all remained loyal to the pope. As Eamon Duffy correctly observed,

‘It was the death of the queen, not any sense of failure, loss of direction or waning of determination’, that ended the Catholic England recreated by Philip and Mary. Even without ‘issewe’ from his marriage to Mary Tudor, a durable Catholic establishment would probably have emerged in England had the queen lived to be 56, like her father, Henry VIII – let alone 70, like her similarly childless sister Elizabeth. Instead Mary died at age 42.

Mary Tudor was not the only relative whom Philip mourned. On 1 November 1558 he received word of his father’s death at Yuste six weeks earlier. The news left him distraught and he at once retired to the monastery of Groenendaal near Brussels. When Emmanuel Philibert visited him there to transact some pressing business twelve days later, ‘I found him very sad’; and when he learned that Mary of Hungary had also died, Philip lamented to his sister Juana:

It seems that everything is failing me at the same time. Let us bless God for what He does, because there is nothing I can say, except to accept His will and beg that He will be satisfied with what has happened so far ... These deaths cannot but create problems for me, and give me a lot to think about in how to govern these provinces, and how best to deal with England, depending on whether the queen should live or die.

He concluded on a note of self-pity: ‘I don’t even want to mention how I myself feel, because that is what matters least.’⁵⁰

His worst fears were realized on 7 December, when he heard that not only Mary Tudor but also Cardinal Pole had died. Four days later, according to his confessor, ‘His Majesty is so depressed by the death of his father and the others, which so afflict him that he does not want to see anyone for a while.’ Three weeks later, still in solitude at Groenendaal, Philip painted a sombre picture of his situation.

I have no money to pay for any of the many things that must be done, so that I cannot maintain myself any more with the resources of the Netherlands. Nor can I go to Spain without making peace first, because it would not look good and would dishearten these provinces – although my presence here does nothing to win them over, but rather alienates them.

Indeed, he mused disconsolately, ‘I think they would be happy with any sovereign except me.’⁵¹

Ever since he started to govern, fifteen years before, Philip had craved independence and respect – and resented the fact that he did not seem to get them. As he scribbled angrily on the dorse of one of Mary of Hungary's hectoring letters to 'Your Highness' in spring 1558:

You will see from this letter that the queen certainly knows how to make her case, and that she must have advisers who tell her what would be best for her, without showing me the respect that they should have for me, because they do not want to recognize my status. I want no one to rank above me in these realms of mine, except for His Majesty [Charles V].⁵²

Now that both Mary and 'His Majesty' were dead, Philip's wish had come true. As he entered his fourth decade, after the long apprenticeship, he could now issue orders 'by virtue of our own will, certain knowledge, and absolute royal authority, which in this matter we wish to use and do use as king and sovereign lord, not recognizing any temporal superior on this earth'.⁵³ Besides respect and authority, he also possessed absolute freedom in his personal life: he could get up and go to bed whenever he wanted, take as long as he liked to shave and get dressed, come and go as he pleased, speak or be silent whenever and wherever he chose, and surround himself with Fools and jesters as much as he desired. How would he make use of all these new freedoms?

PART II

THE KING AND HIS WORLD

The king at work¹

‘A blizzard of problems’

In not waste an hour, spending the whole day dealing with his papers, a French ambassador wrote of Philip II in 1559. Fifteen years later, a Venetian diplomat remained impressed by the king's dedication: ‘The king works with such diligence, without any recreation, that there is no minister in the world, however diligent he may be, who is as involved in his work as His Majesty.’ And in a funeral sermon for Philip in 1598, a royal preacher declared, ‘You never saw in this world a man who worked so hard: he never spent an idle hour, but was always dealing with papers, memoranda and affairs. Even in the woods and gardens he was loaded down with papers, ceaselessly writing and transacting business.’²

The king himself agreed, and often called to his ministers' attention how hard he worked. In 1558, in a letter written when ‘it's already after midnight’, Philip complained that ‘they are killing me with work by day, which means I am worn out by night’, so that ‘if I have forgotten something, you should blame the sleep I lost by having to get up early’. Seven years later, he again complained that ‘the burdens I have to carry are so heavy that I no longer know what I am doing or saying’. He nevertheless kept working on his papers until ‘1 a.m., and everyone is falling asleep around me’. One day in 1577, when the king looked up from his desk, he found ‘it's 10 p.m., I feel shattered and I'm dying of

hunger'. A year later he informed his secretary that 'so many papers have just arrived, after I have spent the whole day working without stopping, that I will not be able to finish with them tonight. I really don't know what they [the authors of the papers] think of me, other than I must be made of iron or stone; but really, although I keep quiet about it, I'm so tired that they will soon find out that I'm human like everyone else.'³

'So many papers': where did they all come from? Since his empire included more than fifty million vassals and extended from the Philippines, via Mexico and Peru, to Spain, the Low Countries and half of Italy, governing them – and especially defending them – created an immense paper trail. From his accession until 1559, and from 1589 until just before his death, he fought the French; until 1576 he remained at war with the Ottoman empire; after 1572, except for six months in 1577, his forces struggled to suppress his rebellious Dutch subjects and their allies (most notably England after 1585). He often fought wars on more than one front simultaneously, and at sea as well as on land; and to fund these various conflicts, in the words of a recent article, he 'managed a budget on a scale that has not been seen since the height of the Roman Empire'.⁴


Fighting wars places all rulers under intense stress. Not only do they require resources that may prove hard to find, they also divert attention from other problems – just as those other problems sometimes divert attention from winning the war. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense of the United States during the 1960s, eloquently voiced this timeless dilemma in his memoirs:

One reason the Kennedy and Johnson administrations failed to take an orderly, rational approach to the basic questions underlying Vietnam was the staggering variety and complexity of other issues we faced. Simply put, we faced a blizzard of problems: there were only twenty-four hours in the day and we often did not have time to think straight. This predicament is not unique to the administration in which I served or to the United States. It has existed in all times and in most countries ... and it ought to be recognized and planned for when organizing a government.⁵

Philip and his ministers faced exactly the same 'predicament' as McNamara and others who led a global empire at war: what they needed was 'time to think straight' about what would be the best

policy – and they usually failed to find it. One day, Philip complained that although ‘I would like to deal with’ some matters of critical importance, ‘there are so many other things that prevent me. What I most regret is that I am slowed down by having so many things to do’, and ‘if I tried to do all of them, I would get nothing done’.⁶

Philip tried to deal with the ‘blizzard of problems’ that he faced in writing. According to an English diplomat in 1575, ‘This king is most wise, a diligent dealer in his owne affaires with great secrecy ... He writeth and dispatcheth by billets more (they will saie) than all his secretaris.’ A decade later, a Venetian ambassador provided a more detailed picture of the workload of this ‘diligent dealer’:



7. Philip II's Wars. Philip's Monarchy enjoyed peace for only six months: between February and September 1577, when hostilities ceased in both the Netherlands and the Mediterranean. Thereafter, although the king

never went to war with the Turks again, conflict returned to the Netherlands (lasting until 1609) and began with England (open hostilities lasted from 1585 to 1603). After the assassination of Henry III in 1589 Philip became increasingly involved in the French Religious Wars until the peace of Vervins in 1598. Overseas, the Portuguese outposts in Africa and South Asia engaged in various hostilities: first against their local enemies and then against the Dutch who after 1594 began to send heavily-armed fleets into the Indian Ocean.

He writes every day with his own hand more than a quinternion of paper, between minutes, opinions and orders, which are transmitted to his councillors, judges, secretaries and ministers in this way; and it is hardly to be believed how much time he spends in signing letters, licences, patents and other affairs of grace and justice, which on certain days amount to two thousand.


In 1592, according to an English spy, writing still formed Philip's 'common occupation, and thereby he dispatcheth more than any three secretaries; and in this manner with his pen and purse governeth the world'.⁷

Even these observers underestimated the quantity of business transacted by Philip in writing, because he and his ministers deliberately destroyed many important documents. Thus in 1579 the president of the council of Castile informed the king that he still had 'some papers' on his desk concerning a delicate matter 'besides those I have already burned; and since the matter is now closed, if Your Majesty agrees I can burn the rest'. The king approved. He and his ministers also refused to entrust some matters to paper: 'You already know what else I might say about this, and about other things that are happening in the world, which should not be written down' (1552); 'I will tell Your Majesty about this in person, whenever it pleases you to hear me, because it is not something to entrust to paper' (1572); 'Let us talk about this in due course, because it is something better spoken than written about' (1577); 'This matter is not something that should be written down' (1579); '[This] should not be committed to paper, so I will talk to you about it' (1588).⁸

The conciliar system

Throughout his reign, most matters that required a decision came to the king's desk from one of thirteen permanent councils and a

permanent committee (the Junta de Obras y Bosques, or ‘Ministry of Works’). Philip inherited five of these councils from his great-grandparents, Ferdinand and Isabella, and five more and the junta from his father; the other three he instituted himself. After 1561, when Madrid became the permanent location of the central government, each body met at fixed times on fixed days in the Alcázar, the royal palace, and transacted business in a constant rhythm, even when the monarch himself was absent. Each council (consisting of a president, a secretary and a number of councillors) performed two principal functions: maintaining the rights and powers of the crown in their area of competence; and discussing letters and memoranda concerning that same area before recommending what action the king should take. Government officials throughout the Monarchy channelled their reports to the king through the appropriate central institution. Thus the viceroys of each of Spain’s Italian dominions received orders to send all letters relating to ‘administration, justice, domain and finance, other routine business, and patronage’ to the council of Italy; matters of war or peace, and relations with other rulers, to the council of State; and any business involving the crown of Aragon and the Inquisition to the appropriate central body.⁹



- 8.** The councils of Philip II (with their dates of creation). By the time of his death in 1598, fourteen central councils or permanent committees (each the equivalent of a modern government department) advised Philip. He inherited eleven institutions and created only three: the council of Italy in the 1550s and the councils of Portugal and Flanders in the 1580s.

The repetition of a council’s name in parenthesis means that it

continued to meet after the king transferred some of its functions to a new body. Two dates of creation separated by a slash indicates that the king drastically changed the body's responsibilities at a later date, so that it could be said to have two 'birthdays'.

At the beginning of his reign, Philip presided in person over meetings of the council of State, but a few months after his return to Spain in 1559 he ceased to attend, on the grounds that his absence would encourage free debate: henceforth his presence at discussions signalled that a major policy decision was imminent. Except for the council of Castile, which by tradition attended on him as a body once a week, the secretary of every council brought a pile of *consultas* (the formal reports communicating the council's recommendations on each incoming letter or other document on which the king sought its advice) to the anteroom of the king's study, whence his valets brought them in sequence to his desk. There, Philip read them and then wrote his decision in the broad left margin empty on all *consultas* for precisely this purpose. Some of his responses were brief ('Agreed', 'Good', 'Do so') but others overflowed between the lines and sometimes overran the corresponding paragraph, necessitating a dividing line to show where one comment ended and the next began. Once Philip had written out his decisions, long or short, the document went back to the secretary of the appropriate council, who prepared a suitable response and sent it to the king for signature (see plates 10 and 11).

The king planned his days meticulously. 'Come tomorrow evening' or 'tomorrow after I eat lunch', he informed the ministers he could not avoid seeing. 'Tell me how things stand tomorrow at lunch time, and I will tell you when I can listen to you.' Whenever possible, Philip planned his tasks a week in advance. One Monday in 1578, when Inquisitor-General Gaspar de Quiroga requested a meeting the king replied: 'I would be very pleased to see you, but I have already planned out the whole week, at least until Saturday'; but when Saturday came, he told Quiroga that he would have to wait another day: 'Tomorrow, Sunday, you can come here after 3 p.m., because I could not manage to see you today.'¹⁰ The unexpected arrival of urgent papers infuriated him. 'These "special deliveries" destroy me,' he once complained, because 'they prevent

me from doing the things that I had planned to take care of today.’ On another occasion, while he was reading a consulta sent by one of his ministers ‘your messenger’ brought another document – but the king refused to accept it, writing on it: ‘I cannot see this until tomorrow because I have already made plans to see many other things tonight. It would mess up everything for me.’¹¹

Philip always carefully read the documents presented by his ministers before signing them. Although he later applied a rubber stamp [*estampilla*] to routine orders, he still seems to have glanced at them first and sometimes struck through a neatly written text because he had noted an administrative irregularity (‘It seems to me that there are problems with the warrants I have not signed, because those for the three kingdoms of the crown of Aragon, and especially the one for Aragon itself, will not be obeyed and are against the *fueros* [local customs]’); because he did not like the tone (‘The letters for the king of Portugal and the republic of Genoa are impertinent, because they read almost like orders’); because it was unclear (‘Do it again, omitting the words I have deleted which nobody will understand’); or because he had spotted an error (‘It seems to me that it was not [1 August] but 31 July. See if this is correct in the cyphered text, because my letters should contain no mistakes.’ He also sometimes insisted on seeing with his own eyes papers which his ministers would have preferred to conceal from him (‘I want to see these messages for myself’). When more delicate matters were at stake, the king might labour to improve the text or add a holograph postscript; and he wrote letters entirely in his own hand to the pope, to his close relatives, and to his senior ministers on sensitive issues.¹²

Only rarely would the king admit that he lacked the competence to take a decision. In 1562, when asked under oath about the orthodoxy of some theological views, he declined to answer because ‘His Majesty is not a theologian’; and a quarter of a century later, when his secretary asked what steps should be taken to deal with an apocalyptic preacher, the king snapped back, ‘Since I am not a lawyer, I have no idea what to say.’¹³ The only subject on which Philip freely (and frequently) admitted his ignorance was finance. Sometimes he became angry when his advisers sent him papers that he could not comprehend: ‘The author must understand this [paper] better than I do, because I cannot understand it at all’; ‘You know how little I know about

which is a better or worse memorial, and now that this one has arrived I do not wish to burst my brains on something I do not understand and have never managed to understand in my whole life'; 'I have never been able to get this business of loans and interests into my head'; 'I have already told you on other occasions how little I understand these matters – and this time I certainly understood very little, almost nothing, of this paper, although I have read it more than twice.'¹⁴ He also became angry when his advisers did not agree. 'For someone who cannot make head or tail of this matter, it is bad to have so many contradictions,' he protested one day in 1573; worse, 'I cannot discuss the various proposals with the council of Finance because it's a matter that I do not understand, and so I would not be able to do anything except what they tell me I should do.'¹⁵

Despite his frustration, Philip knew that financial affairs 'are so many and so important that truly I feel dismayed at not knowing what to do with them, and it is so important to make the right decision'. He usually did his best to understand the memorials submitted by Juan Fernández de Espinosa, a banker who served as his treasurer general – 'I read this paper by Juan Fernández, but not the rest because I did not understand any of them' – but sometimes even Fernández's proposals left him perplexed. 'To be frank,' he complained of one of them,

I could not understand a word of this. I do not know what I should do: should I send it to someone else for comment, and if so, to whom? Time is slipping away. Or would it be best for me to see the author (although I fear I shall not understand him)? Perhaps if I had the papers in front of me it might not be too bad.

The king grudgingly agreed to see Fernández the following day – but on condition 'that he brings the papers with him, so that he has them in his hand while we talk'.¹⁶

Keeping the initiative

Philip's insistence on transacting so much business in writing gave great power to the small number of ministers who handled state papers. The council secretaries, for example, selected the letters and papers he could read in full, those that he would see merely in summary, and occasionally those that he would not see at all. In

1574, when the war in the Netherlands had reached a critical stage, Mateo Vázquez, the king's chaplain and personal secretary, decided to forward a dossier on an unrelated subject with a cover note that read: 'Although I can see that concern for the Netherlands preoccupies Your Majesty, and that the problems there afford little time to attend to other business, I thought I should remind you about the attached letter from Don Diego de Mendoza'. In 1586, one of the king's distant relatives thanked the same Vázquez for having ensured that Philip saw his petition, 'because although His Majesty does everything he can for me, his many concerns sometimes distract him.'¹⁷ Conversely, that same year, Vázquez secretly returned to a colleague a document 'that I came across in the incoming mail that I believe His Majesty should not see'. In 1577 Secretary of State Antonio Pérez informed the Spanish ambassador in Paris, a close friend, that his letters 'gave great satisfaction to our master. He saw all of them – I mean, the ones he should see.' A decade later Pérez's successor, Don Juan de Idiáquez, likewise intercepted and suppressed a letter addressed to the king by the duke of Medina Sidonia, declining his appointment to command the Spanish Armada and expressing serious doubts about the wisdom of the enterprise itself. 'We did not dare to show his Majesty what you have just written,' Idiáquez and his colleague Don Cristóbal de Moura announced. In 1595, finally, when the same Moura received a consulta from the president of the council of Finance, he replied drily, 'I did not wish to tell His Majesty anything about this' because Moura did not think Philip would like it.¹⁸

Unless it arrived with a recommendation from one of his councils, Philip rarely took a decision on any paper that reached his desk without first seeking advice from a trusted minister. For example, when in 1578 he received a memorandum about economic matters, the king asked his secretary: 'See if someone else should take a look at this, and (given the subject) who – because I don't understand it.' Twenty years later, Nuncio Camillo Caetani (an acute observer) confirmed that Philip has 'always sought the opinion of his councillors' – although, Caetani continued, 'to maintain secrecy, he keeps a lot to himself and often shares knowledge of his affairs with only a few people, not all equal to handling so many and different matters'.¹⁹

This administrative procedure fostered bitter personal rivalries

among the ‘few people’ in whom the king placed his trust. His father’s Instructions of 1543 had warned about ‘the animosities, alliances and almost cabals that have formed or are being formed among my ministers’ and, as the emperor had predicted, they increased over time. The rivalry between the two most important officers of the royal household, Ruy Gómez de Silva (*Sumiller de Corps*) and the duke of Alba (*Mayordomo Mayor*) eventually forced almost all ministers to align themselves with one or the other. In addition, those who enjoyed the king’s favour exerted themselves to secure government jobs for their relatives, including distant relatives (thus Ruy Gómez furthered the career of Juan de Escobedo, who would become the personal secretary of Philip’s brother, Don John of Austria, because Escobedo was his wife’s cousin). Such empire-building enabled dynasties like the Toledos (of which the duke of Alba was the senior member) and the Mendozas (to which Ruy Gómez’s wife belonged) to obtain many official posts, producing a sustained rivalry at all levels of the royal administration given that ‘the entire House of Mendoza hates the House of Toledo’.²⁰ Ministers also forged alliances with colleagues who might help them achieve their goals. Thus Antonio Pérez secured for Gaspar de Quiroga first the see of Toledo and then a cardinal’s hat; Quiroga in turn convinced the king to appoint his ally Antonio Mauriño de Pazos as president of the council of Castile; and Pazos reciprocated by singing Pérez’s praises to the king. ‘Patriotism’ could also reinforce factions. When Diego de Simancas, a member of the council of Castile, tried to work out why the king had named Pazos, not him, president of the council, he recalled that ‘some months earlier Quiroga had boasted in his home that the next president would either be him or whoever he wanted’. But why, Simancas persisted, had Quiroga wanted Pazos? He saw the explanation in geography: ‘the Quirogas come from Galicia, and Pazos too was from Galicia’. The archbishop had therefore looked after his compatriot: ‘He got him named bishop of Ávila, telling the king that he deserved to be archbishop of Toledo more than he himself, and that the king could and should employ him in matters of great importance.’ By securing the appointment of an otherwise underqualified compatriot, Simancas concluded, Quiroga ‘had placed him under an obligation, and might expect that he would keep him under his thumb’.²¹

Philip introduced an important innovation to counter the risk that his ministers might deceive him. Early in his reign, he began to instruct senior ministers that ‘You may also put on the envelope “to be placed in the king’s hands”, because I have ordered that such letters should be brought to me sealed so that, when I have seen the contents, I can arrange what is most convenient for my service’. Inevitably a few ministers abused the system, but they did not do so for long. Thus in 1586 the king lost his temper with a viceroy who insisted on referring too much to him directly: ‘Sending letters “to be placed in the king’s hands” has become a terrible burden, because I often lack the time even to open them. In fact it only serves to slow business down, because I have had these two letters for days but have not been able to open them until now.’²² But woe betide the secretary who inadvertently opened a letter ‘to be placed in the king’s hands’! In 1594 Philip’s private secretary trembled as he reported that ‘while opening the packages that the courier just brought, I opened by mistake this one from the president [of the council of Castile] which was to be “placed in Your Majesty’s hands”, and I did not realize until I had removed the envelope; but I swear to Your Majesty that I never saw a word of what it contains’. The king was furious: ‘Make sure you look more carefully in future, so that there are no more mistakes like this.’²³

Yet the king was not above opening letters addressed to others, including those of foreign diplomats in Madrid, or even decoding documents that ‘are not for me’ before resealing the originals and sending them to their destination. ‘You and I must be like confessors,’ Philip joked with Mateo Vázquez when he ordered him to transcribe documents ‘without a living soul seeing or knowing’. From time to time he also ordered Vázquez to maintain a secret correspondence with one minister concerning the conduct of another.²⁴ Such devious practices led Ambassador Leonardo Donà of Venice to warn his masters that ‘by nature, [the king] is both very prudent and very suspicious’, and in his ‘Relation’ to the Senate at the end of his embassy in 1573 he repeated that Philip never entirely trusted anyone: ‘The king suffers from the same malady as his father: that is, suspicion’.²⁵

In 1565 Secretary of State Gonzalo Pérez, who boasted forty years of administrative experience, complained bitterly to a colleague about a major defect in the administrative style of their

master. 'His Majesty makes mistakes, and will continue to make mistakes, in many matters because he handles them with different people, sometimes with one, at other times with another, concealing something from one minister but revealing other things. It is therefore small wonder that different and even contradictory orders are issued.' Two years later, his successor Gabriel de Zayas used even stronger terms. 'The king chooses to allow important matters to flow through many channels,' he complained to the duke of Alba, 'which creates chaos.'²⁶ The king took note, and to ensure that 'important matters' did not travel through 'many channels' he appointed the same ministers to serve on several councils. A position on both State and War, or on Indies and Finance, was common; a seat on State, War and Finance was not unknown – so that at least some members knew what was happening in other advisory bodies and could, at least in theory, help to coordinate affairs. Francisco de Eraso, who had served Philip and his father for thirty years, had by 1559 become the secretary of no fewer than six councils and a member of two more. As the French ambassador put it, just before the king and his entourage left the Netherlands, 'the management of almost everything is now entrusted to the hands' of Eraso 'because his master esteems him and defers to him so much'.²⁷ This 'esteem' lasted until 1565, when accusations of corruption led the king to authorize a formal investigation (*visita*) into Eraso's official conduct. A year later, Philip imposed a fine of 12,000 ducats, suspended him from most of his offices for twelve months and deprived him of all his treasury posts.

Almost immediately, Philip began to defer to Diego de Espinosa, a priest born to a poor gentry family. After studying civil and canon law at Salamanca, the king named him a judge in the Audiencia of Seville, where he impressed the Jesuit Francisco de Borja, who recommended him to the king as 'a person of much learning, virtue and prudence' worthy of high office. Philip duly appointed Espinosa a member of the council of State, president of the council of Castile and Inquisitor-General. By 1565 Espinosa had become 'the man in all Spain in whom the king places most confidence and with whom he discusses most business, concerning both Spain and foreign affairs' and 'everything – sacred and secular, worldly and spiritual – passes through his hands'. In short, as an astonished ambassador put it, Philip had made Espinosa

‘another king in this court’.²⁸

Although concentrating power in a single pair of hands created an enviable consistency in the policies of Philip’s government, it also fostered a false appearance of unanimity among decision-makers – both actively (by discouraging the expression of dissenting views) and passively (by guiding discussions in ways that minimized disagreement). A later generation would call this ‘groupthink’. The stifling of debate during the Espinosa years helps to explain the inflexible policies that provoked both the Dutch and the Moriscos of Granada to rebel (chapters 8 and 11); and it may also explain why, after Espinosa’s sudden death in September 1572, the king did not appoint a successor to ‘superintend matters of war, state and finance, the handling of consultas and all the rest of the burden [of business] entrusted to the Cardinal’.²⁹ ‘I believed that it was right to entrust many matters which concerned my royal office to the Cardinal,’ Philip informed Espinosa’s successor as president of the council of Castile. ‘And perhaps good reasons existed for it then. But experience has shown that it was not a good thing; and although it meant more leisure and less work for me, I do not think it should be allowed to continue.’ Philip had come to appreciate the wisdom of his father’s advice, tendered almost thirty years before: ‘do not become tied or obliged to any [single minister], because while it will save you time it is not in your interest.’³⁰

The junta system

Instead of allowing one of his ministers to serve as ‘another king at court’ (as his successors would do, openly appointing a Favourite), after Espinosa’s death Philip relied on a network of informal committees (*juntas*) coordinated by a ‘chief of staff’: Mateo Vázquez, a priest of obscure origins (an orphan, possibly illegitimate) who had served as Espinosa’s secretary. After the cardinal’s death, Vázquez proposed to Philip a simple method of reducing his burdens. ‘It seems,’ he wrote cautiously, ‘that Your Majesty lacks a private secretary, which means that you cannot avoid reading and writing many things, and I fear this burden of work may damage your health.’³¹ Vázquez took the oath as royal secretary on 1 April 1573 and Philip entrusted to him two principal duties: he handled all correspondence ‘to be placed in the

king's hands'; and he coordinated the informal juntas created by Espinosa, and served as their secretary. Together, Vázquez and the king determined who should become a member of each junta (and when they should be dropped), the times of the meetings and the agenda. Vázquez also took the minutes, relayed the king's instructions to each junta and presented their recommendations to the king. Vázquez later took over two more tasks: drafting the king's decisions on incoming consultas ('His Majesty orders that ...'); and serving as intermediary between Philip and the council secretaries ('His Majesty has given me some letters from prelates about the arms trade and ordered me to send them to the council of Castile, even though they appear appropriate to the council of War' or 'His Majesty ordered me to send to the president of the council of the Indies two letters, even though they come from Inquisition tribunals' in America). He would do this until his death in 1591, making him for a time 'probably the second most powerful man in the Spanish empire'.³²

Vázquez paid a high price for his prominence. He lived constantly at the king's beck and call, often obliged to drop whatever he was doing and attend to something else immediately. 'After writing to you, something has come up about which I must speak to you today. So be ready to come here whenever I call you – which will be as soon as I can' (1574); 'Transcribe this immediately, while I write and attend to other things and then eat my lunch' (1577); 'Look at this while I eat and then take my siesta, and send me your advice so that I can read it and decide what to do when I awake' (1579).³³

Yet even Vázquez's devotion could not halt the avalanche of business that flowed over the king's desk. At the beginning of the reign, the council of the Indies met for three hours every morning, but after 1571 it also met three afternoons a week; and while the council of Finance used to meet only twice a week, by 1580 it transacted business every morning for three or four hours and sometimes continued into the afternoons. This inevitably increased the number of consultas that arrived on the king's desk. The council of War, for example, produced scarcely two bundles of documents a year in the 1560s but over thirty a year in the 1590s – a fifteen-fold increase – while the council's secretaries prepared for the king's scrutiny and signature nearly 2,000 letters annually on military and naval business. The activity of other parts of the

central government increased at a similar pace. Between March 1572 and March 1573, during the 161 days that Philip spent away from his capital, couriers from Madrid brought him more than 500 packets full of letters and consultas from the ministers in the capital. Council secretaries sent the lion's share of the couriers (70 per cent); the marquis of Ladrada, majordomo of the queen and her children, single-handedly sent almost 5 per cent; while four other ministers sent 10 per cent more.³⁴ The same couriers also brought masses of direct petitions from individuals for the king to grant them something: a pension or a pardon; a civil or ecclesiastical post; payment of salary arrears or a licence to print a book; a knighthood in one of the Military Orders or a patent of nobility. In March 1571, for example, over 1,250 individual memorials arrived for the king's consideration – an average of over 40 a day.

Every memorial, like every consulta, required the king to make a decision. Some were easy – 'having read everything, I have decided that ...' or 'They are right about this, so let it be done when and how they suggest' – but others were not. Thus in 1575, Philip spent a miserable day in his role as Grand Master of the Military Order of Santiago, 'in which I am bursting my brains because there are 117 qualified supplicants for 12 vacant positions'. So he put off the decision for three days, but then found the task even more overwhelming because 'with many asking and few receiving, most will remain discontented; and for this and other reasons I say that the office of king is awful'. Filling positions in the Church, in his household and in his government also absorbed countless hours: for every vacancy, there were many qualified applicants, most of them with powerful patrons in his entourage – and in each case the king had to choose among them, sometimes finding it necessary 'to shut myself away yesterday and the day before, because otherwise I would not be able to do anything'.³⁵

Nevertheless, thanks to their dedication and flexibility, the king and the central administration coped reasonably efficiently with the mass of routine business generated by the empire on which the sun never set. The *Diary* kept by Antonio Gracián y Dantisco, who handled the king's correspondence between 1571 and 1576, reveals the remarkable speed with which Philip took many decisions: 'A package from Escobedo [secretary of the treasury]

arrived in the morning and the courier left with the replies at 6 p.m.’; ‘Another courier arrived at 8:30 p.m. with letters from the president [of the council of Castile] and he left with the replies within half an hour’; ‘A courier arrived at 10 p.m. with a small package from the princess [Juana] which had to be given to the king at once; it was, and he left with the reply at 11 p.m.’ One day Philip returned a pile of papers to Gracián’s successor, Mateo Vázquez, with the smug note ‘Here is everything that arrived today’ – but, he added wistfully, ‘Would that it was always thus’.³⁶ In 1573, while serving as viceroy of Naples and desperate to receive orders from the king, Cardinal Granvelle jested to a colleague, ‘if he must wait for death, he wanted it to come from Spain, for then it would never arrive’. Three years later, in Rome, Granvelle again complained:

I am idle here, waiting to see what happens and watching as if from a window as the bulls of the world fight. To be sure, I sometimes want to come down and throw my stick at them, to hurry them along, because travelling as slowly as we do is causing great damage to public affairs.³⁷

The cardinal knew whereof he spoke. In 1560, when he was Philip’s principal minister in the Netherlands, he received a complaint from Gonzalo Pérez, who was trying to coordinate the foreign policy of the entire Monarchy: ‘I have been ill these past few days, but that has not prevented me from attending to business punctually, since decisions are taken so slowly that even a cripple could keep up with them.’ A few years later Granvelle’s brother, a senior ambassador waiting in vain for instruction, petulantly observed: ‘As for our master, everything is put off until the morrow, and the main decision taken in everything is never to take a decision.’³⁸

Foreign observers agreed. According to the French ambassador in 1560, Philip’s decision ‘to be master, minister and secretary at the same time is a great virtue, but it produces such notable delays and confusion that all those who reside here to ask for something are desperate’. A decade later his successor complained that ‘the decisions of the Spanish court are so uncertain and take so long that those who think they will receive dispatches in a week will not get them within a month.’ In 1577 the papal secretary of state, waiting in vain for the king to commit his resources to an invasion of Ireland, fumed that ‘The sole cause of this dilatoriness is His

Majesty's irresolution'.³⁹

Don Diego de Córdoba, a courtier who served Philip for three decades, was particularly outspoken on this subject. In 1560 he regretted that 'There is so much business to transact that we spent the whole day with our heads buried in paperwork. If you take a day off, when you return you pay for it sevenfold'; and a decade later he claimed that life at court had become 'papers and more papers, and the quantity increases every day' because the king 'writes memoranda every hour, and even when he is getting up, eating or retiring his [valets] come in with papers that, in the end, are not worth a fig'. In 1574 Don Diego delivered his most memorable comment on the subject: 'His Majesty has been working in recent days even more than usual in reading and writing papers, until they come out of his backside (may Your Lordship forgive me) ... because on Saturday morning at 3 o'clock he had terrible diarrhoea.'⁴⁰

In part, this was the inevitable corollary of the king's insistence on keeping the central government compartmentalized, on transacting everything in writing and on reserving so many matters for his own personal scrutiny – and this gave rise (to adapt Don Diego's metaphor) to the king's logorrhoea. Thus one day in 1565, having already written twice to Pedro de Hoyo, one of his secretaries, Philip suddenly thought of something else: 'In both of the notes that I sent to you today I wanted to say something that I will tell you now, but I kept on forgetting, although I had it on the tip of my tongue.' And what was this urgent piece of information? That he had decided *not* to send a particular edition of the Bible to the Escorial, because the library there already had one. Two years later, 'Although I have 100,000 papers in front of me' Philip stopped what he was doing to remind Hoyo about 'the stones that we still lack' to complete a phase of construction at the Escorial chapel and that 'the small pond currently under construction' at the Casa de Campo, a royal park on the outskirts of Madrid, 'needs to be completed'.⁴¹

One might argue that the king was entitled to devote detailed attention to the various country retreats where he spent so much of his time, but some of the other matters that absorbed him are astonishing. Gracián's register frequently lists the 'trivia [*menudencias*]' on which Philip insisted on spending so many hours, and his exasperation shines through with particular

brilliance in his entry for 2 June 1573, at a critical time for the war effort in both the Netherlands and the Mediterranean. 'I went to San Jerónimo before lunch, summoned by His Majesty' where 'the whole day was wasted' – an eloquent term! – 'in discussing and conferring about transferring the corpses of the prince [don Carlos] and the queen [Isabel] to the Escorial'.⁴² The following year, Philip began his response to a letter from the Inquisitor-General: 'I will respond to the rest of what you say with a few words, because I lack the time for many' – and then filled three pages with comments. One night in 1575, Philip began a long note to a minister: 'It's 11 p.m. and I am still waiting for the packet for Juan Vázquez [patronage secretary] that you need to send me; but I can't wait for it any more, since my eyes and head are weary, and also I need to go to church and attend Mass tomorrow' – but he still postponed going to bed by writing two pages about matters that (as Don Diego de Córdoba would have said) 'in the end, are not worth a fig'.⁴³ When one of his ministers tried irony to bridle the king's enthusiasm to know and do everything – 'I am sorry to fatigue Your Majesty with such trifling matters' – the king replied imperviously 'They do not fatigue me, they delight me!' On at least one occasion he confessed that he scribbled simply for the sake of it: 'There's no need for you to respond,' he assured Mateo Vázquez after a tirade that covered several pages, 'because I only tell you all this in order to relax'. Relax!⁴⁴

'The largest brain in the world'

Exchanges such as these vindicate critics like Córdoba who claimed that the king wasted his time on trivia instead of taking crucial decisions on which the fate of the Monarchy depended. In 1574, the Venetian ambassador asserted that 'the king spends a lot of time on trivia which deprive him of time to deal with more important matters'; while ten years later, Granvelle complained bitterly:

I see in all matters these delays, so pernicious and in so many ways prejudicial to our own affairs, including the most important ones, which become lost to view with so much delay. And the reason is that His Majesty wants to do and see everything, without trusting anyone else, busying himself with so many petty details that he has no time left to resolve what matters most.

Somewhat later the papal nuncio in Spain complained that 'His Majesty wants to see and do every single thing himself, yet that would not be possible even if he had ten hands and as many heads'.⁴⁵ But the most comprehensive indictment of Philip's refusal to delegate came in 1589 from Don Juan de Silva, who served Philip for over half a century as page, soldier, ambassador and councillor. 'The detailed attention that His Majesty devotes to the most trifling things is a subject for regret,' Silva began, 'because when a man finds things to do in order to avoid working, it is what we call a pastime; but when he works in order to find things to do it cannot be given the name it deserves.' He continued,

His Majesty's brain, although it must be the largest in the world, like that of any other human being, is not capable of organizing the multitude of his affairs without making some division between those that he should deal with himself and those that he cannot avoid delegating to others. It is equally true that His Majesty does not make this distinction ... Instead he leaves nothing entirely alone and takes from everyone the material that should be delegated (concerning individuals and details), and so does not concentrate on the general and the important because he finds them too tiring.⁴⁶

Were these critics correct? Some of them, after all, wrote in anger and frustration: by 1584 Granvelle was an embittered old man who had been twice brutally shunted from the centre to the periphery of power, while Silva in 1589 sulked on his country estates because the king had not rewarded him as he felt he deserved. What really irritated Donà and the nuncio, for their part, was the fact that the king did not concentrate on the matters of primary concern to *them*. Nevertheless, the critics had a point. Although Philip sometimes complained that 'the many tasks and major matters of business at present' prevented him from doing the things he wanted, the same documents show that he always found time to spend on 'trivia' that interested him. Thus in August 1572, while struggling to suppress the Dutch Revolt and fearful that France might declare war on him, Philip received a letter from the prior of the monastery of San Lorenzo de El Escorial complaining that since his monks refused to accept his own allocation of cells, 'I beg Your Majesty to help us, as usual, because once it is known here that this is Your Majesty's decision everyone will be happy and will accept whatever they get'. Forgetting his

‘many tasks and major matters of business’, the king leaped into action. He replied to the prior in his own hand: ‘I accept the task of allocating the cells, because I have committed to memory the floor plan of the monastery; although I will also need a list of all the friars, arranged by seniority and the tasks they do.’ As soon as the list arrived, the most powerful monarch in Christendom sat down to match the friars with the cells – and we know he did so in person because two weeks later the prior wrote again to say ‘I received the allocation of cells that Your Majesty was pleased to make’ and ‘since it was written in Your Majesty’s own hand, everyone saw it as a particular grace and favour’.⁴⁷ One must wonder whether the hours devoted to this exercise would have been better spent on considering how to resolve the rapidly worsening situation in the Netherlands.

The curse of audiences

The king himself saw things differently. For him, the principal causes of delay were the audiences demanded by both ministers and ambassadors, which often took up so many hours that afterwards he lacked both the time and the energy to plunge into the sea of paper that awaited him. In theory, whenever he was in Madrid, Philip gave audience ‘between 9 and 10 a.m., and between 5 and 6 p.m.’, and in addition he deliberately walked slowly on his way to and from Mass so that his subjects could speak to him or give him their petitions in person; but in practice, audiences consumed far more time.⁴⁸ When in 1577, someone suggested that his financial adviser Juan Fernández de Espinosa should come to see him at 2 p.m., Philip vehemently protested:

Let him come at half past three, because it is already two o’clock, and I have no time to see the queen and her children except right now. And impress upon him that he will have to leave at four, because I have lots more audiences then – even though I have [already] held thirty today. And, in view of that, just look at the back-log of papers I shall have.

Six years later, the council of Finance begged the king to grant them a weekly audience, only to receive the crushing rebuke: ‘I would be delighted to grant audiences to everyone’, but ‘it is better not to take up the time I need for so many things when it is in such short supply’.⁴⁹

Philip's desire to limit the number of meetings made good sense. To begin with, as every administrator has found out to his cost, meetings always last too long. He complained one day in 1576 that the Portuguese ambassador 'was here and spoke to me for a long time, which made me waste the whole morning, and I have not been able to recover the time I lost'; and (a few months later) 'the French ambassador and others have just been here, which has cost me the whole day'. Indeed, the king once observed in desperation, 'audiences and paperwork just don't go together'.⁵⁰

Philip himself was to blame for the duration of some meetings. In 1588, he granted an audience to José de Acosta, SJ about the problems faced by the Jesuit Order in Spain. The king read each point, after which Acosta offered clarification, but sometimes the king asked questions: while speaking of the 'secretary of Father Borja, the king interrupted and said "Which Father Borja?" I said "The one who was General of our Order". "You mean Father Francis" said the king; "Yes, sire, Father Francisco de Borja, our General."' The meeting must have lasted at least an hour.⁵¹ Audiences for ambassadors could take just as long – and up to fourteen envoys resided at the court of Spain at any time, each one constantly seeking the chance to explain in person a particular policy, seek clarification of the king's intentions or protest against one of his actions. Philip might procrastinate, but eventually each ambassador had to be both seen and heard – although, with a few exceptions, he seldom said much to them. Leonardo Donà, who wrote down every word spoken at each audience, seldom recorded more than one sentence ('although, as usual, his words were most gracious': see plate 12).⁵²

On occasion, the king seems to have 'tuned out' during audiences. In 1576, when an English envoy wanted to state his business to Philip 'by speache', Secretary of State Zayas replied 'that the king havinge infinite matters of great ymportance, that he could not well remember the particularities of things delivered unto him by speache'. The king did not deny it. Shortly before, when a minister asked Mateo Vázquez to arrange a meeting, Philip confessed 'I would be glad to see him but, really, I do not have the time, and little of what is said to me at audiences stays in my head – but don't tell anyone that. I mean in most audiences, not all.' At other times, however, the king listened intently. When Donà told him during an audience in 1573 that Venice had defected from its

Spanish alliance and made a separate peace with the Turks, Philip listened to the terms of the treaty impassively – except, Donà wrote, that ‘his mouth made a very small, ironic movement, smiling thinly’. But the silence concealed vindictive fury: later that day, when he complained to a minister that the Venetians ‘had made peace with the Turks’ he added malevolently: ‘I hope to God that those who suffer worse from this will be them’.⁵³

Those who wanted an audience experienced the greatest frustration when Philip left Madrid for one of his country retreats. In one of the anecdotes about the king with which Diego de Simancas filled his dyspeptic autobiography, he affirmed that he had gone to Madrid expressly ‘to pay his respects to the king’, but Philip ‘had unexpectedly left for El Escorial. I wanted to go there, but was told that I should not take the trouble because the king would soon be back. He stayed away a whole month. That’s why they say “His exits are predictable; his returns are unpredictable”.’ In 1586 the papal nuncio lamented that ‘it is rather irritating to have the king living so close [at the Escorial], and not occupied with anything important [*non occupato in cosa d’importanza*], when for four months I have been unable to secure an audience and I have received an answer to none – or very few – of the memorials I have sent him in this time’.⁵⁴

Eventually, both ministers and foreign diplomats learned to respect the king’s preferences. Thus Ambassador Fourquevaux of France deliberately delayed compliance with an express order from Paris to seek an audience, because he knew that Philip ‘prefers ambassadors to deal with him by letter rather than in person while he resides in his country houses’. Similarly, when an extraordinary ambassador arrived in Madrid from Venice to congratulate Philip on the victory of Lepanto, Donà did not allow him to ask for an audience until the king returned from the Escorial, because ‘His Majesty does not want ambassadors to come and worry him there’.⁵⁵ Some ambassadors even understood why: Donà’s successor reported that although Philip ‘spends most of his time away from the Court, in part to escape from tiring audiences and in part to take care of business matters better, he never stops reading and writing’. Fray José de Sigüenza, who observed the king at the Escorial for a quarter of a century, agreed: ‘He managed to do more here in one day than in four days in Madrid, thanks to his tranquil lifestyle’.⁵⁶ But a ‘tranquil lifestyle’ was only

one of the reasons why Philip spent so much time at the monastery he had constructed. He could also spend more time there communing with God about how to cope with the blizzard of problems, great and small, that beset him.

The king and God

Keeping the faith

LUIS CABRERA DE CÓRDOBA'S *History of Philip II, king of Spain*, the best account of the king's life written by someone who knew him personally, opens with a striking frontispiece. The king, in armour and with his sword drawn, stands as the sole barrier that prevents heavily armed men from attacking the Virgin Mary, who has placed the king's cloak over her arm while she holds the cross with one hand and a chalice with the other. The motto reads *Suma ratio pro religione*: 'The first priority is religion' (see plate 13). The image epitomizes Cabrera de Córdoba's book, in which Philip the Pious, sole defender of the Catholic Church, always put the protection of the faith before secular goals; but in reality the place of religion in Philip's life, both public and private, was far more complex.

The religious habits learned by the king as a child remained with him for ever. When in 1568 Don John of Austria left the court as Captain-General of the fleet, Philip began 'The Instruction for my brother' in just the same way as his father had done for him twenty-five years before (chapter 1): with his religious duties. 'First, since the foundation and origin of all things and of all good decisions lies with God, I strictly charge you, as a good and true Christian, that you take Him as the origin and foundation in everything you undertake and execute; and that you entrust all your affairs and concerns to God.' Next, Don John must 'take very good care to attend and practise confession, especially at Easter and other festivals, and to receive the Holy Sacrament when you

are in areas and places where you can do so; and when you are on land to attend Mass every day; and to say your prayers and private devotions whenever you have an hour or a moment on your own'.¹

This was a precise reflection of the king's own religious regimen. He attended Mass daily, heard sermons at least once a week and confessed and received communion four times a year. He also spent much time in private devotions. His valet Jehan Lhermite reported that 'ever since I began to know and serve him' – that is, from 1590 – 'not a single day passed in which the king did not devote a long period' to 'contemplation or mental prayer'. Lhermite also noted that 'there was not a corner of his bedroom where one did not see a pious image of some saint or a crucifix, and he always kept his eyes fixed and absorbed on these images, and his spirit lifted to the heavens'. Another valet, Juan Ruiz de Velasco, gave the king 'his books of devotions and opened in front of him a small portable oratory that he always took with him' with 'images of the Crucifixion and of Our Lady in silver bas relief, which had plenary indulgences attached to them. His Majesty spent several hours thinking about and pondering these divine and spiritual matters.'²

The bookcase filled with devotional works which the king kept by his bedside in the Escorial included some items that he had acquired as a child (such as the *Life of Christ* by Ludolf of Saxony, the Carthusian) while others reflected the vibrant spirituality of Spain's Counter-Reformation Church, such as the *Collected Works* of Juan of Ávila, Teresa of Ávila (the only female author in the king's collection) and Luis of Granada. A *Roman martyrology*, a life of Diego of Alcalá, some santorals, and books about the Marian shrines at Guadalupe, Montserrat and Loreto testified to Philip's devotion to the Virgin Mary and the saints; while several liturgical works (a breviary, a missal and a copy of the Polyglot Bible, all in special presentation copies from the Plantin Press of Antwerp) no doubt helped him to follow church services from his bedroom. In 1597, at the age of 70, when he bequeathed to his daughter Isabella Clara Eugenia 'an image of Our Lady and her blessed son' which 'I have heard belonged first to the Catholic Queen [Isabella] my great-grandmother', he noted that his mother the empress had given it to him 'and I have always carried it with me since the year 1535'.³

Periodically the king withdrew from government in order to

concentrate on his devotions. He went on 'retreat' during Holy Week and at times of severe mental strain (such as after the death of a family member) as well as for his routine devotions. In June 1572, when a courier arrived late one evening with documents from several councils, including one concerning the rapid spread of rebellion in the Netherlands, 'His Majesty ordered that it should not be delivered to him until the next day, in the morning, because he had confessed that evening and would take communion early the next day.'⁴ Five years later, when his ministers sent him papers on Holy Saturday, the king exploded: 'It seems that in Madrid they think that we have no Holy Week, Easter, confession and communion here' at the Escorial. 'Since I went to confession today, and have many other things to do, I cannot look at any of these.'⁵ Throughout the liturgical year, delays arose whenever the king attended a service ('I don't think I can manage this tomorrow, because it's a day of matins and vespers') or heard a sermon ('I can't send you any more tonight because we had a sermon today').⁶

No doubt these numerous religious activities allowed the king to step back from the constant stress of having to take decisions and renewed his ability to cope with broader issues. In 1579, while trying to rationalize the arrest of his Secretary of State Antonio Pérez, the perceptive Venetian ambassador in Madrid, Gianfrancesco Morosini, noted a striking parallel between the king's behaviour on this occasion and in a similar crisis eleven years before:

It seems that His Majesty had thought about this most carefully because the previous morning he confessed and took communion in the royal chapel, even though it was not a church festival and he had not taken communion privately like that for many years; but the coincidence that he did exactly the same when he resolved to arrest his son Don Carlos [in 1568] leads one to believe that in making his decision he wanted to entrust this important matter first to God.

Fray José de Sigüenza likewise speculated that when Philip 'spent time alone in prayer', he was no doubt 'rendering accounts to his true Lord and King; and in doing so, no doubt because God secretly inspired him, he worked out what he should do next'.⁷

The obsequious friar exaggerated slightly. On the eve of the patronal festival of St Lawrence in 1571, while the monks at the

Escorial celebrated the various offices, a minister told a colleague that ‘His Majesty attended all of them – although during matins he was writing the note to you that accompanies this’. Three months later the king returned a dossier to Mateo Vázquez with the admission, ‘I have seen all of this, albeit in haste and most of it during vespers’; and in 1584, while at the Escorial during Holy Week, although he ‘sat through two of the longest sermons I have ever heard in my life’, he confessed to his daughters ‘I slept through part of them’.⁸ Even when awake, Philip’s obsessive attention to detail could interfere with his devotions. Thus, at the first Mass celebrated in the basilica of the Escorial, a monk noted that ‘the Catholic King, the great expert on all matters liturgical’, was ‘looking at his missal to make sure we followed the directions there, and if he noticed any departure from the directions he immediately sent word’. Indeed, he added waspishly, ‘the king knew more and cared more about the affairs of the sacristy than the sacristans themselves’.⁹

The king also sought to supplement the effects of his personal devotion by mobilizing the faith of others. He periodically commanded every prelate in his dominions to arrange public prayers for causes that he deemed important. In the 1560s, these included the union of the Church, the success of the council of Trent, the defeat of the Turks, the suppression of the Dutch Revolt, the health of the queen, the end of a plague epidemic and the defeat of the Moriscos of the Alpujarras. In the 1570s, the king established a comprehensive prayer-chain throughout Castile to seek divine guidance and protection, and instructed prelates to mobilize ‘those whose prayers are likely to be most accepted by God’.¹⁰

Philip strove not only to accentuate the positive, but also to eliminate the negative. Fearing that unless his subjects lived godly lives he might forfeit divine support, the king periodically called upon his clergy to admonish their flocks to improve their ways. In 1577, as he wavered between war and peace in the Netherlands, he instructed all bishops ‘to pay special attention to the elimination and punishment of sins, concentrating on any faults among the clergy and punishing them’. He also instructed all secular judges to root out sin among his subjects because ‘we all need to placate Our Lord who, the evidence suggests, is highly offended by all our faults’.¹¹

When taking decisions that involved complex moral judgements, Philip often sought the advice of special committees of theologians (*juntas de teólogos*): on how best to raise war funds from the clergy of Castile; what to do when excommunicated by Pope Paul IV; how to plan for the council of Trent; which policy to pursue towards heresy in the Netherlands; and whether or not to enforce his claim to the Portuguese throne. His normal religious sounding board, however, was his confessor, whom Philip deluged with demands as to whether ‘in conscience’ he could authorize a policy suggested by his ministers. Although his final testament commanded his executors to burn all correspondence with his confessors without reading it, a few exchanges with Fray Diego de Chaves (royal confessor between 1578 and 1592) have survived, all of them terse but decisive. Many concerned matters of finance. Thus, when asked whether a draft proposal for rescheduling the king’s debts ‘is justified in good conscience’, Chaves replied that same day: ‘in this case I say that it is justified, and I can provide reasons if necessary’. Six years later, Philip sent Chaves a list of candidates for vacant bishoprics in New Spain, and once again the reply reached the royal desk the same day, together with an evaluation of each candidate and a recommendation. The king accepted them, ‘because I am obliged to nominate the best one’ – adding somewhat uneasily ‘and if I have not got it right, I will at least have done my duty’.¹²

From time to time, Chaves raised issues of conscience with the king on his own initiative. In 1588, he chided Philip ‘not only as a theologian, but as your confessor’ about his inaction over a contentious issue; and four years later he flatly refused to grant the king absolution unless he followed Chaves’s advice. Philip took the threat extremely seriously, and sent his chamberlain to find out more.

Here is the dossier for Fray Diego ... Give it to him today and bring me his answer tonight. Do try to calm him so that I can gain the [Easter] jubilee this week ... If he should threaten to stand firm, you can tell him that you will inform me, and ask that the matter be left there until after I have gained the jubilee this week.

Chaves did indeed stand firm. He complained that the king’s failure to appoint a president for the council of Castile (the senior law officer of the kingdom) denied his subjects justice, and then

added a wicked parallel about the way the king himself treated offenders at his court:

I, Your Majesty's confessor, cannot say more, nor does God oblige me to do so. It is not my job to arraign Your Majesty before Judge Armenteros [the magistrate responsible for law and order in the royal court]. However, the same God does oblige me to deny Your Majesty all sacraments unless you do what I say.

Philip crumbled: the candidate favoured by Chaves soon became president of the council. It is not hard to see why the king ordered his executors to burn such exchanges.¹³

Philip did not rely solely on the living to mobilize supernatural assistance for his cause: he also sought the intercession of the saints. He displayed a 'holy greed' (in Sigüenza's words) for relics, beginning in 1550 when he travelled through Cologne on his Grand Tour and came upon 'a huge trove of heads and bones' of presumed saints. Philip and his entourage bought many of them and took them back to Spain. Seven years later, when his troops captured the town of St Quentin from the French, the king took under his personal protection 'many relics' including 'the body of St Quentin and the head of St Andrew' and placed them 'with great reverence' upon 'the altar of his chapel' in the camp, before sending them back to Spain.¹⁴ In 1567, at his request, the pope granted Philip permission to collect relics wherever he wished, and over the next thirty years he assembled at the Escorial, among thousands of religious items, 12 entire bodies, 144 heads and 306 limbs of various saints – a total of 7,422 relics, many of them with a label attached written in the king's own hand (see plate 14).¹⁵

Philip's remarkable devotion, and his conviction that he enjoyed a special relationship with God, manifested itself in other ways. Like the biblical Three Kings, each Christmas he donated gilded chalices containing gold, frankincense and myrrh; he repeatedly referred to himself as 'father and shepherd' of his subjects; and he filled his letters and papers with references to God. Thus in 1559, when he could not decide whether to return to Spain or remain in the Netherlands Philip confided in his principal adviser Granvelle that 'since this depends solely on the will of God, I can only wait for whatever he is pleased to grant; and I hope that, since He has removed worse obstacles from my path, He will also remove this one'. Just after his return to the peninsula, he told Granvelle

‘Above all things I entrust matters of religion to your care, because you can see how necessary it is, and how few people in this world protect it. And so the few of us who do so must take greater care of Christendom, and if necessary we will lose everything in order to do in this what we should.’ In 1565 he urged an adviser ‘to tell me in all things what you think is best for the service of God, which is my principal aim, and therefore for my service’.¹⁶

Philip attributed every success and victory to divine intervention and favour, assuring ministers that ‘God did this’. When touching the bones of Fray Diego de Alcalá seemed to have saved his son and heir, Don Carlos, as he lay at death’s door in 1562, the king saw it as a miracle and pressured the pope to canonize Fray Diego until he got his way in 1588. Conversely, Philip rationalized every failure and defeat as some sort of divine test of his steadfastness. When in spring 1578 drought gripped Castile, the king reasoned ‘Our Lord must be very angry with us, because He is withholding the rain that we need so much’; and after his beloved nephew Wenceslas died a few months later he observed philosophically ‘It is certainly a tragedy, but God (who is responsible) must know better.’¹⁷ The king expected God not only to ‘reward’ his constancy but also to let him achieve his goals – if necessary with a miracle. Thus in 1574, as bad news poured in, Philip lamented to his private secretary and chaplain Mateo Vázquez, ‘Unless God performs a miracle, which our sins do not merit, it is no longer possible to maintain ourselves for [more than a few] months, let alone years.’ News of further reverses, instead of leading him to reconsider his unsuccessful policies, reinforced his expectation of a miracle: ‘May God help us with a miracle. I tell you that we need one so much that it seems to me that He *must* choose to give us a miracle, because without one I see everything in the worst situation imaginable.’¹⁸

Philip saw no difference between his own interests and those of God. With stunning presumption, in 1573 he reassured an ailing minister, ‘I hope that God will give you good health and a long life, since they are engaged in God’s service and in mine, which is the same thing’; while three years later, on hearing that another of his officials had fallen ill, he wrote ‘I trust that God will give him strength and health [to deal with] all the great troubles that afflict His service and mine’. Two decades later he still deployed the same rhetoric, calling on the council of the Inquisition to continue

doing ‘what is best for the service of God and myself, and the authority of the Holy Office, because one cannot separate one from the others.’¹⁹

Enforcing the faith

Philip’s enthusiasm for punishing heresy constitutes the most famous (or infamous) reflection of his conviction that he knew exactly what God intended. He ardently supported the burning of some 300 Protestant heretics in England between 1555 and 1558 and ordered the executions of some 300 more in the Netherlands between 1556 and 1565 (chapters 3 and 8). Shortly after his return to Spain in 1559, he attended a great auto-de-fé in Valladolid and during the ceremony drew his sword – just as in the frontispiece of the *History* by Cabrera de Córdoba – and swore that he would always uphold the authority of the Holy Office (see chapter 7). And he did. He attended four more autos-de-fé, often (as at Valladolid) accompanied by members of the royal family, and he regularly consulted the Inquisitors-General (whom he had appointed) on a wide range of business. When in 1577 Cardinal Gaspar de Quiroga assured him that ‘Teresa de Jesús is a good nun, of admirable life and example, who constantly occupies and dedicates herself to God’s service’, Philip promised ‘I will write to the corregidor [senior magistrate] of Ávila just as you suggest’ with orders to protect the future saint and ‘her nuns’ against their rivals. In 1578 Quiroga moved into ‘the apartment of my late brother’, Don John, in the Madrid Alcázar, and thenceforth he boasted almost constant access to the king.²⁰

Philip repeatedly urged other Catholic rulers to keep the faith. When he heard in 1572 that Charles IX had followed his advice and authorized the massacre of French Protestants, Philip declared, ‘I experienced one of the greatest pleasures that I have had in all my life’; and when the French ambassador provided some details on the slaughter at an audience, Philip ‘began to laugh, showing signs of extreme pleasure and satisfaction’, and claimed that no king was Charles’s equal ‘in either valour or prudence’. (The ambassador unctuously rejoiced that the king of France had ‘repaid the master of his apprenticeship so well’.)²¹ Philip also favoured initiatives that might end the schism between Catholics and Protestants. He repeatedly gave orders for public

prayers ‘for the union of the Christian religion’; and when in 1562 Pope Pius IV agreed to reconvene the council of Trent Philip welcomed the decision enthusiastically because it seemed like ‘the last refuge in which Christendom hopes to find a remedy for the ills and divisions that have sprung up in religion’. The king even claimed that ‘if it could be, and if the state of our affairs would allow, we would attend the council in person’, and although in the event he stayed in Spain, he laboured to ensure that as many prelates and theologians as possible from his own dominions attended.²² Moreover, as long as the council remained in session, he bombarded the pope with advice on points that he felt required further attention, and he tried unsuccessfully to prolong the assembly until they had been resolved. He also deluged his ambassador in Trent with instructions to keep certain issues off its agenda because he feared they would perpetuate the schism (as indeed they did). As soon as the council had closed, Philip urged his ambassador (albeit ‘with all possible dissimulation and dexterity, to avoid causing resentment or suspicion’) to oppose any attempt to refer the decrees to the pope for confirmation before they could be executed.²³

The king had two motives for such anxiety: he feared that Pius IV would either modify the decrees or fail to ratify them at all, and he worried that the pope might use the Tridentine decrees as a pretext to interfere in his ecclesiastical patronage. Therefore, as soon as Pius verbally endorsed the decrees in January 1564, Philip issued a proclamation that the Tridentine decrees must henceforth be observed and enforced throughout his realms – the first monarch to do so – but his proclamation made no mention of the pope’s prior approval. Instead, it proudly stated:

Since His Holiness has sent us the decrees of the said Holy Council, printed in their original form, we as Catholic King [*nos, como Rey Católico*] ... wish that they be observed, followed and executed in our kingdoms ... We order and ordain all archbishops, bishops and other prelates, all Generals, Provincials, Priors and Guardians of Religious Orders, and all other persons to whom they refer, to publish immediately the said decrees in their churches, districts and dioceses and any other convenient location, and to observe, follow and execute them.²⁴

Moreover, Philip added a cover letter to the proclamation sent to

senior ecclesiastics which made clear that, although the king had issued a comprehensive approval 'to serve as an example for all of Christendom', nevertheless 'the execution of some of the decrees may cause inconvenience or prejudice, both to the Church and ecclesiastical estate and to His Majesty's rights and preeminences'. He warned recipients to expect further directions – and they came in several instalments. In July, upon learning that some cathedral chapters had sent agents to Rome to secure dispensations from individual aspects of the Tridentine decrees, Philip ordered that in future all doubts and petitions for exemption must be referred to him alone. In September, having heard that some prelates had issued their own abridged or annotated version of the decrees, the king commanded them all to be recalled: in future only texts approved by him should circulate. In December, he ordered that 'If any bull or brief arrives, or has arrived, from His Holiness ... concerning the decrees, send them to me without making use of them, so that in each case we can inform and advise His Holiness of what needs to be done.'²⁵

In April 1565, Philip took the final step in securing his control over the Tridentine reforms: he charged each archbishop in Spain 'to convene, assemble and celebrate' a provincial council at the earliest opportunity, just as Trent required. His letter of convocation again expressed his desire to attend, but added that 'our personal presence is not necessary, since we can achieve the same effect' by sending special commissioners (all of them laymen), who showered each synod with detailed royal comments. They 'clarified' what Trent had intended by changing what he did not like ('His Majesty desires that the rules of episcopal residence should be a little looser than those contained in the Tridentine decrees'). They forbade discussion of reforms that contradicted the law of the land (such as Session XXV, *De Reformatio*, chapter 3, which 'seems to authorize ecclesiastical judges to proceed against laymen, confiscating their goods and sequestering their persons, which the laws of this kingdom do not allow and should not allow'). They also repeated his prohibition on seeking clarification or support from Rome. Such measures ensured that the Tridentine decrees threatened neither the king's interests nor his laws. In the graphic phrase of one royal commissioner, the king had 'translated the council of Trent into Spanish'.²⁶

When Pius IV ignored Philip's pleas regarding the best way in

which to reform the Catholic Church, the king instructed his representative in Rome to remind the pope ‘of things that affect our conscience, given the position in which God has placed us, and the attention that we must pay to religion in our kingdoms’ and that ‘we cannot, as father and shepherd of our subjects, avoid showing constant vigilance’. When his successor Pius V also ignored his requests, Philip instructed his ambassador in Rome to seek a private audience at which ‘you will point out that the damage that may stem from this, if he does not believe me and remedy this, will be on his conscience and not on mine’ – a passive-aggressive combination of pleas and threats that characterized many of Philip’s communications with the pope.²⁷

Apart from throwing his weight behind the council of Trent, Philip provided lavish funding and detailed editorial direction for another venture aimed at ‘the reunion of our Christian faith’: the Polyglot Bible, published in eight sumptuous volumes at Antwerp between 1569 and 1573. He entrusted the noted humanist Benito Arias Montano with oversight of the venture and instructed him to work with biblical scholars from Lutheran and other ‘suspect’ creeds, because the king hoped that providing agreed texts in Hebrew, Greek, Aramaic and Latin (Vulgate), with additional Latin versions specially translated from the Greek and Aramaic texts, would appeal to Protestant and Orthodox as well as to Catholic Christians. The motto chosen for the enterprise was PIETATIS CONCORDIAE and the title page boldly proclaimed that it was ‘Intended for the piety and study of the Holy Church by Philip II, the Catholic King’. In case anyone missed this message, the second page displayed a female figure (representing Religion) holding a copy of the new Bible in one hand and a shield bearing Philip’s insignia in the other. She stood upon a plinth inscribed with a legend that restated the king’s initiative in producing this new tool for *all* Christians (see plates 15 and 16).

Philip II and the Papacy

Naturally, these unilateral efforts by Philip to reform and unite the Christian Church offended and alienated the Papacy. Gregory XIII (1572–85) declared that no layman could preside over future provincial councils, and when Philip nevertheless sent lay commissioners to convey his wishes to another series of clerical

assemblies, Gregory rejected all the decrees submitted to him for approval – thereby beginning a petulant standoff: with one exception, no more provincial councils would assemble in Spain for three centuries. Such examples of papal intransigence seem to have left Philip genuinely mystified. In 1581 he let off steam to Granvelle:

It is really something to see that I am the only ruler who truly reveres the Holy See, and yet instead of thanking me as they should, the popes take advantage of it to try and usurp the authority that is so necessary and beneficial to the service of God and to the sound government of what He has entrusted to me. It's the exact opposite of how they behave towards those who do the contrary!²⁸

Philip's perplexity arose not only from his conviction that he could interpret God's purpose better than anyone else, and that he could hold his own with any cleric on matters of theology, but also from the pretensions he inherited from 'our predecessors, the kings of Spain' who had claimed to act as *Rex et sacerdos*: king and priest. Philip seldom hesitated to remind the popes about his vast ecclesiastical powers and responsibilities. At an audience with Pius IV, just four days after his election, Ambassador Francisco de Vargas issued a stark warning: 'You should not meddle with the things that His Majesty has taken in hand.' And if the popes nevertheless 'meddled', Philip employed blackmail and threats to stop them. Three decades later, when Sixtus V refused the king's request to order a commission of inquiry into the Jesuit Order in Spain, Philip ordered his ambassador to threaten that, unless the pope acted, he would do the job himself.

If, having listened to you and reviewed the relevant papers, His Holiness should take a contrary position, and refuse to entrust the investigation to a bishop [named by the king], you may tell him that I shall not ask again for the investigation but instead myself put in place the most appropriate remedy to prevent the dangers we fear.²⁹

'There is no pope in Spain'

Like all Spanish rulers down to 1976, Philip exercised extensive ecclesiastical rights and privileges. He personally selected bishops and abbots not only in Spain but also in Spanish America, Sicily and Naples – a right known as the *patronato real* – and when he

succeeded to the crown of Portugal, Philip acquired parallel powers over the Lusitanian empire. Whenever a senior clerical position in his dominions fell vacant, the king 'as patron of the Church', instructed his ambassador to convey to the pope the virtues of his nominee and to request the necessary instruments of appointment, because the diocese 'will be well directed and governed by him, and my conscience satisfied'; and he begged the pope to believe the ambassador 'just as you would believe me.'³⁰ Senior appointments represented only a small fraction of Philip's patronage, however: each time a see fell vacant he allocated a host of pensions to other clerics payable from episcopal revenues, while in Castile alone he personally chose every year up to one hundred canons, deans, priors and chaplains from the lists of candidates submitted to him. Given the length of Philip's reign, and the extent of his dominions, he nominated far more ecclesiastics than any other early modern ruler, whether Catholic or Protestant.

And whom did he choose? Philip once boasted to the pope that, in his role as patron, 'I do not reward services by granting [ecclesiastical office], but rather I go and search in obscure corners for the most suitable subjects for Our Lord's work'; but the available evidence does not support this claim. Instead, we find that a substantial number of Philip's nominees came from the ranks (or the families) of his own employees. Of the 194 Spanish bishops whom he nominated, 45 had been inquisitors and 44 had served the king as judge or councillor. Philip also favoured his own employees when he made nominations for church pensions. Thus, those proposed to the pope in the course of 1578 included the illegitimate son of a bishop who was himself the illegitimate son of the Emperor Maximilian (Philip's great-grandfather); five royal judges; six inquisitors; fourteen sons, brothers or nephews of royal ministers; twenty-four chaplains and four cantors in the royal family's chapels; one doctor and the sons of six other medical officials of the royal family; and thirteen sons of other members of the royal household, including the king's shoemaker and the queen's candle-maker. Despite his boast about searching 'in obscure corners for the most suitable subjects for Our Lord's work', Philip thus appears to have used his church patronage to boost the salaries of his own employees.³¹

Another area in which Philip acted as 'king and priest', following in the footsteps of 'our predecessors, the kings of Spain',

concerned an ecclesiastical sanction: the *exequatur*, the right to suppress any papal initiative of which the crown disapproved. Royal officials used the *exequatur* to hold up some papal bulls and briefs for years and to send them back to Rome for redrafting. Even the new catechism, missal and breviary issued by Pius V to provide a universal liturgy for Catholics provoked strenuous objections from Madrid. In 1566 copies of a new catechism that incorporated the doctrine approved at Trent reached Spain, together with permission to make a Spanish translation; but, Philip's theologians studied the new catechism closely and claimed to find crypto-Protestant doctrines in it. The Inquisition therefore embargoed the text and forbade its use. An amended version of the Roman catechism in Latin appeared in Spain only in 1577, and the first vernacular translation of it – the only form suitable for use by ordinary Spaniards – not until 1777.

Throughout his reign, Philip attempted to exclude papal special envoys from his dominions. Soon after his election in 1566, Pius V decided to send out fact-finding commissions of inquiry to different parts of the Catholic world, but Philip prevented them from entering either Spain or the Netherlands. Next, alarmed by reports of clerical abuses in the Americas, Pius considered appointing a nuncio for the New World. To parry this threat, Philip set up a special committee of his own to find ways to improve ecclesiastical affairs there. Pius responded by creating a Congregation of Cardinals to propose remedies, and enthusiastically forwarded their recommendations to Spain – but Philip refused to accept any of them. Madrid's control over the American Church remained absolute and impregnable. Much the same situation prevailed elsewhere in Philip's Monarchy. According to the Spanish ambassador in Rome, Pius grumbled that 'he can do no more in Sicily than in Germany, because whenever he decides to do something, he runs into another Pius V appointed by the king who will undo it'. This complaint fell on deaf ears. Philip told Pius bluntly that 'in the rights that I have, and that my predecessors have handed down to me, there will be no change'. Or, as the president of the council of Castile memorably remarked during a discussion of church jurisdiction: 'There is no pope in Spain'.³²

Such endless wrangling between Rome and Madrid over relatively minor matters reflected incompatible visions. The popes had good reason to fear Philip, despite his obvious piety. In May 1527, the month of his birth, his father's army had sacked Rome and taken the pope a prisoner; thirty years later Philip's own forces had invaded papal territory and bombarded the Holy City. Although his troops withdrew after making peace, Philip retained great influence over Rome. He plied sympathetic cardinals with Spanish benefices and substantial pensions – by 1591, forty-seven of the seventy cardinals pocketed a Spanish pension – and he supplied the city with grain and wine from Sicily whenever necessary. At the pope's request, he provided galleys to get rid of corsairs and on one occasion sent troops to stifle a tax revolt. He also attempted to prevent the election as pope of 'pernicious or unfavourable' cardinals, starting in 1559 when Paul IV died. For four months, Ambassador Vargas struggled to arrange the election of a Hispanophile pope, or at least one who was not Francophile. Philip never intervened directly in conclaves again until 1590–2, when he threatened to withhold grain shipments from Sicily to Rome and moved troops and galleys to the frontier of the Papal States in order to influence the choice of pontiff.

Some popes struck back. Paul IV excommunicated and declared war on Philip (chapter 3) while Gregory XIII tried to prevent the union of Spain and Portugal, provoking a splenetic outburst from the outraged king:

No one knows better than Your Holiness the love and respect that I have for you; and the setbacks that have afflicted my dominions during your pontificate are also well known – most of them because I have taken upon my shoulders the defence of the Church and extirpation of heresy. And yet the more these setbacks have increased, the more Your Holiness seems to ignore them – something that simply amazes me.³³

Papal 'ignorance' of the 'setbacks' continued. In the 1590s Clement VIII rejected the claim to the French crown advanced by Philip on behalf of his daughter Isabella Clara Eugenia in favour of his arch-rival Henry of Navarre. In the Netherlands, Philip complained (not without reason) that the Papacy remained indifferent if not hostile to his struggle to regain and re-Catholicize the rebellious provinces. As he put it to Granvelle, 'so that you can see the big picture', the pope's indifference

has me weary and very close to losing my patience ... I believe that, if the Netherlands belonged to someone else, he would have performed miracles to prevent them being lost by the Church; but because they are my states, I believe he is prepared to see this happen because they will be lost by me.³⁴

This was a shrewd point, elegantly phrased, but it overlooked the fact that Philip's dominions hemmed in the Papal States from both north and south, posing a political threat to papal authority, and that his messianic rhetoric challenged papal ideology.

Philip's messianism displayed many characteristics common to other Providential visions of the early modern period – such as the fulfilment of prophecies that predicted global upheaval as a prelude to unification; a 'foundational myth' that cast the king's empire as something new in the history of the world; the presumption that the end of time was imminent, so that immediate action was required to achieve all goals; and the assumption that the 'messiah' could both discern God's purpose for the world and pursue appropriate policies to achieve it better than anyone else. Philip's tour of the Netherlands in 1549 included many messianic moments (chapter 2; see plate 7), and more followed after he became king of England. Thus the magnificent stained glass window commissioned by the king for the church of St John at Gouda in Holland to commemorate the victory of St Quentin shows in the upper section Solomon praying at the dedication of his Temple, and the voice of God responding 'I have heard your prayer, and if you walk in my sight as your father did, I shall perpetuate your royal throne for ever.' In the central section, Christ presides at the Last Supper and speaks with his disciple Philip, whose hand rests protectively on the shoulder of his namesake as he kneels in adoration with his wife Mary Tudor beside him (see plate 17).

This messianic mindset had far-reaching consequences. Above all, Philip's absolute certainty that he was doing God's work could make him unrealistic in the realm of politics. He often refused to devise contingency plans, apparently because if God fought on Spain's side any attempt to plan for possible failure could be construed as denoting a lack of faith. For similar reasons he regularly dismissed any suggestion by a subordinate that his orders were unrealistic – because, once again, these lesser mortals failed to understand that, in case of need, God would provide.

The full impact of Philip's faith-based strategy emerges most clearly in his dealings with England. He boasted that 'God has already granted that by my intervention and my hand that kingdom was previously restored to the Catholic Church', and this made him even less willing to listen to alternative strategies. Thus in 1570 Philip ordered the duke of Alba, his governor-general in the Netherlands, to prepare and lead an invasion to depose Elizabeth Tudor and replace her with her Catholic cousin, Mary Stuart. The king recognized that

even though human prudence suggests many inconveniences and difficulties, and places before us worldly fears, Christian certitude and the confidence that we must justly have in the cause of God will remove them and inspire and strengthen us to overcome them. Certainly we could not avoid remaining with great guilt in our soul, and great regret, if I failed that queen [Mary] and those Catholics – or, rather, the faith – so that they suffered and she was lost.

Alba protested that this would be the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time, adding with heavy irony: 'Even though the principal means must come from God, as Your Majesty very virtuously and piously suggests, nevertheless since He normally works through the resources He gives to humans, it seems necessary to examine which human resources would be needed to carry out your wishes' – and these 'resources', Alba added, were totally lacking.³⁵

For a time, the king desisted, but during his first extended stay at the Escorial in summer 1571 he returned to the offensive, informing Alba that, since Mary Stuart was 'the true and legitimate successor' to the English throne, 'which Elizabeth holds as a tyrant', the intervention of just 6,000 troops from the Netherlands, led by the duke in person, would make it 'easy to kill or capture Elizabeth and place the queen of Scots at liberty and in possession of the kingdom'. No doubt aware that this would still seem unrealistic to his lieutenant, Philip asserted that, 'since the cause is so much His, God will enlighten, aid and assist us with His mighty hand and arm, so that we will get things right'.³⁶

The king's religious elation amazed even councillors who had worked with him for years. 'It is extraordinary to see the ardour of His Majesty' for invading England, one of them wrote to a colleague, 'and how little it has been cooled by the news that the

queen knows about [his] plans, and by the mistrust of the duke [of Alba].’ A few days later the same minister added ‘I have never seen the king so animated in any other item of business’. Even Feria, who had served as Philip’s ambassador in England and thereafter championed the English Catholic exiles at the Spanish court, voiced similar incredulity: ‘His Majesty is so ardent about this English business that I seem lukewarm by contrast.’³⁷ His ardour led Philip to try and dazzle Alba with another display of messianic rhetoric. ‘No one can deny that this venture involves many and great difficulties, and that if it goes wrong we will incur considerable risks,’ he conceded; but

in spite of all this I desire this enterprise so much, and I have such complete confidence that God our Lord, to whose service it is dedicated (because I have no personal ambition here), will guide and direct it, and I hold my charge from God to do this to be so explicit, that I am extremely determined and resolved to proceed and participate, doing on my side everything possible in this world to promote and assist it.

Once again, Alba countered the king’s spiritual blackmail with a torrent of practical objections, concluding briskly: ‘As I have already told Your Majesty, I have not begun to make any preparations whatsoever.’³⁸ This dialogue of the deaf only ended when Alba discovered that Elizabeth had placed Mary Stuart under close guard and arrested her leading English supporter.

This failure did nothing to change Philip’s messianic style of strategizing. He continued to use moral blackmail to persuade his lieutenants that, however desperate the situation, God would provide. Thus in 1585 he informed the duke of Parma, Alba’s successor as governor-general of the Netherlands, that although

I hope that Our Lord, in whose service this war [in the Netherlands] has been waged and sustained at the cost of so much blood and money ... will arrange things with His divine providence, either through war or negotiation, so that the world will know, by the happy outcome, the fruit of trusting in Him, always keeping before us this firm resolve; nevertheless, should God be pleased to permit another outcome, for our sins, it would be better to spend everything in His cause and service, than for any reason to waver.

Two years later, when his leading naval commander complained about the dangerous folly of sailing against England in midwinter

as Philip proposed, the king replied serenely: 'We are fully aware of the risk that is incurred by sending a major fleet in winter through the Channel without a safe harbour, but ... since it is all for His cause, God will send good weather.' Nine months later, after a storm had damaged some Armada vessels, driven others into Corunna and scattered the rest, the king reassured his dispirited commander:

If this were an unjust war, one could indeed take this storm as a sign from Our Lord to cease offending Him; but being as just as it is, one cannot believe that He will disband it, but rather will grant it more favour than we could hope ... I have dedicated this enterprise to God. Get on, then, and do your part!³⁹

Occasionally, the catastrophic failure of his plans temporarily punctured the king's confidence. When he first learned the scale of the Armada's failure, in November 1588, Philip confided to his secretary: 'Very soon we shall find ourselves in such a state that we shall wish that we had never been born – at least I will, so as not to see it. If God does not send us a miracle (which is what I hope from Him), I hope to die and go to Him before this happens – which is what I pray for, so as not to see so much misfortune and disgrace.' Such moments of doubt about the congruence of 'the service of God and myself' proved both rare and short-lived, however. Throughout the 1590s, Philip declared that 'I could not – and cannot – abandon' his costly wars against the Dutch, English and French Protestants 'because I have such a special obligation to God and the world to deal with them'. A few months later, when one of his ministers made an impassioned plea for a reduction in military spending in France, the Netherlands and the Atlantic, Philip reminded him that 'These are not matters that can be dropped ... because they involve the cause of religion, which must take precedence over everything.'⁴⁰

Philip's messianism in context

Most of Philip's subjects boasted a messianic outlook almost indistinguishable from his. At the beginning of the reign, a tract by a court theologian emphasized the king and priest link:

Princes, in their role as princes, possess the cure of souls. This means

that it does not suffice for them to reign and rule the state in peace, but they are also personally obliged to strive to make their subjects good and virtuous ... Princes will have to give account to God, at the hour of their death and on the Judgment Day, not only of themselves, but also of all their kingdoms and of all the damage that occurred through their weakness and negligence.⁴¹

Poets, too, sacralized the king's cause. In the 1570s, Fernando de Herrera's 'Canticle for the victory of Lepanto' drew a parallel with the drowning of Pharaoh's army in the Red Sea; Juan Rufo's *La Austriada* (1584) hailed the king as 'God's shepherd on Earth'; and according to Hernando de Acuña's sonnet, 'To the king our lord,' published in 1591:

The glorious day, sire, either approaches
Or has dawned, when the Heavens foretold
One flock and one shepherd in the world ...
And announced to the earth, for its accord,
One monarch, one empire and one sword.⁴²

Catholic artists also explicitly attributed the king's achievements to the divine favour he had earned. Many works of art produced in his lifetime portrayed Philip in direct communion with God. In Titian's *Offering of Philip II* (1573) the king ostentatiously dedicates his newborn son to God in gratitude for the victory at Lepanto (see plate 31); in El Greco's *Dream of Philip II* (1579) he kneels confidently to await his fate on the Judgment Day; in a Netherlands engraving of 1585, Jesus directly confers the insignia of power on Philip, while the pope enviously looks on. In perhaps the best-known portrait of the king, by Sofonisba Anguissola, the king holds a rosary – as if the artist had surprised him at his devotions – while Pompeo Leone's larger-than-life sculptures show Philip and his family at prayer right beside the high altar in the Escorial basilica (see plates 18, 19 and 22).

At least three composers produced religious music that upheld Philip's messianic claims. In the 1550s, Bartolomé de Escobedo composed a Mass for six voices that juxtaposed PHILIPPUS REX HISPANIAE (Philip king of Spain) with the regular liturgy throughout:

Glory to God on high,
And on earth peace to men of goodwill.

We praise thee, we bless thee
PHILIPPUS REX HISPANIAE ...

Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord

PHILIPPUS REX HISPANIAE.

In 1596 Philippe Rogier, master of the royal chapel, did much the same in his *Missa Philippus Secundus Rex Hispaniae* for four or six voices; while Fernando de las Infantas composed a motet for six voices beseeching St Jerome to assist 'his most pious servant' Philip II (and other members of the royal family).⁴³

Finally, Philip's messianic outlook drew strength from the fact that his family and most of his ministers shared and supported it. His sister Juana took vows of poverty, chastity and obedience and joined the Jesuit Order (chapter 9); while his warrior brother Don John of Austria invoked divine intervention with surprising frequency. In a letter to his half-sister Margaret of Parma on the eve of his departure for the Netherlands in 1576, Don John wished that God 'would assist me with some miracles, because if he does not perform one I do not know how life can return to a body that is at its last breath'.⁴⁴ Ruy Gómez de Silva, trusted royal adviser as well as ally of both Juana and Don John, in 1559 informed the General of the Jesuits 'how attached I am to your Order, and for this reason I want there to be a [Jesuit] College in Mélito', his new Neapolitan fief. A decade later, Ruy Gómez and his wife, the princess of Éboli, 'gave an excellent welcome' to Teresa of Ávila when she arrived at their request to arrange 'the foundation of a monastery and nunnery in Pastrana', their principal residence.⁴⁵ In 1568, Don Francés de Álava, Philip's ambassador in France, protested that 'If I am [required] to become an instrument that raises human considerations above divine ones, I hope that God removes me from this world'; while the massacre of St Bartholomew in 1572 impressed even the duke of Alba as clear evidence of God's efforts to further both His own cause and that of Spain. He told a colleague exuberantly:

The events in Paris and France are wonderful, and truly show that God has been pleased to change and rearrange matters in the way that He knows will favour the conservation of the true Church and advance His holy service and His glory. And, besides all that, in the present situation, these events could not have come at a better time for the

affairs of the king our lord, for which we cannot sufficiently thank God's goodness.⁴⁶

Even Antonio Pérez, a minister infamous for his dissolute life, went on a pilgrimage in 1575; and as he organized the departure of Don John of Austria from Italy to the Netherlands the following year he rejoiced 'that something so important to the service of God and of Your Majesty – which is one and the same thing – is going well'. In 1584 the president of the council of Castile expressed the hope 'that the service of God and His Majesty will take precedence over everything else' in public affairs; and three years later Don Juan de Idiáquez, secretary of state, urged his master to persevere with his plans to invade England, no matter what the cost:

It will be such an agreeable service to Our Lord that it is impossible that He would not lend His hand in the execution of this enterprise, openly showing through Your Majesty and his affairs how he rewards those who serve him in this way. I believe that everyone is obliged to serve Him according to their strength, because He gives that strength and He can also take it away; and He confers on Your Majesty so much power and favour that it can be taken as a certain pledge for everything we may do to please Him.⁴⁷

Naturally, the king's numerous clerical officials expressed similar views. In 1574, Mateo Vázquez consoled his master, who was disheartened by the situation in the Low Countries:

God always looks out for Your Majesty, and in your greatest necessities gives the greatest signs of favour – the battle of St Quentin, the victory of Lepanto against the enemy of Christendom, the war of Granada ... These indications arouse great expectations that, since Your Majesty fights for the cause of God, He will fight – as He has always done – for the interests of Your Majesty.

Four years later, when news arrived of the rout and death of Sebastian of Portugal, the king's nephew, Vázquez insisted that soon 'God will return to defend his cause, and grant Your Majesty long life because He sees you as an instrument to defend it; and Your Majesty is well aware that Divine Providence often produces great successes from great challenges and afflictions.'⁴⁸ Juan de Ovando, priest, inquisitor, and president of the council of the Indies, felt much the same: when asked whether appointment as

president of the council of Finance might fatigue him, he responded, in words that echoed the king's own (page 85 above), 'This can be overcome with the work and health that I have sacrificed in the service of Your Majesty, because it is the same as God's service.' In 1583, the arrival of news of the naval victory at Terceira led Cardinal Granvelle to exclaim that 'God's goodness is giving us so many advantages and favours that we must work hard to further His cause, and strive to liberate as many souls as possible from the chains of the Devil [that is, the Protestants], in the Netherlands as elsewhere – and all the more so, since in doing His work we are also doing our own.'⁴⁹

A remarkable messianic consensus thus linked Philip with the soldiers, artists, musicians and ministers who served him. This inevitably reinforced the king's self-confidence and discouraged the formation of alternative, more flexible strategies. But *were* there alternatives? Philip had inherited territories so far flung that they were, in effect, indefensible: Spain and much of Italy, the Americas and the Netherlands. The addition of the Philippines after 1565 and of the Portuguese empire after 1580 dramatically exacerbated this 'strategic overstretch'. As Tommaso Campanella, an acute political observer, put it just after the king's death: 'The Spanish Monarchy is founded upon the occult providence of God rather than upon either prudence or opportunism' and he, like many others, saw Spain's history as a heroic progression in which miracles offset disasters as Spain continued its uneven but divinely ordained advance towards world monarchy.⁵⁰ And indeed, until the Armada, it seemed as if a spectacular success always counterbalanced each defeat: against the failure of his plan to dethrone Elizabeth in 1570–1, Philip could set the victory of Lepanto (which seemed to end the Turkish threat) and the massacre of St Bartholomew (which appeared to deal Protestantism in France a terminal blow). His losses in the Netherlands, and the unsuccessful war to regain them, were far outweighed by the acquisition of Portugal and its overseas possessions, creating the first empire in history 'on which the sun never set'.

Nevertheless, as Carl von Clausewitz wrote in his nineteenth-century masterpiece *On War*, all wars are waged by individuals, 'the least important of whom may chance to delay things or somehow make them go wrong'. To explain the difficulties

encountered by military and naval commanders, Clausewitz borrowed the term 'friction' from physics to cover all the factors that prevent orders being carried out as intended: 'Countless minor incidents – the kind you can never foresee – combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls short of the intended goal.'⁵¹ But Philip's messianic imperialism did not recognize either that human affairs have a tendency to become disorderly or that their random deviations from the predicted pattern require constant correction. Instead, whenever his philosophy of *Suma ratio pro religione* produced unattainable goals and unsustainable strategic overstretch, the king took evasive action: either he wondered how he could 'persuade' God to produce a miracle or he escaped to the worldly delights he had created around his court.

The king at play


MATEO VÁZQUEZ gave him a unique vantage point from which to observe his master's inner feelings and emotions, and he once reminded a colleague that 'kings have pleasures and desires just like other men – but with this difference: they have far more power to pursue them than their subjects and vassals. Moreover, just as many things change every day so do those pleasures and desires.'¹ Philip's undoubted 'power' makes it all the more remarkable that after he returned to Spain in 1559 he pursued the same pleasures and desires with little variation for the rest of his life.

The compulsive traveller

Although Philip made Madrid his permanent administrative capital in 1561, he spent less than half his life there. He resided in his Aragonese lands for several months in 1563–4 and 1585–6, with a shorter visit in 1592; he toured Andalusia in 1570; and in 1580 he left for Portugal and spent three years away from Madrid. Teófilo Ruiz has stressed in *A king travels* that these long, slow royal progresses involved immense preparation and lavish urban spectacles that often left the king exhausted, and that each of them was 'inextricably linked to the exercise and experience of power'.² At other times the king travelled informally, moving rapidly between his country houses with a small entourage and sometimes alone as he tried to escape the bustle of his court, because 'tranquillity', according to a Venetian ambassador in 1565, 'is His

Majesty's greatest entertainment and relaxation'. 'Being alone pleases him more than anything', the ambassador's successor confirmed in 1571, while the time he spent in his 'country houses brings infinite contentment to his soul'.³

Four of the king's country houses could accommodate a considerable entourage: the Pardo (where the king regularly went hunting, especially in the autumn), Aranjuez (where he enjoyed the spectacular gardens each spring); El Bosque de Segovia (also known as Valsaín, which had both excellent hunting and fishing, and was relatively cool in summer); and San Lorenzo el Real de El Escorial, built to fulfil his vow after the victory of St Quentin in 1557 to erect a major monument in honour of the saint on whose feast day the battle had been fought and won (chapter 3). The complex eventually served as dynastic mausoleum, monastery, seminary and library as well as royal palace, and after 1571 Philip resided there for increasingly long periods.



9. Philip's country retreats. Philip built way-stations roughly half way between Madrid and his principal country houses: Aceca on the way to Toledo; Vaciamadrid on the way to Aranjuez; Torrelodones and Fuenfria on the way to El Bosque de Segovia.

So predictable did the king's movements between his various residences become that someone at his court (some said his wayward son Don Carlos) composed a little book entitled 'The great and noble travels of King Philip II' with the same itinerary on every page: 'from Madrid to the Escorial, from the Escorial to the Pardo, from the Pardo to Aranjuez, from this royal palace back to the capital'.⁴ The jibe overlooked the amount of work the king managed to transact while he travelled. The entry for 3 October 1572 in the journal kept by his secretary Antonio Gracián reveals

that, after a few days at the Escorial, ‘His Majesty left after lunch and we slept at la Despernada [one of the small way stations]’. The next day, ‘A courier arrived at La Despernada with dispatches from Zayas [secretary of state for northern affairs], two from Gaztelu [secretary of the council of the Orders], Antonio Pérez [secretary of state for southern affairs], and Eraso [secretary of the council of the Indies] ... Tonight His Majesty arrived at the Pardo and sent a courier with replies’ to all the dispatches. Philip spent the next two days at the Pardo, where he received and returned dispatches from eight ministers before returning to Madrid.⁵

Creating his network of country houses meant that the king often lived in the middle of building sites – and he did so through choice: in the course of his reign, Philip intervened in more than one hundred architectural projects, reflected in the thousands of orders copied into the eight fat registers of his Ministry of Public Works between 1556 and 1598. Although the king apparently lacked a comprehensive architectural programme for all these projects, in effect he served as his own clerk of works taking an almost endless series of ad hoc decisions that enabled him to keep everything under close personal control.

The lack of a comprehensive programme did not mean a lack of vision. The teaching of his preceptor Honorato Juan, and the careful study of the books by Vitruvius, Serlio and others in his library, each containing splendid illustrations of Italian and Roman buildings, had given the young prince a sound grasp of the principles of architecture; and his travels in Italy, Germany and the Netherlands had introduced him to many distinct architectural styles. All this produced a sublime confidence that he could improve on the plans drawn up by his architects (see plate 20). As soon as he returned to Spain in 1551 he began to issue orders designed to reconfigure the royal palaces of Castile and their gardens ‘in the Flemish style’, with red-brick walls and black-slate roofs surrounded by neat, verdant gardens, streams and lakes; and after his departure from Flanders in 1559 he ordered Granvelle to send slaters and masons from the Netherlands to create Flemish-style buildings; hydraulic engineers to make artificial streams and lakes like those of the Netherlands; and gardeners to tend the plants also brought from the Low Countries.

While still in the Netherlands, the king took another major decision essential to the creation of a uniform ‘Philip II style’. In

1559 he invited Juan Bautista de Toledo, who had worked with Michelangelo on St Peter's basilica in Rome, to join him in Spain; two years later he declared that 'from now on, and for the rest of your life, you will be our architect'. The position was new. Philip's pre-decessors had appointed an individual master of works for each project: henceforth everyone answered to Toledo. The king ordered him to reside at court and 'make the plans and models that we ask of you for all our works, buildings, and other tasks related to the said office of architect' and, to this end, Toledo created a special 'study' in the Madrid Alcázar where he trained a team of draughtsmen to prepare technical drawings. But the king did not entirely trust Toledo: he made frequent visits to monitor progress. For example, when he returned to Castile in May 1564 after several months in Aragon, Philip did 'not spend even two days in the same place, instead going with a very small entourage to visit all his palaces around [Madrid] one after the other.'⁶

Unfortunately for his initiative, the king also appointed Toledo to several additional positions – master of works at the Escorial, Aranjuez, El Pardo and the Madrid Alcázar – and ordered him to prepare technical drawings for these and other projects. Inevitably, Toledo fell behind with his tasks. In 1565 Philip opined that 'he neglects them out of pure idleness, weakness, and slothfulness, and not out of malice, because when he wants to do something, he knows just how to do it'; but, he added testily, 'if he does not get on with it, it will not be possible to let him work on so many things'.⁷ As Toledo fell further behind, the king's frustration mounted. 'This is no good at all!' he exploded. 'It is no less than an insult that instead of finishing the work, as I had expected and ordered ... so far he has not even done the half of it.' The architect remained unperturbed. 'Buildings are like plants,' he crooned: 'They only grow if they are watered, and the water they need is money.' This appeased the king somewhat. 'This is fine philosophy about the lack of money,' he commented grudgingly as he released more funds.⁸

The disagreements continued until Toledo's death in 1567, when Philip made an extraordinary decision: he left vacant the posts of royal architect and of master of works at all the various projects. Instead, he made use of a man with impressive skills as a technical draughtsman but virtually no experience as an architect: Juan de Herrera. In 1563 Philip had appointed Herrera to assist Toledo,

and together they prepared plans for work at the *alcázares* of Madrid, Toledo and Segovia, the Alhambra of Granada, and the Escorial, the boldest and most ambitious expression of the 'Philip II style' – and also the only one that survives intact.

The 'eighth wonder of the world'

At first, the king thought of fulfilling his vow to honour St Lawrence by expanding one of the existing royal convents run by the Jeronimites, the 'praying order' in whose house at Yuste his father had found solace. Charles had specified in his testament that he must be buried beside his wife in the royal chapel in Granada, and although a subsequent codicil allowed his son to choose an alternative resting place, so long as it was beside the empress, upon hearing of their father's death Philip ordered his regent, Juana, to send their father's corpse to Granada. Probably due to lack of money, Juana failed to do this, and just before leaving the Netherlands Philip ordered her to leave Charles's remains at Yuste, so that he could personally supervise their re-burial 'with the authority and respect that we desire' after his return to Spain. It seems that Philip had already decided on an important change to his plan to honour St Lawrence: the creation of a mausoleum for his family.⁹

Philip spent eighteen months compiling a shortlist of appropriate sites for the last resting place of his father (and other deceased members of the royal family) in a new convent, to be called 'St Lawrence of Victory', and in April 1561 he advised the general of the Jeronimite Order that 'I intend to return soon to see the sites that I have already visited and discussed, to decide in which of them to start building'. The king made his decision two months later: he would build 'his' Jeronimite monastery in the foothills of the Sierra de Guadarrama near the village of El Escorial, some thirty miles north-west of Madrid – far enough away from the capital to ensure it would remain a place of retreat. He asked the general for approval and the latter suggested only one change: instead of 'St Lawrence of Victory' the new foundation should be called 'Royal St Lawrence'. The king agreed.¹⁰

In 1562 Philip visited the site twice, accompanied by Toledo, who 'had already devised the plan of the principal parts of the edifice': a single structure arranged around twelve patios, perhaps

in imitation of the gridiron on which St Lawrence had been martyred. Despite the king's numerous disputes with both his architect and the leaders of the new monastic community, this design prevailed, giving a distinctive form to one of the largest edifices of its day: a single quadrilateral complex 740 feet by 560 feet (207.20 metres by 156.80 metres), with a modest royal apartment close to the basilica, and surrounded by a walled compound of gardens and fields that eventually measured thirty square miles. Toledo began to supervise the clearing and levelling of the site and on 20 August 1563, a day determined to be astrologically propitious, Philip watched as the first stone of the basilica was laid.

According to Fray Antonio de Villacastín, the monk who oversaw the day-to-day construction, 'Ever since that day, the work advanced at a furious pace as ordered by King Philip'; but the 'fury' soon dissipated because Philip introduced two major changes: adding a seminary to train priests and increasing the monastic community from fifty to one hundred monks. These changes required the construction of an entire additional storey. To make sure that this and other subsequent changes were implemented, Philip gave one of his secretaries 'the plans of the monastery, in final form', with instructions to 'make sure that Juan Bautista [de Toledo] makes copies of them, together with the written annotations, without changing a thing; and he must make multiple copies, because we need three for each floor: one set for the monks, the other for Juan Bautista, and the third set for me. Make sure he makes them this week.'¹¹ The king's insistence on micromanagement caused serious delays and immense cost overruns. In 1569, Philip issued a sharply worded Instruction that forbade the building contractors to make any change to the plans without his express consent ('We order that you consult us before each change') and even removed their freedom to hire site labour: instead, usually working through Juan de Herrera, the king negotiated contracts directly with specialists in the various types of construction required, and then provided them with a copy of the agreed plan as well as specifications down to the sixteenth part of a foot. This unusual system of construction created an assembly line of workers, all following the same protocols, so that Philip could control every aspect of the building process – which explains the visual uniformity that is the most striking feature of the

Escorial.¹²

In 1576, such a 'great dispute' developed between the monks and the building contractors that Philip decided to pay a special visit 'to see it all for himself. To resolve the matter, he first visited the stone quarries to see how they handled the blocks', and then he returned

to inspect the work on the basilica, observing and assessing how the finished blocks and those still to be finished were handled, and assessing also the time spent on each. He decided it was better and advantageous to bring the blocks from the quarry already finished, because His Majesty worked out that it would save time and money.

After that, according to Villacastín, 'eighteen cranes were all simultaneously at work, at a cost of 10,000 ducats a month just for the wages of the supervisors and workmen working on the basilica', until in 1584 the king wept openly as he attended its consecration (see plate 21).¹³ Thanks to the king's personal intervention, as Catherine Wilkinson Zerner observed, although 'many teams of workmen were employed on the building, yet it is impossible to distinguish any differences in handling. The almost perfect uniformity of the technical execution of the Escorial is an amazing accomplishment.'¹⁴

Meanwhile, the monastic community came to life. In 1571, the Jeronimites sang Mass for the first time in the new church, with the king watching from a window in his apartment that overlooked the altar. Shortly afterwards, novices from Madrid and monks from the Jeronimite house at Guadalupe arrived 'in perfect order, two by two, led by two mounted guides'. There followed 'a sung Mass; and this afternoon, solemn vespers in honour of St Lawrence. His Majesty attended everything.' 'You can well imagine', wrote a royal minister, 'how happy His Majesty must feel to see everything already in this state.'¹⁵

Philip also arranged for the transfer of the bodies of eleven of his relatives from resting places all over Spain to be reburied at the Escorial, and he devoted much thought to erecting suitable funeral effigies in the new basilica. In 1572, he approved a plan for two groups of larger-than-life statues kneeling on either side of the main altar as if they had joined the monks in perpetual prayer, and work began on a group of seven figures in the cenotaph of Charles, including his two sons who had died as infants. Philip probably

intended to include his sisters Juana and María in his own family group, but (perhaps in the interests of getting the job done) he reduced each one to just five figures. Just before he died in 1598 he admired the stunning gilded and jewelled bronze statues of his parents and three of his aunts cast by Pompeo Leone and his workshop, and approved the plaster casts of himself and his family (solemnly installed in 1600: see plate 22). As Rosemarie Mulcahy observed, 'They are arguably the most impressive royal funerary sculpture in European art.'¹⁶

The pharaonic splendour of the Escorial impressed everyone. In 1593 John Eliot, an English visitor, thought it 'the most magnificent palace in all Europe' and 'the most beautiful building I have seen in my whole life'. Thirty years later, the Welsh traveller James Howell 'was yesterday at the Escorial to see the Monastery of Saint Laurence, the eighth wonder of the world', where he admired 'the site of the place, the state of the thing, and the symmetry of the structure'. Having considered what might have 'moved King Philip to waste so much treasure', Howell reported that 'there be a hundred monks, and every one hath his man [sc. servant] and his mule, and a multitude of officers; besides there are three libraries there, full of the choicest books for all sciences ... To take a view of every room in the house, one must make account to go ten miles.' It was, he concluded, 'a world of glorious things that purely ravished me. By this mighty monument, it may be inferred that Philip the Second, though he was a little man, yet had he vast, gigantic thoughts in him to leave such a huge pile for posterity to gaze upon and admire his memory.'¹⁷

The cost of realizing the king's 'vast, gigantic thoughts' at the Escorial was stunning. Looking back, Villacastín estimated that over the thirty-five years of construction, the king had spent 6.5 million ducats: more than the entire revenue of Castile for one year. Jehan Lhermite, the royal valet to whom Villacastín provided this detailed estimate, noted that 'popular opinion holds this valuation to be somewhat short, and certainly different methods have been used to make estimates' so that 'some say it cost 14 million'. Lhermite himself thought that 'taking everything into account, and taking it as a whole, the cost may have risen to 9 or 10 million' – and promptly added 'I have heard that His Majesty himself does not want anyone to know for sure the precise expenditure'.¹⁸

In their estimates of the 'precise expenditure' of constructing such a vast edifice in such a short time, Howell, Villacastín and Lhermite all forgot the 'opportunity costs': the hours that Philip spent on the project instead of on other matters. Consider his response to a letter from the prior of San Lorenzo in November 1571: after stating the need for another preacher, and requesting that the king resolve an architectural dilemma in the sacristy, the prior announced that 'today we expelled one of the novices who came from the convent of St Bartholomew because ...' The half-line of text giving the reason for the 'expulsion' has been neatly excised with scissors. Just in case the secretary charged with responding to the prior should think this odd, the king wrote in the margin: 'This is fine: I cut out the rest.'¹⁹ Presumably the novice – one of those whose arrival had so stirred the king's heart on St Lawrence's Day a few months earlier – had been caught committing some serious offence, such as sodomy, and the king wanted to erase all mention of it in order to avoid polluting both the file and the enterprise (see plate 23).

The document which the king cut (a dramatic and apparently unique step) was just one of thousands of letters concerning the monastery that reached his desk, and almost all required a royal decision. In addition, contrary to his normal practice of transacting all business in writing, the king made many decisions concerning San Lorenzo only after a personal visit that involved extensive consultation with those carrying out his orders. Thus in June 1575 one of the monks noted that the king came to 'his convent' because 'he still had many important matters to resolve' – but by this he did not mean winning the war in the Netherlands, defending the Mediterranean or anticipating the impact of the Decree of Bankruptcy (the things that most of his contemporaries would have rated as the 'important matters' in 1575) – but rather arguments with the prior, Villacastín and the contractors, who 'decided nothing without the approval of His Majesty'.²⁰ Where the Escorial was concerned, the king neglected nothing. To decide which design would be best for the stalls in the choir, the king paid for a 'model of the stalls' to be brought all the way to Badajoz, where he then resided, so he could personally inspect and approve the design (1580). He even spent time deciding where the toilets should be situated: 'I wonder whether bad smells from the toilets will emanate from these holes: to help me make up my

mind about this, I would like to see the plan of the water conduits,' the king wrote. Nor did Philip consider only the royal apartments: 'Let these toilets be constructed so that they do not cause the quarters of the kitchen staff to smell.'²¹ One wonders how many other rulers of the day found time to worry whether the kitchen staff would be able to smell excrement.

The royal gardener

Philip spent almost as much time on the creation of his gardens as on building his palaces and, indeed, one of the Jeronimites at the Escorial suspected that the king tried to ensure that buildings and gardens proceeded at the same pace. Philip's characteristic holograph rescript on a letter from his minister of public works – one of hundreds that survive – reveals not only his passionate interest in birds and gardens but also the same excitement and enthusiasm for 'anything outdoors' that he had displayed as a boy (chapter 1).

Find out how the pheasants are doing at the Casa de Campo and if anything more is needed for them, and if it would be better to let them all free at once, or only some of them, or whether we should keep them cooped up. Let me know about this, and tell me whether they have started building any of the walls at the Pardo, and how work there is getting on. And write to Aranjuez and ask them about the buildings there and about the hedges, and whether they can hear the pheasants there ...

Here, too, he wanted to imitate what he had seen in his travels outside Spain. He sent gardeners as well as architects to northern Europe for inspiration, and when his chief gardener died Philip made haste to secure the 'plans and paintings of the orchards and fountains, and of the gardens in France, England and the Netherlands and elsewhere, and the other things that I made him do'.²²

Not everything came from abroad. In 1561, Philip told his minister of public works: 'I want some myrtles to be brought immediately from Valencia to be planted here this year, and also some trees that are said to grow there called locust trees, which are very beautiful'. The minister must not only arrange for their delivery but also hire an experienced gardener to plant them, and

‘find out where we can find orange trees for the Pardo’.²³ The king bought in bulk, so that by the time of his death the gardens in Aranjuez boasted almost 223,000 trees, all of them planted under his personal supervision. According to Catherine Wilkinson Zerner, ‘Aranjuez was the largest domesticated landscape before Versailles, and its design was unique.’²⁴

Philip was a keen fisherman, in both rivers and ponds, and he normally took steps to ensure he would get a good catch. First, he eliminated all competition with draconian legislation: anyone caught fishing in the royal ponds would receive one hundred lashes for the first offence and would be sent to the galleys for the second. Then he cheated. One day in 1566 he gave orders that ‘in case I am free to go to the Pardo ... lower the water level in the small pond tonight so that it will already be lower tomorrow and I can fish there if I want’. A few years later, he adopted the same technique when he and some of his courtiers wanted ‘to fish in the large pond at la Fresneda’, near the Escorial: one of his engineers ‘lowered the water in the pond’ and ‘they caught many fish’.²⁵ Against such an unscrupulous and determined angler, the royal fish had no chance.

More exotically, Philip created two zoos. One at the Casa de Campo boasted elephants, rhinoceros and lions – but security proved less than perfect: in 1563 a lioness escaped and almost mauled a courtier to death while the royal family looked on helplessly from their coach. The smaller royal zoo at Aranjuez started with four camels, brought to the palace from Africa. Since they proved useful as beasts of burden on construction sites, they were encouraged to breed and by 1600 there were about forty of them. In 1584 the king added ostriches from Africa and, to avoid making a mistake in the design of the Ostrich House, he ordered two different designs: ‘one suitable just for ostriches, which will cost 500 ducats, and the other also suitable for other sorts of birds, costing 3,000 ducats’. Philip chose the cheaper one, but this proved to be a false economy: one day a ‘wild ostrich’ escaped and attacked a gardener, injuring him so severely that he was off work for several weeks.²⁶

Patron of arts and sciences

Philip was an avid collector of artistic treasures. By the time of his

death he owned a hoard of over 5,000 coins and medals, all in special cabinets; he possessed jewels and works of art in silver and gold; he had 137 astrolabes and watches; he accumulated musical instruments, trinkets, precious stones and 113 statues of famous people in bronze and marble. The size of these collections, like his 7,422 relics (chapter 5), suggests an obsession with acquiring *things*; but Philip had a genuine and almost inexhaustible curiosity. Thus in 1583 he made a special visit to Segovia 'to see that excellent machine for minting coins, invented by the Archduke of Austria' just installed there. Four years later, when Jehan Lhermite arrived from Antwerp with a pair of skates, the king arranged for a skating display on the frozen lake at the Casa de Campo and took his children out in a warm coach to watch. Afterwards he summoned the new arrival to approach 'because he wanted to examine close up one of my skates, which I showed him'. Since the ice continued for three more weeks, the royal party turned out several times to watch Lhermite execute 'three or four audacious pirouettes on the middle of the ice'.²⁷

The king employed another Fleming, Francis Holbeek, 'who was in charge of distilling perfumed water' at the palace of Aranjuez, to create a botanical garden from which to produce 'quintessences' capable of curing human ailments, according to the teachings attributed to Ramon Llull (Philip systematically collected copies of Llull's works for the Escorial library). The project was in full swing by 1569 when Francisco Franco, professor of medicine at the university of Seville, praised the king for sending 'a diligent herbalist throughout Andalusia with a catalogue of herbs, searching for specimens of each one to take to Aranjuez', where 'His Majesty created large gardens for all sorts of plants with medicinal properties'.²⁸ The next year Philip extended his search, ordering Francisco Hernández, his *protomédico* (chief health official), to sail to America and seek out plants for medicinal uses. Over the next seven years Hernández recorded some 3,000 flora, of which more than 800 were carefully pressed and sent back to the king to be bound into volumes, together with drawings and a commentary.

Philip had an ulterior motive for creating these medical herb gardens and collecting American flora. In 1585 work began at the Escorial on constructing a complex of 'seven or eight rooms' with special chimneys and furnaces to serve as a laboratory 'where you

could see strange ways of distilling and new types of stills, some of metal and others of glass, in which they carried out a thousand tests'. Some 400 glass stills arrived in 1588 (with another hundred in case of breakages), many of them linked to the brass 'philosopher's tower', almost seven metres high, capable of producing up to ninety kilograms of 'quintessences' per day (see plate 24).²⁹

Philip was curious about many other aspects of the natural world. When in 1562 the construction of the Pardo palace was held up for lack of water, he accepted the services of a diviner (*zahorí*): a Morisco 'boy of about eight' who claimed he could detect water 'beneath the ground, whether it was deep or just beneath the surface, but that he could only "see" on days of bright sun'. Philip instructed the boy to put his skills to work 'on the first day with bright sun' – and decided to go and watch him: 'I would like you to bring the boy who divines today, because it seems it will be sunny.' When the boy's prediction led to the discovery of water twenty-four feet beneath the surface, Philip sent him to work at the Escorial.³⁰

The king also encouraged other forms of scientific learning that today enjoy higher repute. Printing presses in several Spanish cities published 74 editions and 57 reprints of scientific treatises between 1561 and 1610 (compared with 65 and 40, respectively, between 1521 and 1560). Some works, like José de Acosta's *Natural and moral history of the Indies*, first printed in Latin at Salamanca in 1589, achieved great commercial success both in Spain and abroad, but most publications depended on a royal subsidy. It is hard to see how any printer could have afforded to publish Pedro Ambrosio Ondériz's handsomely illustrated translation of Books XI and XII of Euclid's *Elements of Geometry* in 1585 without a royal subvention of 700 ducats; while a royal gift of 300 ducats proved crucial in allowing Don Diego de Zúñiga to publish in 1584 his *Commentaries on the Book of Job* in Latin, the only unequivocal endorsement of Copernicus's heliocentric view to appear in early modern Spain.³¹

Philip also subsidized many non-scientific writers, especially those who lionized his own family – the poet Juan Rufo received a subsidy of 500 ducats towards the cost of publishing his *Austriada*, an epic poem about Don John of Austria – and those who dedicated their work to him, but the largest payments went to

those who worked on religious projects of which he approved. Above all, he provided the Plantin Press of Antwerp with over 10,000 ducats towards the cost of printing the eight-volume *Biblia regia* (see plates 15 and 16) and he paid for the publication in Rome of the three-volume in-folio *Explanations of Ezekiel and of the city and temple of Jerusalem*. In 1590 the king granted an audience to the two authors of this ambitious work, full of lavish engravings that showed how Solomon's Temple might have looked, and after insisting on some design changes he granted them 8,000 ducats for the engraving and printing of 2,000 copies (although he saw this as an advance on future sales, believing that 'my treasury will recoup whatever we spend now on this venture').³²

Philip's curiosity led him to initiate several projects designed to improve his knowledge of the kingdoms over which he ruled. Shortly before he returned to Spain in 1559, Philip commissioned the Flemish cartographer Jacob van Deventer 'to visit, measure and draw all the towns of these [Netherlands] provinces, with the rivers and villages adjoining, likewise the frontier crossings and passes. The whole work is to be made into a book containing a panorama of each province, followed by a representation of each individual town.'³³ By the time van Deventer died in 1575, he had completed over 250 bird's-eye plans. His survey constitutes a unique cartographic achievement: no other region in the sixteenth century can boast a series of town plans of similar accuracy, uniformity and precision. While van Deventer toiled in the Netherlands, Philip invited another Flemish cartographer, Anton van den Wyngaerde (Antonio de las Viñas), to undertake a similar survey of Spanish towns. Wyngaerde's technique was somewhat different, for he worked from a slight elevation and in panoramic format, rather than from bird's-eye perspective; but the record was just as impressive. Finished views of fifty-six Spanish cities by Wyngaerde exist, together with preparatory sketches for several more.

To set beside these urban images in 1566 Philip commissioned the necessary surveys to create a map of the Iberian Peninsula on an unprecedented scale. A team of experts led first by Pedro de Esquivel, professor of mathematics at the Complutense University, and then by Juan López de Velasco, 'royal cosmographer', worked on the project; and although it was never published, the team produced an atlas containing an overall map of the peninsula,

together with twenty detailed regional maps on a scale of 1:430,000, similar to that of standard aeronautical charts today and by far the largest European maps of their day to be based on a detailed ground survey.

Philip also commissioned a series of questionnaires, later known as the *Relaciones topográficas*, sent out in the 1570s to every settlement in Castile requiring information about its geography, history, economy, population and 'antiquities' as a prelude to writing a detailed 'description and history' of the kingdom. The king added a letter explaining that he needed each community to complete the questionnaire 'because if we were to send a person to compile the necessary information, it could not be accomplished with the speed that we would like to see in this venture'.³⁴ López de Velasco initiated a similar operation in America. He sent out questionnaires in the king's name to communities in both New Spain and Peru, asking who had discovered and colonized each location. What was its climate, landscape and population (and how had it changed over time and why)? Which native peoples lived there, how did they live and what did they eat? What buildings, secular and ecclesiastical, existed? López de Velasco also asked for maps – although here he miscalculated, because many colonial communities lacked a Spanish cartographer and so sent back a map drawn by an indigenous artist who used the traditional conventions.

The king sent all the results of these various projects to the Escorial in the hope that, on top of its other functions, it would become a research centre. His foundation charter of 1567 envisaged a college for twenty-four students in theology and arts, and a seminary for thirty ordinands. In addition, 'I have given orders to collect a good number of books' in the monastic library, he explained as he asked one of his ambassadors to purchase certain volumes, because 'it is one of the principal source of memories that we can leave, both for the special benefit of the monks who will live in this convent and for all the scholars who will come here and read them'.³⁵ By the time of his death, the monastery library contained 14,000 volumes (including those acquired by Calvete de Estrella).

Philip created a research centre in Madrid, too. On Christmas Day 1582, 'desiring the benefit of our vassals, and that our kingdoms should possess some experts proficient in mathematics,

architecture and related forms of knowledge', Philip appointed three founding professors to a new academy of mathematics in the capital. One of them, Juan Bautista Lavana, a Portuguese cartographer, would receive 400 ducats a year 'to work and study in our court, where he will take charge of cosmography, geography and topography, and read mathematics'. All three scholars reported directly to Juan de Herrera, who signed a certificate confirming that they had performed their work satisfactorily and so could collect their generous salary – considerably more than that of any university professor. This was deliberate. In 1584 Herrera published his Instructions for the new academy, which stressed two points: its exalted clientele and its elitist philosophy. The professors must give public lectures in Castilian (not Latin) each morning in the patio of the Alcázar primarily

so that the nobles in the palace and court of His Majesty should be instructed in courtly speech and manners so that, by the time they leave for the wars or for an administrative posting, they will have a laudable and virtuous career on which to spend their time rather than fall, for lack of conversational skills and enthusiasm, into pointless pursuits and the faults that grow from youthful idleness.

In short, the academy aimed to groom administrators fit for the king's service.³⁶

A day in the life

These myriad interests, combined with his amazing dedication to work and prayer, must lead any reader to wonder how Philip managed to accomplish so much. Like all humans, his days contained only twenty-four hours and his weeks only seven days, and whether he resided in Madrid, Lisbon or in one of his country houses he followed much the same routine. He normally slept alone until 8 a.m. – and did not rise before then: 'See to it that until eight o'clock there is no hammering or great noise,' he told his minister of works one evening. After his barbers had shaved him and his gentlemen of the bedchamber had dressed him, the king began work by signing the papers prepared by his secretaries the previous day. 'I am now signing what has arrived, because that always comes first,' he once observed. This activity could consume

much time: one morning he complained that among his various accomplishments ‘the least has been to sign almost four hundred letters’.³⁷ Next, the king went to ‘hear Mass and explain his affairs to God’. According to Fray Pablo de Mendoza, who in 1583 proposed a detailed daily schedule for the king, ‘in this you might spend an hour and a half’.³⁸ After that, Philip either gave audiences (when in Madrid) or worked on his papers until 11 a.m., when he ate the first of his two daily meals, usually alone. Then he took a siesta while his ministers worked, and then began the main work of the day, with valets bringing to the king’s desk a stream of consultas from his councils, and also the memorials and letters ‘to be placed in the king’s hands’, for Philip to read and then write his decision. We know the king was right-handed because whenever arthritis afflicted his right hand or wrist he complained that he could not sign anything; we also know that his weakening eyesight sometimes reduced his ability to work by candlelight. He frequently complained about this: ‘It is already late and at this hour my eyes are in such a state that I can hardly see’; or ‘I have neither time nor eyesight, which is very poor at night’; or ‘I am writing with my eyes half shut’.³⁹

By 1580, the use of a stamp with his signature circumvented the weakness in his wrist, and his sight received unexpected relief from England, which boasted an active lens-crafting industry. Secretary of State Gabriel de Zayas begged a Spanish merchant living in London to send him a pair of spectacles because ‘although I (praise God) do not need them, I would like to help the duke of Alba and other colleagues who use them’. Before long, Philip himself was wearing reading glasses to work – although he refrained from doing so in public: ‘My sight is not as good as it used to be for reading in a coach,’ he admitted in 1586, but ‘I am ashamed to wear glasses outside’.⁴⁰

Better clocks formed another artificial aid to efficiency. Lhermite provided a detailed description of the two clocks that ‘His Majesty normally used in his apartment’. One came equipped with chimes, and both with oil lamps so that they acted ‘like night lights instead of candles’ and ‘His Majesty made use of no other light than that of these two lamps when he needed to read his papers’. They ‘gave an unusual and powerful impression,’ Lhermite continued:

One might say that there was no other object or item of furniture that

the king valued more, or that he liked more, or that he got more use from than these two machines, which he kept before his eyes day and night. In summary, we could say they completely controlled the life of the good king, because they regulated and measured his life, dividing it by the minute, determining his daily actions and occupations [see plate 25].⁴¹

When the weather was fine, Philip sometimes escaped the tyranny of his clocks – although seldom his paperwork: ‘So far I have been unable to finish with these devils, my papers, and I still have some left to read tonight, even though I am taking some with me to read in the country, which is where I am going right now,’ he announced to his secretary one day in spring 1577.⁴² Occasionally he dropped everything in order to relax outdoors. In the first years of his reign, in the Netherlands, he hunted birds in Brussels (‘we used dark lanterns to drive the magpies into nets, and before night fell we had killed fourteen of them’) and he hunted game in the palace of his aunt Mary at Binche (‘which is a great place for it, and also for the benefit brought by exercise and the open air to my health’).⁴³ After his return to Spain, Philip continued for some years to take part in jousts and tournaments, and even in his fifties he still travelled and hunted on horseback. His ministers sometimes felt resentment when their master relaxed. For example, at El Bosque de Segovia in 1576, Mateo Vázquez included an implicit reproach in a note about the matters that had arisen ‘since Your Majesty left to go fishing’; but Philip paid no attention. He later informed Vázquez that ‘because I have arranged to go on an outing with the queen, I won’t need you today’.⁴⁴

The king enjoyed watching spectacles, especially with his family. In 1584, at the Escorial for Corpus Christi, Philip and his children spent three hours watching ‘a play about the conversion of St Pelagia’, and a decade later, in Madrid just before Lent, they watched two Italian acrobats on a high wire stretched in front of the Alcázar, dancing and performing in time to music ‘making everyone laugh’. The king also enjoyed bullfights, for example attending the five days of corridas held in Lisbon in 1582 to celebrate the defeat of a French attack on the Azores, and describing the finer points in a letter to his daughters.⁴⁵ In 1586 he looked forward to attending an auto-de-fé in Toledo, explaining to his secretary that ‘It’s really something if you have not seen one

before'; and although he was disappointed on this occasion, he was lucky five years later when he visited the city and took his children to watch the spectacle. His only regret, he wrote to his daughter Catalina in distant Turin, was that 'you have never seen one'.⁴⁶

Indoors, Philip's principal source of relaxation since he was a boy seems to have been jesters, buffoons and dwarves. Apart from Perejón (chapter 1), the best known is Magdalena Ruiz, who entered royal service in 1568 and died at the Escorial in 1605. Magdalena had epileptic seizures, got drunk, and over-ate (especially strawberries) until she was sick. Whenever she appeared in public the crowd chanted 'Whip her, whip her', hoping to provoke or frighten her. The king took her with him to Portugal and filled the letters he wrote to his daughters with accounts of her deeds and defects. 'Magdalena is very angry with me,' he told them in 1581, 'and says she wants to leave and that we are trying to kill her; but tomorrow I think she will have forgotten all about it.' She could be rude as well as angry: after taking a short trip in 1584, Philip reported that 'I rode out on horseback but returned in my carriage, and because I did not ride back, Magdalena told me that I wanted to go back to being a baby'.⁴⁷ The frequency with which Magdalena appears in the king's letters to his children suggests that he saw her every day.

Once reunited with his paperwork, Philip normally worked until 9 p.m., when he ate dinner (almost always alone) – although he usually took a short stroll first. One day in 1578, he confessed (in writing, naturally) to Vázquez 'I have been very careless today' because his valets had brought him two files and 'I put them on a desk where I had other papers, so that I could see them later, but because I had many audiences, and the rest of the files that I gave you, and lots of other papers that I signed earlier, I forgot about them – so that even though we spoke this evening ... I did not remember them until now, when it is already nine o'clock'. But then the king had a stroke of luck: 'Having just asked for dinner [to be served], while taking a stroll, and walking near the desk, I happened to see them and read them.' When dealing with matters that he felt could not wait, the king might delay his dinner for an hour or more. 'It's ten o'clock and I have not dined or lifted my head all day,' he complained to Vázquez in 1588 as he wrestled with Armada business, 'as you will see by the size of the file' he

was returning; but ‘now I have neither eyes nor concentration’ and so ‘send the rest back to me tomorrow’.⁴⁸

His meals, when they came, were abundant but monotonous. Every day at lunch and dinner Philip could choose from fried or roast chicken; a partridge or a piece of game; a side of venison or beef (normally about two kilos). Soup and white bread came with every meal, plus fruit with lunch and salad with dinner; but, according to his household account books, the king rarely ate fruit or vegetables. Until 1585, he ate fish every Friday but in that year he obtained express permission from the pope to eat meat every day, even during Lent, because ‘We do not want to risk a change to our diet’. Henceforth, he gave up meat only on Good Friday.⁴⁹

After dinner, the king continued to work on his papers until about 11 p.m., but seldom later. One day in 1572, at the Escorial, Antonio Gracián received a letter from Madrid ‘and I was urged to deliver it to His Majesty before he went to bed. I sent it immediately, but it was almost 11 o’clock and His Majesty had already retired and so it could not be delivered.’ A decade later Philip upbraided Mateo Vázquez for sending him dossiers at bedtime: ‘I was already in bed last night when this came and, as you know, my doctors do not wish me to see any papers after I have eaten dinner.’ Sometimes, as the king looked back on his day, it seemed as if he had done nothing but push papers: one evening at the Escorial, he complained to his daughters (in Madrid) that ‘I have spent the whole day reading and writing’ and so ‘I am writing this after 10 o’clock, very tired and very hungry’.⁵⁰

Only the combination of his many virtues – his ability to work long and hard days, his intelligence and his memory, his exercise regime and his moderation in all things – can explain Philip’s ability to take so many decisions on so many different matters throughout the fifty-five years that he governed. Nevertheless, this prowess disguised a surprising indiscipline in what he chose to concentrate on. Thus he read and commented on countless papers concerning the Escorial and ecclesiastical patronage, however trivial, whereas many documents on issues of national security contain few signs of royal interest – just as Don Diego de Córdoba, Don Juan de Silva and others complained (chapter 4). The king was not unaware of this problem. In March 1566, with war in the Mediterranean, a rebellion narrowly averted in Mexico and trouble brewing in the Netherlands, Secretary Pedro de Hoyo apologized

for troubling his master with ‘trivia’ about the royal palaces: ‘When I see Your Majesty with many tasks, I am sometimes afraid to worry you with matters that could be postponed without detriment.’ The king replied ‘I gave up on the tasks: although there are plenty of them these days, sometimes a man can relax by doing other things.’⁵¹ Everyone who has wielded executive power can sympathize with this statement: in a time of crisis, solving minor problems can provide short-term satisfaction, even relaxation, which seems to make the major problems less daunting. But Córdoba, Silva and the rest felt that Philip did not ‘relax’ by ‘doing other things’ just ‘sometimes’: they complained that he did so constantly, so that ‘relaxation’ became escapism.

Sex in the palace?

A few others have suggested that the king’s ‘relaxation’ included illicit sexual relations. In his 1997 biography, *Philip of Spain*, Henry Kamen asserted that Philip’s ‘fondness for women was evident (he was scrupulously faithful to only [his fourth wife], Anna)’. Specifically, ‘When Philip went to the Netherlands in 1555 he immediately had love affairs with at least two ladies’; and ‘despite his marriage’ to Isabel of France, ‘Philip continued to divert his sexual energies elsewhere’. ‘He may have had other lovers,’ Kamen added mysteriously, ‘but they are not documented.’⁵² It seems that only one lady left direct testimony concerning the king’s infidelity. According to the confessor and eulogist of Lady Magdalen Dacre, some time in 1554 or 1555,

[w]hiles she lived a mayd of honour in the court, on a tyme King Philip who had maryed Queene Mary, youthfully opened a window where she was washing her face, and sportingly putting in his arme, which some other would perhaps haue taken as a great honour and reioyced thereat ... she tooks a staffe lying by, and strongly stroke the King on the arme.

The confessor, who included this incident in a chapter entitled ‘Of her notable chastity’, had no doubt that Philip had some ‘lewdnes’ on his mind, and rejoiced that Lady Dacre had ‘rejected the King’; and it is indeed hard to see why else a married monarch would have ‘youthfully opened a window’ explicitly to grope one of his wife’s maids while she washed herself.⁵³ All other stories of Philip’s affairs are based on indirect evidence, however, and most

concern only two ladies. The first alleged affair, with Isabel Osorio, seems plausible (chapter 1); the second, with Doña Eufrasia de Guzmán, does not. To be sure, in 1565 Venetian ambassador Giovanni Soranzo claimed that Philip had sired a child, the prince of Asculi, by Doña Eufrasia (like Osorio, a lady-in-waiting to Princess Juana); but Soranzo was apparently the only ambassador to mention this, and he did so only after returning to Venice, not in his dispatches written while in Spain. A comment by Ruy Gómez, whose household office obliged him to sleep in the king's bedchamber, indirectly refuted Soranzo. In October 1564 he provided the French ambassador with 'some details of the king's former love affairs, which had now ceased, and had been outside the palace, so that everything was now going so well with the queen [Isabel of France] that one could not wish for more'. In reporting this indiscretion to King Charles IX, the ambassador made no mention of Doña Eufrasia or anyone else – and since the queen was Charles's sister, had there been any suggestion of adultery he would certainly have mentioned it, as well as any illegitimate child sired by the king.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, speculation continued. In 1578 the Spanish ambassador in Rome, Don Juan de Zúñiga reported on 'a rumour that has recently spread far and wide: that Your Majesty has a bastard son' (presumably Asculi) and was about to confer on him lands of the Military Orders, for which the pope would need to give his consent. Therefore, Zúñiga continued, 'if there is a son, it would be wise to request in advance a papal dispensation for the lands that Your Majesty might wish him to have, even though he is not legitimate'. What makes this letter so extraordinary is that Zúñiga, who had known Philip 'since he was a child' (as he stated later in the same letter), should apparently show no surprise that 'Your Majesty might have such a son'.⁵⁵ A few years later, also in Rome, a cardinal asked his agent in Madrid whether Philip had an illegitimate daughter. After careful enquiry, the agent replied that 'As yet, I have not heard a word about any natural daughter of His Majesty'; and although 'I have heard that a couple of princes have some claim to be his sons', he did not believe it 'because His Majesty has not given any sign of recognizing them as such'.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, others remained credulous. When William Cecil, Lord Burghley, Elizabeth's chief adviser (and formerly a minister of Philip and Mary), read a list of the gentlemen adventurers

mustered aboard the Spanish Armada in May 1588, he found the name of 'the prince of Asculi' and annotated it: 'The king of Spayne's bastard'. Likewise, ten years later an English manuscript prepared for Elizabeth's Favourite, the earl of Essex, and entitled *Anatomie of Spayne* devoted a page to Philip's 'yncestuous adulterie' with Doña Eufrasia.⁵⁷ Why would otherwise sensible statesmen like Burghley and Essex fabricate an almost certainly false adulterous sex life for Philip? The answer lies in the king's aggressive foreign policy in northern Europe, which led his enemies to use every artifice at their disposal to undermine him.

PART III

THE FIRST DECADE OF THE REIGN

Getting a grip, 1558–1561

A reluctant suitor – again

Two days after hearing of the death of Mary Tudor, in November 1558, Philip gave orders to remove ‘England, France and Ireland’ from his seals and style. He also forfeited the title ‘Defender of the Faith’, conferred on England’s monarchs by the Papacy. In the monastery of Groenendaal, near Brussels, where he mourned his father, the arrival of so much bad news depressed the king. Even small setbacks, like the illness of the brother of the count of Feria, his representative in England, made Philip wallow in self-pity: ‘I hope that God will restore his health – unless the fact that *I* hope for it will harm him,’ he wrote grimly to the count. But he still devoted much thought to the future. Just before Feria departed on his last mission to London, Philip ordered that if Mary were still alive when the count arrived, he should suggest to Elizabeth, his sister-in-law, that she should marry Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy; but if Mary had died, Feria must immediately suggest to Elizabeth that she should marry the newly widowed king – a proposal of stunning insensitivity.¹

Feria’s next letter, written four days after Mary’s death, communicated three pieces of unwelcome news. First, Philip had become very unpopular in England.

The people bitterly resent that the late queen sent large sums of money to Your Majesty ... and that the problems that the kingdom faces are Your Majesty’s fault; that they lost Calais; and that because Your Majesty did not come to see the late queen, she died of grief.

Second, Mary's intransigence and Philip's own procrastination had prevented him from playing a part in Elizabeth's accession: 'The new queen and her subjects hold themselves free of Your Majesty'. Third, England now seemed on the brink of chaos: 'with the change of sovereigns, and of ministers, there is so much uproar and confusion that fathers do not know even their own children'.²

Despite all these setbacks, Feria asked permission to convey Philip's offer of marriage to Elizabeth, as instructed, but the king now had second thoughts. 'I see many obstacles in the way of achieving my desire, according to the conditions you describe,' he wrote; and until he knew whether she would accept his offer, 'I shall not write to Elizabeth'. Shortly afterwards, the arrival of a special messenger from the new queen brought some reassurance. Elizabeth professed not only 'grief and sorrow' at the 'departure to God' of her 'dearest syster the queen his late wife' but also expressed 'our zeal and affection to continue the old and perfect amity that from time to time hath been so friendly maintained' between their predecessors; and she signed her personal letter of condolence '[your] sister and perpetual ally'.³ Feria, too, regained a measure of optimism because (as he put it to Philip) the fate of Catholicism in England 'depends upon the husband that this woman chooses, because if she does what she should, our faith will do well and the kingdom will remain Your Majesty's friend; and if not, all will be lost'. Specifically, Feria continued, 'If she does decide to marry a foreigner, she will look favourably upon Your Majesty' – adding tactlessly 'When Your Majesty married the late queen, the French resented it greatly and they will resent it now if Your Majesty marries the present queen, because of her age and character, because in both she far excels the late queen.' When on 14 December, not even a month after Mary's death, Feria formally suggested to Elizabeth the possibility of marrying Philip, the queen politely asked what conditions her former brother-in-law had in mind.⁴

This gambit presented the king with a dilemma, reflected in two holograph letters written on 27 December 1558. One, to Feria, procrastinated. In effect, the king ordered the count to buy time until he had decided whether or not to conclude another 'English match':

Concerning what Elizabeth asks about my intentions about this

marriage, what I can tell you now is this: because it is a matter of such great importance and weight, even though we talked about it in your presence, as you will remember, I want to examine and think about it much more. Meanwhile, you must deal with the queen in a way that neither raises nor dashes her hopes, but rather draws this matter out until I can make up my mind.

Philip's second holograph letter, addressed to Elizabeth herself, was far less ambiguous – indeed, it was the only occasion on which he expressed love for a spinster his own age. Because of 'the desire I have always had to further your contentment and ease', he assured her that 'I shall take no less care of your affairs, being those of a sister whom I love so much, than I take of my own'.⁵

Over the next three months, the king dictated several letters to Elizabeth, always using the salutation 'To the most serene princess Elizabeth, queen of England, France and Ireland, Defender of the faith, our very dear sister and cousin', and referring to 'the royal person and estate of Your Highness'. These apparently routine phrases were significant, because they reveal that Philip did not share the doubts about Elizabeth's legitimacy held by his late wife (and many other Catholics, including the pope), and that he still considered his 'very dear sister and cousin' to be a Catholic.⁶ This correspondence dealt principally with three items of business: how to secure the best terms from the French at the peace conference in the frontier town of Cateau-Cambrésis; how to prevent the pope from deposing Elizabeth on the grounds either of illegitimacy or because she had not made her submission to Rome; and how to counter the claims of Mary Stuart, queen of Scotland and a Catholic married to the heir to the French throne, to be the legitimate successor of Mary Tudor. But both parties scrupulously avoided all discussion of marriage.

Philip's indecision irritated Feria. 'It is necessary for Your Majesty to get a grip on this matter,' he warned, 'and take immediate steps to ensure both that the king of France does not gain a foothold here and that the vineyard that Your Majesty planted should not be ruined.'⁷ These reproaches hit their mark: on 10 January 1559, Philip replied that 'having examined and thought about the matter a lot, even though I see many and great obstacles' – all described in numbing detail – 'I have made up my mind to perform this service for God Our Lord', namely 'to marry the queen of England, and to use all appropriate means to achieve

this, provided it can be done with the conditions and in the manner that I am about to tell you'. The king specified three conditions, all non-negotiable. 'The first and most important of these is that you must secure from the queen a promise that she will adhere to the same religion as me, which is the one I will always hold, and that she will continue in it and maintain and preserve her kingdom in it.' Next, 'the marriage contract made with the late queen stipulated that the Netherlands should be joined with England to form a single inheritance for any son born of the marriage; but that could have led to grave problems, and it could lead to even greater ones now, since the prince my son [Don Carlos] is now grown up'. Therefore 'under no circumstances will I agree to this'. Finally, 'because of the great and extreme necessity that exists for me to return to Spain I have resolved that, even if the marriage takes place and I go to England to take care of necessary business ... I will not stay there, even if the queen should not be pregnant, because she is young enough to wait for my return to that kingdom to conceive others'. Philip fully recognized the outrageous nature of this last condition, because he added for Feria's benefit: 'Although this is what would suit me, and what I have decided, which is to return to Spain at the end of next summer, even if I have to go in a small yacht', nevertheless 'it would be better not to say this to the queen, but rather "at a convenient moment", or even "after concluding the marriage"'.⁸

If this message seemed grudging, a second letter to Feria that same day – this time in the king's own hand – was glacial:

Nothing on earth would have made me take the decision you will see [in the other letter]: I do it to see if this might prevent that lady [Elizabeth] from making the changes in religion that she has in mind, and so to serve God. You would do me a very great service if you can ascertain what she wants to do, because I do not want to be in suspense right now; and, whatever happens, I want very much to go to Spain.

He concluded: 'Tell me exactly what happens, because I feel like a condemned man wondering what is to become of him. And, believe me, I would be just as happy with either outcome, because having offered myself to God, I think He will lead me to do whatever is better for His service.' Two weeks after stating his conditions, Philip once again let off steam to Feria. 'Believe me, if it were not to serve God, I would never do this, even if I thought I

could become ruler of four worlds,' he raged. 'Nothing could or would make me do this, except the clear knowledge that it might gain the kingdom [of England] for His service and faith.'⁹

Elizabeth's enthusiasm for matrimony matched that of her reluctant suitor. As long as his conditional offer of marriage remained on the table, Philip was obliged to protect her against her French and Scottish enemies, whatever policies she followed. So although she addressed Philip as her 'most dear brother, cousin and ally' in their official correspondence, she refused to renew England's submission to Rome or to attend Mass – unmistakable signs that she did not intend to fulfil the first of Philip's non-negotiable conditions: that she and her kingdom remain Catholic. Only in March 1559 did she respond to Philip's offer of marriage. Feria reported to his master incredulously that she first stated that 'she had no wish to marry'; then that 'although she could clearly see how the marriage would maintain the king's honour and the defence of his dominions, maintaining a close friendship with Your Majesty would attain both goals'; and 'finally, that various people had told her that as soon as Your Majesty had come to marry her, you would immediately leave for Spain'.¹⁰

Mumbling that the matter 'could be postponed for another day', Feria left the audience and his report to the king adumbrated possible strategies for turning Elizabeth's 'no' into 'yes'; but Philip had anticipated rejection. 'I have just learned the queen's decision about our marriage,' he replied upon receiving Feria's news, and continued (with palpable insincerity), 'and although I could not help feeling regret that it did not prove possible to achieve something that I wanted so much, I am content; what makes her happy makes me very happy.'¹¹ He neglected to inform Feria that he felt particularly 'happy' because he was now free to wed another Elizabeth.

The death of Mary Tudor brought Philip gains as well as losses. Above all, it removed a major stumbling block to the conclusion of peace with France: Calais. The victory at Gravelines (chapter 3) had already demonstrated that the Low Countries could be defended without English control of Calais; now, freed of the need to keep his English spouse and subjects happy, 'it made no sense that we should not make peace for the sake of a single town: better to let the French keep Calais'.¹² In addition, Henry II of France had offered the hand of his eldest daughter, Isabel, to Don Carlos, as a

way of guaranteeing peace between the two dynasties; but now that Philip was a bachelor again the French negotiators insisted that he should marry Isabel instead. On 23 March 1559, the very day that Philip received news of Elizabeth Tudor's rejection, his plenipotentiaries informed the French that 'His Majesty wishes to marry the eldest daughter of the king of France, requesting the same terms and conditions as those agreed for his son the prince'.¹³

The peace signed at Cateau-Cambr sis on 3 April 1559 secured every one of the goals that Charles V had laid down for his son in his 'Political Testament' a decade before (chapter 2). Admittedly, Henry II made a few gains from the treaty – but not from Philip. Thus he acquired Calais from England; he retained the three imperial enclaves in Lorraine seized from the Holy Roman Empire in 1552; and he gained the right to garrison some bases in the duke of Savoy's Italian territories. But although both sides handed back their conquests in the Netherlands, Henry not only ceded almost all the rights and possessions claimed by Philip in Italy but also agreed to withdraw his troops from the lands of Spain's principal allies: Savoy, Mantua and Genoa.

Spain or England?

Although Cateau-Cambr sis thus greatly strengthened Philip's position on the continent, it greatly reduced his ability to influence affairs – especially religious affairs – in England. Realizing that a Protestant triumph in England would jeopardize his control over the Netherlands, shortly before signing the peace Philip expressed in a holograph letter to Feria his perplexity about what to do next. He began 'This is certainly the most difficult decision I have ever faced in my whole life' (a phrase he would use frequently later in his reign):

It grieves me greatly to see what is happening over there [in England] and to be unable to take the steps to stop it that I want, while the steps I can take seem far milder than such a great evil deserves ... The evil that is taking place in that kingdom causes me great anger and frustration ... but I believe we must try to remedy it without involving me or any of my vassals in a declaration of war until we have enjoyed the benefits of peace [for a while].

He added 'My only aim is to get it right [*azertar*]' (another of the king's favourite phrases) before lapsing into self-pity. 'May God grant that things turn out the way I want, but I am so unlucky that when I want something this much, it often turns out badly. This is how the world works.'¹⁴

Philip only hardened his attitude when Elizabeth openly broke with Rome, and Paul IV gave his full approval for the king to invade and overthrow Elizabeth – 'a venture entirely worthy of a "Catholic King"' – promising to invest him, should the invasion succeed, as king of England.¹⁵ But could Philip accept? His ministers in Spain bombarded him with warnings that they faced challenges that might overwhelm them unless he returned; and, as he confided to Feria, 'If I do not leave soon, I will not find a Spain to go to. That is why we must conclude our business here.' The strain of wrestling with these incompatible alternatives left the king exhausted. In late June 1559 he told Granvelle, in a rare abdication of responsibility, 'if any urgent missive should arrive, you may open it' and 'write to me about it' at the same convent near Brussels where he had mourned his father and his wife: 'I will go there tomorrow, to deal with other matters that I cannot handle here; and also to recover my health, because I am very much afraid that it will fail me. I have not been well these past days.'¹⁶

Throughout his long reign, at times of crisis Philip often secluded himself in order 'to deal with other matters that I cannot handle here', occasionally for weeks; but this time, astonishing news brought him out of his seclusion almost immediately. While jousting, Henry II had received a severe head wound from which he died on 10 July 1559, and his son Francis, already king of Scotland thanks to his marriage to Mary Stuart, now also became king of France. Philip and his ministers pondered the impact of this dramatic development. As Granvelle pointed out to a colleague in Spain, Philip's departure from northern Europe might precipitate 'developments that could do irreparable damage to His Majesty and to his successors. It cannot be a good thing for him to leave the Netherlands with English affairs as they are at present and relations with France not settled. I am not sure that the needs of Spain are so great that they exceed ours.' A few days later, the English ambassador at Philip's court couched the dilemma in more specific terms: 'When the king is once departed, it may chance whilst he studieth to kepe Spain pure from Protestantship, he may

fynde [heresy in] Flanders at his retourne well advanced.’¹⁷

A scathing letter from the regent Juana and her advisers soon settled the matter: she reported that ‘Protestantship’ had already taken root in Seville, Valladolid and several other Spanish cities. In addition, the princess pointed out, high taxes, disrupted trade and poor harvests had raised tensions throughout Spain, while many parts of Aragon verged on open insurrection. Above all, Juana insisted, in spite of the bankruptcy of 1557 (chapter 3) Castile’s treasury was empty. She included a detailed memorial revealing an annual revenue of 1.5 million ducats – already alienated for 1559, 1560 and part of 1561 – and immediate obligations of over 4 million for defence and for interest payments on a total debt of 25 million ducats. Therefore, Juana continued relentlessly,

Not only can Spain not provide Your Majesty with the enormous sum you say you need, but not even the smallest amount; nor can we meet the necessary ordinary expenses of these kingdoms. What the service of Your Majesty needs most is that you return to these realms as fast as you can, as I have so often written. Once Your Majesty has arrived, I hope to God that His assistance and your presence can restore the order necessary both to provide assistance for the Netherlands and remedy affairs here – which we cannot do in your absence.

Philip’s cheeks evidently flushed as he read this barrage of reproaches, because he scribbled to his secretary: ‘The council is not to see this, nor must you show this passage to anyone.’ He continued: ‘They have had a good laugh’ at his expense, and concluded bitterly ‘I do not wish to deal with these matters. Instead I want to do what I know is best for me, which is to leave’ for Spain.¹⁸

Philip now concentrated on preparing for his journey. He sent two of his most trusted councillors to Spain bearing a list of urgent questions: how best to improve Spain’s defences (galleys, fortifications, munitions); which public works (‘such as ports and docks, bridges and roads’, and public granaries) were under construction or planned (each town must send in a list); how to improve ‘river navigation and irrigation’; how to increase industrial production (especially textiles); how to eliminate imports of ‘linen, paper, and other things’ by developing domestic production; and how to raise revenues and reduce debt. Juana must create a committee of experts to discuss these matters, ‘and,

given their importance, they must be discussed in secret. On no account must anything become public knowledge.’ Moreover the committee must start its deliberations at once, ‘so that once I arrive, and receive their recommendations’, he could take the appropriate actions.¹⁹

It proved harder to reorganize the government of the Netherlands, in spite of receiving some useful last-minute advice on the subject from his father. The emperor’s trusted companion, Luis Quijada, passed on advice delivered by Charles just before he died on what he thought his son should do ‘before Your Majesty leaves the Netherlands’:

You should create a council composed of the individuals who seem most suitable, and who have the greatest experience of war in the Low Countries. The duke of Savoy should govern according to the advice of the said council, as was the custom when His Majesty [Charles] appointed regents there – although he also said that it would be necessary to give much thought to those individuals, because in some of them he saw difficulties.²⁰

Philip followed this posthumous advice from his father as best he could. The first obstacle he faced was the refusal of Emmanuel Philibert to remain as regent: the French evacuated Savoy after the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, and naturally the duke insisted on going home. Philip therefore needed to appoint another close relative, and he eventually chose Duchess Margaret of Parma, Charles’s illegitimate daughter, even though she lacked political or administrative expertise. Philip tried to remedy her inexperience in three ways. First, as he had done with Juana five years before (chapter 2), he spent several weeks instructing her in person about his overall aims and how she could help him to achieve them. Second, again as he had done with Juana, Philip issued detailed Instructions that left her little room for manoeuvre, requiring Margaret both to inform him of every matter of note and to take no decision without consulting him first. He also gave her a list of candidates to be appointed in strict order of seniority to ecclesiastical vacancies as and when they became available. Finally, Philip followed Charles’s advice and created ‘a council composed of the individuals who seem most suitable, and who have the greatest experience of war in the Low Countries’. Since the emperor died before he could enlighten his son about those

potential councillors in whom 'he saw difficulties', Philip chose men with competing ambitions as well as complementary talents. Count Lamoral of Egmont, the victor of Gravelines, boasted great military prestige and also, like Prince William of Orange, combined diplomatic expertise with widespread international contacts (Egmont had spent time in England and Spain negotiating the marriage with Mary Tudor; Orange had helped to negotiate Cateau-Cambrésis; both men had many friends and relatives in Germany). Overshadowing all of them stood Granvelle, who for the previous fifteen years had planned and executed delicate diplomatic and administrative missions for the Habsburgs. Until he left the Netherlands, Philip consulted Granvelle daily on all affairs of state, and for some years afterwards he communicated all important orders through him rather than through Margaret.

Some idea of the difficulties Margaret and Granvelle would face after the king left emerged in Ghent in July 1559, when for the first time Philip exercised his powers as sovereign of the Order of the Golden Fleece to convene a meeting of all its members. Such gatherings were normally boisterous – the 'Sovereign' and each knight delivered a formal critique of everyone else's behaviour since the last meeting – but this time, according to his own account, Philip provoked uproar when he asked the knights to do three things: 'First, that they should elect [to the Order] only Catholics; next, that from now on they should take great care to punish all heretics in their domains; and finally that they should hear Mass every day.' Although almost everyone accepted the first, several objected to the second (on the grounds that adequate legislation already existed, so that to single out the knights called their devotion into question) and 'they objected even more to the third, saying that they were all Christians and so were already obliged to do so'.²¹ Eventually Philip gave up the struggle and set off to join the fleet assembled in Zeeland to carry him home to Spain.

As he waited for a favourable wind, Philip's spirits rose somewhat. He told Granvelle 'I feel well, and I have done so since I got here, since I can travel around these islands where there are more opportunities to exercise'. Yet anxiety and anguish still lay close to the surface.

The delay in my departure seems very dangerous to me, but since this

depends solely on the will of God, I can only wait for whatever He is pleased to grant; and I hope that, since He has removed worse obstacles from my path, He will also remove this one, and provide me with the means to hold on to my dominions, and not let them be lost because I lack the means to hold on to them, which would be the saddest thing for me and something I would regret more than anything else one can think of – and much more than if I lost them in battle. I tell you that I'm leaving with grave concerns about what I will find.

The next day, 25 August 1559, he set sail from the Netherlands for Spain. He would never return.²²

Spain under quarantine

The 'grave concerns' that preoccupied Philip included irrefutable evidence that Protestant heresy had taken root in Spain. In May 1558 Inquisitor-General Fernando de Valdés had submitted a comprehensive report on how the religious situation had evolved 'since Your Majesty left these kingdoms' (surely not a casual choice of words). He began by lamenting the 'great number of Bibles and other books of Holy Scripture, all contaminated and filled with Lutheran material', found in Salamanca 'as well as in many other towns of these kingdoms, both in the possession of individuals and of convents and universities'. Next he described an upsurge of Moorish and Jewish worship elsewhere in Spain before returning to the 'large number of Lutherans' arrested in Seville, Valladolid, Salamanca and many other towns.²³

Far away in the Netherlands, apparently Philip did not grasp the seriousness of these developments. He did not reply for six months and then, writing 'from our camp', he urged Valdés 'to proceed with full rigour against those in prisons, so that such a great evil may be stopped and punished without pity'. He added that to avoid 'any delay in doing what is needed through seeking to consult me while I am on campaign', the Inquisitor-General must 'give a full account of these matters to His Majesty [Charles V], because I know he will be willing to listen, decide and execute what the situation requires'.²⁴

Valdés had no intention of taking his orders from Yuste. Instead, he worked to convince the regent Juana that since 'in perilous times the anchor of the faith and of the Monarchy' of Spain 'had always been the Inquisition', he now needed extensive new

powers. Valdés also explained the gravity of the situation to Pope Paul IV, detailing his success in uncovering ‘a large number of Lutherans’, and he requested papal briefs that would permit Inquisitors to pursue and prosecute all suspects. Valdés entrusted his correspondence to his nephew, with orders to reveal them only to the pope in a private audience. Neither he nor Juana sent a copy of the document to Philip, nor did they reveal that one of the briefs Valdés requested would empower the Inquisition to gather information on possible heterodoxy concerning all ‘bishops, archbishops, patriarchs and primates living in Spain’, and to arrest and imprison any who might attempt to ‘flee or otherwise try to leave the kingdom’.²⁵

Valdés and Juana had already identified a potential suspect: Fray Bartolomé de Carranza, architect of the re-Catholicization of England, whom the king had just appointed archbishop of Toledo (and thus Primate of Spain) and also (unknown to Valdés) governor of Spain and tutor to Don Carlos should the king die.²⁶ While awaiting the brief, Valdés ordered all the ‘Lutherans’ already incarcerated to be interrogated about Carranza, using torture if necessary to secure incriminating evidence. He also asked selected bishops and theologians to read and assess the orthodoxy of Carranza’s writings, especially the catechism he had published earlier that year to win over the Protestants of England.

Philip did not intervene directly in the Carranza affair until December 1558, when he told Juana to urge the Supreme Council of the Inquisition (the ‘Suprema’) ‘to punish thoroughly and harshly the heretics whom I hear are over there [in Spain], and to neglect nothing that might advance this goal, whoever is implicated – even it should be the prince’.²⁷ Nevertheless the king seems to have seen the accusations and counter-accusations for what they were – part of the ‘factions that have formed or are being formed among my ministers’ that Charles had warned him about (chapter 1) – because in April 1559 he granted a private audience to Fray Hernando de San Ambrosio, Carranza’s personal envoy, who reported to his master that Philip’s answer ‘showed me how much he loves Your Lordship, and that the things that have been written and said to him have not changed the high opinion he has of you’. Admittedly, when Fray Hernando requested, on behalf of Carranza, permission to ask the pope for assistance, the king refused; but immediately afterwards, he wrote to reassure his

primate that all was well, urging him ‘most strongly to make no change in what you have been doing up to now, and to seek help from no one except me.’²⁸ Although Philip was a master of dissimulation, the warmth and intimacy of this letter confirm the impression he gave to Fray Hernando that at this stage he still had a ‘high opinion’ of his primate.

Carranza nevertheless remained uneasy. He informed the king of his fears that Valdés ‘would use the powers of the Inquisition as an instrument to achieve his goals or avenge his grievances’, adding that ‘if he could, he would make me out to be a heretic’.²⁹ He was right: a few days later Valdés received a papal brief authorizing proceedings against any prelate suspected of heresy, and he immediately convened the Suprema, together with some of the crown’s legal experts, ‘to read and consider the evidence’ against Carranza. The committee agreed ‘to begin proceedings against the archbishop, according to the papal brief’, and then composed a letter cunningly crafted to secure Philip’s approval. The Inquisitors noted that those already condemned for Lutheranism included friends and disciples of Carranza, several of whom had denounced him, whereas he had not denounced any of them; they also asserted that the archbishop’s catechism contained numerous Protestant ideas and phrases. Lest any royal doubts survive, the Inquisitors resorted to naked blackmail, exploiting two of Philip’s anxieties: his conscience and his authority. Unless the king approved the arrest, they argued, Carranza might ‘convince others to follow his false and heretical opinions, and then we do not know how Your Majesty’s conscience and reputation could remain untainted – besides the danger that royal authority would suffer if the matter should end up in the hands of the pope, because we do not know how he would respond or how the business would end’. The Suprema concluded with an ingenious ruse: Carranza should receive a letter ‘urging him in the name of Your Majesty or of the princess [Juana] to come to this court’, where he could immediately be placed under house arrest.³⁰

The Suprema’s letter placed the king in an impossible position: he could either uphold the authority of the Inquisition or he could save Carranza, but he could not do both. His reply, dated 26 June 1559, revealed that the blackmail had worked: Philip authorized the Suprema ‘to proceed in this and other matters with the rigour that their serious nature requires, without considering anything

other than the service of Our Lord, the well-being of the realms that God has entrusted to me, and the discharge of my conscience'. He also approved the ruse.³¹ As soon as this letter arrived, Juana informed Carranza that 'the service of God and the king requires that you should come to this city of Valladolid to discuss some extremely important matters that I will share with you when you arrive', adding that 'I would be very glad if you could come at once, even if you have to travel light. Appropriate lodgings will be provided.' When the archbishop nevertheless delayed, a posse of Inquisition officials surrounded the building where he lay sleeping, and just before dawn burst into his bedroom saying, 'You have been arrested by the Inquisition'. When he reached Valladolid, under guard, Carranza found out the meaning of Juana's promise to provide 'appropriate lodgings': the Inquisitors placed him under guard in two small rooms and, lest anyone should doubt his ultimate fate, they auctioned off his personal goods in the city square.³²

Although Philip had approved Carranza's arrest, he may not have realized that this formed only part of a comprehensive program conceived by Valdés to control Spain's intellectual life. In April 1559, the Inquisitor-General issued an order 'that no person, university or college' could henceforth 'issue a judgement or opinion about any book on any subject without first submitting that judgement of opinion to the council of the Inquisition'; and he announced his intention of prohibiting almost 700 'books listed in the Catalogue that We have ordered to be compiled'.³³ Six months later the king attended an auto-de-fé in Valladolid. 'It was extremely solemn,' according to an eyewitness, 'because the king our lord was present in his full majesty. He stood, removed his hat, and took an oath in the hands of the Inquisitor-General that he would uphold the business and the ministers of the Catholic Church'. Some forty nobles and a crowd of perhaps 200,000 observed this significant act of deference, listened to the sentences passed on those convicted, and watched some of them being taken away to be burned alive. According to the chronicler Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, when one of them reproached the king for allowing him to burn, Philip replied 'I would carry the wood to burn my own son if he was as wicked as you.'³⁴

In November 1559, the king signed a final measure prepared by Valdés to root out heresy: a proclamation prohibiting all Spaniards

‘from leaving these realms to study, teach, learn, attend or reside in any university, school or college abroad’. Students and teachers currently abroad had four months to return, on pain of losing their benefices (for clerics) and their possessions (for laypeople); while ‘the degrees and courses’ of those who henceforth studied abroad ‘will not count, and will never count, for anything’ in Spain.³⁵

It would be hard to exaggerate the cumulative impact of the measures conceived by Valdés and enacted by Philip and his sister in 1558–9. Certainly, they halted the practice of Protestantism in Spain – there would be no more ‘Lutheran cells’ and little circulation of heretical books – but keeping the lands of the Catholic King free from heresy came at a high price. After 1559, Spain was in effect quarantined from the rest of the world: without express approval from the Inquisition, no ideas could enter and no scholars could leave. Moreover, within Spain, the spate of arrests and accusations meant that no one – whether cleric or lay – could safely express any opinion about religion. As the count of Feria (still abroad) put it: ‘Affairs in Spain are taking a turn for the worse, because we are getting to the stage where we will not know who is a Christian and who is a heretic’; and so, he opined, where religion was concerned ‘it is better to be silent’.³⁶ But silence was not always possible: between 1560 and 1562 over a hundred members of the Spanish elite, including Feria, received a summons to give testimony under oath to the Inquisitors involved in the trial of Carranza. Even the king had to do so – twice.

The trial of the century

On 4 September 1559, a week after Carranza entered Valladolid in custody (and four days before Philip returned to the city), Valdés confronted his victim and demanded a full confession of guilt. To his surprise, the primate first pointed out that Pope Paul had died before the Inquisition arrested him, and so the brief was invalid, and then noted that the Inquisition’s own protocols required a judge who was ‘impartial and above suspicion’. Since Valdés ‘is my declared enemy ... according to justice and law he should recuse himself as my judge’. Carranza later presented twenty-five charges to support his claim that not only the Inquisitor-General but also two other members of the Suprema ‘hate me’ and so should recuse themselves from the case. The accused had become the accuser.³⁷

Carranza's remarkable memory allowed him to recall his past with great precision: places, dates and subjects; opinions, speeches and sermons; relations with a vast number of people in Spain, at Trent, in England and in the Netherlands. Although he was occasionally vague and evasive (he was, after all, on trial for his life), he managed to recreate in detail, with amazing accuracy, all that had happened to him right down to his arrest. Furthermore, having worked for the Inquisition for twenty-five years, he knew exactly how to use its standard operating procedures to his advantage. First, although the Inquisitors concealed the identity of his accusers, so that Carranza could not demand that they too recuse themselves, he could discredit hostile testimony by demonstrating that a *potential* accuser was a 'declared enemy' and so should not be believed – and his evidence discredited more than thirty other individuals (we now know that almost all of them had indeed testified against him). The second legal recourse allowed by the Inquisition to all accused was the right to present evidence that either refuted specific charges of heresy or else provided an innocent context for a suspect remark. Third, the archbishop (like all those accused) could present evidence of the *good* things he had done at every stage of his life: his piety, poverty and humility; his alms and acts of charity; above all his resolute and enthusiastic persecution of heretics in England and the Netherlands. In all three categories, Carranza formulated lists of questions and named those from whom the Inquisitors must secure an answer. On several matters he 'called as a witness King Philip, our lord'.³⁸

In January 1560, two Inquisitors and their secretary arrived at the royal palace and asked the king to answer five questions about whether or not Valdés hated Carranza. It was probably the first time he had been interrogated since his father's prying questions about his sex life as a teenager (chapter 1) and he opted to study the questions in private and submit a written response. 'I would not know if hatred or enmity exists' between the two, he answered evasively, 'because if it does, it would be in their thoughts, which no one can know or judge with certainty.'³⁹ Two years later, the Inquisitors returned and interrogated the king in person on whether he had heard certain sermons preached by Carranza in the royal chapel while he was in Brussels, and if 'the doctrine that he preached was sound and Catholic'. Philip replied, with evident irritation, that 'in the sermons by the archbishop that I heard in

1558 and 1557, I never heard anything that could have given offence to me or anyone else; and *since I am not a theologian* that is all I can say on the subject.’ As the notary read his answer back, Philip had second thoughts about the phrase in italics and crossed it out before he signed his testimony (see plate 25).⁴⁰

Gradually, Philip realized that Valdés had indeed acted through animosity, and his confidence in the Inquisitor-General waned. In 1566 he suspended Valdés from his post. But he would go no further: the credibility as well as the authority of the Holy Office was at stake – and the king could hardly challenge the institution for which he had proclaimed his support so often. From the moment he approved Valdés’s plan to arrest and imprison Carranza, the king needed a conviction just as desperately as the Suprema and for the next seventeen years he struggled to achieve this goal – to no avail. In 1567, despite Philip’s strenuous efforts, Pope Pius V summoned Carranza (whom Philip now described as ‘the criminal with the highest profile in these kingdoms’) to Rome and continued his trial there. For the next nine years, the king’s fears of an acquittal led him to bombard both Pius and his successor with warnings ‘of what the world would say’ and ‘what a triumph it would be for the heretics if they should see that someone who had held, concealed and written false doctrines should be exonerated by Your Holiness’; and when in 1576 Gregory XIII announced Carranza’s relatively mild sentence – just five years’ suspension from his office as primate of Spain – the king was outraged and protested vehemently that ‘it should have been harsher, given the nature of the trial’. Only the archbishop’s death two weeks after sentencing put an end to the disagreement (and to the prospect that he might try to return to Toledo).⁴¹

Creating a court and finding a capital

On 9 October 1559, the day after presiding over the auto-de-fé, Philip left Valladolid and ordered the central government to relocate to Toledo. According to Cabrera de Córdoba, the decision reflected the king’s outrage that heresy had contaminated the city, and this may indeed have been a contributory factor; but it had been clear for some time that the government could not remain indefinitely in Valladolid. A year earlier, Princess Juana informed her father that, after five years of continuous residence, the court

needed to move because ‘with so many people here, and so much going on, there are more problems than anyone could imagine.’ She believed that Madrid ‘would be best’, failing which she suggested Guadalajara, Toledo or Burgos as potential capitals.⁴² During his first year back in Spain, Philip would visit each of these cities; but, before he left Valladolid, he carried out a delicate and important task – welcoming a brother he had never met into the royal family.

In February 1547, in Regensburg, Barbara Blomberg gave birth to a son by Charles V (chapter 2). In stark contrast to his dealings with the illegitimate daughters born before his marriage, whose personal lives he constantly micromanaged, the emperor seldom admitted to being the boy’s father. He even failed to mention him in his last testament, executed in 1554, instead drawing up a special codicil devoted to a boy named Jerónimo, which he sealed and gave to Philip, with orders not to open it until after his death. Meanwhile Charles entrusted his younger son to his comrade-in-arms, Luis Quijada and his wife Doña Magdalena de Ulloa, who carefully and discreetly supervised the boy’s education in Spain.

Philip thus discovered that he had a brother only after Charles’s death and his feelings at this discovery – a mixture of delight and disgust – emerge from his initial reply to a letter in which Quijada revealed the true identity of ‘that person whom Your Majesty knows is in my care’. At first, the king wrote enthusiastically ‘concerning don Juanyto, *I was delighted to learn that he is my brother*’ – a frank recognition of the boy’s parentage, and of the new name that he had chosen for him – but then Philip had second thoughts and deleted this phrase, replacing it with the noncommittal ‘*concerning that boy*, I was delighted to read what you wrote about him’, and he ordered Quijada to conceal the boy’s identity ‘until I arrive’ in Spain.⁴³ Despite this apparent indifference, at the assembly of the Golden Fleece held in Ghent in July 1559, of the fourteen new knights created by Philip one remained anonymous until after the two brothers met for the first time near Valladolid two years later. On that occasion, in a highly unusual gesture of affection, Philip embraced and kissed his twelve-year-old sibling and dubbed him Knight of the Golden Fleece. He also gave him the title ‘Don John of Austria’ together with a formal household, under Quijada, and arranged for him to take his place at court beside Charles’s other grandsons, Alexander

Farnese (son of Margaret of Parma) and Don Carlos, both born in 1545 and thus only two years his senior.⁴⁴

In November 1559 the expanded royal family took up residence in Toledo, which briefly became the capital of the Spanish Monarchy, and six months later, led by Princess Juana and Don John, the entire political elite of Castile swore allegiance to Don Carlos as ‘prince and successor to the kingdoms of his father and, after his death, as their king and natural lord’. The ceremony lasted nine hours, followed by banquets and jousts (in one of which Philip led a ‘team’). The prizes were awarded by another teenager who had joined the royal family in January 1560: Philip’s third wife, Isabel of France.

Toledo did not please the young queen. Soon after she arrived, she contracted smallpox and told her mother: ‘I can assure you that if it were not for the pleasant company of my husband in this city, I would judge it one of the most disagreeable places on earth’. She was not alone. Philip’s courtiers found little convenient accommodation because the Tagus surrounded the city on three sides, and climbing up to the royal castle through steep and winding streets – many of them too narrow for a horse – left them exhausted. Before long, ‘because the streets were so filthy and so narrow, and because of the high price of food’, most courtiers wanted to leave.⁴⁵

Some expected the court to return to Brussels, but as the king explained to Granvelle, although ‘I love Flanders very much, and now more than ever’ he lacked funds ‘even for trivial things, so that you would be shocked if you saw it. I tell you that I never thought while I was there [in the Netherlands] that things could be like this’ in Spain. So if not in Brussels, Valladolid or Toledo, where would Philip locate his capital? He settled the matter on 8 May 1561, when he signed a letter alerting the city council of Madrid that, ‘having determined to travel with our court to your city’, he was sending officials there to ‘prepare accommodation for our household and court’.⁴⁶

In retrospect, the decision seems inevitable. In 1536 the emperor had embarked on extensions to the medieval Alcázar on a bluff at the outskirts of the city, and it served as Philip’s headquarters during his second regency (1551–4). While still in Brussels, he purchased parcels of land around the Alcázar, and also on the other side of the Manzanares to form what would become the Casa

de Campo, and he ordered the master of works to construct ‘a fine suite of rooms with glass windows that look out on to the fields’ (see plate 27). The 235,000 ducats spent on remodelling the Alcázar between 1536 and 1562 produced (in the words of Véronique Gérard), ‘the largest royal palace complex in Spain. Its size, configuration, and the presence of a chapel and a great hall facilitated court life.’⁴⁷ Even when the king was absent from his new capital – in 1563–4 when he spent almost six months visiting his Aragonese inheritance; in 1570 when he toured Andalusia; even in 1580–3 while he went to Portugal – the bureaucracy, the diplomatic corps and the rest of the royal family all remained in Madrid.

From peace to war again

Philip inherited from his father a war with Suleiman the Magnificent (chapter 3), and the strain on his resources led him early in 1558 to authorize his agents to secure a long truce with the sultan (although he kept their negotiations secret in order to avoid revealing Spain’s weakness to the French). Later that year, as soon as he was elected Holy Roman Emperor, Philip’s uncle Ferdinand also sent envoys to arrange a truce with the Turks, and Philip sought to use this initiative as a front to conceal his own negotiations. The sultan refused, declaring that he would deal only with Ferdinand: if Philip wanted an armistice, he would have to beg for one publicly. In March 1559, still fearful that the war with France might drag on, Philip swallowed his pride and approved draft terms for a ten- or twelve-year truce with Suleiman; but the favourable terms of Cateau-Cambrésis led him to change his mind. ‘In view of the peace concluded between me and the King of France’, and in view of the advanced ‘age of the sultan and the anxiety that the discord between his sons causes him, I believe that neither negotiating nor concluding a truce with him is in my interest’. Instead, Philip reasoned, ‘without the friendship of France, and lacking ports to welcome his fleet, the Turks will not send their fleet against Christendom’, and he ordered all his forces in the Mediterranean theatre to rendezvous in Sicily in preparation for a surprise attack. In June 1559, still in Brussels he directed the duke of Medinaceli, viceroy of Sicily, to lead these forces to recapture Tripoli.⁴⁸

This decision mired Philip's dominions in a war that lasted more than eighteen years and tied down resources needed to respond effectively to threats elsewhere: how could he have made such a catastrophic miscalculation? Perhaps his participation in two victorious campaigns against France had given the king delusions of invincibility while doing God's work? Or perhaps he saw it as his destiny. As a child he had memorized medieval legends of knightly combat between Christians and Moors, and an emblem prepared for him in 1548, on the eve of his departure for the Grand Tour, showed a sun with the name 'Philip' and the motto *Donec auferatur Luna* (until the moon disappears) which, the author explained, meant that 'this sun, Philip, who represents Your Highness', should fight 'until you have removed the moon from the Turks and Arabs and others who take it as their emblem'. The following year the prince received a presentation copy of a book, with a binding that sported the names of both Philip and Christ in gold letters, which called upon him to bring peace to Christendom, extirpate heresy and wrest Constantinople and Jerusalem from the Turks.⁴⁹

Brussels, however, was a poor place from which to orchestrate the recapture of Tripoli (let alone Constantinople or Jerusalem). By the time Philip's orders reached Italy, more than a month had passed and news both of Cateau-Cambrésis and of the concentration of ships in Sicily had reached the Ottoman garrison of Tripoli, which now hastened to repair the port-city's fortifications. This news caused Medinaceli to lose his nerve – 'He felt he needed more troops to carry out the venture' – and his expeditionary force did not leave until December.⁵⁰ Predictably, winter storms drove it back.

Many military experts at once realized the significance of these delays – an attack that lacked the element of surprise was less likely to succeed and more likely to attract an immediate Ottoman counter-strike – but Philip held firm and the expeditionary force set out once more in February 1561, landing near Tripoli. Medinaceli promptly lost his nerve again and retreated to the island of Djerba (also known to Spaniards as Los Gelves), halfway between Tunis and Tripoli, which his men fortified. There, just as the military experts had feared, the Ottoman fleet encircled them. The Spaniards suffered heavy casualties in the pitched battle that followed and the survivors took refuge behind their fortifications

and begged Philip to save them.

The king now found that Toledo was little better than Brussels as a place from which to orchestrate campaigns in the Mediterranean. With his elite forces marooned on Djerba, the king became desperate. According to Secretary of State Gonzalo Pérez, who saw Philip every day, ‘this has touched His Majesty to the quick, and so he has ordered major and immediate preparations’. Indeed, Pérez continued, ‘he is so determined to ensure that relief reaches the duke of Medinaceli and the troops who remain on Djerba that if it should be necessary he will commit the rest of his resources and also his royal person’.⁵¹ This boast did not save the starving defenders of Djerba, who surrendered to Suleiman and took part in his victory parade through the streets of Constantinople. Most recovered their freedom only after a decade of captivity. It was a devastating reverse. According to the French ambassador, ‘No one would believe how much the loss of this fort has affected the court, Spain and all its dependencies, and how ashamed they are of ... having so miserably abandoned so many good men without doing anything to relieve it.’ ‘His Majesty,’ he added, ‘seems to be draining the bitter cup slowly.’⁵²

The ‘cup’ was ‘bitter’ indeed: many of the veterans lost at Djerba had a lifetime’s training in naval warfare, and without them Philip could not guarantee the safety of his Mediterranean possessions. To replace them, he therefore reluctantly decided to withdraw the 3,000 Spanish veterans whom he had left in the Netherlands.

At first it seemed that Philip had over-reacted: for the next two years the Ottoman fleet stayed out of the western Mediterranean, which allowed him to send troops into France in 1562 to support the regency government against a Protestant rebellion. As usual, the king justified such a rash military initiative in messianic terms. ‘Although the expense has come at a bad time,’ he wrote,

it seems clear to me that the service of God (which is the main thing) and of me and my dominions requires me to send assistance to the Catholics. I realize that it involves a risk, but allowing the heretics to prevail would undoubtedly risk far more – because if they do we can be sure that all their energies will be directed against me and my dominions, to make them [Protestant] too.

And that, he concluded defiantly, ‘I will never allow or tolerate, even if it should cost me 100,000 lives (if I had them).’⁵³

Then, in 1563, Ottoman forces besieged the Spanish outpost of Oran, forcing Philip to concentrate his attention and his resources on the Mediterranean. According to a Netherlands minister at court, 'No one here speaks of anything but the siege of Oran' – adding that preparing a relief expedition 'has already cost more than 600,000 ducats'.⁵⁴ Although Philip's forces eventually relieved Oran, and the following year captured and fortified an outpost near Algiers, coordinating these operations kept the king in Spain: as Gonzalo Pérez put it, 'Since Castile is the core [of the Spanish Monarchy] which has to succour and support other parts, I do not know how His Majesty could abandon it.'⁵⁵

Combating the Turks drained Philip's resources. A senior minister observed that 'I have seen the statements from the treasury, and they are certainly depressing; but if God would free Your Majesty from war, a lot could be done'.⁵⁶ It was not to be: in 1565 news arrived in Madrid that Suleiman had prepared almost 200 vessels – the largest fleet recorded since Antiquity – and in May they carried 20,000 Ottoman soldiers to the island of Malta, where they laid siege to the headquarters of the Knights of St John. For the next six months, arranging for the relief of Malta became Philip's top priority, forcing him once again to neglect all the problems that faced him elsewhere, including in the Netherlands.

‘I would rather lose a hundred thousand lives if I had them’: keeping the faith, 1562–1567

Throughout the Spanish Monarchy, including the withdrawal of the Spanish veterans from the Netherlands in order to shore up the defence of the Mediterranean. ‘Please God,’ Philip wrote, ‘that everyone there [in the Netherlands] will now see the love and sympathy with which I handle their affairs, because now to placate them I am doing something that I fear will be greatly to my disadvantage.’ Some ministers played down the significance of Philip’s decision. It was ‘something necessary or, rather, obligatory’, wrote Gonzalo Pérez, who prayed that God ‘will sustain us in such a way that we will not regret it one day. But, as they say, “out of the frying-pan and into the fire”.’ In Brussels, Granvelle was more sanguine. The Spanish veterans, he warned the king, ‘upheld our prestige with our neighbours, and perhaps also served as a brake on the native population. May God grant that their departure does not stir up something.’¹

Granvelle was right. The Spaniards not only served as a rapid response force should a crisis arise in northern Europe: they could also intervene in case of domestic unrest – and for that very reason the king’s Netherlands subjects feared their presence. Everyone knew that a single Spanish regiment sufficed to uphold Philip’s control over Milan, Sardinia, Naples and Sicily; and the count of

Egmont spoke for many when he complained to William of Orange, just before the king left the Netherlands, 'I believe that so many innovations make people unhappy'. In particular, 'the king is totally determined to retain the Spanish infantry and demobilize all the other troops: I leave you to guess his reasons'. At a tense meeting with Philip during the chapter of the Golden Fleece held in July 1559 (see chapter 3), both nobles threatened to resign their offices if Philip did not withdraw the Spanish troops. Only the king's counter-threat to withhold a promised cash reward brought them to heel.²

Orange, Egmont and their colleagues possessed a powerful forum in which to express their opposition to 'innovations' that 'make people unhappy': the States. Each of the seventeen provinces that recognized Philip as their ruler in 1549 had their own States (Staten, États) composed of representatives of the clergy, nobles and towns who met regularly to handle matters of common interest – above all, legislation and taxation. Periodically Charles V had asked each of them to send delegates to a States-General to hammer out common policies, and Philip did the same as soon as he went to war with France in 1557, convening an assembly explicitly to vote new taxes. After months of bargaining, the deputies sanctioned taxes worth the unprecedented sum of 3.6 million ducats, payable over nine years, but they insisted that the proceeds must be both collected and disbursed by their own agents. Philip bitterly resisted this, correctly foreseeing that the States would thus gain the power to withhold funds if he failed to redress their grievances; but French military pressure forced him to give way. In January 1559 the States-General created a standing committee to oversee the collection and disbursement of the 'Nine Years Aid' by each province. Although Philip dissolved the assembly soon afterwards, the provincial States continued to meet and – just as Philip had feared – several of them threatened to withhold the proceeds of the Nine Years Aid unless he withdrew the Spanish garrisons.

The disaster at Djerba resolved this issue, but a few weeks after the withdrawal of Spanish troops another 'innovation' came to light: the creation of thirteen new bishoprics and an archbishopric of Mechelen, whose incumbent would become primate of the Netherlands. In addition, two canons in every cathedral chapter would now act as Inquisitors, and every prebend in the new

hierarchy must be a university graduate. The new bishoprics scheme had much to recommend it. Until that time, only four bishops served the three million inhabitants of the Habsburg Netherlands so that, from a Catholic standpoint, adding more sees and creating a single hierarchy made good sense. So did improving the educational standards of the senior clergy, and making ecclesiastical frontiers follow linguistic lines, so that the bishop, his clergy and their parishioners all spoke the same language; but the formula adopted to fund the scheme proved a disaster. The obvious way to pay for the new bishoprics was a tax levied on all clerical revenues, but instead Philip proposed that each new bishop should take over as abbot of a rich local convent, and receive its revenues. Not only did this measure make poor ecclesiastical sense (the same prelate could not efficiently carry out both tasks) but it was bound to create a political firestorm because several of the abbots about to be displaced had voices and votes in the provincial States.

This ambitious ecclesiastical reorganization represented the fruit of long planning by Philip and his advisers, but implementation required papal approval. To secure it, the king prepared a characteristic passive-aggressive letter to Pope Paul IV.

I, as a most obedient son of the Church, cannot refrain from reminding and urging, and with the greatest vehemence requesting ... Your Holiness to view with favour and approve as soon as possible the plan for the Netherlands as I have requested for so long ... It would cause me the greatest grief and regret if I could not finalize the religious situation of these provinces before I leave [for Spain], and thus ensure that no problems arise in my absence – but if they do it would be a great blot on Your Holiness's conscience, since you had the means to take appropriate action so easily.³

The blackmail worked: no sooner had he received this threatening message from his 'most obedient son' than Paul approved a bull authorizing the creation of the new bishoprics along the lines proposed by the king; but the bull arrived just as the king prepared to board his ship for Spain, forcing him to delegate implementation to his regent, Margaret of Parma. Almost at once Paul died, which inevitably created new delays while his successor, Pius IV, reviewed the entire scheme.

Still fearful that 'problems could arise in my absence', Philip

decided to keep the whole venture secret until all details had been finalized, and so it became public knowledge only in March 1561 when another papal bull announced the names, duties and revenues of the new prelates – starting with the archbishop of Mechelen: none other than the king's close adviser Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle, whom the pope also made a cardinal. Henceforth, Granvelle took precedence over Orange, Egmont and everyone else at all official functions.

These changes alienated the entire political elite of the Netherlands. Those abbots forced to resign their places (and their revenues) to the new bishops naturally objected vociferously and mobilized their colleagues in the provincial States against the scheme. The magistrates of major cities like Antwerp (which now became the seat of a diocese) objected equally vociferously to the introduction of Inquisitors, since many visiting merchants were Protestants who might stay away if they feared arrest for heresy. The nobles resented the king's insistence on appointing only graduates to the rich church livings traditionally occupied by their own offspring. Finally, everyone felt insulted that such a complex scheme had obviously been in preparation for many years, yet Philip had made no attempt at consultation. The various opponents of the scheme therefore turned their ire on the new head of the ecclesiastical hierarchy: Granvelle.

The cardinal had already made many enemies, chief among them Ruy Gómez and Francisco de Eraso, whose important role in the central government survived the move to Spain. They found a valuable ally in Philippe de Montmorency, count of Hornes, captain of Philip's bodyguard, who in 1561 requested and received permission to return to the Netherlands on the grounds that the king never listened to his advice. His return coincided with the turmoil caused by the new bishoprics and he informed Eraso that 'since this is a matter that does not affect me, I do not wish to say more about it. I only want to tell you that the cardinal is in charge of it all, and if things go wrong, His Majesty should lay the blame on him alone.' The secretary immediately showed the letter to the king, hoping to discredit Granvelle, but for the time being Philip did nothing.⁴ Next, Hornes persuaded Orange and Egmont to join him in signing a letter to the king threatening that unless the cardinal left the Netherlands, they would all resign their offices. The count also organized an informal league of the cardinal's

enemies, who dressed in the same livery with a badge on their sleeve that showed a fool's cap (in parody of the cardinal's hat), and they refused to attend Margaret's council whenever Granvelle was present. This fatally compromised her ability to govern and in 1563 she sent her brother an ultimatum: unless he returned to the Netherlands in person at once, Granvelle would have to go.

Hornes and his colleagues had struck at a moment when the king was extremely vulnerable. On the one hand, their minatory letter arrived at court at the same time as news that Ottoman forces had laid siege to Oran, and in the words of a minister at court, 'on its outcome depends many other things – including whether we [sc. the king] stay here or return there [to the Netherlands]'. On the other hand, the enmity between Ruy Gómez and the duke of Alba had created serious instability in policy-making (chapter 4). An astute French observer wrote that 'The success and perseverance of the [Netherlands] nobles in their quarrel is based on the partisanship and divisions that exist at the court of Spain' because the two prominent ministers 'spread their wings over the furthest dominions, like Flanders, where the duke supports Cardinal Granvelle while Ruy Gómez, who since the time of the late emperor [Charles V] has been his enemy, on the contrary favours the nobles'.⁵ Ruy Gómez therefore supported Margaret's ultimatum: if the king wanted to safeguard his authority in the Netherlands he must either return or remove Granvelle. In March 1564, preoccupied by the defence of the Mediterranean, Philip reluctantly ordered the cardinal to leave Brussels. 'Now we will see,' he observed cautiously, 'how things turn out.'⁶

The origins of the Dutch Revolt

The fall of a ministry, in the sixteenth century as today, meant not only the removal of the principal adviser but also the eclipse of his policies and his supporters. In Brussels, the dissident nobles returned to Margaret's council and pressured her to halt implementation of the new bishoprics scheme, while several provincial States warned her that unless she suspended the laws against heresy 'an uprising by the people' might ensue.⁷ The religious situation soon changed. Whereas over 600 men and women faced prosecution for heresy in the province of Flanders in

1562, when Granvelle still enforced the king's will, the total fell to 250 the following year and to scarcely 100 in 1564; but at the same time, the number of heretics increased. The rise of Protestantism in France, England and Germany had created asylums to which Dutch dissidents could retire to escape persecution; now, with Granvelle's departure, many exiles returned and began to hold open-air services with impunity near the borders.

Economic circumstances heightened the tension. In 1564–5, a landmark winter caused widespread misery and ruined the next harvest, while the outbreak of war between Denmark and Sweden threw out of work many families in the Netherlands who produced or shipped exports to the Baltic, as well as interrupting the import of Baltic grain. Both unemployment and food prices therefore increased. As unemployment and the price of bread continued to rise, one observer fretted that 'I do not know if it will prove possible to restrain the common people, who are discontented and protest loudly'. Moreover, he continued perceptively, 'If the people rise up, I fear that the religious issue will become involved.'⁸

Margaret's aristocratic advisers chose this moment to insist that the best way to halt heresy was to remove the mandatory death penalty imposed on heretics, arguing that magistrates reluctant to kill for the sake of religion would once more be willing to act. They decided to send Egmont to persuade the king to sanction this change, and also to secure more power for Margaret's council. Just before the count left Brussels, news arrived from Constantinople that 'the Turks are preparing 120 galleys and 10 large transports' ready for a major campaign in the Mediterranean. Confident that this would force the king to give way again, Egmont arrived at court in February 1565 and lodged with Ruy Gómez. He remained there for six weeks.⁹

Philip's top priorities at this point were to defend the Mediterranean in case of a Turkish assault, and to prepare a meeting at Bayonne between his wife Isabel and her mother, Catherine de' Medici, to reconcile policy differences between France and Spain. Maintaining the status quo in the Netherlands was essential to the success of both ventures, and so when Egmont arrived at court the king procrastinated for as long as possible. He flattered his visitor by ostentatiously consulting him on military issues (Egmont had fought with Charles V in Africa and Germany

before his great victory over the French at Gravelines); the count, for his part, dazzled Don Carlos, now aged 20 and increasingly interested in the affairs of northern Europe, with accounts of his military exploits. But eventually Egmont became impatient and warned the king that unrest in the Netherlands would abate only if he appointed four of his noble friends to Margaret's council, and granted that body full powers 'to handle all affairs of state'. Faced with these new demands, Philip oscillated between frustration and anger. 'I have so much on my mind that I scarcely know what I am saying or doing,' he protested even as he speculated about the motives that underlay the count's demands: 'I think we have reason to look into the motives of those, both here and in the Netherlands, who have put Egmont up to this.'¹⁰ Then news arrived that the Turkish fleet had left Constantinople and was heading west, forcing the king to seek a way to keep the Netherlands peaceful during the coming Mediterranean campaign. He opted for deception, appearing to comply with the count's wishes without making any concessions. In particular, he would agree to create a 'Theological Committee' in the Netherlands, composed of bishops, lawyers and theologians, to consider whether it might be possible to change the method of punishing heresy without furthering its spread. When Gonzalo Pérez, a cleric as well as secretary of state, questioned the wisdom of this, Philip reassured him that 'under no circumstances do I wish the punishment of heretics to stop ... I only want the method of punishment to be considered' because 'if we sacrifice religion, I will sacrifice my dominions'. Therefore, the king continued, 'my intention, as you will have gathered, is neither to resolve these demands of the count, nor to disillusion him about them, for then he would worry us to death and we would never be finished with him – and I am dying to get rid of him because he does not let me get on with any of the other things that I have to do.' Philip and Pérez worked together on various drafts of instructions for the count, until the king wrote with an audible sigh, 'everything appears fine to me: may God grant that it will satisfy Egmont so that he will leave'.¹¹

Pérez's final draft incorporated many passages crafted by the weary king, but also included a rhetorical flourish of his own: 'What matters most to me is that there be no change in religion, and I would think nothing of losing a hundred thousand lives (if I

had them) rather than agree to that.’ The instructions ended by expressing Philip’s regret that he could neither leave Spain ‘to visit and relax in the Netherlands’ nor send sufficient funds to implement his policies; but with ‘the increasing threat from the Turkish fleet, which as you know is advancing in such force against my kingdoms’, the defence of the Mediterranean must take precedence.¹²

Philip and Pérez calculated that Egmont would be at his most gullible if he received his instructions during a personal meeting, and accordingly the king summoned him to an audience on 4 April 1565. At the outset, he confirmed Egmont’s disputed title to two towns in Brabant and allowed him to accept an honorarium of 50,000 ducats offered by the province of Flanders. Having thus softened up his victim, Philip delivered a carefully prepared speech emphasizing the need to maintain the exclusive exercise of the Catholic religion, but he made much of the Theological Committee and promised a speedy resolution of all other issues as soon as he had consulted with Margaret. Philip’s only specific requirement was that wearing the anti-Granvelle liveries must cease: ‘Count, it must stop,’ he interrupted, when Egmont tried to explain. A few days later the count rode off for Brussels ‘the happiest man in the world’, his wildest hopes of personal wealth and political success fulfilled.¹³

By contrast, the performance left the king drained. It was the sort of public confrontation that he loathed, and planning the elaborate deception had prevented him from transacting other business. He was ‘so exhausted by what has just happened’, Philip told Pérez, ‘and so deprived of sleep’ that he could not concentrate. A week later he still felt ‘preoccupied and starved of sleep because I need to spend most nights looking at papers which other business prevents me from seeing during the day’.¹⁴ Shortly afterwards the king gave up the unequal struggle with his paperwork and rode off alone to spend some time hunting and fishing at the Bosque de Segovia, confident that he had won the breathing space in the Netherlands essential for success both in the Mediterranean and at Bayonne.

Egmont’s spirits were still high when he reached Brussels. He (quite falsely) assured everyone that, despite the clear phrasing of his instructions, the king intended to relax the heresy laws and enhance the powers of Margaret’s council. In any case, the count

continued smugly, 'being preoccupied with the war against the Turks, who are expected to attack Malta, His Majesty finds it impossible to come to the Low Countries this year'. (The Ottoman siege of Malta began on 18 May.) Encouraged by this information, the council usurped 'sovereign control of all public affairs' and instructed the Theological Committee to discuss ways of 'moderating' the heresy laws – precisely what Philip had forbidden it to do.¹⁵

At least criticism of royal policy temporarily ceased, but the king himself squandered all the benefits of his studied ambiguity on 13 May 1565, when he signed a packet of apparently routine letters to Margaret, including one that quashed the appeal for clemency by six Anabaptists condemned to death and ordered that they should be burned. The king's administrative style had betrayed him. Pérez, who had worked so hard with the king to craft Egmont's Instructions, did not prepare the letters of 13 May; instead the task fell to Charles de Tisnacq, the Netherlands minister who normally handled French-language correspondence. No doubt because in the past Philip had always approved the execution of heretics, Tisnacq now prepared a short letter rejecting their appeal, just as he had done on previous occasions, and he sent it to the king for signature. Since it was in French, the king may not even have read it; Margaret and the Netherlands nobles, by contrast, read and pondered every word.

Shortly afterwards, news arrived in Brussels that Ottoman troops had landed on Malta, and the following month the Theological Committee produced a report that strongly recommended relaxing some of the heresy laws. Margaret duly forwarded this to Philip, asking both for his decision and also for clarification of his position 'on several matters which Count Egmont had heard from the royal lips, [because] Your Majesty's letters [of 13 May] appear, at certain points, to contradict the report he has made'. She and her advisers now awaited the king's response anxiously, realizing that 'not even the capture of Constantinople, let alone the relief of Malta, would help the Netherlands'.¹⁶

Margaret's letter, and its unwelcome enclosures, reached Philip late in August, and Pérez immediately drafted a stern response that included a flat rejection of the proposals of the Theological Committee; but with Malta still under siege, Philip dared not sign it. Instead he used excuses such as 'I had a terrible headache

yesterday and this morning' to postpone taking decisions on Netherlands affairs because, as he told Pérez, 'there is so much to consider, and it is so important to get things right'.¹⁷ Only in October, advised by both Pérez and the duke of Alba, who had just returned from masterminding negotiations with the French at Bayonne, did he elaborate a comprehensive solution to outstanding Netherlands problems.

To avoid the possibility of any further contradictions, the king ordered Pérez to draft *all* the answers to Margaret's letters, making copies in his own hand of the ones in French before asking Tisnacq to prepare fair copies. He also checked the completed letters against his drafts. Between 17 and 20 October 1565, while at the Bosque de Segovia, the king signed almost a hundred letters that clarified his position on all issues: the heresy laws must remain intact; the inquisitors must continue their work; all captured heretics must be executed; Margaret's council would receive no new powers; none of the new members proposed by Egmont would join it. A special envoy explained to Margaret that her brother could not concede more because 'it would not only be a grave blow to his authority and honour but would also forfeit reputation and respect' – to which Margaret observed presciently that it was better to forfeit 'reputation and respect' than to forfeit dominions.¹⁸

Although Philip must have realized that his decisions would not be popular, he cannot have anticipated the dramatic reaction that ensued. Already, on receipt of the king's letter of 13 May ordering the execution of the Anabaptists, some Dutch nobles had met informally to discuss possible responses should the king flatly refuse to moderate the heresy laws once his Mediterranean campaign ended. In November, on receipt of the letters from the Bosque de Segovia, the same group of nobles met again and prepared a petition, known as the 'Compromise', calling for abolition of the Inquisition and the heresy laws. They rapidly secured about 400 signatures – almost one-tenth of the Netherlands aristocracy – and although no grandees signed, the marquis of Bergen and the prince of Orange resigned all their offices and many others threatened to follow suit. With central authority thus in abeyance, on 5 April 1566 some 300 confederates rode fully armed into Margaret's palace to present an ultimatum based on the Compromise, demanding that she

immediately suspend all the heresy laws. Abandoned by everyone, Margaret reluctantly complied: she issued a 'Moderation' that instructed all inquisitors and magistrates to cease enforcing the heresy laws until further notice. She also deputed two nobles sympathetic to the confederates, Bergen and the baron of Montigny (Hornes's brother), to go to Spain and persuade Philip to approve her concessions.

Protestant exiles now streamed back from France, England, Germany and the Swiss Canton and exploited Margaret's orders to leave Protestants alone. The long summer evenings, and the unemployment caused by the continuing war between Denmark and Sweden, which crippled all Baltic trade, allowed Calvinist preachers to attract thousands of hearers to their open-air sermons. In a letter dated 19 July 1566 Margaret warned her brother that the Netherlands lay poised on the brink of rebellion, and she presented him with two alternatives: 'Either take up arms' against the Calvinists and return to Brussels in person, 'or authorize the concessions' already made in the Moderation.¹⁹

While the courier bearing Margaret's disturbing message was still en route, the Spanish council of State debated the growing crisis in the Netherlands. On 26 July Philip informed Montigny, newly arrived at court, 'that he did not like the terms of the Moderation that he had been sent, and did not wish them to continue; and that he had decided to go to the Netherlands in the spring to restore order to everything'. To this 'Montigny replied angrily, bringing colour to His Majesty's cheeks, that this decision was not appropriate' because spring was eight months away, and between then and now 'His Majesty will face other pressing matters'. He added provocatively that 'delays and procrastination had created all these problems and would create many more'.²⁰

Montigny would pay with his life for 'bringing colour to His Majesty's cheeks', but the arrival of Margaret's dramatic letter of 19 July postponed his punishment. On 31 July, just five days after telling Montigny that he would make no concessions, Philip crumbled. After protesting that 'in truth I cannot understand how such a great evil could have arisen and spread in such a short time', he authorized Margaret to abolish the Inquisition in the Netherlands, suspend all laws against heresy and pardon the opposition leaders. Then, just as he had done twelve years before, when forced to accept the marriage treaty negotiated by his father

with Mary Tudor (chapter 3), Philip recorded before a notary that since his concessions had been extracted under duress he did not consider them binding. He also reassured the pope – as he had reassured Gonzalo Pérez – that ‘rather than suffer the least injury to the Catholic faith and the service of God, I would rather lose all my dominions and a hundred thousand lives if I had them’. Finally, he authorized Margaret to raise 13,000 soldiers in Germany, sending letters of credit to pay for them; but by the time news of his change of policy arrived in the Netherlands, what Dutch chroniclers would later call *Het wonderjaar*, ‘The year of miracles’, had already begun.²¹

The year of miracles

On 10 August 1566, St Lawrence’s Day (and thus the anniversary of Spain’s great victory at St Quentin), a small group of Protestants entered a Flemish monastery and smashed all its images. Nine days later, Egmont informed Philip that ‘at present all Catholic worship in the province of Flanders has ceased’ and that ‘all trade has ceased, so that 100,000 men in the Netherlands who used to earn their bread now beg for it ... Much depends on this,’ the count added ominously, ‘because poverty compels people to do things that otherwise they would never have thought of doing.’ That same day, Margaret signed another frantic letter to her brother claiming that ‘almost half the population over here practise or sympathize with heresy’ and that the number of people who had taken up arms in defiance of her authority ‘now exceeds 200,000’.²²

For a while the iconoclasts targeted only isolated convents, but on 22 August a column of Calvinists entered Ghent, the capital of the province of Flanders, and systematically smashed the images, stained glass and other visible symbols of Catholic worship in every church and convent. With the world collapsing about her, Margaret now received the king’s concessions of 31 July and immediately published them – but they came too late to halt the Iconoclastic Fury. Within a few weeks, gangs had smashed images and stained glass in over 400 churches and monasteries, and Calvinist congregations began to hold services in several of the churches thus ‘purified’.

News of these stunning events reached Philip on 3 September

1566, and that night he went down with a fever. Over the next four days he 'was bled twice. Therefore there was no way to handle any business, and His Majesty has signed nothing.' Alonso de Laloo, the count of Hornes's agent at court, stressed to his master the dire consequences of these developments for those who had demanded so many concessions over the past four years: the king 'will lack neither troops nor money' to do whatever he wants, Laloo warned, because a fleet from America had just arrived at Seville with almost five million ducats, the highest total ever recorded. In addition, the kingdom of Naples had voted the king taxes worth two million ducats, and the Cortes of Castile (just summoned) would surely vote even more. 'These funds will suffice not only to subjugate what His Majesty inherited in the Netherlands,' Laloo exclaimed, 'but also to acquire new dominions.' Everyone in Spain, he continued, believed 'that the rebellion in the Netherlands aims at complete liberty, without obedience to either God or the king'. A week later Laloo predicted that 'sooner or later, without fail, His Majesty will exact vengeance for such great disrespect, and if he leaves Spain it will be with more strength and power than any king has ever taken to the Netherlands'. The question was no longer whether Philip would use force to restore order, but when.²³

On 22 September 1566, although the king seemed to the Portuguese ambassador 'somewhat weak, his face showing signs of his many purges and bloodlettings', he presided over a meeting of the council of State – a highly unusual action. The meeting took two critical decisions: 'that the situation in the Netherlands could not be remedied without troops'; and 'that only His Majesty in person' should command them.²⁴ The council next considered Spain's overall strategic position, noting two temporary but critical advantages: the Ottoman sultan had invaded Hungary, which would remove pressure in the Mediterranean theatre of operations; and although neither France nor England would welcome suppression of the Dutch Revolt by force, neither had the means to mount effective resistance. The council therefore recommended that Philip concentrate as many troops as possible in Lombardy and lead them to the still-loyal province of Luxemburg, where they would join forces with 60,000 other troops to be raised in Germany. The king and his mighty army would then crush all opposition.

The council of State convened again in the king's presence on 22 October 1566 to discuss the evolving situation. Those present restated their conviction that to permit the troubles to continue 'would jeopardize the reputation of Spain' by providing an 'example of weakness that would encourage other provinces to rebel'. They therefore still saw the use of troops as unavoidable – but how should they be deployed? Ruy Gómez argued that, if the king went to the Netherlands in person to restore order, only a small number of troops would be required; but Alba and others objected that, given the extent of the insurgency, this strategy would place the king at grave personal risk. Instead they proposed that the Spanish troops now assembling in Lombardy should march to the Low Countries and suppress all sedition, after which the king could arrive by sea.²⁵

But who should lead the troops from Lombardy and command the army of repression? The duke of Alba, Spain's most experienced general, was 60 and in poor health (gout had kept him immobilized for much of the autumn) but in November he agreed to sail to Italy in spring 1567 and take command of the troops assembled to suppress the Dutch Revolt. As the official historian of the House of Alba later wrote, even if the decision to send the duke did not turn out well, it was virtually the only option at the time, 'since the Netherlands situation was like a snowball rolling down a mountain of snow'.²⁶ Some of those who had signed the Compromise, fearing the worst, now tried to recruit troops in France and Germany, but they failed; by contrast Margaret used the money received from Spain to raise troops who, on 13 March 1567, routed a large group of insurgents at the battle of Oosterweel, near Antwerp. All over the Netherlands, Calvinist worship ceased; towns that had defied the king hastened to make their peace; and most dissidents, including the prince of Orange, fled abroad.

The following month, Alba had a long one-on-one audience with his master at Aranjuez. The two men agreed that, thanks to Oosterweel, restoring order in the Netherlands would no longer require the 72,000 soldiers at first envisaged: Alba's veterans from Italy, plus the troops already mobilized by Margaret, would now suffice. They also agreed that Philip should assemble a fleet in one of Spain's Atlantic ports ready to depart on 15 August carrying the king and his court to the Netherlands – assuming that the duke

had got there first and eradicated all opposition. Cardinal Diego de Espinosa would remain as ‘governor’ of Spain.²⁷

The duke then left Aranjuez but upon reaching Milan he hesitated, fearing that the exodus of so many veteran troops might leave Italy exposed to a Turkish attack. He did not leave for the Netherlands until 18 June, leading his veterans along a 700-mile itinerary that contemporaries (some in admiration and others in fear) would call ‘the Spanish Road’. He reached Luxemburg on 15 August – the exact date on which Philip and his court were supposed to set sail from Spain.

The voyage that never was

Alba’s progress reports as he marched slowly along the Spanish Road had already revealed that he would not arrive in the Netherlands in time to implement the original plan, and on 7 August Philip sat down at his desk to inform his lieutenant that he had decided to postpone his departure until the following spring, a decision ‘that I felt I should make known to you at once, with secrecy and dissimulation, so that you will be forewarned and can take the appropriate steps’. The king conveyed this message in a unique way: spending several hours alone, armed with the code books normally used by his clerks, he laboriously enciphered his thoughts on how to restore order and stability in the Netherlands. ‘This letter is sent to you in such secrecy,’ he assured Alba, ‘that no one in the whole world will ever find out what it contains’ (see plate 27).²⁸

The king dealt first with how to punish those involved in the insurgency. Originally, he had instructed Alba to round up all suspects before the royal fleet arrived; but now, ‘I am not sure if this can be done with the appropriate security and thoroughness’, so that it would be wise to delay any arrests – especially since a delay might ‘lead the prince of Orange to feel secure and be willing to return to those provinces’. Then ‘you would be able to deal with him as he deserves’. By contrast, ‘if you punish the others first, it will make it impossible ever to deal with him’. Events would vindicate the king’s insight but, unfortunately for his plans, he immediately made a crucial concession: ‘I delegate all these matters to you, as the person who will be handling the enterprise and will have a better understanding of the obstacles or

advantages that may prevail, and of whether it is better to move quickly or slowly in this matter of punishment, on which so much depends.’

Next the king turned to the problem of who would govern the Netherlands until he arrived himself the following spring. He had dispatched Alba from Spain with full powers to command the royal army but ordered him to share civil authority with Margaret. At the height of the Iconoclastic Fury the previous year, Margaret had pleaded with the king to send troops; but now that she had restored order she bitterly opposed Alba’s approach and bombarded both Philip and the duke with requests to halt his march. When her pleas failed, she informed the king curtly that she had decided ‘to leave here in October’ whether His Majesty came or not. Philip therefore entrusted Alba with full powers to govern the Netherlands until he arrived in person.

Finally, the king addressed a third consequence of his decision not to sail at once to Flanders: the cost of maintaining Alba’s Spanish troops until he arrived. He asked how much the Netherlands might be expected to pay and how much would have to come from Spain (reminding the duke that, having spent a million ducats on arranging his march, the Spanish treasury was now short of funds). Philip concluded his unique excursion into cipher by repeating the need for secrecy: Alba must send his responses to the king in person and to no one else – especially not to Tisnacq, who normally handled Netherlands affairs at the court of Spain. ‘Writing like this has not fatigued me at all,’ the king concluded (unconvincingly), and in any case ‘it was necessary because of the contents’.

Alba made full use of the king’s permission to disregard the contents of the letter. Although during his first two weeks in Brussels the duke felt ‘forced to hide my claws’, he then created a secret tribunal to try those suspected of rebellion and heresy. A few days later, he arrested Egmont, Hornes, their secretaries and ‘anyone who had signed the Compromise’ whom he could locate, commenting smugly that ‘I managed to have them arrested on the charge of treason’ (for which the punishment was death).²⁹ As soon as news of the arrests arrived at the royal court, Philip ordered the arrest of Montigny and urged Alba ‘to use all speed’ in trying those imprisoned on presumption of treason, ‘because you know that the matter should be concluded before the spring’. He

also now made public his decision to delay his voyage to Flanders. In his somewhat defensive letter to the pope he gave two explanations: 'because of the dangers involved in sailing the Atlantic in winter', and 'even more because it seems to me that certain matters should be resolved before I get there' – that is, the same strategy that Philip had adopted in the Carranza case: he wanted the dirty work done before he arrived.³⁰

Events would soon show that Philip's decision to delay his journey to the Netherlands was a critical error: only his return to Brussels could have stabilized the situation. If Orange and the other nobles who had fled to Germany refused a direct summons to explain their conduct to Philip in person, they would have lost credit both at home and abroad. Had the king been present, they would also have found it difficult to mount an invasion of the Netherlands as they did against Alba in 1568 because few if any German rulers would have allowed them to recruit troops. Finally, the king's presence would have made it hard for the States-General to refuse the taxes needed to pay for Alba's troops.

Why, then, did Philip change his mind about the voyage? It all came down to timing. In his meeting with Alba at Aranjuez, the king had agreed to set sail from Spain on 15 August, but the duke did not arrive in Brussels until 22 August. Since even the fastest courier needed ten days to reach the fleet waiting in Cantabria, he could not now set sail before September – and by then Philip had another reason to remain in Spain: he was about to become a father once more. In August 1566 Queen Isabel had given birth to Isabella Clara Eugenia, and early the following year she became pregnant again. Even when Alba left Aranjuez in April, the queen knew that she would give birth in mid-October – and, unlike Mary Tudor, she had calculated correctly, giving birth to her second child, Catalina Michaela, on 10 October 1567.

'His Majesty will face other pressing matters'

Philip now had three children as well as a fertile and intelligent wife to serve as his regent: everything suggests that he planned to resume preparations for his return to the Netherlands in spring 1568. But, as Montigny had warned him: any delay involved the risk that 'His Majesty will face other pressing matters' to distract his attention from the Netherlands. And indeed, three totally

unrelated distractions – two in America and one in Spain – forced Philip to remain in the Iberian peninsula.

In 1562 a group of French Huguenots sailed to Florida and established a fortified colony, which they called New France. From there they could threaten every treasure fleet returning from America to Europe, since all had to sail through the Bahamas channel to gain the easterlies that would take them home. Before long, Spanish forces captured some settlers who, under interrogation, revealed details of the location, size and defences of the Huguenot base. They also stated that a second expedition, currently fitting out in France, would soon bring reinforcements. This alarming news reached the king in March 1565, and he immediately authorized Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, who had extensive experience in commanding transatlantic convoys, to lead an expeditionary force from Seville and take possession of Florida.

The king hesitated to sanction a direct attack on New France because his wife was about to meet her mother at Bayonne in an attempt to settle all outstanding disputes amicably, but Alba, head of the Spanish delegation, strengthened his resolve. The duke recommended mobilizing a second fleet both to intercept the reinforcements and ‘to expel the French from their bases quickly’; and suggested that ‘the council of the Indies should put down on paper the reasons why Your Majesty believes that the French should not settle there’ – a ‘paper’ that Alba would submit to the French at Bayonne.³¹ Meanwhile, after building a fort on the Florida coast that he called San Agustín, Menéndez launched a surprise attack on the French colony, sparing the women and children but killing most of the men in cold blood and imprisoning the rest. News of these events reached Spain in February 1566, and Philip enthusiastically endorsed the executions and condemned the rest to lifetime servitude rowing his galleys. He also funded the construction of twelve purpose-built vessels in the shipyards of Bilbao to form a permanent flotilla to safeguard the Caribbean and Florida against further Protestant attack. The total cost of this notable extension of Spain’s American dominions was scarcely 250,000 ducats – about one-quarter of the cost of sending the duke of Alba to Flanders.

All the same, Philip could not rule out the risk of further French incursions, and this influenced his response to a challenge that arose shortly afterwards in New Spain. After the death of Viceroy

Don Luis de Velasco in 1564, some colonists demanded that Philip name as Velasco's successor the largest local landowner, Don Martín Cortés, marquis del Valle and son of Hernán Cortés. They also requested the right to meet periodically in an assembly ('parlamento') to discuss and determine the affairs of the viceroyalty. Two years later the judges of the Audiencia, who exercised executive authority in New Spain after Velasco's death, heard rumours that several landowners planned to mount a 'rebellion and uprising' aimed at 'killing the said judges and others who upheld the authority of Your Majesty', and elect Cortés as their ruler. Some reports claimed the conspirators had links with alienated settlers in Guatemala and Peru – a daunting prospect because five years before, Lope de Aguirre had fortified Margarita island, declared himself king of Peru, and proclaimed: 'I renounce my links to the kingdoms of Spain and no longer recognize the king of Castile as my sovereign'. In July 1566 the judges of New Spain therefore reacted firmly: they arrested and imprisoned Cortés and several others, two of whom they executed almost immediately. At this point, a new viceroy arrived, suspended the sentence on Cortés, and sent him to Spain in custody. The judges thereupon accused the viceroy of sympathizing with the rebels and demanded that the king recall him.³²

News of these dramatic events reached Spain in March 1567. The Portuguese ambassador at Philip's court heard that '700 Spaniards in New Spain have conspired against the king', while his French colleague, Baron Fourquevaux, noted that 'the king has so many regions to worry about that he cannot deal with all of them'.³³ The king shared these concerns and he too reacted firmly. He recalled the new viceroy in disgrace and sent out special commissioners to investigate 'the rebellion and uprising that some have attempted against our authority in New Spain'. Eventually his officials tried eighty-nine people (including twenty-two major landowners and twelve clerics) for the crime of rebellion, of whom they executed ten, sentenced seven to serve on the galleys or in a distant garrison, and condemned several more to perpetual exile from America.³⁴ The Cortés rebellion was the last in New Spain for well over a century.

Philip thus demonstrated that he could deal with 'other pressing matters' in the western hemisphere without becoming distracted from Netherlands affairs; but the same could not be said of his

own family. In the course of 1567 the behaviour of Don Carlos gave cause for concern, and in January 1568 Philip decided that his son and heir posed a serious security threat. The king therefore arrested and imprisoned him. This development could not but affect Philip's plan to return to the Netherlands, and the process by which he came to terms with its implications appears in the draft of his letter to Emperor Maximilian explaining the reasons for his son's arrest. It originally ran 'I expect to go to the Netherlands in the summer'; but, on reading it through, the king changed this to 'since I will not be going to the Netherlands this year'.³⁵ Little did Philip realize, as he made this small change, that 'this year' of 1568 would see not only the incarceration and death of his son and heir, but also the death of Isabel of France, leaving him a widower with only two infant daughters to succeed him.


Family life – and death

A king without a family

Filip enjoyed little family life. His father left Spain almost immediately, leaving orders that severely limited the time Philip could spend with his sisters María and Juana; and although in 1543 he married his cousin María Manuela, thanks to his father's micromanagement (chapter 2) they spent little time together before her death left him a widower, aged eighteen. Between 1548 and 1551, Philip left his siblings and his son in Spain while he spent time in northern Europe with his father, his aunt Mary of Hungary and his uncle Ferdinand. As soon as he returned to Spain his sister María, married to her cousin Maximilian, left for Austria: Philip would see her only once during the next three decades. His sister Juana also left Spain to get married in 1552 and as soon as she returned, Philip sailed for England. They would not see each other again for five years.

Philip's time in England also included little family life, because he brought with him no relatives, and for much of his time there Queen Mary's only sibling, Elizabeth, languished either in prison or under house arrest on suspicion of treason. Soon after he travelled to Brussels in 1555, his father and his aunts Mary and Eleanor left for Spain, and Philip would never see them again. Two years later, he returned to spend three months in England with his wife, but of his own relatives only his half-sister Margaret of Parma and her son Alexander Farnese visited them.

The king's family solitude ended only in 1559, when he returned to Spain and re-joined Juana and Don Carlos, met his half-brother Don John for the first time, and married Isabel of France (chapter 7). His position as head of his own family was reflected in the numerous family portraits in which the sitter holds a medallion or cameo depicting the king (see plate 29). All of these relatives – wife, siblings, children and other close relatives – provided the king with important emotional and practical support in dealing with the pressures and problems created by ruling a global empire.



10. The family of Philip II. Although Philip married four times, and although three of his wives gave birth to children who reached adulthood, only two of them – Catalina and her half-brother Philip – became parents themselves. Philip III was the fourth of his father's sons to become prince of the Asturias.

We know little of the relations between Philip and his extended family while they were under the same roof, but their prolonged separations generated letters in which they wrote down the things they might otherwise have said in person. The first intimate correspondence to survive is the series of Philip's holograph letters to Maximilian, informing him of his activities ('Tomorrow I will start hunting ... How I wish Your Highness could accompany me'), his disappointments ('The queen's pregnancy, which we considered

so certain, has turned out to be a false hope. Your Highness and my sister manage it better than the queen and I do'), and his pleasures ('I'm very happy, because I hope to be in the Netherlands soon, and thus closer to Your Highness').¹

Philip also maintained an intense correspondence with his sister María throughout their years of separation, especially after her husband became Holy Roman Emperor. We know that he read her letters closely because many bear his holograph annotations; and as he finalized travel arrangements for his niece and future bride Anne to come to Spain in 1569, he tried to persuade María to come too, and 'to spend time with me and our sister' Juana 'because we are siblings who are so fond of each other' and 'I would so much like to see [you]'.² Even though on this occasion María disappointed her brother, she regularly promoted the interests of Spain in Germany and occasionally even spied on her husband. On one occasion she confided to a Spanish diplomat that while 'reading some letters on the emperor's desk', she noticed matters that her brother should know about, and so she leaked them. The king also shared secrets with his sister. Thus in 1570, he informed his envoy at the Imperial court:

I am writing two letters to my sister: one about matters that she should share with the emperor – and you should forward this to her when you open this package – and the other about matters that are for her alone, without the emperor or anyone else knowing about them. I am sending this one under separate cover in an envelope addressed to you by [Secretary of State Gabriel de] Zayas, as if it came from him. You must keep this entirely secret and when you see my sister you must tell her, without anyone else knowing, that you have another letter for her, and she will tell you how and when to give it to her.³

Normally, the correspondence between María and Philip centred on the well-being of her children at the court of Spain (first Rudolf and Ernest, then Anne, Albert and Wenceslas), and after he married Anne in 1570 the empress gave advice to Philip, now also her son-in-law, on such domestic matters as how to avoid 'rivalries' between Anne's children and Philip's two daughters by Isabel of France. The siblings also shared memories, referring to things that their parents had said and done or looking out for those who had served them. In 1573, for example, María told Philip:

The death of Ruy Gómez has caused me great grief because he was such a good servant of Your Highness for such a long time, and because he is the last of our mother's servants to die. I know that Your Highness will honour him after death as you did when he was alive, because you are obliged to do so, but I cannot refrain from begging Your Highness to do so also for my sake.

Shortly afterwards, María and her brother grieved over a far greater loss: the death of their sister Juana. The empress confided to Philip 'I cannot refrain from admitting to Your Highness that I find myself very much alone without her, even though we lived so far apart' (she had not seen Juana for over twenty years). That was the whole point of this intimate correspondence: it maintained the links between the king and his closest relatives even though they 'lived so far apart' for most of their adult lives.⁴

Las Descalzas Reales: a 'female space' for the royal family

In 1554 Philip ignored the strong objections of Charles V, who complained that his younger daughter Juana 'is very haughty and has led a disorderly life', and appointed her regent of Spain during his absence.⁵ Juana certainly followed an unusual path. Two years into her regency she took the vows of poverty, charity and obedience required of all novices in the Jesuit Order, and became its only known female member (under the name 'Mateo Sánchez'). In 1559 she founded a convent in Madrid, soon known as Las Descalzas Reales, and after Philip made the city his capital her spacious apartments in the convent formed a 'female space' where his wife and daughters could take part in religious services and, albeit briefly, enjoy convent life. But Juana could still be 'haughty'. In 1562, when some Inquisitors interviewed her as a character witness (*testigo de abono*) in the trial of Bartolomé Carranza, and asked her (as they did with all witnesses except for the king) to state her age, 'she replied that she was fifty'. What a blatant lie: everyone knew that she was only 27! No doubt the emperor's daughter considered such personal questions impertinent.⁶

Juana also maintained an apartment in the Madrid Alcázar, and since she was considerably older than both the queen and the prince, she presided over the court whenever Philip was absent. She saw Queen Isabel almost every day and together they

undertook a variety of activities, above all attending Mass and other services, and visiting nearby convents and shrines. They also organized entertainments at court. For example, the pair ‘arranged a splendid masque with all their ladies-in-waiting’ in honour of St Sebastian’s Day, 20 January 1568, but the arrest of Don Carlos the day before led to its cancellation. The Portuguese ambassador at once visited Juana, ‘and I found her distraught and in tears over the event. I consoled her as best I could, but with little success’. She wept again a few months later when Isabel died, and she looked after the two motherless infantas whom ‘I love and treat like my own daughters, just as [the queen] used to do’.⁷

As long as she lived Juana held the royal family together, and whenever she fell ill the king worried. ‘I have heard nothing about my sister today,’ he wrote to a minister while he was away from Madrid and news reached him that Juana had been unwell. ‘Arrange for Dr Vallés’ – his personal physician – ‘to give you each evening a report on how she was the previous night, and send it to me by courier.’ When she died in 1573, Philip was distraught ‘because he loved her so much’ and ‘he could not conceal his grief’.⁸

Because it was a royal foundation, Las Descalzas now came under Philip’s direct patronage and it therefore continued to offer a refuge for the women in his family. While the king resided in Portugal between 1580 and 1583 his younger children stayed in Las Descalzas; and when in 1582 their aunt María returned to Spain she moved into her late sister’s apartment, where like Juana she welcomed the children of Philip and Anne (and thus her own grandchildren) as well as the daughters of Philip and Isabel of France.

Isabel of France, queen of Castile

Philip’s third marriage lasted almost nine years – far longer than either of the preceding ones. ‘Isabel of France, queen of Castile’, as she styled herself, was fourteen at the time of her marriage in 1560 and throughout her teenage years she remained lazy and self-indulgent: rising and dressing at erratic hours, eating whenever she felt like it, retiring to her bed at the least excuse. She was also improvident. Philip initially assigned 80,000 ducats for the annual expenses of her household (compared with 250,000

ducats to fund his own household, chapel, guards and all officials of the central government), but though he soon increased it to 100,000 ducats, still the young queen spent far more than she received, until by 1565 her debts totalled 180,000 ducats.

Where did all this money go? Isabel seems to have bought few books; and although Philip hired Sofonisba Anguissola, the talented daughter of an Italian diplomat, to teach his wife to paint, she preferred to pose for Sofonisba (who produced and reproduced a series of spectacular portraits which the queen sent to her relatives). Nor did Isabel spend money on entertaining guests: except for other members of the royal family, relatively few gained access to the apartments where she spent most of her life. Even foreign ambassadors and visiting dignitaries could only pay their respects by prior arrangement, seldom for long, and never when the king was absent from the capital. The accounts of Isabel's household reveal just four active interests: dancing (she purchased numerous viols and flutes, an organ and three harps, and maintained a dancing master); gambling (almost every day she played cards and board games, threw dice and cast lots, often borrowing money from servants so that she could keep on playing – and losing); and, above all, plays and clothes. The queen's household accounts reveal that she arranged over thirty plays (*comedias*) between 1561 and 1568, seven of them featuring the celebrated actor Lope de Rueda (who received ten ducats in cash for each performance). At Epiphany 1565, the queen and Juana arranged entertainments that involved writers, tailors, the king's principal landscape artist, Anton van den Wyngaerde (who received 100 ducats 'for his work in painting canvases and other things needed for the play'), and two sculptors brought by the king from Italy who received 100 and 70 ducats respectively for fashioning 'massive figures' and other things for the play. The afternoon's entertainment may have cost 50,000 ducats.⁹

Expenditure on the magnificent outfits seen in portraits of the queen absorbed a substantial part of her household budget, because she hoped that they would dazzle her husband whenever he paid her a visit. These visits became more frequent after the queen started to menstruate, and by January 1562 (according to one of her ladies-in-waiting) 'after she has said her prayers she sleeps all night with the king her husband, who never stays away without good cause'. A year later, however, the Venetian

ambassador claimed that although 'in public the king always displays honour and affection' towards his wife, 'in private she gives him little satisfaction'. Indeed, he continued, Philip visited his wife 'at all hours of the night' after she had fallen asleep and then crept away to spend the night in his own apartment, feeling virtuous that he had 'done his duty'.¹⁰ Isabel's mother, Catherine de' Medici, urged her daughter to ignore such behaviour and instead do everything she could to please Philip, but he still announced that he would visit his Aragonese subjects without her. He had not intended this: the purpose of the trip was to secure the formal recognition of Don Carlos as heir presumptive by the Cortes of Aragon, but when an accident rendered his son too ill to travel Philip decided to leave Isabel behind as well. According to Francisco Pereira, the Portuguese ambassador, the desperate queen 'tries everything she can to make the king take her along', and eventually Philip placated her with the promise that she could join him later. No sooner had he made his escape from Madrid than Pereira learned the truth: the king had no intention of summoning his wife. Instead, he issued orders that during his absence – which would last nine months – Isabel could only leave her apartment to hear Mass in the palace chapel or to dine; that she could receive no visitors after 2 p.m.; and that at 10 p.m. guards must seal off her quarters for the night. Isabel gradually realized that her importuning had led her husband to deceive her: 'She is full of regrets', Pereira reported, and sheds 'many tears because the king has abandoned her'.¹¹ Catherine de Medici shared her daughter's regrets and instructed her ambassador to seek an audience with her son-in-law and remind him of 'our desire to see some grandchildren' and to express the hope that he would soon 'justify our opinion that he is a good husband'. At this, for once, Philip lost his self-control and burst out laughing: he begged the ambassador to assure his mother-in-law that 'he would be at pains to keep up the good opinion he had acquired' in France.¹²

Isabel developed a new strategy in her solitude: she took Spanish lessons so that she would be better able to entertain her husband when he returned – and her progress is evident in her testament, which covered thirty-two pages, written in her own hand in perfect Castilian and including a legacy of 2,000 ducats to 'Claudio, my instructor, who taught me to read and write'.¹³ The queen's strategy worked. When in May 1564 Philip returned to his

wife, now eighteen, he soon proved himself a 'good husband'. The couple went to Aranjuez, eating picnics alone together in the secluded gardens, and the queen now claimed that she had no time to write to her family because the king was constantly with her, and his love (she said) filled her with happiness. By July she was pregnant, but complications soon followed and the physicians' purges, clysters and bloodletting apparently caused a miscarriage. Eventually she recovered, although the scars of the incisions and tourniquets took months to disappear.

Throughout his wife's illness Philip remained in Madrid, spending several hours each day by her bedside. After she recovered, with her permission, he departed to inspect the progress of the Escorial, but first he asked the doctors 'if they could sleep together when he returned'. Presumably their reply was affirmative because in 1565, when the French ambassador again conveyed Catherine de' Medici's eagerness to see grandchildren, Isabel 'replied with a smile that the fault lay with her, not with the king her husband'. The queen also reported that this situation changed just a few weeks later. After complex negotiations with the French court, Philip secured the return of the relics of San Eugenio to his native city of Toledo, and in November 1565 Isabel left her apartments to venerate the saint, making a vow that if she should conceive she would name her child after him. This evidently impressed San Eugenio because nine months later, when the queen gave birth to a daughter, she told the French ambassador that 'she thought she had conceived the infanta' the night after she venerated the relics 'because she returned to her husband' afterwards and (presumably) they expressed their pious exaltation by making love.¹⁴

Meanwhile the French ambassador reported that (according to their servants) Philip's affection for his wife 'grows greater and greater since she became pregnant, so much so that he spends two hours with her every afternoon', and 'at all times he shows her affection in ways that he has never done before'.¹⁵ In June, the couple moved to El Bosque de Segovia, which Philip thought would be healthier and more congenial than Madrid, and they continued to spend much time together. One night, when Isabel thought her labour had started, the king leaped up from his bed to be with her; and, although it proved a false alarm, thereafter Philip visited her as much as five times a day. When labour began,

the king stayed by his wife's side, holding her hand in his and giving her a special potion sent by her mother to ease the pain at the moment of birth. They duly named the child Isabella Clara Eugenia.

Although Philip displayed immense pride and pleasure at having sired another child, he became anxious about carrying the baby to the font for baptism. According to the French ambassador, who must have got the story from the queen, Philip practised 'carrying a large doll from one side of the room to the other; but in the end he could not manage it, obliging him to let Don John carry the *infanta*'. Perhaps the king's anxiety arose because Isabel developed puerperal fever, just like his first wife, María Manuela, but she soon recovered and Ambassador Fourquevaux predicted that 'the queen will give us a son or daughter every year'.¹⁶ His forecast soon came true: early in 1567 Isabel became pregnant again.

This pregnancy posed a dilemma for the king: he had promised to go to the Netherlands and restore order. First, he made plans to take her with him, since a child born in the Netherlands would count as a 'natural prince' and so perhaps appease his Dutch subjects, and later he resolved to leave her in Spain as his regent; but in the end, he decided that the continuing unrest in the Netherlands made it unsafe for him to leave Spain (chapter 8). He therefore once again stayed at his wife's side throughout her labour until she gave birth to Catalina Michaela – but this time, he did not conceal his disappointment that he had sired another daughter, not a son: he did not even remain for her baptism.

Soon afterwards, Isabel was pregnant again. She relaxed by playing at cards, quoits and dice, listening to the jokes of her buffoons, watching plays in her apartments or lunching *al fresco* with Juana and her ladies-in-waiting until in September 1568 she became ill. She fainted repeatedly; she had trembling fits; she ate and slept poorly and irregularly. Once again, her doctors applied clysters and drew blood while the king stayed by her side, holding her hand, soothing and comforting her. They heard Mass together for the last time on 3 October 1568. Isabel had always tried to influence her husband in matters that affected France – persuading Philip to grant audiences to the French ambassador when he refused to see all the rest; discussing with him affairs on which her mother wanted support; occasionally leaking confidential information to French diplomats – and now, as she felt her life

ebbing away, Isabel asked her husband to promise that he would continue to support her brother, the king of France. After he had done so, she asked him 'to give his word to protect and favour all her servants, especially those from France. And the king gave his word that he would do as she had asked.' Finally she told Philip that, just as throughout her life she had prayed that God would grant him a long life, she would continue to do the same in heaven. At this point Philip broke down: moved by the fact 'that the queen, being in so much pain and with such mortal ailments, should speak such words with so much spirit, he could not hold back the tears that fell'. A few hours later Isabel gave birth to another girl. They both died a few hours later.¹⁷

Juana supervised the queen's burial in Las Descalzas Reales, where she had found solace, while the king moved into a monastery to mourn. For over two weeks he refused to see papers, ministers or ambassadors, joining the monks as they said continuous Masses for the soul of his late wife; and when he emerged, he went straight to the Escorial for a further period of seclusion. On Christmas Eve 1568, he granted an audience to the French ambassador, who read out a letter of condolence from Catherine de' Medici at which, the ambassador reported, the king wept again. Six months later he told his former mother-in-law that Isabel's two young daughters were 'the only consolation I have left, since Our Lord deprived me of the company of their mother.'¹⁸

Family life again

Lacking both a male heir and a wife Philip could not avoid remarrying, and he soon arranged with his sister María to wed Anne, her oldest daughter; but then Pius V refused to grant the necessary dispensation. In a holograph letter, the pope stated that 'although some of our predecessors have granted dispensations in similar cases' of consanguinity, they had erred: according to Pius, no pope had the power to override the biblical prohibition on marriages between uncle and niece. Moreover, the pope added pointedly, 'we have already seen the unfortunate consequences of these marriages of the first degree' – an unsubtle reference to the mental instability that had recently led the king to imprison his son and heir, Don Carlos.¹⁹ Philip, too, felt little enthusiasm for

the marriage. In a long holograph letter to the duke of Alba he expressed much the same sentiments as he had done a decade before, when he feared he would have to wed Elizabeth Tudor (chapter 7). 'Marriage does nothing to make me happy, especially now,' he grumbled. 'How I wish I could avoid it ... I feel very tired and weak, and I find pleasure in nothing. It is better to be alone at such times. But, as I have said, I am prepared to sacrifice myself to duty.'²⁰ He therefore blackmailed the pope – threatening to forsake the Holy League against the Ottoman sultan desired by Pius unless he got the dispensation – and in November 1570, with the pope's reluctant blessing, aged 43, he married his 21-year-old niece.

The couple evidently experienced some problems at first, because three months after the marriage Don Diego de Córdoba (a courtier who seemed to know everything that happened in his master's bedroom) rejoiced that at last the king and queen were spending more time together. 'May God watch over them, so that we may soon see the fruit we desire. They are together every night. The things that sometimes prevented this are forgotten, thanks be to God and to the queen' – although, he added, 'it's a pity they spend so few hours in bed'. Nevertheless, in late April 1571 another courtier reported gleefully, 'the queen has not had her period since 20 March'. When Philip took his family to Aranjuez, he insisted that the pregnant queen travel in a litter or a special chair; and when he went to the Escorial he insisted that Anne stay in the Madrid Alcázar – although he worried that 'The queen's apartment will be hot, at least at night, and so it would be better if she sleeps – but only sleeps – in my room, so that she will be cool at night'. In July, he fretted that 'if the queen wants to leave [the palace], remind her that she should be carried in a chair so that she does not fall again'. As the queen's 'due date' approached, whenever he left Madrid Philip ordered her majordomo, the marquis of Ladrada, to 'tell me as soon as she feels contractions, so that I can get there in time for the birth'. In the event, he sat beside his wife on 3 December 1571 as she gave birth to his son and heir, Fernando, making the king, according to an observer at court, 'the happiest man you have ever seen'.²¹

For several days, according to the diary of his private secretary, the king transacted no official business; and when an ambassador arrived to present his congratulations, he found the proud father

wearing a black silk jacket and silver-coloured velvet breeches and hose, with a cloak of damask trimmed with fur. A few days later, Philip took centre stage in the procession from the Madrid Alcázar to the adjacent church of San Gil for the baptism of his son by Cardinal Espinosa, watched by a host of grandees and the entire diplomatic corps (see plate 30). Philip's euphoria led him to pardon a number of criminals 'in thanks to Our Lord for the birth of a son and for our naval victory' (the battle of Lepanto). He also commissioned a massive painting from Titian that linked the two events: Philip's court painter Alonso Sánchez Coello sent instructions and sketches, approved by the king, and *The Offering of Philip II* duly emphasized the direct and special relationship between the king of heaven and the king of Spain, as well as the glorious future that awaited Prince Fernando, whom Titian placed at the centre of his composition (see plate 31).²²

A large family now surrounded the king. Anne not only gave birth to seven children during the next ten years: she also brought with her to Spain two of her younger brothers, Albert and Wenceslas, and became a 'second mother' to her stepdaughters Isabella Clara Eugenia and Catalina. Throughout the 1570s, the royal family followed much the same routine. The king, his wife, children and nephews spent most of the winter together at the Madrid Alcázar and their summers at the Escorial, with visits to Aranjuez in spring and El Pardo in autumn. Occasionally, Philip visited one of his country estates alone, but (according to a Venetian ambassador) whenever they were under the same roof,

His Majesty visits the queen three times a day: in the morning before hearing Mass; during the day before he starts work; and at night as they prepare to sleep. They have two low beds, about one foot apart, but because a curtain encloses them they look like one bed. The king loves his wife most tenderly and seldom leaves her side.²³

When he did 'leave her side', Philip and Anne seem to have exchanged letters once or twice a week (Anne was fluent in Spanish). For example, in July 1572 Ladrada told Philip that 'tonight the queen gave me this letter for Your Majesty' and forwarded it to the Escorial. Two days later Philip wrote, 'Here is the reply, which I was unable to write until this morning because I arrived [here] rather tired, and had business to transact.' On another occasion Philip told Ladrada that he had read 'the queen's

letter in reply to mine' and instructed the majordomo 'to give the queen the letter enclosed with this one'.²⁴ The king also wanted regular reports concerning the health of his family. 'Inform me every day of the health of the queen and the prince,' he told Ladrada when he left Madrid for the Escorial two weeks after Fernando's birth; and nine months later, he gave orders 'to send me a courier in the evening every day that I am away' – adding, 'also find out what the doctors say about my sister and my nephews and tell them to write to me'.²⁵

Whenever the prince's health deteriorated, the king worried. In October 1572, Ladrada sent a pessimistic medical report to the Escorial at 7.30 in the evening. The following day, the king wrote that 'the courier arrived last night after midnight, an hour after I had gone to sleep, and so it rather depressed me; but that cannot be avoided when there is due cause, as now. And although it did not keep me awake for long, I slept badly afterwards.' When Ladrada sent a better report two days later, the king replied 'It was very good to send me this news, which I think will allow me to recover the sleep that I lost the other night.'²⁶ Philip worried about his daughters, too. He wanted them to spend time outside – 'It seems to His Majesty that the infantas should go outside sometimes, so that they can get some fresh air, because no plant can grow without it' – and to live healthily. Ladrada must make sure that his daughters 'get up early and do some exercises, and for this and other reasons it would be better if they went to bed early'. Philip also fretted that the infantas spent too much time reading 'books of chivalry' and he gave orders that 'they should read more books of devotions'.²⁷

On other occasions, Philip seems to have been less attentive to his children. Although he provided his sons with toy soldiers and encouraged his daughters to keep songbirds in a cage, as he had done himself forty years before, he seldom spent 'quality time' with them until they were teenagers. Thus in July 1575, when Philip was struggling to solve a financial crisis, Prince Fernando (now three) fell seriously ill and his doctors despaired over the best remedy. The king gave advice on the best food for his ailing son – omelettes, although 'I'm not sure whether the omelette should contain bacon, but if he likes it I see no reason not to include it, provided that in return he agrees to eat it' – and he demanded frequent reports on how well his son ate and slept. Thus

far, the model father; but when the doctors reported the next day that the prince refused to eat the omelettes and asked the king to come in person to provide encouragement, Philip refused: 'He is not old enough to derive any benefit from a visit by me' because 'at his age, I don't think he would pay much attention to what I say about his food. If fear might influence him, he would fear his governess more than me.'²⁸

Perhaps, however, the king himself feared the encounter, and the possibility of watching his heir die, because two weeks earlier another of his sons, Carlos Lorenzo, not quite two years old, had sickened and died. Philip gloomily sent the 'tiny body' to be interred at the Escorial beside his other deceased offspring, and he wrote a remarkable lament to one of his leading treasury advisers:

Consider my reasons to feel sad. I am forty-eight years old, with an heir who is just three, and my finances are in a mess ... Besides, what sort of old age will I have ... when I fear each day will be my last, and do not know how to find the resources to maintain all the things that are so necessary?²⁹

This time, the prince recovered his health, and three days after Carlos Lorenzo's death the queen gave birth to her third son, Diego; but the anxieties soon recommenced. In 1577, Diego fell sick. According to his majordomo: 'This is particularly worrying now, because we are about to wean him. I would really like Your Majesties to see him first, because he is the most beautiful child, plump and strong and healthy.'³⁰ Although Diego survived, the following year brought a series of cruel blows to Philip's family circle: in August 1578 his nephew Sebastian, king of Portugal perished in battle; in September his nephew Wenceslas, Anne's brother, died; in October, news arrived of the death of the king's own brother, Don John, in the Netherlands; and the next day Prince Fernando died in Madrid. Philip was particularly affected by the loss of his heir; he wept, refused to eat, and secluded himself in a convent to mourn. In 1580, further blows rained down: the king and queen took Diego (now heir apparent) Isabella and Catalina to Estremadura, where in October an influenza epidemic killed the queen just before her 31st birthday (chapter 15).

The lonely father

Immediately after Anne's death, although Philip went on to Portugal he sent the prince and his daughters back to Madrid to join their younger siblings Philip (born in 1578) and María (born earlier that year). Until his return to Madrid in March 1583, his only contact with them was by letter: throughout their separation, his teenage daughters wrote regularly to their father, and almost every Monday he sat down with their latest letters in front of him to compose a reply. When Catalina left Spain after her marriage to Duke Charles Emmanuel of Savoy she took with her over thirty of these letters addressed to 'the infantas, my daughters', and she would later receive (and carefully preserve) over a hundred more from her father. The survival of these letters – a happy contrast with the fate of the letters he wrote to each of his wives, all of which were burned – offers a unique insight into the king's ability to love.

Some aspects of the correspondence suggest indifference. On the one hand, Philip never addressed his daughters by name (instead referring to Isabella as 'you, the elder' and to Catalina as 'you, the younger'); and on the other, he told them that he destroyed their letters after he had replied to them 'to avoid having more papers than necessary'.³¹ This may seem insensitive, because most absent fathers would have kept these precious souvenirs of their children, but Philip's own letters were full of love and affection. In March 1582 he wrote, 'you must both have grown a lot, especially you, the younger one. If you have a tape measure, let me know how much you have grown since I last saw you', adding 'and also measure your brother, because I would like to see his height – although I would like even more to see you all'. The infantas evidently took their father literally and sent him portraits, because three months later Philip blurted out 'I want to see all of you, and not just portraits of you!'³² After the king returned to Castile in 1583 he spent a great deal of time with his daughters. He regularly played cards and dice with them for money (the accounts of the infantas' household frequently record money issued 'to play with the king our lord') and sometimes they ate their meals together (see plate 32). When Catalina sailed away to Italy with her new husband in 1585, the king became tongue-tied – 'I could not take my leave of you and the duke as I wanted to do, or tell you some of things I was thinking' – so he climbed a nearby church tower in

order to catch a last glimpse of their galley, only to be disappointed again: 'We saw a lot of sea, but you were no longer to be seen.' So he sat down to write his inner thoughts in a letter, which he sent together with one from Catalina's sister Isabella 'to reach you in the port of Rosas'. Yet again he was disappointed: the courier could not catch up with the galley and so brought the letters back. A week later the king wrote once more 'so that you will see that we do not fail to write to you, or to miss you, which is the way we feel right now'.³³

He was thrilled to receive the first letters that Catalina wrote when she reached Savoy, announcing a safe and rapid crossing, and told her with surprising passion: 'I don't know whether it's because I love you so much that I feel this way, but I think the duke and I will be in competition to see who loves you more'. He commented on every point in her letters before sighing 'your sister and I cannot help thinking about you all the time, and we miss you a lot'. A year later the king let slip to Catalina that he had just spent two weeks at the Escorial without 'your siblings' so that 'I have felt very much on my own, which also made me miss you even more'; and in 1588, in the midst of micromanaging the invasion of England, he revealed that he had been counting the days since Catalina left: 'Yesterday marked three years since you sailed away, and since I saw you, which has made me feel very lonely; and I know that is because you love me and I love you.'³⁴

Occasionally the king also mentioned to his daughters how much he missed 'your two mothers' (as he called Isabel of France, whom they would not remember, and Anne of Austria, who had raised them). While writing to them in 1582, on the eve of the second anniversary of Anne's death, although 'it is very late and I am tired' Philip added a moving postscript that he knew the girls would understand: 'I shall remember that night, even if I live a thousand years.' On the next anniversary, Anne was again on his mind when he visited El Bosque de Segovia alone. 'God alone knows how lonely I feel,' he wrote to his daughters sadly, 'and especially today.'³⁵

The king could also be surprisingly playful in his letters. In March 1582, writing from Portugal, he described in detail how much he had enjoyed a trip down the river Tagus, 'seeing all the ships there were today in the river ... It was really something worth seeing, and we had a wonderful day. I tell you this,' he

continued (and we can imagine him smiling as he wrote), ‘to repay you for the envy I felt on reading about your visit to the Pardo and the Escorial.’ A few months earlier he had teased his daughters by pretending that he could not remember the ages of their younger siblings:

They tell me that your little brother [Philip] has lost a tooth. It seems to me that this is rather late, because (as you will remember) today marks three years since he was baptized – although I’m not quite sure if it is two years or three ... I’m also not quite sure how old your older brother will be in July: I think he will turn six. Please tell me the truth.³⁶

Naturally the king knew the ages of his sons perfectly well (Diego was indeed six and Philip three) but, like other parents trying to persuade their taciturn teenage children to write them letters, he no doubt realized that feigning ignorance was a good way to get results.

On occasion the king reproached his daughters, for example when he heard that they had misbehaved – ‘you both need to be sure to do everything [your governess] tells you’ – or when their letters contained errors. ‘You, the older one, wrote that your brother is gaining fame for his prowess [with the crossbow], but I think you meant your sister ... and you also omitted a word. You must have written the letter in a hurry’ – a crushing rebuke for a fifteen-year-old girl who desperately missed her father. Normally, however, Philip’s letters were full of praise. He was delighted when his daughters encouraged young Diego to dance, and he studied with pleasure his letter and ‘a picture of a horse which seems to me better than he usually manages’. He promised to send a picture book as a reward. Later he sent his son some letters of the alphabet to colour in and announced that he had more to send when they were required.³⁷

It was not to be: Diego died the following month of smallpox, aged seven – the third heir to perish in Philip’s lifetime. ‘It is a terrible blow,’ he wrote to one of his ministers, ‘coming so soon after all the other [deaths]; but I praise God for everything He has done, submit myself to His divine will, and pray that He will be satisfied with this sacrifice.’³⁸ The death of Diego forced the king to change his plans. He had hoped to leave Portugal and spend Christmas 1582 with his family in Spain; but now he had to wait until the Portuguese Cortes could assemble and swear allegiance to

his last surviving son, the future Philip III, as his heir. Once that ceremony had been accomplished, the king left Lisbon and finally reached the Escorial in March 1583. After attending a service, 'His Majesty visited the queen's apartments', which must have been a bitter moment, and then 'climbed up to the dome of the church' and explored other additions built since his departure. He also received the body of María, the youngest of his children who (like Diego) had died while he was in Portugal, which also 'affected him as a father so much that grief prevented him from doing anything else'. He buried her beside the bodies of five of his other children.³⁹

A fifth bride for the king?

Amid all these losses, Philip found some consolation in the arrival of his sister María, now a widow, and her youngest child, Margarita. They arrived in Madrid from Austria in March 1582, and after a short rest in Las Descalzas, they set out for Portugal. Philip could not disguise his excitement at their impending arrival. He told his daughters 'I am very envious of you' because 'when you get this letter you will already have seen my sister'. The girls must write at once to tell him 'if she is fat or thin, and if we still look somewhat alike as we used to do. I am sure she does not look as old as I do.' Philip set out to meet his sister near the Portuguese frontier and, he told his daughters, 'I got out of the carriage quickly and kissed her hands before she could get out of hers' (one of the few times Philip seems to have done anything 'quickly'). Thereafter they travelled in the same carriage and 'you can imagine how much she and I enjoyed seeing each other, since we had not done so for twenty-six years, and only twice in the past thirty-four years, and both times for only a few days'.⁴⁰

Philip was also happy to meet his young niece Margarita. The death of Diego, leaving Philip once more with only one son, Prince Philip, led his ministers in Madrid to press for remarriage, and their thoughts turned to Margarita. The empress was horrified because, as she told Imperial Ambassador Hans Khevenhüller, 'she had already decided to place her daughter as a nun in the convent of Las Descalzas'. Khevenhüller suavely reminded María that 'she must not act precipitately in something that could not later be changed', adding that 'now that King Philip has made clear that he

wishes to marry' Margarita, the empress 'could not in good conscience let her daughter become a nun'. Furthermore, Khevenhüller noted, 'His Majesty does not wish to slight his own family and seek a foreign bride' – that is: Philip would only marry another Habsburg, and Margarita was currently the only one available.⁴¹

As the pressure to marry intensified, Margarita composed a remarkable letter to her uncle. She began by stating that since 'everyone is on the side of Your Majesty, and no one on mine, I have turned to God, entrusting this matter to Him'. On two grounds, she wrote, 'I find it impossible to marry': first, 'because I have taken a vow to become a nun, and given God my word that I will become His bride'. She asked rhetorically: 'I ask Your Majesty to tell me: having given my word to the King of Heaven, would it be right for me to renege in order to marry a king on this earth?' Margarita concluded with a second consideration, carefully calculated to appeal to Philip's Providential vision. Given all that the king did for God, she argued, He would surely reciprocate, 'giving you a long life, success in your affairs, and the survival of the children He has given you'. Moreover,

Although the prince, may God preserve him, is still young and is so sickly and in poor health, I will take responsibility before God for his well-being. And Your Majesty can be sure of one thing: that if Your Majesty consents to leave to God his bride, his Margarita, and does not break such firm bonds, God will grant the prince good health as he grows up, and a numerous progeny when he marries.⁴²

This was spiritual blackmail worthy of Philip himself, and in autumn 1584 the king finally accepted defeat, attending a simple ceremony with his daughters in Las Descalzas at which he apparently wept as Margarita cut off her hair and the empress 'dressed her in a nun's habit'.⁴³

Ambassador Khevenhüller by contrast breathed a huge sigh of relief: he had evidently feared that the physical demands of another teenage bride would exhaust Margarita's 58-year-old uncle: 'His Majesty,' he told María, 'has prudently decided to marry neither the Infanta nor anyone else, because according to the advice of his doctors, His Majesty might live several years more if he remains single, but if he marries they do not give him one more year.'⁴⁴ Instead, Margarita remained at Las Descalzas as

a nun until her death almost fifty years later, no doubt watching with satisfaction as Prince Philip grew up, married and sired five healthy children (see plate 33).

Although the Empress María also spent the rest of her life in Las Descalzas, she kept in regular touch with her brother. Sometimes she joined him at the Escorial and Aranjuez, and he sometimes visited her in her apartments at the convent. At other times, the siblings used Khevenhüller as an intermediary. He claimed that the empress became so involved not only in ‘foreign affairs but also in the most intimate family matters’ that ‘every day I had to go and consult His Majesty about them, taking and receiving notes from Las Descalzas to wherever the king might be’.⁴⁵ In addition, after her brother’s death she helped his children (some of them, of course, also her grandchildren) to adjust. Thus in October 1598, the new king Philip III visited her every day; while Isabella Clara Eugenia lived with her aunt and Margarita for eight months until she married another of María’s children, Archduke Albert (chapter 19).

Death and debts

Philip also boasted a sizeable cohort of illegitimate relatives, and although he knew few of them personally he sometimes intervened decisively in their lives. Each of them bore either the style ‘of Aragon’ (descendants of his great-grandfather, Ferdinand the Catholic) or ‘of Austria’ (descendants of his great-grandfather Maximilian and his father Charles V). The former included Hernando de Aragón, archbishop of Zaragoza, who served Philip as viceroy of Aragon until his death in 1575, and Francisco de Borja, an intimate adviser of both Philip and his sister Juana until his death in 1572: both, as Philip and Juana, were great-grandchildren of Ferdinand. Among members of the other branch of the family, Philip took a personal interest in ‘el Señor Maximiliano de Austria’, illegitimate son of one of the twelve illegitimate sons of Emperor Maximilian, whom Philip named abbot of Alcalá el Real and later bishop of Cádiz.

Charles V had sired two illegitimate daughters, both born in 1522. Philip was unaware of the existence of the first, Doña Tadea de la Penna, until he received a letter from her in 1560. She announced that she was a nun in Rome and complained that ‘many

lay and religious people know (much against my will)' her parentage. She asked her half-brother to recognize 'that I, although most unworthy, am the daughter' of the emperor, and either grant her a pension payable in Rome or else bring her to Spain.⁴⁶ Although the king's reply has apparently not survived, it seems likely that he left his half-sister in her convent. Margaret of Austria, born in the Netherlands and raised by her aunt Mary of Hungary, enjoyed a very different destiny. Charles recognized her as his daughter and married her to the duke of Parma, and between 1557 and 1559 she spent much time with Philip in both England and the Netherlands. Although the two never saw each other again after the king left for Spain, they exchanged many letters, especially when Margaret served as regent in the Netherlands. Her son Alexander spent many years at the court of Spain before fighting at the side of Don John first in the Mediterranean and later in the Netherlands, where he became governor-general in 1578. Philip always showed him great affection. After both Alexander's parents died in 1586, the king wrote his nephew a warm letter of condolence: 'You must bear this like a good Christian,' he wrote, 'and you must also take care of yourself', adding in his own hand: 'Although you have lost both of your parents almost at the same time, I am always here in their place.'⁴⁷

At first, Philip also showed great affection for Charles's other son, 'my brother Don John'. In 1559 he made him a knight of the Golden Fleece and set up a separate household for him (chapter 7), and in 1568 he named him captain-general first of the Mediterranean fleet and later of the royal forces fighting to suppress the revolt of the Alpujarras. In 1570 he agreed to allow the pope to name Don John commander of the Holy League against the Turks. Although his brother disobeyed the king for the first time in 1565, when he fled from court to participate in the relief of Malta, three years later he revealed the plans of Don Carlos to flee to Germany (chapter 10).

It is hard to imagine the meteoric career of Don John. Until 1559, when he was twelve, only four or five people knew his true identity, and for another decade his name was known only in the court of Spain; but his great victory at Lepanto, when he was 24, turned him into an international superstar and also a power at court. Urged on by some of his followers, Don John now dreamed

of becoming a king himself, first of Tunis and then of England, but Philip thwarted him, insisting that his brother must strive only to achieve the goals of the Spanish Monarchy. Sometimes Don John refused: in 1575, although Philip had ordered him to remain in Lombardy, as soon as he learned that the Ottoman fleet threatened Tunis, he set out at the head of the king's fleet to fight another battle; and the following year he disobeyed a royal order to travel directly from Italy to the Netherlands, and instead went to Spain. Soon after he arrived in the Low Countries, he did everything he could to leave them, first for England and later for Spain (chapter 13). Such defiance eventually irritated the king so much that in October 1578 he decided to recall his brother. Only death allowed Philip to become reconciled with Don John: he buried him in the Escorial, near to their father – the only illegitimate member of the House of Austria to be honoured in this way.

Philip showed the same ambiguity towards both the daughters sired by his brother. The older, Ana, was the love child of Don John and Doña María de Mendoza, a relative of the princess of Éboli, in whose palace at Pastrana she was born in 1568. Shortly after the death of her mother in 1572, Ana entered a convent; and in 1578, soon after her father's death, the king granted her the same privileges enjoyed by other nuns from the royal family, including the right to call herself 'Ana of Austria'. She lost everything in 1594 when a 'man named Gabriel de Espinosa came' to the convent claiming to be her cousin King Sebastian, miraculously preserved from death after his defeat in Africa, 'and he persuaded me to believe him'. She began to call Espinosa 'my Lord' and made plans to marry him, after which they would travel to Lisbon and claim their rightful status as king and queen of Portugal. After prolonged investigation, Philip ordered the execution of Espinosa and others involved in the deception, and the transfer of Ana to solitary confinement in another convent, where she would remain until after the king's death (see plate 34).⁴⁸

Philip also intervened directly in the upbringing of the other daughter left by his brother: Juana of Austria, conceived with a noblewoman of Naples in 1573. Don John initially entrusted her to his half-sister Margaret of Parma, and when he died, Margaret begged her brother to bring Juana to Spain 'to be raised by the queen'. But Philip 'preferred another course, believing that it

would be better to deposit her in the convent of Santa Clara in Naples ... intending that when she reached a suitable age she would wish to remain there as a nun'.⁴⁹ Ten years later, a nephew of Sixtus V expressed the desire to marry Juana, and Philip (welcoming the opportunity to please the pope) gave his blessing; but the death of Sixtus ended the discussion. Although she received other proposals of marriage, Juana would remain confined in the convent of Santa Clara in Naples for some years after Philip's death.

Philip had one more family obligation: paying the debts left by his father and other deceased relatives. The Archivo General of Simancas conserves fifty-two huge bundles of desperate requests from hundreds of former servants of the emperor for payment of salary arrears or reimbursement of expenses incurred in Charles's service. In 1559 the king allocated 80,000 ducats to be spent by the executors of the emperor's testament in paying debts; but it soon emerged that Charles owed far more – not only to his own servants but also to the creditors of his own father and grandparents, 'because, after I took the oath as king of Castile and Aragon, I fought great wars and incurred unavoidable expenses'. In 1579, a committee of ministers appointed to solve this embarrassing problem asked Philip to provide funds to pay off the creditors of his deceased relatives. The king dictated a dismissive reply: 'To be sure, I would be very happy if this could be done at once, but pending matters are so numerous and the funds available for them so little; so you can remind me about this later.' On reading this response, the king apparently realized just how heartless it sounded, because he added in his own hand: 'I mean, in future tell me what would be necessary each year to cover the expenses detailed here.'⁵⁰

The king was similarly lax in discharging the debts of his son Don Carlos. He silently appropriated some of the late prince's most valuable possessions, but refused to pay a suitable amount to the estate to help discharge the prince's debts. When in 1571 'His Majesty wished to send a jewel to the queen of Scotland', Mary Stuart, instead of sending her one from his own collection he chose one from 'those that belonged to the prince'; and six years later he still had not parted with a 'a golden crucifix' and a Calvary 'that Pompeo Leone, my sculptor, made for the said prince', which Don Carlos had bequeathed to a Madrid convent.⁵¹ This unusual

behaviour reflected the unusual relationship between Philip and his oldest son.

The enigma of Don Carlos

The most famous (or infamous) and dramatic episode in the life of Philip II occurred just before midnight on 18 January 1568 when the king led a small group of courtiers through the darkened corridors of the Madrid Alcázar to arrest and imprison his son and heir, Don Carlos. Six months later, while still in confinement, the prince died – according to the English ambassador John Man, ‘Not without great suspyton, as is reported, *of a taste*’: that is, poisoned on the orders of his father.¹

Over a hundred versions of this episode have been published, starting with two tracts that appeared in the Low Countries in 1581. First and better known, William of Orange’s polemical *Apology* asserted that Philip ‘unnaturally murdered his own child and heir’. The second tract, *Diogenes*, an anonymous appeal in verse to the king of France to support the Dutch struggle against the tyranny of Philip, was far shorter but it made an accusation that would enjoy a long life: that Don Carlos had fallen in love with his stepmother Isabel of France and that Philip had murdered both of them when he found out.² These accusations recurred in César de Saint-Réal’s historical novel *Don Carlos* (1672), in Friedrich Schiller’s play *Don Karlos* of 1787, and in Giuseppe’s Verdi’s opera *Don Carlo*, first performed in 1867. Most of these versions relied on indirect sources – often the same indirect sources: thus Verdi’s libretto drew upon Schiller’s play, which was in turn based on Saint-Réal, who incorporated the unsubstantiated allegations of Orange’s *Apologie* and *Diogenes*.

The events of 18 January 1568 and their antecedents

All this lay in the future. In 1568, Francisco Pereira, the Portuguese ambassador and Ruy Gómez's uncle, was the first outsider to learn of the dramatic acts – 'at 2 a.m. [on the 19th] I was informed of what had happened' – and was also the first to write down what he heard. He stated that the king celebrated Christmas 1567 with the monks and a few courtiers at the Escorial, returning to the Madrid Alcázar on the night of 16 January 1568. The following day, a Sunday, Pereira noted, the king attended Mass accompanied by his son. He spent the whole of 18 January 'in bed, saying that he felt unwell' until at some point Philip summoned four of his leading councillors, including Ruy Gómez. When they assembled, the king

told them that the affairs of the prince had become so disordered that it was necessary to act, both as a father and as a Christian, and for the good of these kingdoms; and that he had not summoned them to give him their opinions on the matter, because he had decided what he must do, but rather to accompany him and carry out his orders.³

The king had already shared his plan with six other people. The two gentlemen of the prince's bedchamber on duty that night received orders to leave the door to his apartment unlocked, to extinguish all lights and to remove all weapons and all guards; while four other courtiers (two of them armed with hammers and nails) were told to stand by to receive further orders.

At 11 p.m. Philip put on a coat of mail and his helmet and led his posse stealthily through the Alcázar 'without torches or candles to the apartment of the prince, who was in bed'. He 'immediately seized the sword that [his son] kept by his bed and the loaded arquebus that he always kept close to him'. Awakening to find armed men surrounding him, Don Carlos exclaimed in alarm: 'What does Your Majesty want? What time is it? Does Your Majesty want to kill or arrest me?' 'Neither, prince,' Philip replied as his entourage nailed the windows shut. At this, the prince 'leaped out of bed and apparently wanted to throw himself in the fire'. When a courtier restrained him he cried out: 'Does Your Majesty want to tie me down like a madman? I am not mad, just desperate.' Philip replied, 'phlegmatically, as usual: "Calm yourself, prince, and get into bed. What we are doing is for your own good."' The king then 'collected all the papers in the prince's writing desks', together with 30,000

ducats in cash found there, and departed. He left two courtiers in the prince's bedchamber while the rest of the party stood guard outside.⁴

These dramatic events caused a sensation. The next day, Pereira noted that 'the whole country is shocked and amazed'; and a week later one of Philip's Netherlands ministers still found the new situation 'totally unexpected and most remarkable'. But some observers now realized that the arrest was not, after all, 'totally unexpected': they had missed at least one important clue. French ambassador Fourquevaux recalled that

on the 13th of this month the king ordered the churches and monasteries of this city to say prayers at all canonical hours and at Mass, asking God to inspire and guide him on a certain deliberation and plan that he had formed in his heart. This provided the gossip-mongers [*speculatifs*] of this court with much to talk about – but I never thought it concerned the prince.⁵

Fourquevaux nevertheless overlooked one important circumstance: if Philip had indeed decided the fate of his son that far in advance, it would have been an act of stunning hypocrisy to go to Mass with him on the day before the arrest, thus giving Don Carlos a false sense of security. One must wonder why, if the king had made up his mind at the Escorial on 13 January, he waited five days to act.

Explanations

The diplomatic corps in Madrid could not explain this either. 'What the true cause might be, I cannot say,' sighed the Tuscan ambassador, adding: 'Many affirm that His Majesty will provide an account not only to his subjects but to all Christian princes.' He was right. Philip spent much of 19 January in meetings with different groups of councillors, whom he reassured that he had acted 'for reasons that reflected the needs of his service and the well-being of these kingdoms, which he would explain to them in due course'. He also wrote or dictated letters that apprised his principal vassals and allies of his actions.⁶ In each case, Philip emphasized that he had arrested the prince only on account of his 'natural and unique temperament' and not 'for some offence or wrong he had done to our person, nor anything like it', and he promised to supply further detail in due course (according to one

source ‘the king said he would give forty causes and reasons that had compelled him to make the said arrest’). Until then he forbade further discussion, especially in the form of sermons: all prelates and generals of the religious orders received an injunction that the matter must not be mentioned from the pulpit.⁷

At this stage, Philip supplied further details only to his closest Habsburg relatives. He revealed most to his aunt Catherine, queen dowager of Portugal, both because as the only surviving sibling of Charles V she was the senior member of his family, and because as mother of his first wife, María Manuela, she was also Don Carlos’s grandmother. Philip began his long holograph letter on 20 January by reminding his aunt that he had already warned her ‘of the lifestyle and habits of the prince my son’ together with the ‘numerous and weighty arguments and evidence’ that proved ‘the unavoidable necessity to find a remedy’. His ‘paternal love’, he continued, ‘restrained him, so he had sought and used all the means, remedies and ways I could find to avoid reaching this point’. But now

the prince’s condition has deteriorated so far and reached such a state that, in order to discharge the obligation that as a Christian prince I have towards God and towards the kingdoms and dominions that He has chosen to place in my charge, I could not avoid making a change to his situation, arresting and imprisoning him.

Philip also revealed to Catherine (and, at this stage, apparently only to her) that this would not be a temporary step:

My decision does not derive from any crime, disobedience or disrespect, nor does it aim to punish, because although there was plenty of evidence for that, it could have waited the proper time and place. Nor is this a means to an end, hoping that in this way to reform his excesses and disorders. The problem has another root and origin that neither time nor treatment can solve.⁸

Philip disbanded his son’s household and moved him to a tower in the Madrid Alcázar in a windowless apartment that measured ‘thirty square feet’ – about the same size as that of Bartolomé Carranza after his arrest (an ominous coincidence, noted by many) – where six trusted courtiers kept the prince isolated under strict guard both night and day. According to the Imperial ambassador in early February, ‘Everyone keeps quiet about the prince as if he

were dead'; and two months later, according to his Tuscan colleague, 'no one pays attention now to the prince of Spain, as if he had never been born, and his life in custody is the same as on the first day, with no prospect that he can speak a single word' to the world outside.⁹

Not surprisingly such drastic and dramatic measures, combined with Philip's refusal to provide a detailed explanation, gave rise to a wide range of reactions. In Lisbon, Queen Catherine proposed to come and see the prince in person 'to look after him as a mother', and Philip had to send a special messenger to dissuade her.¹⁰ In Vienna, María and Maximilian protested to Philip about the lack of a full explanation when news arrived that Don Carlos had taken Easter communion, which suggested that he was again 'normal', forcing Philip to sit down and 'open my heart to Your Highnesses'. In what must have been a most painful exercise, he provided the only surviving analysis of his innermost thoughts on 'the nature' and 'the defects' of his son. He began by explaining that at first 'neither I nor those who are with the prince were satisfied that he was in a suitable state' to receive communion; but 'since it seemed to his confessor that it was a more pious and healthy course to proceed, we deferred to him, and so he received it'. Philip conceded that everything had gone well at the Mass but, he continued,

Your Highnesses must realize that this is something that has phases, so that at some times there is more serenity than at others; and that it is one thing to deal with the prince's defects as they affect government and public affairs, and another as they affect personal actions and affairs, and private life – because it may well be that what could be disastrous in one could be excused and allowed in the other.

Therefore, Philip concluded sadly, 'this single example [communion] does not change the defects of understanding that God, for my sins, has allowed in my son.'¹¹


'The defects of understanding'

Philip's effort to 'open his heart' to his closest relatives revealed a commendably realistic appraisal of his son's 'nature' – but not of its causes. This should not surprise us: even today, the prince's medical condition remains an enigma. Don Carlos was born after a

difficult labour that lasted three days, which may have deprived him of oxygen at times and caused right-side hemiparesis, resulting in speech and balance difficulties which persisted throughout his life. He also experienced what would be called today an emotionally deprived childhood. He was an only child, his mother surviving his birth by a mere four days, in 1545; his father was abroad from 1548 to 1551. Furthermore, at eleven months he also lost his wet-nurse, which provoked 'an intense, continuous and inconsolable wailing, anger, and refusal to eat'; and at age seven he was abruptly separated from both his aunt Juana and his governess, who had taken care of him and for whom he felt affection. When his father left Spain again in 1554, Don Carlos in effect became an orphan. As psychiatrist Prudencio Rodríguez Ramos has written, 'Don Carlos experienced an emotionally and physically complicated childhood', which can produce 'a complex and narcissistic personality'. Dr Rodríguez Ramos continued,

Children with similar affective losses tend to seek affection in assertive and indiscriminate ways, and display their emotions without restraint. That description fits the infancy and adolescence of Don Carlos: anxious for affection and loyalty from anyone, extreme in his likes and dislikes, and explosive in his reaction to the slightest frustration.¹²

The prince suffered from one more problem, thanks to the consanguinity favoured by the Habsburg dynasty: his deficient gene pool. Instead of eight great-grandparents, Don Carlos had only four, and instead of sixteen great-great-grandparents he had only six. Even this under-represents the endogamy. Many of Don Carlos's Burgundian and Trastámaran ancestors also had intermarried: thus Mary of Burgundy had just six great-grandparents instead of eight, while her son Philip I married his third cousin Juana, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, themselves the product of numerous intermarriages among the various branches of the House of Trastámara. Repeated intermarriages created an 'inbreeding coefficient' for Charles V of 0.037, but the marriage of both Charles and Philip to their double-cousins dramatically increased Don Carlos's 'inbreeding coefficient' to 0.211 – almost as high as the children of brother and sister, or parent and child (0.25).



11. Don Carlos and his absentee ancestors. Don Carlos was the great-grandson of Juana ‘the Mad’ through both his father and his mother – thus giving him a double-dose of the mental instability in her line. Moreover, instead of eight great-grandparents, he had only four. A marriage to his cousin Anne, ardently desired by both him and Anne’s parents, would have reduced the gene pool even further.

Although these incestuous unions created a vast empire, just as they were meant to do, they also produced heirs with serious defects: not just poor health, physical deformities and general weakness, but also reduced fertility. Inbreeding may explain why only four of the fifteen children sired by Philip survived into adulthood. Endogamy had already caused serious problems for the royal family. Queen Juana, grandmother of both Philip II and María Manuela, lived in confinement at Tordesillas until her death in 1555, her behaviour so idiosyncratic that towards the end even her own progeny feared she might be either a witch or a heretic. Juana’s grandmother Isabella of Portugal had also been locked up, ending her days a demented prisoner in Arévalo castle. Don Carlos thus not only possessed a remarkably small gene pool but one that contained at least two cases of serious mental instability.

Wife	Pregnancies	Miscarriages	Died Aged 0-2	Died Aged 3-10	Survived Childhood	Survived Philip
Mary Manuela	1	0	0	0	1	0
Mary Tudor	2?	2?	0	0	0	0
Isabel of France	5	2	1	0	2	1
Anne of Austria	7	1	2	2	1	1
Total	15	5	3	2	4	2

12. The limited fertility of Philip II. Both the Portuguese and the Spanish royal families sought to unite the entire Iberian peninsula under one sceptre; and to that end, generation after generation intermarried. Although incest eventually produced the desired effect – in 1580 Philip of Spain succeeded to the Portuguese throne – it drastically reduced the gene pool of the dynasty and may also have reduced its fertility. Only four of the fifteen children sired by Philip survived to become adults, and only two became parents.

Initially, Philip entertained no doubts about Don Carlos's ability to succeed him. His testament of 1557 named his son as his 'universal heir' and decreed that he should govern the Netherlands as well as Spain and its overseas territories after his death, albeit subject to a council of regency until he reached the age of 20. Two years later, perhaps recalling the humiliating regime imposed on him by his own father after he married (chapter 1), Philip signed a codicil that loosened this restriction: the regency would end and Don Carlos would rule as well as reign as soon as he 'is married, even if he has not reached the said age [of 20]'.¹³ But long before then, Don Carlos displayed some worrying physical problems. His shoulders were uneven, his left leg was shorter than his right, and his muscles were weak; he also suffered from 'quartan fever' (probably malaria) that periodically left him incapacitated. In 1561, after a particularly severe bout of fever 'left him so weak and exhausted that his doctors believe he needs a change of air', Philip decided to send his son to Alcalá de Henares, where he could enjoy a salubrious climate and acquire the university

education that the king himself lacked.¹⁴

At first all went well, and the prince took his studies seriously. Then in April 1562, perhaps because of his physical asymmetry, Don Carlos missed his footing when descending a flight of stairs and fell heavily against a door, suffering a serious head injury. Initially he seemed only dazed, and he talked with his doctors as they dressed his wound and bled him; but after ten days, perhaps because the dressing was not sterile, the wound festered and Don Carlos developed a fever. The infection (termed 'erysipelas' by his doctors) spread through the prince's lymphatic system from his head (abscesses forced his eyes shut) to his neck and chest. He soon became delirious.

Philip had visited soon after the accident but returned to Madrid once his son's recovery seemed assured: now he hastened back to Alcalá, and in the palace of the archbishop of Toledo (the unfortunate Carranza) he attended fourteen lengthy consultations among the doctors treating his son. He also ordered prayers and processions throughout the kingdom for the health of Don Carlos, and he himself prayed by his bedside – but apparently to no avail: on 9 May the doctors predicted that the prince would die within a few hours. The king's confessor, Fray Bernardo de Fresneda, a Franciscan, now suggested an alternative course of action. 'Since His Highness was so ill, there was no longer any hope for an earthly remedy, and they must look instead for a cure from heaven.' Specifically, Fresneda proposed bringing to the prince's bedside the earthly remains of Fray Diego de Alcalá, a local Franciscan, which had acquired a local reputation for performing miracles. Despite misgivings, the king issued the necessary orders for the friar's sarcophagus to be broken open and for his remains to be placed beside the prince, who touched them just before he lost consciousness.¹⁵

Unwilling to watch his son and heir die, Philip now rode back to Madrid where he prayed as he waited for the apparently inevitable news – but that same night the prince began to recover. A week later the doctors were able to drain the abscesses that had closed his eyes and removed a sequestrum of bone from the site of his head injury. His fever abated. Philip, overjoyed, celebrated this deliverance by distributing alms, pardoning those in prison for debt and walking in a special procession before hearing a sermon that called for the canonization of Diego de Alcalá in view of this

evident miracle. On 16 June, almost two months after his fall, Don Carlos managed to stand and embrace his father and the following day he gave an audience to a group of ambassadors who came to offer their congratulations on his recovery. He remained seated, wearing his hat to cover the wound and, although he was gracious, the Venetian ambassador found Don Carlos ‘very pale and weak. He is of very small stature, far shorter than one would expect for his seventeen years.’ When his doctors weighed him three weeks later, they found that the prince ‘weighed in jacket and hose, with damask underwear, three arrobas and one pound’ – that is, just 76 pounds.¹⁶

Philip now resumed his efforts to pave the way for his son’s smooth succession. In 1563 he went to Aragon and tried to persuade the Cortes to take an oath of allegiance to Don Carlos even though, ‘because of his illness and weakness, I decided not to bring him with me on this occasion’. At one point Philip claimed that if only the Cortes would break with precedent and swear obedience to an absentee prince ‘I would consider it a good bargain to promise not to increase taxes again in my lifetime’ – an extraordinary offer (and a foolish one, given that he lived for thirty-five more years, whereas Don Carlos died within five years), but one that fully revealed the king’s continued confidence in his son.¹⁷

The prince seemed to have two personalities – or as his father later expressed it, he ‘has phases, so that at some times there is more serenity than at others’. In 1564 Baron Adam von Dietrichstein arrived in Spain as the new Imperial ambassador and his first assignment was to finalize the marriage of Don Carlos with María and Maximilian’s daughter Anne (who would later marry Philip himself). When he found the king evasive on the matter, Dietrichstein started asking his Spanish contacts about the prince. The information he acquired was ‘pretty bad [*schlecht genueg*]’: apart from his physical deformities and poor health, the prince displayed disturbing mood swings. Although ‘in many matters the prince shows good understanding’, Dietrichstein reported, ‘by contrast in others he is still like a child of seven years. He wants to know everything and asks about everything, but with no sense of proportion and to no purpose.’ Furthermore ‘his sense of judgement does not seem sufficiently developed to allow him to distinguish the good from the bad, the worthless from the

valuable, or the possible from the impossible'. Dietrichstein modified his views somewhat after he met the prince. Although he found that Don Carlos's body was indeed deformed, and that he spoke with some difficulty (in particular mixing up his 'r' and 'l' sounds), the ambassador noted that he could always make himself understood. Dietrichstein also found that the prince 'has a quick and violent temper, and he often loses it; he says whatever is on his mind freely and without restraint, and without stopping to think whom he might offend'; but he considered some of the other negative opinions he had heard to be exaggerated.

He has already spoken to me several times and, according to his habit, asked me many questions; but far from finding them irrelevant, as I have been told is often the case, they all seemed very sensible to me. He has an excellent memory, and means well, so that it seems his hostile behaviour, which can be extreme, is not malicious ... He is strongly religious, very fond of justice and truth; he hates lies and forgives no one who has ever told a lie.¹⁸

Father against son

Philip, like many other parents of unstable children, seems to have felt a combination of guilt and denial, of inadequacy and anger, when faced with his son's unpredictable mood swings. Not long after his trip to Aragon, he lamented to the duke of Alba the lack of moral and physical strength in his son, 'not only in his judgement and lifestyle but also in his understanding, which lags far behind what one would expect at his age'; and, in response to Dietrichstein's nagging about finalizing wedding arrangements with Anne, the king reminded Maximilian that 'although my son is already nineteen years old, and although other children develop late, God wishes that mine lags far behind all others'.¹⁹

At what point did Philip decide that Don Carlos must not be allowed to succeed him on the throne? Ten days after the prince's arrest and imprisonment, Ruy Gómez told the French ambassador that 'it is more than three years since the king fully realized that the prince's brain was even more deformed than his body' – a cruel and unworthy jibe – 'and that he would never have the necessary judgement' to govern; adding that 'His Majesty has long dissimulated this realization, hoping that age would bring wisdom and discretion; but exactly the opposite happened, for every day

he became worse'.²⁰ This statement dates the king's change of heart to 1565, and indeed from that point onwards criticisms of the prince's conduct multiplied. In his Final Relation that year, Ambassador Giovanni Soranzo informed the Venetian Senate that 'the prince neither hears nor heeds anyone' and 'is by nature very cruel'. He 'has extraordinary habits' and 'is nice to nobody. In everything he does he shows pride and arrogance.' The following year a courtier who saw a lot of Don Carlos informed a confidant that 'the prince is getting worse every day – not in health, but in an ailment that is harder to cure'. In April 1567 Ambassador Fourquevaux noted that Don Carlos was 'somewhat disobedient to his father', while the king, for his part, had 'little confidence in the capacity and adequacy of the said prince his son to leave him as ruler and heir to so many states'.²¹

Later in 1567, however, the same Fourquevaux reported that 'at present the prince is a good son, so that he is getting from his father all he wants. Moreover the councils of State and War meet in his room and he commands absolutely in many matters of state and wants to be obeyed without question.' Government documents partially support these claims. Thus in April, when letters arrived warning that the Dutch rebels might recruit German troops, Philip endorsed the package. 'Tell Ruy Gómez to inform the prince that he should summon the council of State to meet immediately in his presence, where they should consider these letters and discuss how to respond to them – and especially concerning this point.' Six months later, when another package arrived from Germany, Philip instructed his secretary: 'This should be seen by the council, with the prince present'.²² The king did the same with dispatches from the Netherlands. In spring 1567 Secretary of State Antonio Pérez reported 'it seems the council will meet this afternoon, with the prince'. Don Carlos was well prepared for such discussions because Margaret of Parma wrote letters directly to him from Brussels and he was also in touch with the Netherlands ministers who resided at the king's court.²³

Fray Bernardo de Fresneda, the royal confessor who had advocated using the bones of Fray Diego de Alcalá when the prince seemed close to death, provided an interesting explanation for his involvement in affairs of state. Shortly after the prince's arrest he told an ambassador:

We put up with his excesses to see whether they might diminish over time; and we created various tests to see whether the extravagant things he did proceeded from youthful anger, or a desire to dominate, or lack of wisdom. That's why the king allowed him to preside over the council, granted him executive power in many matters, and ordered that he be allowed to receive large sums of money.

Fresneda concluded that this had proved a dangerous strategy, because 'we found that when the prince entered the council, he created confusion everywhere and held up the transaction of business'. Moreover Don Carlos 'used the authority granted by the king to further his own wickedness'.²⁴

This 'wickedness' took several forms. Thus in December 1566, when Philip presided over the opening of the Cortes of Castile in the Madrid Alcázar, he brought along the prince, who sat beside his father as a royal secretary read the royal charge to the assembly, asking for funds to pay (among other things) for his return to the Netherlands. After the royal party withdrew, the Cortes began to discuss not only how to finance the king's voyage but also the regency arrangements during his absence, with many deputies calling for Don Carlos to remain behind, just as Philip had done during the absences of his father. This was not at all what the prince wanted, and so he returned to the room where the Cortes met and threatened that 'anyone who recommended that he remain in Spain would become, along with the city he represented, his capital enemy'. He also announced that 'he was determined to go wherever His Majesty went, and that the whole world could not stop him', and then stormed out of the assembly.²⁵ Why?

Don Carlos knew that Maximilian and María planned to meet Philip in Brussels, bringing with them their daughter Anne, whom the prince was to marry – and he showed considerable enthusiasm about marrying her. Don Carlos 'very much liked' her portrait, which he put 'in a round ebony box, with silver mouldings'. He also showed considerable enthusiasm about the Empire. In July 1566 the prince started to pay a salary to 'Luis de Morisote who taught him the German language', and he purchased German artefacts and several German books, including 'a book about the knight Theuerdank' in German.²⁶ Anne was fluent in Spanish, so Don Carlos did not need to learn German for her sake; but perhaps the purchase of *Theuerdank* reveals his intentions, because the epic poem narrated the odyssey of Emperor Maximilian I to marry

Mary of Burgundy – an encouraging example for his great-grandson.

Acts of ‘wickedness’ steadily multiplied. On one occasion Don Carlos defenestrated a page who annoyed him; on another ‘His Highness became very angry and annoyed’ with Juan Estébez de Lobón, the keeper of his wardrobe,

because he could not find a receipt, so much so that he wanted to throw him out of a window, but some gentlemen of his bedchamber saw this and prevented him. And so His Highness ordered the said Lobón to be dismissed and sent back to his home, calling him a villain and a thief, and saying that he had committed treason.²⁷

Yet more ‘wickedness’ came to light on the night of the arrest. The king discovered over 30,000 escudos in the prince’s apartment, and debts of over 200,000 ducats to various bankers; while letters dated 1 December 1567, signed ‘Yo el príncipe’, ordered his chamberlain to raise 600,000 ducats in Seville and to do so ‘with all the secrecy and propriety possible’ in connection with ‘an unavoidable and most urgent necessity’.²⁸

Treason and plot?

Even the officials of the royal treasury could not identify this costly ‘necessity’ when in 1572 they audited the prince’s accounts. He had left some items deliberately vague – such as two payments of over 1,000 ducats ‘which His Highness authorized on the last day of April 1567 to be given to a certain person in secret’ – while others could no longer be explained: an official wrote despairingly beside the twenty-nine loans to the prince by Anton Fugger and his nephews: ‘we do not know why this was done.’²⁹ Ambassador Emilio Roberti of Mantua was apparently the only contemporary who divined the real reason for the prince’s ‘necessity’: ‘His Highness wrote to the grandees [of Spain] inviting them to accompany him on a journey, which we now know was to travel on the royal galleys to Italy, and present himself to the emperor ready to marry’ his daughter. ³⁰ That is, knowing that the emperor still wanted him to marry Anne, Don Carlos had concluded that his only chance to circumvent Philip’s opposition was to imitate his great-grandfather Maximilian in *Theuerdank* and claim his betrothed in person. Unfortunately for him, the success of his plan

depended on the willing participation of his uncle Don John of Austria, named captain-general of the royal fleet on 15 January 1568, who now commanded the galleys necessary for the prince to reach Italy.

At a meeting with his uncle on 16 January Don Carlos apparently revealed his plan, indicating that he would be ready to leave court 'the next night' and begging for assistance. Don John asked for time to think about this and immediately informed the king. According to several observers, the prince soon realized that he had been betrayed and, having loaded and cocked an arquebus, invited Don John to return to his apartment, intending to kill him. A suspicious gentleman of the prince's bedchamber uncocked the weapon so Don Carlos could not use it when his uncle arrived. Instead he drew his dagger. Don John, who was much stronger, pushed him away and shouted very loudly 'Don't come one step closer, Your Highness!' which brought several attendants running. Don John seized the prince's dagger and took it to the king as evidence. News of the plan, and of the attempted assassination, finally compelled Philip to act. As Ambassador Roberti wrote: 'The king, who was already giving serious thought to what the prince was planning, decided that he could not continue to dissimulate.' The arrest took place that night.³¹

One might have expected that the papers seized by Philip in the prince's apartment would clarify everything because, as Fourquevaux observed, 'the prince wrote down in his own hand everything he thought, and in this way himself revealed the ten thousand or so foolish and strange dreams in his head'. Certainly the king lost no time in perusing his son's archive: according to Pereira, Philip was 'reading though the prince's papers' the next day 'from lunchtime until well into the night'.³² Although no document written by Don Carlos describing his plans has survived, the archive of Simancas contains a large bundle of letters received by the prince during his last year of liberty from a surprisingly large number of people around the Monarchy. All of them displayed great anxiety to please. From Milan, a treasury official informed Don Carlos of 'what was happening for the service of His Majesty'; from Genoa, the Spanish ambassador relayed news about the Ottoman fleet; and from New Spain, the viceroy reported that 'this land is, thanks be to God, tranquil and at peace' and sent the prince 'three tigers' as a present. Although these letters seemed

innocuous, others did not. From Laredo, in northern Spain, a merchant shared his personal grievances with the prince because the king 'will not listen to my pleas for justice'; while from Granada, the president of the Chancery announced that he had intervened to ensure the speedy trial of someone the prince favoured. Even if Philip could overlook these indiscretions, he could hardly miss the extravagant language used by all the prince's correspondents, whatever the contents of their letters: 'May Our Lord watch over the most high and most mighty person of Your Highness, increasing your kingdoms and dominions as I, your most insignificant vassal, desire' and signing off 'the most faithful vassal of Your Highness, whose royal hands I kiss'. These unctuous formulas, unparalleled in the records of the Habsburg Monarchy, appear in letters from so many different correspondents that they could only stem from a directive from either the prince or a member of his entourage.³³

That entourage contained many talented young men who would later rise to prominence: don Cristóbal de Moura and don Juan de Idiáquez, who would become Philip II's most trusted advisers in the last fifteen years of his reign; don Juan de Silva and don Juan de Borja, who would both (like Moura) play a crucial role in the union of Portugal and Castile. All four formed part of a group of courtiers known as 'the Academy' which gathered around the duke of Alba. Initially, the group met in Alba's apartment but after he left for the Netherlands they gathered with increasing frequency in the prince's apartments in the Madrid Alcázar. There they discussed not only women, poetry, war and chivalry, but also 'how to become a royal Favourite' and 'how to transact business at court'. Many members held an office in the prince's household, and Don Carlos himself may have attended some discussions.³⁴

Although no evidence exists that any of these men showed disloyalty to Philip, the prince and his household certainly represented the 'reversionary interest' in the Monarchy: if the king had died at any point before midnight on 18 January 1568 the members of Alba's Academy would immediately have gained control of the central government. Conversely, if Philip had predeceased his son, everyone involved in the arrest would face disgrace if not death. As the papal nuncio put it, just two weeks after the arrest: 'The prince has a mortal hatred of the ministers most esteemed by the king, and if he should ever gain the throne,

they and their progeny will be ruined.’ The nuncio therefore predicted that Ruy Gómez, Feria, Espinosa and the others ‘would take legal proceedings’ to ensure that the prince ‘should never gain the throne’. Ambassador Fourquevaux agreed, predicting that ‘there will be a formal trial of the prince of Spain to declare him incapable of succeeding’.³⁵

Although no reliable evidence suggests that Don Carlos was ever put on trial, the royal historian Antonio Herrera y Tordesillas later affirmed that the option received serious discussion: ‘It was said in the court that the king wanted to start a trial, and to have the council declare the prince incompetent to succeed to the crown’, but abandoned the idea ‘since no evidence emerged that the prince had undertaken anything against his father, nor held any opinions or thoughts against the faith, but rather showed signs of being a most Catholic prince and a true son of the Church.’³⁶ The king therefore decided to keep his son locked up until he died – just like his grandmother Juana (to whom the Cortes of Castile had sworn allegiance as queen). Perhaps Philip reasoned that if Charles V could keep his mother locked up for half a century, he could do the same with his son.

The prisoner

Certainly, permanent incarceration seems to have been Philip’s intention from the outset. Two days after the arrest, he had informed Catherine of Portugal that his son would never leave prison (page 178 above) and, after a while, he revealed his resolution to others. Thus in April he reminded the duke of Alba, who had asked for more guidance on the subject, that

I did not imprison [the prince] either to put an end to his behaviour or to reform his character, because this technique of improvement would fail like all the earlier ones ... My aim was to find a permanent remedy to the problems that could arise during the rest of my life, and above all after my death. And so, since Time is unlikely to bring a cure, the decision I have taken is permanent.³⁷

Philip had depersonalized his son, turning him into a purely administrative problem: all he needed to do now was ensure that Don Carlos, like Queen Juana before him, remained under secure guard and received enough to eat and drink. The latter proved the

greater problem. Francisco Pereira reported late in February that the prince had eaten little during the previous week and nothing at all for four days, and that when his confessor failed to persuade him to eat, his guardians 'entered his room with an iron tool in their hand and a machine to make him open his mouth, and in this way forced him to eat a little soup and meat'.³⁸ On one occasion the prince consumed a diamond, hoping it would poison him; but his doctors administered purges until it emerged again. In the end, according to the count of Lerma, his jailer, the prince 'had not eaten for fifteen days in order to kill himself'. But then,

persuaded by his confessor and his doctor, he wanted to eat and to live; but neither was possible by then, because the passages that convey our food had closed up, so that he could scarcely take even a little broth ... but every day he drank a gallon or more of iced water, which would have sufficed to kill a thousand men made of iron [almost certainly a symptom of malaria]. In the end, they told him that he could not survive, and when he heard this he confessed and received all the sacraments, including extreme unction, with great sorrow and regret for his sins. He lived for three more days like this, showing every sign of being a good Christian, and calling out to God for mercy and to his father for forgiveness and his blessing.³⁹

He failed to obtain the latter. Instead of visiting his son, the king moved to the Escorial and made a trip to El Bosque de Segovia before returning to the capital when news arrived that his son was dead. Philip now secluded himself in a monastery and ordered his subjects 'to wear mourning and take the other accustomed actions' in memory of the 'most serene prince Don Carlos, my dear and beloved son'.⁴⁰ When Philip began to re-enter the corpses of his family at the Escorial, his dead son arrived first (together with the body of Queen Isabel, his third wife) and he allowed Pompeo Leone to use a striking 1567 portrait of the prince in armour as his model for the vast statue in the cenotaph beside the high altar in the basilica of the Escorial where, alone among the king's offspring, he stands beside his father (see plate 22). The decision to include Don Carlos, and thus perpetuate the memory of the heir who had so disappointed him, cost Philip II around 13,000 ducats – no mean investment.

As Fourquevaux slyly noted, the prince's 'death has solved a number of problems that faced the Catholic King' – and those close

to the king and his son knew it. The count of Lerma breathed an audible sigh of relief when he reported his prisoner's passing:

God had done the greatest favour imaginable in granting the prince a good death, since he so little deserved it, and a great favour to all Christendom by taking him to heaven, because if he had lived he would assuredly have destroyed everything, since his nature and habits were so disordered. The prince is just fine where he is, and all of us who knew him give thanks to God for it.

The duke of Alba's agent at court likewise rejoiced 'because, given his habits', had the prince lived 'he could have put at risk the peace of these kingdoms, especially had he managed to escape from his confinement'. Don Juan de Zúñiga, who had seen the prince on a regular basis right up to his arrest, entirely agreed. 'What we all know about the personality of the prince', he wrote to a colleague, had made me 'afraid of him, so that I went against the advice of all my friends and refused to serve him'; but 'when I saw that you had done the same' – that is, declined to serve Don Carlos – 'it convinced me that I was right'.⁴¹ Even Queen Isabel hinted at insanity in a tearful letter to Fourquevaux written the morning after the prince's arrest – 'God has wished to make public his true nature' – and the ambassador himself expressed disbelief at Maximilian's insistence on pressing on with the plan to marry Anne: 'The emperor claims that he does not know – or does not want to know – the real cause of the prince's imprisonment, namely the striking incapacity and lack of common sense in the poor young man.'⁴²

Four and a half centuries later it is hard to resolve the enigma of Don Carlos. A few surviving letters, written when he was 22, display an epistolary style more appropriate to a child half his age (see plate 35). It is hard to imagine someone who wrote with such difficulty ruling an empire on which the sun never set – and that was his destiny, because although his father would experience opposition in enforcing his claim to the Portuguese throne in 1580, no one disputed that Don Carlos was heir presumptive to his cousin Sebastian. But therein lay the central problem: the endogamy that made the prince next in line to his cousin also accentuated his physical and mental weakness.

Philip's explanation for his drastic measures on 18 January 1568 – that he had not acted 'for some offence or wrong he had done to

our person, nor anything like it' – was thus not entirely true: the prince's plan to flee to Germany, and perhaps even more his attempt to assassinate Don John, apparently served as the trigger. Nevertheless the underlying cause lay in the prince's 'natural and unique temperament'. As most courtiers and diplomats recognized, this left Philip with no alternative than to place his son under permanent restraint, just as Charles V had done with his own mother. Philip's misfortune lay in the fact that his contemporaries were no better equipped to understand genetic defects and traumatic head injuries than he was, so that many of them accepted the baseless assertions of John Man, William of Orange and the anonymous author of *Diogenes*, that his father had murdered him.

PART IV

THE KING VICTORIOUS

Years of crusade, 1568–1572

The tragedy of Don Carlos and the death of his wife Isabel, his disaffected Dutch subjects secured foreign support for an invasion of the Netherlands that cost a fortune to defeat. Worst of all, at the end of the year, the Moriscos of Granada rebelled. Even in Madrid, criticism of the king and his policies mounted. ‘It makes me sad and depressed to see Your Majesty angry and frustrated at what people are saying,’ Philip’s chief adviser, Cardinal Diego de Espinosa, wrote soothingly, adding ‘I therefore beg Your Majesty not to exhaust yourself.’ In a remarkably frank rescript, Philip revealed how demoralized he felt:

These things cannot fail to cause pain and exhaustion, and, believe me, I am so exhausted and pained by them, and by what happens in this world, that if it was not for the business of Granada and other things which cannot be abandoned, I do not know what I would do ... Certainly I am no good for the world of today. I know very well that I should be in some other station in life, one less exalted than the one God has given me, which for me alone is terrible. And many people criticize me for this. May God grant that in heaven we will be treated better.¹

Over the next two years, Philip’s situation improved dramatically. His troops pacified both the Netherlands and Granada; his fourth wife, Anne, bore the longed-for heir; and his brother won a spectacular victory over the Ottoman navy at Lepanto. Espinosa now felt jubilant. Spain had a prince, he boasted

to the duke of Alba at the end of 1571, 'and His Majesty is healthy. With this and with the great victory at sea (the greatest since Moses parted the Red Sea), it seems that we lack little.' Nevertheless, some continued to criticize the king's reliance on Espinosa. That same day, the duke of Alba's agent in Madrid reported:

The world here continues as usual – I mean the government, because the man in red [*el rojo*: Espinosa] still carries everything on his shoulders, although there is no shortage of people who would like to relieve him of his burden, at least in part. Indeed the matter has now reached such a state that preachers use their pulpits to tell His Majesty openly of the evils of entrusting so much to one person.

The events of 1572 would show the folly both of the crusading policies that 'the man in red' had pressed upon the king and of 'entrusting so much to one person'.²

'Creating a New World': the duke of Alba and the Netherlands

The duke of Alba brought with him to Brussels in 1567 an extensive agenda, elaborated in his meetings with Philip at Aranjuez: 'If Your Majesty looks closely at what is to be done,' the duke observed, 'you will see that it amounts to creating a New World.' The king committed part of his agenda to paper in formal Instructions, but much remained secret and in June 1568 Alba provided a detailed account of how he had implemented 'the orders I committed to memory'.³ The first and most important of these was 'to arrest the most prominent suspects and offenders, in order to give them an exemplary punishment, and also some of the guilty lesser offenders'. Accordingly, two weeks after he arrived in Brussels, Alba created a special court, the 'council of Troubles', to try all those suspected of rebellion or heresy. He then arrested and imprisoned Egmont and Hornes, their secretaries and some other political leaders, charging all of them with treason; and in March 1568, his agents coordinated the simultaneous arrest throughout the Netherlands of over 500 suspects, including all available signatories of the Compromise. Over the next five years the council of Troubles tried over 12,000 persons for treason and condemned almost 9,000 of them to lose some or all of their goods. It executed over 1,000 of them, including Egmont and Hornes.

Alba had less success to report in fiscal matters. Philip had instructed him to ensure that the Netherlands henceforth fund their own administration and defence by imposing a sales tax (similar to the *alcabala* in Spain). The duke boasted that the Netherlands would soon provide '300,000 ducats a year which Your Majesty can put in your treasury' to form a strategic reserve 'to meet the emergencies that may arise', but the invasion of the Netherlands by troops commanded by William of Orange forced him to postpone this initiative. It took Alba almost six months to destroy most of his adversaries. Few escaped (although Orange was one of them) and the duke regarded his success as proof of divine favour for Philip's cause ('God be praised for showing such clear and evident favour to Your Majesty's affairs'). The king, by contrast, showed more interest in raising taxes.⁴ Defeating Orange had required the dispatch of a further two million ducats from Spain, and a month later the Moriscos of Granada rebelled, leading Philip to warn his lieutenant in Brussels: 'I am very much afraid that sending so much money from here to help you over there will one day cause us problems, without sufficient resources at a time when we may most need them.'⁵ In April 1569 Alba dutifully convened the States of the various Netherlands provinces and demanded that they approve three new taxes. They agreed to the Hundredth Penny (a tax of 1 per cent on capital assets), mainly because it would be a one-time levy, which eventually produced almost two million ducats; but they rejected both the Twentieth Penny (a 5 per cent levy on all sales of land), and the Tenth Penny or *alcabala* (a 10 per cent tax on all other sales). The duke used his Spanish troops to induce the States to offer another one-time levy of two million ducats and, given the critical situation of the Monarchy, the king authorized Alba to accept this offer.

Having accomplished so much, in 1570 Alba asked the king for permission to return to Spain. Philip's long response showed a remarkable understanding of his prickly and proud subordinate.

You have achieved so much there in God's service and mine that I am well aware that it has been the salvation and preservation of those provinces, and at present you may feel that you have accomplished everything necessary to put religion, justice, obedience, treasury, defence and the other things on a sound footing ... Nevertheless, if you do not stay on for a while to finish the task entirely, it could easily revert to its former state.

Philip continued slyly: 'Taking these final steps directly affects you, because if something should undermine your achievement, or if some unfortunate event should occur because it remained incomplete, it could not fail to cause you much grief and regret.' Therefore, although 'I understand your good reasons to want some leave and rest, after such a long absence and after all the spiritual and physical exertions required of you since you left Spain', Philip turned the question back to the questioner. 'I urge you to weigh these two considerations most carefully with the Christian prudence that God has given you, keeping in mind the primacy you have always given to His service and mine.' If, after mature reflection, the duke decided that he could safely leave without 'the dangers that I foresee', he must tell the king 'at once, using an express messenger, and I will then name and send a successor so that he can be there a few days before your own departure'.⁶

Philip's letter was a masterpiece. He appeared to leave Alba free to choose, but by asking how the duke would feel 'if some unfortunate event should occur because [your work] remained incomplete' he made virtually sure that he would stay at his post. Alba would bitterly regret his decision not to return to Spain while his reputation remained more or less intact, but that lay in the future. For the moment, both he and the king focused their attention on the journey of Anne of Austria through the Netherlands.

The lonesome death of Baron Montigny

In 1566 Margaret of Parma had sent a prominent Netherlands nobleman, Floris de Montmorency, Baron Montigny and brother of the count of Hornes, as her special envoy to Spain (chapter 8). As soon as news arrived in Madrid that Alba had arrested Egmont and Hornes, Montigny was seized and imprisoned in Segovia castle. Although the baron denied any wrongdoing, the testimony and confiscated papers of his colleagues incriminated him. In addition, the baron had publicly rebuked the king over his refusal to go to the Netherlands, 'bringing colour to His Majesty's cheeks'; moreover, nine months after his arrest he was captured while trying to escape. The council of Troubles reviewed the case against him *in absentia*, found him guilty of treason and decreed that 'his head be cut off and displayed on a pike'. Alba referred the dossier

to Philip and kept this verdict secret until he received a response.⁷ Shortly afterwards, Anne of Austria arrived in Brussels, and Alba reported that Montigny's relatives and friends reminded her of the baron's long career of service to the dynasty. Anne graciously agreed to champion his cause. The duke pointed out to Philip that it would be difficult 'to cut off his head' and 'display it on a pike' after Anne had begged her new husband to show clemency; he therefore suggested that it would be simpler to kill Montigny before the queen arrived and pretend he had died of natural causes.⁸

Philip accepted this advice. Some of his advisers in Madrid suggested 'putting some sort of poison in Montigny's food or drink' but 'it seemed to His Majesty that this would not be an act of justice, and that it would be better to garrotte him in his cell with such secrecy that no one would ever know that he had not died of natural causes'. Philip ruled out killing the baron in Segovia castle, where he still languished in prison, because that was where the marriage to Anne would take place; so in August 1570, just as his bride prepared to leave the Netherlands, Philip ordered Don Eugenio de Peralta, castellan of Simancas, to go to Segovia and take Montigny under guard to the archive fortress.⁹

Philip now orchestrated the most elaborate and remarkable act of dissimulation of his entire reign. Peralta allowed his prisoner unusual freedom within the walls of Simancas, even allowing him 'to sunbathe in a patio', but the day before Anne landed at Santander, Peralta left a forged 'paper, written in Latin, near Montigny's apartment' that apparently revealed new escape plans. This justified placing the baron in close confinement again, and Peralta now composed a letter full of falsehoods specifically (Philip later explained to Alba) 'so they could later be made public both here and there [in Flanders]'. According to Peralta's letter, the baron had contracted 'a fever which (according to the doctors) is extremely serious' and the castellan sent for a compliant doctor, who 'entered and left the fortress as if he were treating Montigny, bringing with him medicines', and also a confessor.¹⁰

The next stage of the deception now unfolded. A royal judge, together with a notary and an executioner, came secretly to Simancas and notified Montigny that he had been sentenced to death. Philip had given permission for the baron 'to confess and receive the sacraments, if it seemed appropriate, and to turn back

to God and repent'; and once he had recovered his composure, Montigny confessed, took communion and drew up a statement of his innocence. He expressed his appreciation for 'the king's clemency and goodness' for deciding 'that he should be executed in private and not in public' (the fate of his brother, Hornes), but he 'continued to protest his innocence'. 'Once he finished speaking', the last act of Philip's dissimulation took place.

The executioner did his job, garrotting him, and immediately the royal judge, the notary and the executioner left ... so that no one knew they had been in Simancas; and the said notary and executioner were placed under sentence of death if they ever revealed it. After this, [Peralta] dressed Montigny in a Franciscan habit, to conceal the fact that he had been garrotted, announced his death, and started to plan his burial.

By the time Anne reached Valladolid, only seven miles from Simancas, Montigny was dead and buried. Philip gloated to Alba that the deception had 'succeeded so well that up to now everyone believes he died of his illness', and no doubt he spent his wedding night in Segovia castle with a clear conscience: the pleas of his new wife for clemency had come just too late.¹¹

Another 'New World'

Philip's fiscal pressure on the Netherlands formed part of a remarkable Imperial strategy that sought to mobilize the resources of all his dominions. In 1568 the king tasked Espinosa with creating a large committee, soon known as the Junta Magna, to overhaul the entire colonial administration. From the outset, the ministers followed the admirable precept 'that the general principles in all these matters are the ones that can be dealt with and settled here: we must refer specific and detailed matters to those who will put them into practice' (a distinction that Philip himself might have embraced with profit).¹²

The junta began with religious matters because in the words of Fray Bernardo de Fresneda, the royal confessor, 'promulgating the Sacred Scriptures forms the basis for the just claim of His Majesty and his predecessors to rule and be sovereigns over those dominions'. It recommended the introduction of provincial councils, episcopal visitations and new dioceses (each with a seminary) as enjoined by the council of Trent; and to fund these

ecclesiastical innovations it proposed a more equitable division of tithes so that local churches and convents received more support. The junta also called for the establishment of tribunals of the Inquisition in Mexico and Lima both to persecute heresy and to 'silence the differences of opinion that have developed among the preachers and confessors in those provinces concerning the jurisdiction and moral justification for what we acquired and now hold' – in other words, no cleric could henceforth call the legality of Spanish rule into question.¹³ Next came the economic foundations of the colonies. To ameliorate the lot of indigenous subjects, the junta proposed reforms to the landholding system; to stimulate production, it devised new regulations for mining, commerce and manufacture; and to augment the crown's revenues, it advocated a combination of tribute levied on communities (rather than on individuals) and a sales tax.

After three months of intense but focused discussion, the junta presented its comprehensive recommendations to the king. Don Francisco de Toledo, named as viceroy of Peru, who had participated in the debates, made an additional request: so that he should be both 'feared and loved' he sought permission to use both 'the sword of punishment' and 'the gratification of rewards'. Philip agreed, and even allowed Toledo and his colleague Don Martín Enriquez, named viceroy of New Spain, to spend money without his express warrant whenever they engaged in 'pacification' and 'in time of war and rebellion'.¹⁴ Thanks to this flexibility, Enriquez waged a 'war of blood and fire' against the Chichimecas to stabilize the northern frontier of New Spain; while Toledo subjugated the last Inca survivors in Peru and sent vital reinforcements to the settlers of Chile in their struggle against the Araucanians. These initiatives cemented Madrid's control over the American continent from the Rio Grande in northern Mexico to the Bio Bio in Chile, while the religious, political, economic and military initiatives proposed by the Junta Magna and endorsed by the king ensured that America would remain Spanish until the nineteenth century and Catholic to this day. It forms Philip's greatest achievement and his most lasting legacy.

Rebellion in Spain: the Morisco Revolt

The Junta Magna was one of two bodies, both chaired by Espinosa,

tasked by Philip with promoting uniformity among his subjects. The other, created in 1566, debated what to do about the 400,000 Moriscos of Spain, an ethnic minority equivalent to about 6 per cent of the total population – but not evenly spread across the country: almost half of all Moriscos lived in the kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia, where they made up between one-fifth and one-third of the population, while most of the rest populated the kingdom of Granada, comprising over half of the total inhabitants. Some mountainous regions, like the Alpujarras south and east of Granada, boasted scarcely any residents except Moriscos.

Ever since the expulsion of all Muslims who would not convert to Christianity in 1502, the central government had striven to integrate those who remained. In 1526, while he resided in Granada (and sired Philip), Charles V presided over a commission that formulated a series of decrees (known as the *Mandatos*) aimed at Christianizing the Moriscos, but almost immediately he suspended them for forty years in return for a substantial payment from the community. The Moriscos secured this reprieve largely because the Turkish conquest of Hungary and war with France made Charles both desperate for money and anxious to maintain domestic peace in Spain; and when the forty-year term expired in 1566, with another Ottoman offensive in progress as well as rebellion in the Netherlands and New Spain, the chances of renewing the suspension seemed similarly propitious. Unlike his father, however, Philip refused. Instead, Espinosa and his committee issued a proclamation in both Arabic and Castilian commanding the enforcement of ‘the Mandatos of the Emperor Charles V in the year 1526’: all Moriscos must abandon their dress, language, customs and religious practices within one year, on pain of fines and imprisonment.¹⁵

Faced with this comprehensive attack on their lives and liberty, a group of Moriscos began to plan a major insurrection – the first in Castile since the Comunero revolt – and on 24 December 1568, the inhabitants of almost 200 Morisco villages in the Alpujarras murdered local priests and other prominent Christians, while a task force made an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the inhabitants of Granada’s Moorish quarter to join them. Since at this stage the insurgents scarcely numbered 4,000, a counter-attack by the local authorities scored some early successes; but they lost control of their troops, who committed atrocities that

gave the rebellion a new lease of life. The king therefore appointed his brother Don John to supervise both military operations in the countryside and the deportation of all Moriscos from the city of Granada – but this too boosted the rebels' cause because many of the deportees fled to the Alpujarras, where at least 4,000 volunteers from North Africa joined them. The rebels now started to raid Christian outposts on the coastal plains, forcing Philip to recall some veteran troops from Italy to regain control.

Reviewing the budget for the 1569 campaign gave the king pause for thought – 'No one who has not experienced war themselves would believe what it requires' – but, he reassured Espinosa (incorrectly), 'it seems that this war will not cost as much as the others in which I have participated'.¹⁶ When the revolt dragged on into 1570, Philip decided to go to Andalusia in person, entering Córdoba on horseback, advancing through the crowds in majestic circles so that everyone could see his self-confidence (and his horsemanship). Since this display did not suffice to end the war, the king sent an emissary into the Alpujarras to negotiate, and in May the rebels 'surrendered, handed over their standard, and submitted themselves to His Majesty's mercy'.¹⁷

As the king's Dutch opponents would soon discover, submission 'to His Majesty's mercy' was a high-risk strategy, and six months later, according to a pre-arranged schedule, his officials herded some 50,000 Moriscos into designated hospitals and churches. To create a false sense of security among the deportees, Philip ordered those supervising the operation to explain that the war had caused such devastation that 'it is impossible for them to survive' in the kingdom of Granada.

For the time being the Moriscos will be removed from there and taken to Castile and other provinces where the harvest has been abundant and the war has caused no damage, so they can be fed and maintained properly for the coming year, while we consider when and how they can return.

This, of course, was totally false – the king had already decided that no Moriscos would ever return to Granada – but (as with Montigny) he regarded telling lies as the essential prerequisite to a favourable outcome. In the event, a quarter of the deportees died during the following two months, either of hunger as they marched in the rain and snow or by drowning at sea when storms

struck the galleys on which they travelled. According to historian José Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, 'In one way or another, the war of Granada caused the death of at least 90,000 people.'¹⁸

Deportation formed only half of Philip's solution to the Morisco problem. He also confiscated the deportees' lands and invited inhabitants from other parts of Spain to come and settle on them. A new council for the Repopulation of Granada surveyed the confiscated property and redistributed it among the new settlers, offering incentives and granting them tax relief and subsidies until they could sustain themselves on their new lands. By 1598 some 60,000 immigrants had settled in 250 Granadine communities.

This complex process of ethnic cleansing testified to Philip's vision and power: no other Western ruler of his day could have coordinated the movement of so many people in such a short time. And yet the venture failed. Many rural areas in Asturias and Galicia were abandoned or ruined when their more energetic settlers left for Andalusia. Nevertheless, there were never enough settlers: the kingdom of Granada as a whole lost about a quarter of its pre-war population while the Alpujarras region, with almost 6,000 families according to the census of 1561, had fewer than 2,000 in 1587. Moreover, although ethnic cleansing permanently removed the risk that an Islamic 'fifth column' in southern Spain might welcome Ottoman or Maghrebine invaders, northern towns liberated from Muslim rule centuries before suddenly acquired a 'Moorish Quarter'. An analysis of the DNA of Spain's current population shows that although chromosomes normally associated with people of North African descent are almost totally absent from eastern Andalusia they are relatively common (up to 20 per cent) in Galicia, León and Extremadura.¹⁹

Lepanto: 'The greatest victory since Moses parted the Red Sea'

Despite Philip's prediction that the war in Granada 'will not cost as much as the others in which I have participated', it left him ill prepared to campaign in the Mediterranean after an Ottoman expeditionary force occupied most of the Venetian island of Cyprus in 1570. Venice desperately sought aid from the other Christian powers of the Mediterranean and found an enthusiastic advocate in Pius V, who saw the struggle as a crusade. The pope sent out envoys urging all Christian rulers to join a Holy League to save

Cyprus and drive back the forces of Islam, but he pinned his chief hope on Philip.

The king demanded a high price for his support. Previous popes had allowed the kings of Castile to raise taxes on the Church for pious causes; and Philip exploited Pius's anxiety to create a Holy League to demand a renewal of all these taxes, known as the 'Three Graces', and an improvement in the terms. His ambassador in Rome told Pius in March 1570 that 'unless His Holiness immediately conceded' the Three Graces 'it would make the venture impossible, because without these and other concessions [His] Majesty could not even ensure the defence of his own dominions, let alone at the same time undertake a major war like this one'. The blackmail worked: Pius made so many generous financial concessions that, in the coarse phrase of Espinosa, 'His Holiness seems to have acted out a proverb that we have in Castile: the constipated die of diarrhoea.'²⁰

Philip nevertheless retained his own agenda. He eventually agreed to join the Holy League only because he expected that, as the most powerful partner, he would be able to use the combined fleet to recover Tunis, not Cyprus, and when it became clear that he might not get his way, he sought ways to back out. 'To tell you the truth, I do not regret that we have not yet signed' the League, he confided to Espinosa, because 'as things currently stand',

I do not believe it will ever achieve any success. It is not possible to deliver what I have promised, not only this year (which is totally impossible) but also in future years because even four times the 'Graces' I have been conceded would not suffice for that ... Even if we gain prestige by joining the League now, it will be a very different story if we fail to honour our commitments.²¹

After much hard bargaining, in May 1571 Philip agreed to pay half the operational budget of the Holy League, while Venice, the Papacy and the other participants provided the rest; and Don John of Austria now took command of the combined fleet, which was assembling at Messina.

He arrived too late to prevent the Ottoman fleet from sacking Venetian settlements on the coast of Crete but in late September, having run short of provisions and acquired copious booty to sell, the Ottoman commanders decided to winter in the Gulf of Lepanto. They evidently assumed that their adversaries would not

dare to commence operations so late in the campaigning season, but Philip had different ideas. He reminded the pope that ‘this great concentration of infantry, cavalry, galleys and ships will be of little benefit or effect’ if it merely defended its own bases, while ‘raiding the coasts and lands of the enemy will not yield any fruit of importance’. Instead, the king argued, ‘It would be best to gather as large a force of galleys as possible, enough to outnumber the enemy, and use it to optimal effect, which would be to seek out and destroy the enemy’s main fleet, which constitutes the real threat.’ The king evidently charged his brother with executing this daring strategy, because on 16 September Don John informed a political ally that his fleet was setting forth ‘with the intention of seeking a battle, as you will see’.

Many people over there argue that it is now too late in the year, and that the enemy will already have withdrawn anyway; others say that they never retreat, and will sally forth when they learn we have entered their territorial waters. In this fleet, enthusiasm for a fight is high, and confidence in victory no less ... If you want to know any more, you can read about it in the history books!²²

Don John led the largest Christian fleet ever seen in the Mediterranean – 208 galleys and 30 other warships – to Corfu. When it found no Ottoman ships or garrisons to attack it dropped down to the Gulf of Lepanto, where it encountered the entire Ottoman fleet and prepared for action. Some 170,000 men fought in the battle of Lepanto on 7 October 1571, and although the forces of the Holy League suffered serious losses – at least 7,500 dead and 20,000 wounded (among them Miguel de Cervantes) – they won a stunning victory, capturing 130 Ottoman warships, 400 pieces of artillery and almost 3,500 prisoners. In addition they sank 110 Ottoman galleys and liberated some 15,000 galley slaves.

Was this ‘the most memorable and happy event that past centuries have seen or that future centuries will ever see’ (as Cervantes claimed), let alone ‘the greatest victory at sea that has ever been’ (as the naval commander Gian Andrea Doria asserted) or ‘the greatest victory since Moses parted the Red Sea’ (the verdict of Espinosa)? No: Cyprus remained in Ottoman hands, and the victors failed to execute the instructions of the Venetian Senate to ‘remove from the enemy, by whatever means, the potential to recreate his fleet’.²³ Yet had the great battle not been fought and

won, the Turkish fleet would surely have left the Gulf of Lepanto early in 1572 and either conquered some Venetian outposts in the Adriatic or taken Crete. Instead, the Christian victory sparked uprisings in Greece and Albania, which for a time threatened Turkish control of the peninsula, and temporarily halted the westward advance of the Ottoman empire.

‘To kill or capture Elizabeth’

The Lepanto campaign was not Philip’s only crusading venture in 1571. No sooner had he agreed to sign the Holy League than he authorized the duke of Alba to invade England and overthrow Elizabeth Tudor. This dramatic policy change towards ‘a sister whom I love so much’ began two years before when the queen seized some ships carrying money from Spain to the Netherlands. Although the money was not strictly royal property, it belonged to a consortium of Genoese bankers who had agreed to lend the duke of Alba money to pay off his army. Philip’s ambassador in England, Don Guerau de Spes, saw this as the prelude to a trade war and he urged both Alba in the Netherlands and Philip in Spain to confiscate English ships and goods. Both obliged, and Elizabeth promptly placed Spes under arrest. Earlier that year, Philip had expelled the English ambassador at his court, Dr John Man, a married Protestant cleric, on the grounds that his continued presence at court might offend ‘God Our Lord, whose service, and the observation of whose holy faith, I place far ahead of my own affairs and actions and above everything in this life, even my own’.²⁴ The rhetoric disguised the fact that, without Man and Spes, Philip possessed no direct diplomatic channel through which to resolve disputes with England.

This anomaly increased Alba’s influence over the king’s policy. The duke had resided in England during the 1550s; he maintained his own intelligence network there; and, above all, he possessed his own strategic agenda. On the one hand, he never saw the point of replacing Elizabeth Tudor with Mary, Queen of Scots, whom many Catholics saw as the rightful ruler of England, because she had grown up at the French court and retained close relations with the French royal family. On the other hand, since the prosperity of the Netherlands depended on trade with England, Alba opposed any action that might jeopardize it. Curiously, although Philip

recognized that his Dutch subjects 'always want to remain friends' with England, he never seems to have realized that Alba himself shared this view – even though it would torpedo his plans to overthrow Elizabeth.

In February 1569, outraged by the imprisonment of Spes and the confiscation of the Genoese treasure, Philip asked Alba to suggest how best to launch an outright attack on England. The duke refused: he replied forcefully that defeating the prince of Orange had left his treasury empty, and so all funds for intervention in England would have to come from Spain – knowing very well that the revolt of the Moriscos would prevent this, at least for a while. Alba's intransigence made Philip more receptive to a proposal from Roberto Ridolfi, a Florentine banker who handled secret funds sent by the pope to the English Catholics. In 1569, Ridolfi visited Spes (despite his confinement) bearing a message from the duke of Norfolk and two of Elizabeth's Catholic councillors saying that they intended to force her to restore close links with both Rome and Spain.

The ease with which Ridolfi glided between the government's various opponents does not seem to have aroused Spes's suspicions, and early in 1571 he entrusted to Ridolfi an ambitious plan, for which he coined the term 'the Enterprise of England'. It called on Philip to persuade the other states of Europe to boycott all trade with England; to send financial support to Norfolk and his allies; and to fan the discontent of Irish Catholics. More radically, Spes suggested that the king should either support Mary Stuart's claim to the English crown or else claim it for himself. Ridolfi first went to Brussels, where he explained the Enterprise to Alba, whose suspicions were immediately aroused by the effortlessness with which Ridolfi had managed to leave England with incriminating documents. Nevertheless, he allowed the conspirator to proceed to Rome.

Ridolfi arrived at an auspicious moment. Pius V had recently issued a bull deposing Elizabeth and now sought a means to carry it out. For a while the Holy League distracted him but on 20 May, the same day that representatives of Spain, Venice and the Papacy signed the Holy League, Pius entrusted Ridolfi with letters urging Philip to support the Enterprise of England. Six weeks later, the king granted Ridolfi an audience. The Italian made a remarkable impression on the king: a few days later, when the nuncio urged

the king to support the Enterprise, much to his surprise ‘His Majesty, contrary to his normal custom [at audiences], spoke at length and entered into great detail about the means, the place and the men’ that he would devote to it.

He ended by saying that he had wanted and waited for a long time for an occasion and opportunity to reduce, with God’s help, that kingdom to the [Catholic] faith and the obedience of the Apostolic See a second time, and that he believed the time had now come, and that this was the occasion and the opportunity for which he had waited.²⁵

Philip proved as good as his word. In July he sent a secret letter to Alba affirming that Mary Stuart was ‘the true and legitimate claimant’ to the English throne, ‘which Elizabeth holds through tyranny’, and asserting that the duke of Norfolk

has the resolve, and so many and such prominent friends, that if I provide some help it would be easy for him to kill or capture Elizabeth [*le sería facil matar o prender a la Isabel*] and place the Scottish queen at liberty and in possession of the throne. Then, if she marries the duke of Norfolk, as they have arranged, they will without difficulty reduce [England] to the obedience of the Holy See.

In the course of the next six weeks, Philip continued, Alba must therefore prepare a powerful fleet and army to carry this out. He promised to send immediately 200,000 ducats – but ‘I warn and charge you expressly that you must not spend a single penny of this sum on anything else, however urgent it may be’. No doubt sensing how unrealistic all this would seem, Philip concluded that ‘since the cause is so much His, God will enlighten, aid and assist us with His mighty hand and arm, so that we will get things right’. The king’s enthusiasm increased as the festival of St Lawrence approached, when one of his ministers noted that ‘His Majesty proceeds in this matter with so much ardour that he must be inspired by God’; and it persisted even after news reached him that Elizabeth had ordered Norfolk’s arrest.²⁶ Even with experienced rulers, one must never underestimate the power of self-deception.

Philip alone

In his *History of Philip II*, Cabrera de Córdoba later identified 1571 as ‘a fortunate year for the Monarchy’, but by the time it ended

Philip had managed to alienate virtually all his former allies. Unravelling the Ridolfi plot revealed to Elizabeth that her ‘good brother’ had planned to murder her. Not surprisingly, she never trusted him again and instead increased surveillance of all Catholics in England and executed those who proved obdurate (including the duke of Norfolk). She also supported privateering activity against Philip (a dozen major expeditions left England in the 1570s to plunder Spanish property) and provided material assistance to his Dutch rebels because, as Alba later pointed out, ‘the queen knew full well that the king our lord had tried to deprive her of the kingdom and even to kill her’. He therefore ‘regarded the queen as quite justified in what she had done and is still doing’ to disrupt the Netherlands.²⁷ Philip’s faith-based strategy had left a toxic legacy.

Philip also managed to alienate Emperor Maximilian in 1571. When intelligence reports suggested that France stood poised to intervene in support of a rebellion against the ruler of the small but strategically important Imperial fief of Finale Ligure, adjacent to Genoa, Philip mounted a surprise invasion. This unilateral action infuriated Maximilian, who mobilized the independent states of Italy to condemn Philip’s unprovoked attack. Empress Maria tried to mediate between her brother and her husband, assuring Philip:

God knows how much I want to settle this accursed dispute over Finale, so that Your Highness need not exhaust yourself over it. I really believe that if it were not for the prestige that blinds us so much, the emperor would not act as he does, which is to importune Your Highness; but I am very confident that it will turn out as we wish, because Your Highness can see that the emperor does not lack good cause.²⁸

Since Philip refused to ‘see’ this, Maximilian sent a special commissioner to reside in his duchy of Milan – also an Imperial fief – with orders to watch ostentatiously over the interests of the Austrian Habsburgs in Italy. This was a major humiliation, and it led Philip to withdraw his forces from Finale – but this recognition that ‘the emperor does not lack good cause’ came too late: Maximilian provided no assistance to Philip in 1572, when a new rebellion broke out in the Netherlands.

The war of Granada had greatly impressed the exiled prince of Orange. ‘It is an example to us,’ he confided to his brother early in

1570: 'if the Moors are able to resist for so long, even though they are people of no more substance than a flock of sheep, what might the people of the Low Countries be able to do?'²⁹ Since the prince knew that the 'people of the Low Countries' would not be able to tackle Alba and his Spanish troops alone, he worked hard to find allies. His agents forged links with the numerous communities of Dutch exiles – perhaps 60,000 men, women and children who had fled to England, Scotland, France and Germany to escape condemnation by the council of Troubles – and these exiles provided recruits for a fleet of privateers known as the 'Sea Beggars', sailing under letters of marque issued by Orange. The exiles distributed plunder taken by the Sea Beggars from merchant ships belonging to Philip's subjects and allies, thereby raising money for Orange's cause as well as sustaining his fleet. Meanwhile Orange and his brother Louis of Nassau fought with the French Calvinist leader Gaspard de Coligny, unsuccessful defender of St Quentin in 1557 and equally unsuccessful patron of the attempt to colonize Florida in 1565. Now Coligny persuaded Charles IX of France to recognize Louis and Orange as his 'good relatives and friends' and to pay them a subsidy.

King Charles also agreed that his sister Margot would marry the Protestant leader Henry of Navarre, and that as soon as the wedding had taken place Coligny and his Protestant followers could invade the Netherlands in support of Orange and the exiles. On the strength of this commitment, Orange laid plans for other invasions to coincide with the main attack by Coligny: the Sea Beggars, together with a squadron to be assembled at La Rochelle by Filippo Strozzi, a Florentine exile with extensive military and naval experience, would capture ports in Holland or Zeeland; Orange's brother-in-law, Count van den Berg, would invade Gelderland with a small force from Germany; and Orange himself would raise an army in Germany and invade Brabant. The only problem lay in timing: everything depended on the date fixed for the marriage of Margot and Henry, but after frequent postponements in April 1572 Charles IX announced that the wedding would take place the following August.

The second Dutch Revolt

Conditions in the Netherlands could hardly have been more

favourable to Orange's cause. The combined impact of raids by the Sea Beggars, the English trade embargo and war in the Baltic had caused a major economic recession: food prices soared just as thousands of families lost their livelihood. Nature intensified the misery: storms caused widespread flooding by seawater; ice and snow froze the rivers; and a plague epidemic ravaged the country. Alba pleaded with the king to send funds from Spain to provide relief but in February 1572 Philip replied, 'With the Holy League and so many other things that must be paid for from here, it is impossible to meet the needs of the Netherlands to the same extent as we have been doing up to now.' A month later he was even more insistent: 'It is my will that henceforth the Netherlands be sustained from the proceeds of the Tenth Penny.' Collection of the new tax must begin at once.³⁰

Since the provincial States still refused to sanction the Tenth Penny, Alba decided to impose it without their consent. His officials started to register all commercial activity, and when in March 1572 some shopkeepers and merchants in Brussels ceased to transact business in protest, the duke brought detachments of his Spanish troops into the city – but to no avail: the shops remained shut and economic activity atrophied. Maximilian Morillon, Cardinal Granvelle's agent in Brussels, reported that 'Poverty is acute in all parts', with thousands in Brussels 'dying of hunger because they have no work. If the prince of Orange had conserved his forces until a time like this,' Morillon concluded, 'his enterprise would have succeeded.'³¹ Morillon sealed his prescient letter on 24 March 1572. Just one week later, a party of Sea Beggars captured the seaport of Den Briel in Holland in the name of William of Orange, and they flamboyantly declared that they would treat everyone well 'except for priests, monks and papists'.

Nevertheless, the rebel garrison of Den Briel was small (perhaps 1,100 men, against the millions at Philip's command); the town was isolated; and it lacked fortifications. News that Strozzi's fleet at La Rochelle might launch an attack convinced Alba that the effective defence of South Holland and Zeeland required the immediate construction of a citadel at the largest port in the region, Flushing on the island of Walcheren, and on 29 March 1572 he dispatched one of his leading military architects to the city with the necessary plans. For good measure he also sent a warrant to arrest the local magistrates, who had failed to start

collecting the Tenth Penny.

The Tenth Penny epitomized all the disagreeable aspects of the 'new world' envisaged by Philip and Alba: it was unconstitutional; it was oppressive; it was foreign; and its proceeds were destined for the hated Spanish garrisons. In addition, it placed magistrates everywhere in an impossible position: those who complied lost control of their towns, and Alba dismissed those who refused. The Sea Beggars knew what they were about when they flew at their masthead flags showing ten coins. Philip nevertheless persevered. On 16 April 1572, before news of the capture of Den Briel arrived in Spain, he again informed Alba that 'we cannot send you any more money from here', because 'my treasury has reached the state where no source of income or money-raising device remains which will yield a single ducat'. By then the citizens of Flushing had defied him – first by refusing to admit a Spanish garrison, then by murdering the engineer sent to construct a citadel, and finally by admitting the Sea Beggars. Philip immediately recognized the strategic importance of this development, since both he and his father had sailed to Spain from Flushing in the 1550s. 'It would be good', he wrote officiously to Alba,

that if you have not already punished the inhabitants of those islands, and those who have invaded them, you should do so right away without allowing time for them to receive more reinforcements, because the longer the delay, the more difficult the venture. When you have done this, make sure that nothing like this can happen again on the island of Walcheren, because you can see what a danger it poses.³²

Alba scarcely needed this lecture on strategy. He would no doubt have taken great pleasure in punishing 'the inhabitants of those islands', but in May the port of Enkhuizen in North Holland also declared for Orange and accepted a garrison of Sea Beggars, while Louis of Nassau and a band of French Protestants surprised the city of Mons in Hainaut, defended by powerful fortifications. The following month van den Berg and his German troops captured the stronghold of Zutphen in Gelderland, while Orange himself crossed the Rhine at the head of an army of 20,000 and advanced towards Brabant. Before long, fifty towns had rebelled against Philip and declared for Orange.

Facing so many threats, Alba now took a crucial decision: he refused to re-inforce his hard-pressed subordinates in the northern

provinces and instead withdrew their best troops southwards to await the expected French invasion – which never came. Although the wedding of Margot of Valois and Henry of Navarre passed without incident on 18 August, a few days later a Catholic marksman tried to assassinate Coligny, but only managed to wound him. Fearing that the botched assassination attempt would provoke a Protestant backlash, Charles IX did nothing to prevent – and may have encouraged – a killing frenzy by the Catholics of Paris on St Bartholomew's Day, 24 August, that took the life of Coligny and most other Huguenots in the capital. The slaughter of the Protestant populations of a dozen other French cities soon followed.

These events transformed the situation in the Netherlands. As Morillon observed, 'If God had not permitted the destruction of Coligny and his followers, this country would have been lost'; and the prince of Orange agreed. The massacre, he wrote to his brother, was a 'stunning blow' because 'my only hope lay with France'. But for St Bartholomew, 'we would have had the better of the duke of Alba and we would have been able to dictate terms to him at our pleasure'. On 12 September the prince's attempt to relieve Mons failed, and the city surrendered one week later.³³

Now Alba turned his attention to the other towns in rebellion, and since the campaigning season was running out he decided upon a strategy of selective terror, calculating that a few examples of unrestrained brutality would accelerate the process of pacification. At first the policy proved spectacularly successful. First his men stormed Mechelen, which had refused to accept a royal garrison and instead admitted Orange's troops, and sacked it for three days. Even before the screams abated, all other rebellious towns in Flanders and Brabant had surrendered. The duke now moved against Zutphen, which (like Mechelen) had defected to the rebels at an early stage, and sacked it. Once again, strategic terror paid off: Alba proudly informed the king that 'Gelderland and Overijssel have been conquered with the capture of Zutphen and the terror that it caused, and these provinces once again recognize the authority of Your Majesty'. The rebel centres in Friesland also surrendered, and the duke graciously pardoned them, but he resolved to make an example of one more town loyal to Orange in order to encourage the surrender of the remaining rebel enclaves. Naarden, just across the provincial boundary of Holland,

obligingly declined a summons to surrender, and so (as the duke smugly reported to his master) ‘The Spanish infantry stormed the walls and massacred citizens and soldiers. Not a mother’s son escaped.’³⁴

Almost immediately, just as Alba had anticipated, envoys from Haarlem (the nearest rebel stronghold) arrived at the camp; but, instead of offering unconditional surrender, they asked to negotiate. The duke refused: he demanded immediate surrender or else his troops would take the city and sack it. This proved to be a fateful decision. The rebels had put down far deeper roots in Holland and Zeeland than in the other provinces, and Haarlem (unlike Mechelen and Zutphen) boasted a hard core of Orangist loyalists: after declaring spontaneously for the prince, the city allowed a large number of exiles to return and take charge. The new rulers promptly purged and reformed the town’s government, closed Catholic churches and allowed Calvinist worship. All of those involved in thus flouting the king’s authority in both politics and religion knew that they could expect no mercy if Alba’s Spanish troops got inside their walls – and if any of them doubted this, they had only to consider the fate of Mechelen, Zutphen and now Naarden. Moreover, it was now December, the fields were frozen and the duke’s forces were far weaker. The very success of his campaign had dramatically reduced the size of the Spanish army, both because the sieges and storms had caused relatively high casualties among the victors, and because each rebellious town recaptured, whether by brutality or clemency, required a garrison.

Alba now commanded scarcely 12,000 effectives: to besiege Haarlem, which boasted a powerful garrison and strong defences, with such a relatively small force would have been rash at any time. In the depths of winter, on tactical grounds this was an act of egregious folly. It was also an act of egregious folly on financial grounds. The war in the Netherlands had absorbed almost two million ducats in 1572, and the war in the Mediterranean cost almost as much – with the certainty of an increase in 1573 because in February, as the Spanish troops froze in the trenches before Haarlem, the Venetian Republic resolved to sacrifice Cyprus in return for peace with the sultan. Alba’s intransigence towards the envoys from Haarlem had plunged Philip into his worst nightmare: a full-scale war on two fronts.

Years of adversity, 1573–1576

‘The greatest and most important matter that I face, or could ever face’

Bthe Duke of Alba to suppress the Dutch Revolt and decided that finding an immediate and permanent solution to the Netherlands problem had become ‘the greatest and most important matter that I face, or could ever face’. He therefore ordered Don Luis de Requesens, governor of Lombardy (and formerly his chief page), to leave immediately for the Netherlands to replace Alba and end the war ‘through moderation and clemency’.¹ Almost immediately the Venetian Republic made a separate peace with the sultan, leaving Philip to withstand the Ottoman incursions in the Mediterranean virtually alone, and since Requesens demanded various favours before he would accept his new post, the king instructed Alba to make peace as soon as possible and at almost any price:

It is essential that we bring affairs to a conclusion, as much to avoid the loss and destruction of those provinces as because of the impossible financial situation that we face. So I request and require you most earnestly to arrange things so that we may gain days, hours and even minutes in what must be done to secure a peace.²

As usual, the king’s insistence on a radical change of policy 700 miles away proved totally unrealistic. The courier carrying this crucial dispatch only arrived in the Netherlands six weeks later – long after the fall of Haarlem, which would have afforded an

admirable opportunity for clemency – and by then the Spanish army had begun to besiege Alkmaar, a town in North Holland recently fortified in the Italian style. ‘I do not see this as a difficult enterprise,’ Alba boasted, and indeed many of the town’s inhabitants favoured surrender; but the duke once again insisted on unconditional surrender – and when his artillery failed to open a breach in the town’s powerful defences and his troops refused to launch an assault, he had to withdraw. For the first time, a Dutch town had successfully defied Philip.³

The king did not know what to do. In one of the tortuous holograph letters in which he pleaded with Requesens to go immediately to the Netherlands, he summarized the contradictory advice that he had received on the subject. Alba and his supporters, he wrote, saw the revolt as primarily religious and therefore impossible to end by compromise, whereas most Netherlanders ‘take the opposite position and say that very few rebels acted for reasons of religion, but rather through the ill treatment they have received in everything, especially through the troops and most of all through the Tenth Penny’. They therefore contended ‘that the solution to everything lies in mildness and good government’. The king confessed:

With so many different opinions I have found myself in a quandary, and since I do not know the truth of what is happening there I do not know which remedy is appropriate or whom to believe; so it seems to me safest to believe neither the one group nor the other, because I think they have [both] gone to extremes. I believe it would be best to take the middle ground, although with complete dissimulation.⁴

Philip therefore prepared two contradictory Instructions for Requesens. ‘You will see that those written in Spanish lean somewhat in one direction,’ he explained, ‘while those written in French very clearly go in the other.’ The king apologized for the difficulties this contradiction might cause, but concluded feebly: ‘I did not want to burst my brains emending them except for small things, because your real instructions will be what you see and learn when you get there.’⁵

Once Requesens arrived in Brussels in November 1573 and began to ‘see and learn’, he informed his master:

There is no doubt that if we could pacify these lands just with force and

troops, it would be best for the service of God and Your Majesty, and it would preserve your reputation better because you could do what you liked with them, so that using clemency at that time would be more admired.

Unfortunately, he continued, 'I find this rebellion in the worst state it has ever been', with a military stalemate, huge debts to the troops, an unsustainable operating budget, the risk of more mutinies and an army so widely scattered that it was out of control. Spain could not continue to tackle the rebellion in this way. Requesens went on to make a telling comparison. Three years before, Philip had begun talks 'with the Moriscos of Granada, at a time when your position was more favourable than it is now here', and this had opened the way to peace. Requesens recommended doing the same now, because the king's opponents did not all share the same motivation. 'For the prince of Orange and many of those who follow him, religion was (and still is) the major issue,' Requesens argued, 'but I do not believe this is true for most people here. Rather, they [rebelled] because of the taxes imposed on them and the outrages they have suffered at the hands of your troops.' Requesens therefore recommended issuing a General Pardon to all those willing to live as Catholics under Philip's rule.⁶

Philip now tasked his council of State with discussing 'if this is the right time to issue a General Pardon, and if so what form it should take', as well as whether to open direct negotiations with Orange. One councillor reminded his colleagues that 'if we try to proceed with harsh measures, the war will last longer than we think' – a telling criticism of Alba's claims that total victory lay just around the corner. Everyone agreed 'that we must issue a General Pardon'; they also agreed that 'Your Majesty should revoke the Tenth Penny and abolish the council of Troubles, which everyone in the Netherlands hates so much'. Like Requesens, the councillors drew some telling parallels, including the measures taken by Charles V half a century before, suggesting that the king should announce all his concessions at the same time, 'as was done in Valladolid during the Comunero revolt'. Finally, the council recommended granting Requesens discretion 'because he is the man on the spot, and knows what is happening from hour to hour; so he can see better than anyone what is best for the service and authority of Your Majesty.'⁷

After much heart-searching, in May 1574 Philip accepted this

advice. He authorized Requesens to abolish both the new taxes and the council of Troubles, and sent him four different versions of a General Pardon, with full discretion to promulgate the text he judged most appropriate. Requesens chose (as Philip duly noted) 'the version modelled on the one for Comuneros of Castile'. It excluded only 144 rebels.⁸

War on two fronts

Why, then, did these concessions not end the Dutch Revolt whereas similar ones had ended the Comunero uprising fifty years before? From Italy, Cardinal Granvelle put his finger on the central problem: suspicion. 'I know the nature of those people,' he warned. 'Many Netherlanders have sinned through weakness, others through fear, and others still because they were pressured to do so': it would be difficult 'to remove their fear and suspicion that at some future date they will be put on trial and punished'. Indeed, the cardinal quipped, 'even if Christ himself arrived to govern them, they would still complain and make demands'. In Madrid, another minister pointed out to Philip an essential corollary to issuing the General Pardon: 'It is essential to send funds together with these concessions, because if we show military weakness, the Dutch will believe that you gave way because you had no choice.' Requesens commanded 60,000 men, which 'is more than enough to conquer many kingdoms – but not to crush all the heresy and wickedness that exist in the rebellious towns'. Moreover, those 60,000 men all had to be paid, on top of the money required to fund the Mediterranean war and all the other needs of the Monarchy.⁹

Some ministers advocated solving this financial dilemma by scaling back the war in the Mediterranean so that Philip could concentrate his resources on recovering the Low Countries, but the king disagreed: 'The sultan has mobilized more forces and is so angry with me' that rather than waiting for the inevitable Ottoman attack, and then trying to respond, it would be more effective and also cheaper 'to proceed with the campaign we have planned, which will maintain our reputation and also restrain the Turks, France, and the independent states of Italy, which might dare to do something if they detect any weakness in me'. In addition, abandoning the campaign would mean 'forfeiting the 800,000

ducats, more or less, that have already been spent'. By contrast, the king predicted optimistically, for just a few ducats more Don John of Austria and his fleet might score another victory.¹⁰

Philip changed his mind when news arrived that Venice had concluded a separate peace with the sultan, and hastily sent agents to Constantinople with powers to conclude a truce; but he still allowed the campaign to go forward. In October 1573 Don John launched a surprise attack that captured Tunis and neighbouring Bizerta. The arrival of this news in Constantinople naturally brought all talk of a truce to an abrupt end, which placed Philip in an extremely serious situation. When in April 1574 Don John sought permission to 'set forth with the fleet to prevent the enemy from achieving anything', his brother refused and instead ordered him 'to go to Milan until further orders, there to monitor developments in all areas and to respond accordingly'.¹¹

The first development occurred in the Netherlands, where Louis of Nassau invaded again at the head of an army raised in Germany. Initially fate smiled on Philip: the Spanish veterans sent by Requesens to intercept the invaders routed them at the battle of Mook, but the victors promptly mutinied for their wage arrears and occupied Antwerp, which they held to ransom for six weeks until they received satisfaction – at a cost to the king of some 500,000 ducats. Requesens immediately grasped the deleterious consequences of these prolonged disorders, complaining to a colleague that 'it was not the prince of Orange who had lost the Low Countries, but the soldiers born in Valladolid and Toledo who had driven money out of Antwerp and destroyed all credit and reputation'. Requesens claimed that 'within eight days His Majesty would not have anything left here', and he told Philip that even if 'it was not the Original Sin of this country to hate [all Spaniards], these mutinies by our own troops, and the damage they cause, would suffice to make us loathed here'. Granvelle, for his part, predicted pessimistically (but accurately) that 'if we fail to gain the goodwill of those provinces, they will eventually ruin both Spain and the reputation of His Majesty'.¹²

Once 'the soldiers born in Valladolid and Toledo' had returned to obedience, Requesens launched them against the city of Leiden, judging that its capture might fatally weaken the rebels because it would separate North Holland from Zeeland. Leiden did not boast state-of-the-art defences like Alkmaar, and the Spaniards managed

to seal it off from the outside world with a chain of blockhouses. Then, in late September, as the starving city prepared to surrender, Orange gave the order to open the sluices and dikes to allow a fleet of shallow barges to bring relief. Although this stratagem failed, as the waters rose ‘a great and sudden fear possessed the Spanish infantry’, who unexpectedly abandoned their posts and fled. For the second time, a Dutch town had successfully defied Philip.¹³

Alternative strategies: fire, flood and a fleet

Requesens and his senior commanders now suggested to the king that ‘since the defiance and rebellion of the people of Holland persist, we must burn and destroy all the villages and fields’ on whose crops the towns depended, and also consider the possibility of ‘flooding this country, since it is in our power’, given that many areas in revolt lay below sea level.¹⁴ Philip gave careful consideration to both of these indirect strategies. ‘It is very clear,’ he informed Requesens, ‘that the severity, wickedness and obstinacy of the rebels have reached the level where no one can doubt that they are worthy of a harsh and exemplary punishment.’ He recalled that the duke of Alba had suggested ‘burning them out’ (standard military practice in enemy territory) and ‘if it had been the land of another prince, the duke would have done it without consulting me and he would have done well; but he held back, because it was mine, and likewise I refrained from giving the order’. But now, seeing that the rebellion continued,

it seems appropriate to use the ultimate, rigorous punishment. We suppose that this could be done in one of two ways: either flooding the said villages and countryside, or by burning them, although we would gladly avoid both. However the wound is already so cancerous that it is necessary to apply strong medicine, and to apply very strong pressure, because it is clear that by letting the rebels enjoy the produce of the earth ... [they can] sustain the war as long as they want.

Concerning which of the two strategies to implement, the king admitted:

Flooding Holland could be achieved easily, by breaking the dikes; but this method brings with it a big disadvantage: that once broken it would result in their loss and destruction for ever, to the evident detriment of

the neighbouring provinces ... In effect, this method cannot be used, nor should we use it, because (in addition to the disadvantages mentioned, which are great and manifest) it would bring with it a certain reputation for cruelty that should be avoided, especially among vassals, even though their guilt is notorious and the punishment justified.

Instead, Philip continued, 'burning is better, because (in addition to its use being appropriate in warfare) it can be stopped' as soon as the rebels 'beg for the mercy that I would wish to grant them. And in this way, we would swiftly achieve the end that is desired.'¹⁵

Although the strategic use of terror might have succeeded, as with the king's 'clemency initiative' the previous year his change of plan came too late to be effective. Anticipating a favourable decision, Requesens had already sent Spanish units into the rebel heartland to break a few dikes and torch some farms; but after a few days, the veterans threatened that unless they received their wage arrears at once they would abandon their posts. Since Requesens could find neither the money nor replacement troops in time, in December 1574 the Spanish garrisons left North Holland, never to return.

The king showed admirable analytical rigour in evaluating these two 'indirect strategies' – burning or flooding – but he failed to do the same with a third initiative designed to defeat the Dutch rebels: creating an Atlantic fleet. 'Since the day I assumed responsibility for this war', Requesens claimed, he had 'often written' to his master that 'it is impossible to end this war without warships sent from Spain'. Philip acted on this suggestion in 1574. He had over 200 ships seized in the ports of Cantabria and instructed Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, who had successfully expelled the French from Florida, to equip the best of them with ordnance and munitions ready 'both to clear the Channel of pirates and to regain some of the Dutch ports occupied by the rebels'. The king also raised 11,000 soldiers to serve on the new fleet.¹⁶

These orders reveal Philip's lack of strategic and operational experience. First, it took months to locate and load the artillery and other equipment required to turn any embargoed merchantman into a fighting ship so that, as Menéndez crudely stated, creating a suitable fleet 'could take several years'. Moreover, once in northern waters, a large fleet from Spain would

need a suitable harbour in which to shelter in case of need, and Philip no longer controlled one. Finally, when news reached him that a large Turkish fleet had left Constantinople for the west, the king ordered Menéndez to keep close to Spain, so that his fleet could ‘assist where it was most needed’ – in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, depending on the circumstances.¹⁷ In the end it made no difference: in September 1574 an epidemic decimated a large part of the expeditionary force, killing Menéndez, and Philip cancelled the entire expedition. He had squandered over 500,000 ducats on it – all for nothing.

Between a rock and a hard place

Although his other realms made substantial contributions, Castile provided the lion’s share of the budget for both of Philip’s wars, and although the totals in Figure 13 are massive, they record only the money *received* by Philip’s armed forces abroad from Castile, not the money that the kingdom actually *provided*: his treasury also had to pay transport charges and interest. In February 1574, officials calculated that Castile had spent 22 million ducats on the Netherlands since the duke of Alba left the court seven years before; and now defending the Mediterranean cost almost as much as fighting the Dutch.

Money received from Castile (in ducats)		
Year	By the Mediterranean Fleet	By the Army of Flanders
1571	793 ,000	119,000
1572	1,463 ,000	1,776,000
1573	1, 102,000	1,813,000
1574	1,252,000	3,737,000
1575	711,000	2,518,000
1576	1,069,000	872,000
1577	673 ,000	857,000
Total	7,063,000	11,692,000

13. The cost of war on two fronts, 1571–7. The cost to Spain of defeating the Turks at Lepanto in 1571 remained relatively low, thanks to contributions from Philip’s Italian dominions as well as from his allies, but the campaign of the following year, although it achieved nothing, cost twice as much. After Venice made a separate peace with the Turks in 1573, Philip’s subjects had to shoulder almost the entire burden of Mediterranean defence. At the same time, the cost of suppressing the Dutch Revolt soared. Since the total revenues of the crown of Castile

barely exceeded six million ducats, of which half went on servicing previous loans, the treasury quickly ran up huge debts. In September 1575 Philip issued a 'Default Decree' suspending all payments.

The haemorrhage of funds on this scale could not continue, and Philip authorized two remedial measures: he summoned the Cortes of Castile and asked them to vote new taxes, and he set up a secret committee (later known as the Junta of Presidents because it included the presidents of several councils) 'to discuss all major fiscal matters'. Initially the king considered chairing the junta himself, but 'my normal duties do not allow me to do this'; instead, he entrusted the task to Diego de Covarrubias, who had succeeded Espinosa as president of the council of Castile, and therefore as royal spokesman in the Cortes. Philip warned Covarrubias that solving the financial crisis was 'the most important item of business that there could be, because I believe the conservation of religion and of Christendom largely depend on it – and this worries me far more than if it affected just me'. The king lamented that 'everything is in such a state that, unless we find and provide a remedy, I cannot but fear that [my entire Monarchy] will collapse very soon'; and he believed that enabling 'my treasury to fund all ordinary and extraordinary expenditures' required three things:

First, finding new revenues, since there is now so little – or, more accurately, nothing – to fund what is necessary. Second, dealing with the bankers who are charging interest, to ensure that they cease and do not consume all our resources, as they are doing now. Third, rescheduling my debts.¹⁸

After reviewing a mountain of papers, the Junta of Presidents estimated that the king owed at least 35 million ducats on loans that needed to be re-scheduled, and it proposed that the Cortes increase the sales tax (*alcabala*) levied on certain goods, but at the same time devolve collection to the principal cities of Castile in return for an annual lump sum paid in advance. Although the Cortes did not rule out this proposal, it demanded numerous other concessions: the suppression of all taxes imposed by the crown without the consent of the Cortes; restrictions on the export of bullion from the kingdom; and a promise that the king would not alienate to bankers the revenues freed up by rescheduling his debts

in return for new loans. When Philip refused to make all of these concessions, the deputies declared that they needed new instructions from the towns they represented, forcing the king to suspend the session.

The intransigence of the Cortes of Castile, combined with the death of several trusted advisers (Feria in 1571, Espinosa in 1572, Ruy Gómez in 1573), seems to have convinced Philip that since he could not understand his financial situation himself he needed to find someone who could. 'I see no alternative to granting someone oversight in all treasury matters,' he wrote early in 1574, and he turned to Juan de Ovando, priest, inquisitor and a disciple of Espinosa, who as president of the council of the Indies had rationalized the crown's efforts to govern America.¹⁹

Ovando soon submitted to Philip a series of documents that analysed Castile's underlying financial problems. First, he proposed that, as an emergency measure, all the crown's fiscal officers should report to him while he alone would report directly to the king, streamlining both the formation and implementation of policy. Ovando next explained the current fiscal problems in a form that even Philip could understand, written in unusually large script and using only simple terms, as if for a child (see plate 36). It began: 'In order to understand and make use of the Royal Treasury, we need to consider four basic things':

1.

'What do we have?' Ovando estimated that the annual revenues of the crown of Castile amounted to less than six million ducats.

2.

'What do we owe?' The total came to over 73 million ducats.

3.

'What do we have and what do we lack and need?'

Ovando hardly needed to state the obvious, but he did so anyway: 'We can see that we owe far more than our income, and we lack everything that we need.' Specifically, the royal household and local defence absorbed almost 100,000 ducats a month; interest on government bonds required a further 250,000 ducats; while maintaining 'armies and navies strong enough to oppose and defeat our Ottoman and Protestant enemies' required over a million ducats a month. Ovando estimated the treasury's commitments for the year 1574 at

almost 50 million ducats whereas its income, he reminded his master, was less than six million.

4.

‘How and where can we fill the gap?’ Surprisingly, Ovando did not suggest reducing expenditure ‘to oppose and defeat our Ottoman and Protestant enemies, because unless we defeat them, they will surely defeat us’. Instead, he proposed two ways to fund the king’s existing policies: raising income and reducing debt payments. For the former, he favoured further increases in the *alcabala* as well as seizing all silver and gold aboard the next fleets to arrive from America. To reduce debt payments, he recommended not only unilaterally lowering the interest rate on all government bonds but also issuing a Default Decree (*Decreto de Suspensión*) that would freeze both the capital and accrued interest on all loans signed with bankers since 1560, forcing lenders to accept low-interest bonds as repayment. Ovando insisted that all these measures must take effect simultaneously: the Cortes should increase the sales tax at the same moment as the king issued the Default Decree and his officials in Seville confiscated the treasure.²⁰

While he pondered Ovando’s solutions, Philip strove to secure divine favour. When news arrived that Louis of Nassau was about to invade the Netherlands while a Turkish fleet seemed poised to avenge the loss of Tunis and Bizerta, the king urged the clerics of Castile to pray for a miracle, since one was ‘so necessary, as you must know. I hope this will lead Him to pity us, since the cause is His.’ He also prepared to revise his testament, because although ‘I hope that God will give me life and health, which He can use for His service, it is good to be prepared, and if things go as badly in the future as they are going now ...’ – the king scratched out the rest of his sentence (a very rare event in his correspondence).²¹

In mid-May 1574, news that mutinous Spanish troops had entered Antwerp, and were holding it to ransom, deepened the king’s despair. ‘Unless God performs a miracle, which our sins do not merit, it is no longer possible to maintain ourselves for [a few] months, let alone years; nor can life and health withstand the anxiety caused by this, and by thinking of what may happen – and in my lifetime.’ Two days later he wailed: ‘These are things that cannot fail to worry me and make me anxious’; and two weeks later, he again concluded that only divine intervention could save

Spain: 'I believe the moment that I have always feared has arrived, through lack of money. I fear that we cannot find a remedy in time unless it comes from God, who can do everything, and that is what I hope for and what sustains me – although I do not think we deserve it.' By the end of May, even those faint hopes had dissipated:

I fear that our lack of money means that the rebels will not want to negotiate or anything, and I am as sure as is possible in these circumstances that the Netherlands – and even the rest of the Monarchy – will be lost, although I hope that God will not permit or wish it because of the harm it will do to His service ... It is a terrible situation and it is getting worse every day.²²

When yet more bad news arrived in June 1574, Philip lamented anew that 'I am thinking that everything is a waste of time, judging by what is happening in the Netherlands, and if they are lost the rest [of the Monarchy] will not last long, even if we have money'. The following month, he repeated the same refrain:

The Netherlands are very much at risk, with so many troops and no money to pay them, and so we must send financial help without delay. Our affairs there cannot be improved without money unless God performs a miracle ... Once we lose the Netherlands, however many millions we might have here will not suffice to prevent the loss of all the rest [of my dominions].

When neither miracle nor money materialized, the king sighed: 'We are running out of everything so fast that words fail me.'²³

At least Philip scored one partial success. In August 1574, he made a peace that restored diplomatic and commercial relations with Elizabeth Tudor and obliged both parties to desist from assisting rebels against the other – but almost immediately he allowed Inquisitor-General Don Gaspar de Quiroga to nullify one of its advantages. At a meeting of the council of State Quiroga argued that in order to avoid the 'contagion' of heresy, no Protestant should be allowed to set foot in Spain. Philip referred the matter to the Suprema, which opined that all future English ambassadors must be Catholics (or else the ambassador must allow his baggage and that of his entourage to be searched for prohibited books); and that they must revere the Holy Sacrament at all times, say or write nothing against the Roman Church and refrain from

discussing Catholic doctrine. Any deviation would incur the normal penalties imposed by the Inquisition. The king supported this tough line, which perhaps encouraged Quiroga to harden his position: 'I say that the queen must not succeed in placing an ambassador here with the freedom to practise his creed in private'. Indeed, 'since the queen is who she is, we should not accept even a Catholic ambassador [from her]'. Once again, Philip sided with the Inquisition: there would be no more Tudor ambassadors in Spain, even though the lack of diplomatic representation increased the likelihood of another inadvertent lurch into war, as it had done in 1569 (chapter 11).²⁴

Keeping the peace with England was essential to the security of the Spanish Monarchy because in autumn 1574, while the Army of Flanders abandoned the siege of Leiden, a Turkish expeditionary force recaptured Tunis. Philip's spirits sank even further. He began one rescript with a warning that 'today I am in a foul mood and fit for nothing', and when he read about unrest in some Castilian cities caused by the increased *alcabalas* he longed for death. 'Everything seems about to fall apart: how I wish I could die, so as not to see what I fear.' Upon opening two letters 'to be placed in the king's hands' describing new problems, he exclaimed: 'If this is not the end of the world, I think we must be very close to it; and, please God, let it be the end of the whole world, and not just the end of Christendom.'²⁵

The road to ruin

Instead of the Apocalypse, the New Year brought the king a new problem: his brother. As soon as Don John heard that the Ottoman fleet had left Constantinople, he disobeyed Philip's express orders to remain in Milan. As he explained to Margaret of Parma, his half-sister and closest confidante: 'Everything is in a perilous state, my lady, although it is not entirely His Majesty's fault': the real problem was that their brother 'allows people to govern his dominions who do not take responsibility for anything that does not immediately affect them'. As a result, 'the money that takes so long to find is spent at the wrong time and the wrong place, with the result that it is wasted'. So, to save the situation, Don John decided to disobey his brother: 'Without waiting any longer, I shall now go to Spain.'²⁶

In a memorandum written in January 1575, shortly after his brother's unexpected arrival, Philip lashed out at virtually everyone around him. 'My head is so full of concerns and complaints from the people who are supposed to help me that I can scarcely contain myself. And all they do is raise fears and problems, as if I did not already know about them; and they provide no solutions, as if I were God and could provide them.' And then 'in comes my brother to tell me that nothing is getting done; and although he did not blame anyone, I was somewhat annoyed and I told him that nothing was getting done because there was nothing to do it with, and that we cannot do the impossible.' Finally, 'as I was writing this, they brought in this package from Juan de Ovando. Just consider: I am in no state to work out a reply, although I am sure there are some things here that require one. But I just can't.'²⁷

Ovando had become used to his master's procrastination, but now his patience snapped. In March 1575 he sent a blistering analysis of how Philip had mismanaged his financial affairs. First, Ovando pointed to his own achievements over the previous year. 'Although the Royal Treasury had reached a desperate state', he had managed to raise and dispatch a million ducats to the Netherlands, and more than half a million to the fleet of the late Pedro Menéndez, almost another million to Italy, and loans worth over two million more for the campaigns under way. Ovando now contrasted these concrete achievements with the king's inaction, 'because you did not trust me, or any of your fiscal officers', and then he listed the various concrete proposals that he had made, only to have the king reject all of them. Ovando also denounced the relentless rise in the interest rates demanded by the king's bankers, noting that firms that had made loans in the 1560s at 8 per cent annually now demanded 16 per cent and sometimes more. He concluded that only a Default Decree could end the vicious circle.²⁸

Before Philip could digest all this, news arrived that the Ottoman fleet was about to mount another campaign in the western Mediterranean. Just as in the previous year, he ordered his fleet to maintain a defensive posture, and impressed on Don John that if he decided to attack Tunis and Bizerta again, it must be to destroy them: under no circumstances should they be recaptured and garrisoned. Philip also ordered Requesens to adopt

a defensive posture in the Netherlands. He authorized formal negotiations with the rebels, approving in advance numerous political concessions. He forbade only discussion of religious matters.

So many difficult decisions left the king exhausted. According to Don John, ‘when I left court’ in spring 1575,

His Majesty was well, thanks be to God, but so tired by public affairs that you can see it in his face and his grey hair. I am very worried about him. The news from the court that I can share is certainly not good, because His Majesty has no one with whom he can relax, and so everyone is confused and our master is exhausted – and business is not dispatched with the same speed as at other times.

He did not exaggerate: Philip himself admitted that he felt ‘so tired’ that ‘I really don’t know how I survive’.²⁹

Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, delegates representing the king, the prince of Orange and the States of Holland and Zeeland assembled in the town of Breda. No sooner had talks begun than Requesens noted that ‘rumours are circulating throughout this country that if we do not come to some agreement, a general revolution will break out’ – and, he gloomily predicted, ‘I have no hope that we can reach an agreement because we cannot grant them any of the religious concessions that they ask.’ Twelve weeks of discussion at Breda proved Requesens right. Just before he broke off the talks in July 1575, he wrote to a colleague: ‘If we were talking about a peace that could be settled by transferring four towns or four kingdoms’, a settlement could surely have been reached; ‘but since everything depends on religion’, peace was ideologically impossible. The war could not be won by conventional means, ‘with all the debts we have, and so many soldiers here whom we cannot demobilize without pay nor maintain without much money’. In short, ‘I do not know how we can carry on like this.’³⁰

The conference at Breda proved an expensive error for the king. It strengthened the Dutch, because by agreeing to the talks Philip accorded his rebels a degree of recognition, while the experience of negotiating collectively increased their internal cohesion. Conversely, it weakened Spain, because the king’s soldiers continued to earn wages even though they did not fight. Above all, it made nonsense of a decision taken by Philip in December 1574:

that he would issue the Default Decree advocated by Ovando only the following September – a nine-month delay explicitly designed to permit Requesens to make one more attempt to crush the rebellion. Delaying the start of operations by three months in order to hold abortive peace talks ruined this prospect, too.

Nevertheless, the king stuck to his original timetable. Although in May 1575 he admitted that ‘if the cost of the war [in the Netherlands] continues at its present level, we will not be able to sustain it, still it would be a great shame if, having spent so much, we lost any chance that spending a little more might recover everything’ – the classic argument of a superpower in difficulties.³¹ On 1 September 1575, however, he signed two documents: one froze the capital of all outstanding loan contracts worth between 15 and 20 million ducats (estimates varied wildly) and terminated all payments to his bankers; the other ordered the rigorous audit of all loans made since 1560 to detect any fraud. For a few more days the king delayed but (as he explained to his ambassador in Genoa, where many of his bankers were based), ‘although we have maintained secrecy about this, it has not been sufficient to prevent the bankers developing certain suspicions, which has caused much harm because they no longer want to negotiate with us or lend any more money’. On 15 September, printed copies of the decree went out to all revenue officers in Castile with orders to cease paying anything on ‘the warrants that we have granted to merchants and bankers with respect to the loans and transfers we have arranged with them’ and instead to send ‘whatever they were due, and anything else’ to the royal treasury.³²

Initially, Philip was optimistic. He had ‘created a special room and put in it a number of strongboxes’ in the Alcázar of Madrid, ready to receive ‘all the revenues collected in all parts of the realm’ formerly assigned to paying loan interest; but others knew better. The Dutch rebels lit joyous bonfires and offered prayers of thanksgiving upon hearing of the decree; while Domingo de Zavala, an agent of Requesens at court, wearily explained to the king that even though he had managed to send to Antwerp a letter of exchange for 100,000 ducats, 150,000 more in silver coins by sea and a further 100,000 in gold coins via Italy, ‘all of that together will not suffice to keep the war going for a single month’. Everything will be lost, Zavala continued, ‘unless Your Majesty ceases to fund all other ventures and expenditures in order to

concentrate' on the Netherlands, 'so that we can retain the provinces still loyal and shorten the war, because prolonging it will bring high costs and high risks'. In Antwerp, Requesens shared this pessimistic assessment, warning his brother in November 1575:

The Default Decree has dealt such a great blow to the Exchange here that no one in it has any credit ... I cannot find a single penny, nor can I see how the king could send money here, even if he had it in abundance. Short of a miracle, the whole military machine will fall in ruins so rapidly that it is highly probable that I shall not have time to tell you about it.³³

Sent to the Netherlands under protest and left without clear instructions, Requesens claimed that the decree had broken his heart. It certainly broke his health and he died suddenly on 5 March 1576. The loyal Netherlands provinces, and the 60,000 royal soldiers fighting there, therefore came under the authority of the council of State in Brussels, composed of men with little aptitude for fighting a war – let alone for handling an army on the verge of mutiny.

Philip could do little to help them. The Default Decree proved a disaster for his foreign enterprises: 'It certainly has not led me out of my necessity,' he lamented in March 1576, 'rather I stand in greater need since I have no credit and cannot avail myself of anything except hard cash which cannot be collected quickly enough.'³⁴ It also proved a domestic disaster. Philip's principal financial adviser assured him that 'ever since the publication [of the decree] all merchants lack credit and almost all trade in all commodities has ceased' in Castile; while 'nowhere, either within these kingdoms or beyond, can anyone find a large or small sum of money, unless they use coins, which is expensive and risky'. In addition, Mateo Vázquez reminded the king about 'the great distress in which Your Majesty's servants find themselves: it would break your heart to see how some of them are broken in spirit and ready to die of hunger'. The king's reply revealed his desperation: 'If God would only give us more time, we could deal with these issues, but with so little of it, we cannot do everything ... Nothing could be worse than everything being in suspense like this.'³⁵

Philip was wrong: there was indeed 'something worse'. In July 1576, the Spanish veterans, some of whom could claim six years of

back pay, launched a surprise attack on Aalst, a town fifteen miles west of Brussels, and sacked it – even though it had always remained loyal to Philip. News of this atrocity caused widespread outrage, and in an attempt to restore calm the council of State in Brussels declared the mutineers of Aalst to be rebels against God and the king who could be killed on sight. The council also authorized the States of the provinces still loyal to the king to raise troops for defence against the mutineers. Then in September some of the soldiers raised by the States of Brabant arrested all the councillors; and the following day the States summoned representatives of the other loyal provinces to meet and authorize talks with their former colleagues in Holland and Zeeland, and with the Spanish mutineers, about ending the war. Representatives of the various protagonists assembled at Ghent to negotiate a ceasefire, using the issues agreed upon at Breda the previous year as their starting point, and by late October 1576 they had agreed to the terms of a ceasefire, deferring to a meeting of the full States-General the resolution of outstanding religious and political issues. Until Philip agreed to ratify the Pacification of Ghent, and recall the hated Spanish troops, the States refused to recognize the authority of his new governor-general, Don John of Austria.

The crisis of the reign, 1576–1577

Although Philip II governed for fifty-five years, his dominions enjoyed complete peace for only six months: between February and August 1577. This interlude came about because, after twenty-five years of continuous war, the king reluctantly authorized a ceasefire with the Ottoman sultan. 'It is extremely important to conclude this truce,' he stated: 'so much so that I do not know how we can survive without it.' With equal reluctance, the king also accepted that 'we must make all the concessions required' to reach a settlement with his rebellious vassals in the Netherlands after four years of 'the most deadly war that has been seen for many years'.¹ Although concluded at much the same time, the two initiatives had very different outcomes. Spanish and Ottoman diplomats repeatedly renewed the truce between their masters, bringing peace to the Mediterranean for the rest of the century; yet although the settlement with the Dutch was called 'the Perpetual Edict', after scarcely six months the king renewed the war.

For some time, matters hung in the balance. Philip pursued several initiatives that jeopardized the ceasefire in the Mediterranean (chapter 15), while hostilities resumed in the Netherlands primarily because of the complex relationships among three men: the king's half-brother Don John of Austria; Don John's secretary, Juan de Escobedo; and the king's secretary of state, Antonio Pérez. These three induced Philip to end the agreement he

had concluded with the Dutch six months earlier – a decision with deleterious consequences for all concerned. Escobedo lost his life, Pérez his liberty and Don John his honour: all three would die disillusioned and discredited. Philip also paid a high price. He lost the services of three talented servants, but only after their antagonisms had polarized and eventually paralysed his entire government. In addition, Pérez would become the catalyst for the revolt of Aragon against Philip, the ally of his French and English enemies, and the author of savage criticisms of the king that enjoyed wide circulation. Worst of all, Philip lost the most favourable opportunity to end the Dutch Revolt, and plunged the Netherlands into a savage war that lasted for thirty more years without intermission, compromising Spain's dominant position in western Europe and the North Atlantic. How could a monarch 'who has already dealt with public affairs for thirty-three years' (as Philip boasted at this time) make so many errors?²

A tale of two secretaries

Antonio Pérez was born in Madrid in 1540, the illegitimate son of Gonzalo Pérez, the cleric and royal official who soon afterwards became Philip's personal secretary. Antonio later claimed that his father had 'taught Philip the signature known throughout the world', *Yo el rey* ['I the king']; and given his humanist education and broad experience of public affairs, Gonzalo no doubt also taught his master many other things. When Philip became king of Spain in 1556 he appointed Gonzalo his secretary of state for foreign affairs, an office he held until his death in 1566, retaining the confidence of his sovereign to the end (chapter 8). Gonzalo also obtained a declaration 'that he was born in Aragon', a measure that half a century later would save his son's life.³

Young Pérez studied in the Venetian Republic and the Netherlands before returning to Spain around 1558 to take courses at the universities of Alcalá and Salamanca. He also learned much from his father, in whose office he worked from at least 1562. The fact that both Philip and Antonio shared the same preceptor may have formed a bond between them, but if so it was not strong enough to secure Antonio's immediate succession to his father's post, perhaps because the king disapproved of the young man's affair with Doña Juana Coello, with whom he had a child before

they married in 1567. Antonio also faced the hostility of the duke of Alba, with whom Gonzalo had quarrelled in his last years, and the duke promoted his own protégé Gabriel de Zayas. Although Antonio eventually became secretary of state for Mediterranean affairs, while Zayas handled the affairs of northern Europe, henceforth Pérez was a member of the anti-Alba coalition of courtiers and ministers led by Ruy Gómez de Silva.

Juan de Escobedo, a member of the gentry born about 1530, belonged to the same coalition. In the 1550s he served as the confidential official of the duchess of Francavilla, no doubt thanks to some tie of kinship (the duchess addressed him as 'my cousin'), and he advised the duchess's only child, Doña Ana de Mendoza, who married Ruy Gómez. Escobedo served as a trusted messenger between members of the Mendoza clan until 1566, when he became secretary of the royal treasury. Seven years later, Ruy Gómez decided that Escobedo would be more useful as a link with Don John who, as victor of Lepanto and captain-general of the forces of the Holy League, boasted both enormous prestige and an annual budget of over a million ducats. Pérez approved of Escobedo's appointment as Don John's secretary, telling the king: 'I believe he will be more useful at Don John's side because I see him as a restraining influence,' adding: 'I beg Your Majesty to excuse me if I am getting ahead of myself, but I do so because I know something about this matter.'⁴

This message reveals both Pérez's self-confidence when advising his master and the friendship between the two secretaries, which a courtier later stated 'could not have been closer or more firm between two men'. Pérez also forged a close link with Don John, who in 1571 told Pérez how much 'I wanted to come and kiss His Majesty's hands, and to spend lots of time with Señor Antonio Pérez'. Three years later, when Philip was considering how to distribute funds for the next Mediterranean campaign, Pérez suggested that he should just 'remit everything to Señor Don John, and let him allocate it and make the necessary arrangements in all parts'. Whenever he visited Madrid, the king's brother stayed in Pérez's sumptuous villa, 'La Casilla', on the outskirts of the capital on the current site of Atocha station.⁵

Escobedo soon became the principal intermediary between Don John and the king. Shortly after the secretary arrived at court in 1575 Philip complained that 'I am so fed up and tired' of dealing

with Escobedo that ‘we need to get rid of him at once’; and when he eventually left Madrid, Philip informed an Italian ally that Escobedo would tell him about ‘the decision I have taken concerning the matter about which my brother Don John sent him here. I would be very grateful if you would keep it a secret.’⁶ What was that secret matter that had made the king ‘so fed up and tired’?

Don John: the next king of England?

Catholics from all over Europe flocked to Rome in 1575, a Jubilee Year, and a group of English and Irish exiles persuaded Pope Gregory XIII that both kingdoms could be won back for the faith by sending an expeditionary force of 5,000 soldiers from Italy directly to Liverpool under the command of one of their number, Thomas Stukeley. They optimistically claimed that the invasion would provoke a general rising of Catholics (particularly numerous in Lancashire), allowing Mary Stuart to escape from captivity, become queen of England and then marry Don John. Escobedo now went to Rome to make sure that the plan, once again code-named ‘the Enterprise of England’, enjoyed the pope’s complete backing, and then to Madrid to secure 100,000 ducats and the king’s blessing. Philip immediately sent half the subsidy requested but insisted that Stukeley and his men must not launch their venture until after Spanish forces had regained control of the Netherlands.

Late in 1575 Philip also resolved that his brother should replace Requesens as governor-general of the Netherlands, and he began to ponder whether Don John should lead reinforcements up the Spanish Road to continue the war or travel virtually alone with full powers to make peace. He had not reached a conclusion when news arrived of Requesens’s death in March 1576, making the immediate departure of Don John imperative; but now the king worried that his headstrong brother might procrastinate, negotiate, or even refuse to go. He therefore worked with Antonio Pérez to offer an irresistible bribe: if Don John went to Brussels and ended the Dutch Revolt, Philip would do everything possible to place his brother on the English throne.

The king wrote a letter to his brother that described the desperate situation in Flanders and the urgent need to find new

solutions. He claimed that he wanted to return to the Netherlands in person to take charge of the situation; but since he must remain in Spain to mobilize the resources needed to sustain the entire Monarchy, and since only a member of the royal family ‘as closely related to me as possible’ could replace him, ‘I have come to the conclusion that there is not, and could not be, anyone other than you’, both ‘because of the gifts God has given you and those you have acquired through experience’. Details of the irresistible bribe appeared in three other letters, all sent to Escobedo and signed by Pérez but in effect co-authored by the king. In the shortest of the three, ‘Pérez’ explained that Escobedo must show the other two to Don John and convince him to go, adding that if he succeeded in this, ‘you will do His Majesty a great service and deserve a signal reward’ – a dangerous promise that would come back to haunt its authors. In a second epistle, ‘Pérez’ required Escobedo to swear Don John to secrecy before delivering the king’s letter to him and emphasized that ‘this is not something that will suffer any argument or bargaining’. He also assured Escobedo that ‘since so much is at stake for His Majesty in this matter, and since he wants to send his brother because he cannot go himself’, Don John ‘must believe that His Majesty will do and provide everything possible to ensure that he succeeds in what he will undertake’: in other words, that Philip would support the Enterprise of England – another dangerous promise that would come back to haunt its authors.⁷

The third letter to Escobedo was even more remarkable, because it insisted that Don John go directly to Brussels without troops or advisers. ‘I have revised this letter twice,’ Philip informed Pérez, expressly so that his brother ‘cannot turn me down’, and he added a further note of blackmail to the draft with his own hand: Don John ‘will fail in his duty to God if he fails in this’, and also ‘in his duty to his father, who loved those provinces so much and risked so much for them’. Indeed, the late emperor, now ‘in heaven, would surely complain if he fails in this’ (a threat that Pérez would scarcely have made himself!). This letter also stressed that once Don John had reached the Netherlands, he would be well placed to effect the Enterprise of England – and later, perhaps, even more:

I was thinking, sir, that for the English venture that you discussed in Rome [with the pope], it would be no bad thing if Don John happened to be close by and engaged in something so important for His Majesty’s service. In addition, I would like to see Don John hold some major

office in which he had full charge of everything, so that His Majesty would see his true worth and the good account of himself that he would give in any task of government without the interference or rivalry of other ministers.

Philip raised no objection to these extravagant statements when he read and corrected the draft for the last time, and on 8 April 1576 the letters left Madrid for Naples, where Don John resided. Philip added in a postscript to his own missive ‘how I wish that the person carrying this dispatch had wings to fly, and you too, so you could get to the Netherlands faster’.⁸

The king wished in vain: almost three months passed with no reply. Pérez played down the ominous silence from Naples, assuring his master in June that Don John would ‘definitely submit himself to the will of Your Majesty’, largely thanks to his own skill in ‘mobilizing Escobedo’; but Philip proved to be a better prophet when he replied: ‘I cannot help fearing that Don John is about to make some dreadful demands that will be hard to grant, such as wanting lots of money, lots of troops and lots of freedom.’⁹

The silence ended on 1 July, when Pérez abruptly informed the king that ‘Escobedo has just arrived’ at the palace, having ‘ridden together [with me] from Alcalá, discussing the matters entrusted to him’ by Don John.¹⁰ What were these matters? And why did Pérez insist on riding with Escobedo for almost sixty miles – a two-day journey – before informing the king that the long-awaited messages had at last arrived?

Don John received the letters signed by Philip and Pérez at the beginning of May, and after brooding over his options for almost three weeks, he accepted his appointment as governor-general of the Netherlands. Nevertheless, as his brother had feared, before leaving Naples Don John dictated two sets of instructions for Escobedo, filled with demands to present to the king, some of them political (full powers, lots of money) and others personal (rewards for supporters; recognition of his daughter Juana as legitimate; and so on). Escobedo must also impress upon Philip the need for Don John to come to Spain and discuss in person the exact nature of his mission in the Netherlands and later in England. While he awaited the king’s answer, Don John travelled to Vigevano, a town in Lombardy close to the border with Savoy. For a while, according to a Tuscan spy, everything suggested that ‘he was about to travel to the Netherlands’, but in July ‘all talk of

war turned into celebrations and tournaments', and Don John rode to Milan. Now, the spy observed, 'although letters from the court of Spain insist that he will go to the Netherlands, at present we see no sign of it here'. He speculated that Don John would not leave until he received news from Escobedo that his brother had granted all his demands.¹¹ Although correct, the spy had uncovered only part of the story.

On 16 April 1576, one week after signing the letters (extensively revised by the king) intended to convince Escobedo that Don John must leave immediately for the Netherlands, Pérez wrote to provide his colleague with more details on his recent dispatches, 'all of which, except this one, His Majesty has seen'. This letter was both secret and subversive. Pérez began by revealing 'that everything that may have seemed to you insistent and harsh' in the letters of 8 April 'was added by the king in his own hand to the drafts that I had prepared'. But, Pérez continued:

In my opinion, when it comes to obeying and leaving for Lombardy, and to sacrificing himself to duty, Don John should obey and leave and sacrifice himself to the will of his brother, saying that he has no other intention. Once he has done that, he should specify, inform and request the things that seem to him necessary for the success of the venture.

For 'Lombardy' – not for the Netherlands! Pérez advised this dramatic departure from the king's plan because if, when Don John reached Lombardy, 'the Low Countries are lost, or if the path to peace is blocked', the mere fact that he had left Naples as ordered would earn the king's confidence and gratitude; whereas if, by the time he got there, 'it seems that the arrival of Don John in the Netherlands in person' could save the situation, continuing on his journey would be 'a great service to God, to the Crown, and to his brother, and would win credit for himself'. In addition, 'as the world turns, you and your master would not be in a bad place for your own purposes and those of your friends'. Pérez's filled his letter with a conspiratorial 'we':

Whatever may happen, in my opinion we must immediately obey and leave; and having done that let [Don John] respond, or ask, or advise whatever he wants, although let it all be for the advancement of the venture, not for personal items. For the rest, we may hope that Time will provide us with a thousand possible courses of action.¹²

Clearly, Pérez's instruction that Don John should sabotage Philip's plan for the salvation of his Monarchy by waiting in Lombardy instead of going to the Netherlands amounted to treason; and that no doubt explains why, when he learned that Escobedo had arrived in Spain, Pérez intercepted him at Alcalá and rode with him for two days 'discussing the matters entrusted to him' by Don John until they reached the Escorial on 1 July 1576: he needed to make sure that Escobedo would not reveal the contents of his secret letter and that Don John had followed his advice and remained in Lombardy. Presumably Escobedo gave an affirmative response on both matters. The situation changed six weeks later, when at dawn on 12 August Don John suddenly left Milan for Genoa, where he had assembled a small galley squadron ready to 'carry him to Spain on some business of importance to the king our lord and the well-being of Christendom'. Ten days later he arrived at Barcelona, and immediately set out for the Escorial.¹³

The reason for this act of naked disobedience to the king's orders emerged only after Don John's death, when the Spanish ambassador in Rome asked the cardinal of Como, the pope's secretary of state, 'to share with me a secret, now that the people to whom he might have promised confidentiality are dead. I asked "What dealings and information did the late Don John have with His Holiness and with him?"' concerning the Enterprise of England? The cardinal's reply contained sensational revelations: that he had written some 'very long letters' on behalf of the pope urging Don John to undertake the Enterprise; that Escobedo had gone to Rome, where Gregory 'had talked to him about it'; and that the cardinal had later written a letter to Don John on behalf of the pope when he went to Spain in 1576, tasking him with proposing the 'venture' to Philip. That letter, the cardinal repeated, 'exhorted [Don John] to go and propose the Enterprise to His Majesty in person, even though he lacked permission to go' to Spain. That is why Don John suddenly disobeyed his brother.¹⁴

Discord between the sons of Charles V

Don John's arrival at court took Philip completely by surprise. He had worked hard on a raft of concessions that he planned to entrust to a messenger who would arrive in the Netherlands at the same time as Don John. Once Escobedo confirmed that Don John

would accepted appointment, Philip dispatched the messenger to Brussels with letters informing all his ministers that his brother would serve as the new governor-general, followed by his instructions for discharging this task and letters urging neighbouring sovereigns to maintain ‘the same good relations and amity’ with his brother as with his predecessors.¹⁵ No sooner had he signed these letters than Philip learned that Don John was in Barcelona instead of in Brussels. Unable to conceal his rage, the king immediately scribbled the following message:

Brother: Last night Escobedo gave me your letter and the news that you had arrived in Barcelona. I cannot refrain from telling you that much as I want and would like to see you and have you here, in view of the present situation and state of affairs, your decision has caused me such anxiety that it has removed a good deal of the pleasure that I would otherwise have felt.¹⁶

News of Don John’s disobedience reached the king at much the same time as alarming news from Brussels. ‘Developments in the Netherlands,’ Philip complained on 29 August to Cardinal Quiroga, ‘have made me so concerned and even anxious that I cannot always take care of other matters as I would like.’ He sought advice on the quickest way to get his brother to Brussels, ‘because if he returns the way he came, it will involve major delays. I was thinking that he could travel overland, under an assumed name, travelling at speed with just two or three others.’ Quiroga opined that unless Don John left at once, with full powers to grant the Dutch all they demanded, ‘they will create a republic with such advantages and with so much liberty that it would hardly be worth being their sovereign’. He suggested that the king should announce that his brother would travel via Italy in order to distract attention while he travelled through France ‘at top speed, in disguise’. Quiroga continued perceptively (and prophetically) that ‘although this will be very difficult, with each day’s delay things [in the Netherlands] are going from bad to worse, so that all the effort and expense will have been in vain’. The king accepted this sombre logic. For optimal ‘secrecy and dissimulation’, Don John should leave court to visit Doña Magdalena de Ulloa, who had raised him, ‘as he has always done when he has returned to these kingdoms from abroad’, and from her house near Valladolid his brother could slip away to the Netherlands unobserved. And then,

Philip concluded optimistically, 'his mission cannot go wrong, with God's help, and may He guide it, since it is done for His service'.¹⁷ Philip wrote these words on 1 September 1576. Later that day, at the Escorial, the two sons of Charles V were reunited.

Don John's presence at court gave him an important advantage, and he lost no time in making the 'dreadful demands' that his brother had feared (page 232 above). Margaret of Parma had encouraged him 'to speak freely to His Majesty about everything, and reveal to him the naked truth about the current situation' because, 'as you have already discovered yourself on past occasions, once you leave you will not be able to achieve either by letter or by intermediaries the same things that you can achieve easily now in person and in direct conversation'. Don John took heed, and refused to leave the court unless his brother guaranteed adequate funds to execute both of his missions: the pacification of the Netherlands and the invasion of England.¹⁸

Philip did his best to raise money but, not surprisingly, the bankers affected by the Default Decree refused to make new loans unless the king agreed to honour the old ones. 'I don't believe we will ever reach a conclusion,' the king lamented to Mateo Vázquez, whom he charged with drawing up a General Settlement (*Medio General*) with his bankers, 'and that we will pass the rest of our lives in the shadow of this business'.¹⁹ Nicolas Ormanetto, the papal nuncio, who had worked with Philip when he was king of England, seized this moment to insinuate that placing Don John on Elizabeth's throne would solve all Philip's problems; but the king remained cautious. 'No one desires more than me to see this matter take effect', he replied,

because of the benefit that the conversion of that kingdom would bring for God's service and for the well-being of Christendom. When and how to undertake such a venture, however, depends on events in the Netherlands and on many other things and important matters like this require very careful evaluation.

Philip promised to continue to think about possible solutions 'although I see many difficulties'. The constant delays caused him 'so much grief and anxiety' that 'I don't know how I endure them.'²⁰

Finally, on 18 October 1576, Don John declared himself satisfied. A paper written in the king's hand, apparently notes for

the final meeting between the two brothers, listed the concessions that Philip was now prepared to make. To facilitate the attack on England, Philip authorized his brother to grant the Dutch demand that all foreign troops be withdrawn from the Netherlands, provided the Spanish veterans could leave by sea (which would permit Don John to lead them against England). The king also conceded that 'we must forget everything that has happened in the recent disorders, and take no account of what is past'. Furthermore, if Don John found upon his arrival in the Netherlands 'that affairs are in such a desperate state that [the Dutch] insist on getting everything they want, and will not accept anything less', then 'since we must extinguish this fire and avoid making those people absolutely desperate, you may concede everything that may be necessary to reach a settlement'. Philip struck only one note of caution: he rather pompously urged his brother 'to proceed with caution in love affairs, and do not thus cause offence to the [Dutch] elite'. Although the king was ready to sacrifice his sovereignty, he did not want any more illegitimate nieces or nephews.²¹

Don John now set out for Brussels, travelling somewhat ignominiously (as his brother demanded) through France disguised as a servant, with a single companion. He still harboured doubts that his brother would keep all his promises, and in his last letter written on Spanish soil he reminded the king: 'Now, sire, I may face a situation in which I have to respond with my own blood, if necessary, and so I now ask Your Majesty once more to do what I have asked: which is to send money, money and more money, because without that it would have been better not to have invested so much.'²² Escobedo remained at court to maintain the pressure on the king.

Don John in the Netherlands

Don John's fears proved well founded: his departure from the court freed the king from the threat of blackmail, and now he callously changed his plans. On 11 November 1576 – scarcely three weeks after his brother's departure – he entrusted to Escobedo a set of tortuous and confusing instructions for Don John written in his own hand. The king conceded that 'this is the best opportunity we could expect to take the queen of England at a

disadvantage, to withdraw my troops from the Netherlands without losing face and to perform a great service to Our Lord by regaining that whole kingdom for the Catholic faith'. Nevertheless he worried about 'the danger of beginning this venture without a sound foundation or the assurance of a favourable outcome, the difficulties that might arise in achieving success and the risks that might arise of stirring up Christendom and the whole world'. Therefore, he continued, 'under no circumstances can the Enterprise [of England] begin until the Netherlands are entirely pacified and peaceful so that there is no chance of any trouble there, however slight', because 'you can easily appreciate what a great error it would be to leave our own dominions in danger in order to try and gain others'. In addition, Don John must ascertain how much support he would receive from English Catholics, 'because no kingdom exists, however weak or small, that can be taken, or should be assaulted, without some help from within'. Finally, and most remarkably, the king stated 'You already know that the queen [Elizabeth] is in the habit of maintaining relations and contact with the people she believes she might marry; and perhaps by some devious means she may harbour some thoughts about you on this subject and open some communication. If this should occur, it seems to me that you should not avoid it but rather let it develop as much as she wants' in order to disguise with 'greater dissimulation' the planned invasion and conquest.²³

Escobedo, with whom Philip discussed these instructions, warned that they 'will be so unwelcome that I am dreading my arrival, fearing that Don John will become so desperate when he sees what I have brought that he may take a catastrophic decision'.²⁴ He was right. When Don John read the documents brought by his secretary – so different from what he had been promised while at court – he concluded that his brother had faked enthusiasm for the Enterprise of England from the start solely to persuade him to leave Naples for the Netherlands. Feeling cruelly deceived, he now began to seek alternative strategies to achieve his personal goals.

Although Don John's resentment did not lack justification, it never seems to have crossed his mind that his own delays – first in Naples, then in Lombardy and finally in Spain – had undermined the Enterprise. By the time he arrived in Luxemburg on 3 November, the royal army in the Netherlands had disintegrated: of

the 60,000 men whom Requesens had commanded in March, scarcely 11,000 remained, most of them mutinous. Worse still, the day after his arrival the Spanish mutineers in Aalst captured Antwerp, which they proceeded to sack: they destroyed more than a thousand houses and killed more than 8,000 citizens. This tragedy, soon known as ‘the Spanish Fury’, unleashed the ‘general revolution’ predicted by Requesens. Four days later, the States-General ratified and published the Pacification of Ghent, which brought the fighting to an end. They then sent delegates to secure approval of the agreement from Don John and, through him, from the king

Don John was well aware that he lacked the necessary skills for such a delicate situation. As he confessed to his cousin (and former governor-general of the Low Countries), Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy, those who have to ‘deal with people so committed to being insolent and impertinent’ needed ‘the spirit of an angel. Therefore I, who am less like an angel than most, suffer more than others.’ Instead of cultivating ‘the spirit of an angel’, however, Don John concentrated all his energies on the Enterprise of England, for which he mobilized the pope, the English and Irish exiles, the French Catholics, Juan de Escobedo and Antonio Pérez.²⁵

The two secretaries were involved from the start. While Don John was still at court, Philip complained that ‘Escobedo is pushing hard in this matter [England], and I asked him to write down for me what he thought about it’. ‘I see many difficulties,’ he continued, ‘even though Escobedo still thinks it will all be very easy.’ Once Don John left for the Netherlands, Escobedo and Pérez became virtually the sole intermediaries between the king and his brother. When Quiroga, the councillor on whose advice Philip had previously relied heavily, asked the king for details about Don John’s mission in the Netherlands, the reply was concise and dismissive: ‘Antonio Pérez will tell you.’²⁶ Some years later, a courtier asserted that

His Majesty trusted Pérez so much that he decided with him all the great secrets of state that monarchs have to resolve, and he sought and valued his opinion in all things ... And because the person whom Don John of Austria most esteemed, and to whom he entrusted his affairs, was the same Antonio Pérez, he knew so much that he could maintain the balance between the two royal personages, each of whom trusted what he told them about what the other one wanted. He was thus able

to serve in the role of double agent.²⁷

And, indeed, an important change in Philip's administrative system at this time made it easy for the secretary to serve 'in the role of a double agent' if he chose.

Among the concessions Don John demanded before he agreed to leave court was that Pérez and not Zayas handle his Spanish correspondence with his brother. As the king later explained: 'I did not agree to this through lack of confidence in Zayas, but because my brother demanded it so insistently, saying that he did not want to accept his appointment without this concession. Therefore I was forced to make it.' Not satisfied with this change, once he arrived in the Netherlands Don John questioned whether 'Your Majesty should allow my letters to be read by the council [of State]' at all; and without awaiting the answer, he demanded that 'they should be seen and discussed' by only two people: Pérez and Don Pedro Fajardo, marquis of Los Vélez, who had been at university with Pérez and like him supported Ruy Gómez de Silva against the duke of Alba. Philip accepted this suggestion too. Although he himself suggested one change – 'you might add the Inquisitor-General' (Quiroga) – he immediately added: 'You do whatever is best, Antonio Pérez'.²⁸

Pérez welcomed the suggestion, and for the next eight months the letters received from Don John in the royal archives are endorsed 'Seen by the two [*Visto por los Dos*]' – that is, by Quiroga and Los Vélez. Since the letters that 'the two' saw depended exclusively on Pérez, whose officials deciphered all incoming letters from northern Europe, the three ministers served as Philip's sole sounding board on Netherlands affairs. In the words of an astute ambassador, 'they are everything, and everybody else is window-dressing'.²⁹

It is now almost impossible to disentangle the respective roles of the king, his brother, Pérez and 'the two'. To begin with, Philip communicated some crucial decisions in meetings alone with Pérez that left little or no archival trace: as the king wrote just after he received some letters from Don John, deciphered by Pérez, 'Let us talk about this, because it is something better spoken than written about.' Moreover, Don John omitted some important details because 'they should not be written down in a letter that must travel by such a long and dangerous route'.³⁰ Finally, many of the

secrets committed to paper were later deliberately destroyed. In 1576, in 1579 and again in 1590, Pérez burned a large number of letters, including those exchanged with Don John; the king also regularly burned confidential letters once he had read them. Don John did the same: he once warned a trusted correspondent, 'for greater security, I am in the habit of destroying your letters once I have replied to them' because 'in the end, papers are papers'. When he died, according to an executor of his testament, 'burning his papers and portraits caused great sorrow', but 'that is what he ordered so that is what we did'.³¹ Despite these gaps in the surviving evidence, it is obvious that by allowing Pérez alone to handle his correspondence with his brother, Philip set himself up to be deceived. Henceforth the secretary opened, deciphered and summarized all letters received from Don John – even those 'to be placed in the king's hands'; and Pérez alone drafted all the consultas from 'the two' as well as the royal rescripts.

Having thus created an ideal environment for 'groupthink' (chapter 4), Don John, Escobedo and Pérez took several critical decisions to facilitate the invasion of England despite the king's misgivings. In the Netherlands, Don John and his secretary arranged a ceasefire with the States-General in December 1576, and when the news arrived in Madrid, Pérez immediately did his best to convince his master that he must 'conclude matters on the best conditions possible, and quickly'. Shortly afterwards he repeated with the same certitude: 'what Don John and the service of Your Majesty need is to win back those provinces through a peace'.³² It was not so easy.

The States-General contained over 200 deputies and they were seldom of the same mind. As Don John put it: 'Not only is it impossible to know from one hour to the next what will happen, but they link items of business together so that just when you think about announcing that something has been decided, they spend days discussing how to put the decision into effect.' He concluded angrily, 'The only thing they all agree on is to die in order to get what they want.' Escobedo went further, warning the king that some deputies wanted to 'form a republic, recognizing no superior', so that 'war is inevitable. Securing provisions and making preparations immediately would save a lot of time and money.'³³ He attached a budget suggesting that the war would cost 500,000 ducats each month.

Did Don John and Escobedo really believe that 'war is inevitable' or had they sent their pessimistic predictions and alarming budgets as a ploy to persuade Philip to make peace in the Netherlands and thus clear the way for the invasion of England? Whatever their intention, the prospect of renewing hostilities prompted the king to send an express letter in triplicate forbidding it: 'I must insist, brother, that you avoid a breach and that you accommodate yourself to time and necessity, which are the best guides you can have in such a difficult and desperate business.'³⁴ Two weeks later, Philip complained to Pérez that 'nothing my brother does is appropriate', because he and Escobedo 'still want war, and try to bring it on'. Should they succeed, he wailed, 'it will not be possible to provide what they need – and if we did, it would not leave enough to oppose the Ottoman fleet or to do anything else'. Then, almost in mid-sentence, the king changed his mind, recalling with approval the scorched-earth strategy proposed by Alba and Requesens as the best means to force the Dutch to negotiate. 'The only remedy I can see is that my brother gather as many German infantry and cavalry, together with the Spaniards who are already there (since we cannot send him any more), and let them destroy the country. What they get in plunder will be their wages. That's how we will reach an agreement' with the Dutch. He ordered Pérez to run this suggestion past 'the two', adding that 'Although this policy is not at all what I want, it would be better to retain provinces even though they have been ravaged than to lose them intact.'³⁵

This unexpected suggestion stunned Pérez and 'the two', and they rejected it firmly, stressing 'the need to make the best deal we can, and the impossibility of making war, and the great danger that would ensue for both the Netherlands and for Italy if Your Majesty begins hostilities'. The king backed away partially, but not entirely, from his draconian plan to destroy what he could not keep: 'If the States-General want war and not peace, we cannot avoid it. In that case, seeing that we lack the means to make war as we have done so far, we will have to proceed as I have said' – that is to carry out a scorched-earth policy. Now Pérez weighed in. 'We must charge Don John to procure a settlement by any human means possible,' the secretary insisted and, for greater effect, he invoked an alarming domino theory. If war broke out again in the Netherlands, 'I greatly fear that all its neighbours and all Germany

will rise up against Your Majesty's forces'; moreover, the king should remember 'the great dangers that may arise both here and in Italy'. Indeed, he continued relentlessly, 'we should fear that even these realms may weary of being bled white for such a lost cause'. The moral was clear: 'It is necessary to avoid a breach and instead persevere with the talks.' The king crumbled under this verbal spanking: 'All this is well said and well argued,' he conceded. 'I just wish it was not true.'³⁶

Philip therefore instructed his brother (as Pérez and 'the two' had urged) to avoid resuming hostilities at all costs. 'I do not know how we could provide as much' as 500,000 ducats a month in the Netherlands, he wrote, 'even if we had nothing else to fund except that; and since war on such a scale is out of the question, because everything has been spent and exhausted, it is imperative that our policy coincides with our power'. Don John must make peace on the best terms available.³⁷

As it happened, the king wrestled with his conscience in vain; the decision had already been taken. On the same day that he, Pérez and 'the two' debated their options in Madrid, Don John signed an agreement with the States-General known as the Perpetual Edict, which confirmed the Pacification of Ghent, and he ordered Escobedo to raise enough money to persuade the Spanish mutineers to leave the Netherlands within a month, as the edict required. Fearing that once the veterans had left the Dutch would not obey him, he also begged Philip to let him return to Spain. According to an indiscreet letter to Margaret, 'I told him that unless I received permission, there is nothing I would not do, including just leaving everything and going there, even if it is to be punished' and that 'my patience will last only until August or September'.³⁸

The Perpetual Edict contained one surprising clause: Don John agreed that the Spanish veterans would leave by land, not by sea, thus depriving him of the vital instrument for conquering England. This critical concession reflected the arrival at his small court of a group of Anglo-Irish exiles, including the ubiquitous Thomas Stukeley. Together they discussed alternative strategies for deposing Elizabeth Tudor in favour of Don John, and Stukeley convinced him that even if the Spanish troops left by land, he could conquer England with the 5,000 soldiers raised in Italy, for whom the pope would provide wages and a fleet to bring them to

the Channel, where Don John would join them. As soon as the Perpetual Edict had been signed Stukeley left for Rome, taking with him letters of commitment signed by Don John, and copies of Don John's letters to both Philip and Pérez begging them to provide support for Stukeley's venture. Gregory XIII confirmed in writing that 'he greatly desired that Your Highness should lead the Enterprise' and begged him 'to begin to think about' a suitable strategy 'so that His Holiness can also prepare everything that he is obliged to do in full confidence of success'. He also ordered Nuncio Ormanetto to obtain Philip's consent for this plan and sent a special envoy to the Netherlands to handle the distribution of papal funds for the Enterprise.³⁹

Just like the ambitious and deceptive plans of Roberto Ridolfi a few years before (chapter 11), this project rested on flawed foundations. Stukeley lacked the resources to recruit and maintain 5,000 soldiers, still less a fleet to carry them from Italy to Ireland or England. And if the papal force did reach its destination, even Ormanetto recognized that 'success depends principally on an uprising by the Catholics of England whenever they see our fleet', but no one had arranged for such an uprising.⁴⁰ Finally, to imagine that Don John could secretly leave the Netherlands at a moment's notice to join Stukeley's adventurers when they arrived from Italy was pure fantasy.

Nevertheless, when Ormanetto mentioned the pope's invasion plan to Philip during an audience in April 1577, 'I found him constant and firm in his commitment to the Enterprise because he finds himself in a position to undertake it with a reasonable chance of success'.⁴¹ Ormanetto did not yet know that one of Philip's secret agents in Istanbul had concluded a one-year ceasefire in the Mediterranean war with the Ottoman sultan; nor yet that, in the Netherlands, Escobedo had raised enough money to persuade the Spanish veterans to return to Italy. This permitted Don John to enter Brussels where, on 5 May 1577, he took the oath as governor-general, reiterating his promise to fulfil all the conditions of the Perpetual Edict. In return, the States of every province except Holland and Zeeland recognized Philip as their sovereign once more. Despite all the delays and missteps, it seemed as if Don John had successfully concluded the first part of his mission.

In his anxiety to become the next king of England, however, Don

John (like Pérez and Escobedo) had overlooked a capital fact: just like him, the States-General had signed the Perpetual Edict without full consultation. Although William of Orange and his followers in Holland and Zeeland had ratified the Pacification of Ghent, they were not represented in the States-General's negotiations with Don John. They had therefore been unable to insist that the settlement guarantee the religious and political freedom for which they had fought – and so they rejected the Perpetual Edict. Philip identified this fatal flaw as soon as he read the text. For a moment it slipped his mind – 'I was thinking of something else to write to you about the Netherlands, and now I can't remember it,' he apologized to Pérez – but 'now I remember what I forgot: that, if I understand this correctly, we should not say "the ratification of the agreement with the prince of Orange", but only "between my brother and the States-General".'⁴² In an attempt to persuade Orange to accept the Perpetual Edict, Don John sent negotiators to the town of Geertruidenberg to discuss with the prince and his associates their conditions for signing the Perpetual Edict and demobilizing their armed forces. The Netherlands would then be 'entirely pacified and peaceful, so that there is no chance of any trouble there, however slight', just as the king wanted, but Orange informed Don John's representatives, 'To tell you the truth, we can see that you wish to extirpate us and we do not wish to be extirpated.'⁴³ He declared that he would settle for nothing less than full religious freedom, guaranteed by foreign rulers.

The prince's intransigence reflected a strange circumstance: his agents had intercepted and deciphered all the letters sent by Don John and Escobedo to Philip and Pérez, and then shared them with Queen Elizabeth. They therefore knew Don John's true aims, as expressed in his decoded letters. 'If I deal and have dealt with the affairs of England,' he explained to his brother in May 1577, 'the main reason is because I can see that nothing is more important to the service of Your Majesty than to reduce that kingdom to the obedience of the pope and entrust it to a person who will serve you – like me.'⁴⁴ This and other letters revealed that the new governor-general was prepared to accept any terms for a settlement in the Netherlands, however outrageous, in order to clear the way for the Enterprise. His only alternative would be to resume the war – something that Orange now knew Philip would never condone. Therefore, supported by Queen Elizabeth, he made

extreme demands, confident that he would get them – but in this he made a grave error: he reckoned without his rival's penchant for unilateral action.

After the failure of the talks at Geertruidenberg, Don John resolved to declare war on Orange and his allies, calculating that this would not only force Philip to recall him to Spain but also distract Elizabeth while Stukeley and his soldiers landed in England and liberated Mary Stuart. Don John therefore left Brussels and persuaded the papal agent to use the money he had brought from Rome for the Enterprise to raise German troops instead. He also summoned the recently departed Spanish regiments to return; sent letters to the pope and to the king's ministers in Italy explaining his new plan and asking for their support; and dispatched Escobedo to court, with orders to secure either the return of foreign troops or permission for him to return to Spain so that he could join Stukeley's expedition. Escobedo arrived in his native land for the last time on 21 July 1577. Three days later, without awaiting his brother's approval, Don John unilaterally declared war on Orange and the States-General.

Peace or war?

Philip's initial response to this staggering act of disobedience was to send express messengers to his ministers in Italy forbidding them to comply with Don John's orders: 'For the present do not do this, even if my brother has ordered it, because that is what my service requires. I do not wish the Netherlanders to see Spanish troops and bankers arriving, because of the fears and suspicions this might cause.' Philip also dictated a long and bitter rebuke to his brother. Don John must not forget that the king wanted 'those provinces to be won over by peaceful means' and 'to avoid a breach and open war with them. We must not station foreign troops in the Netherlands again because of the unequivocal evidence from the past that this does not work.' Therefore, the king thundered, whatever the situation in the Netherlands, 'I will decide what is best in light of the affairs of my other kingdoms, and the resources and funds at my disposal'.⁴⁵

The king wrote this clear admonishment on 28 August 1577, but in the course of the following week he made one of the most remarkable and fateful U-turns of his long reign. The change began

three days later, when Philip signed a series of letters ordering his ministers in Italy to place the Spanish veterans on standby, ready to return to the Netherlands as soon as they received further orders from him. He also ordered his ministers to debate the current situation in the Netherlands – but this time, instead of consulting just ‘the two’, he sought the opinion of the full council of State. Quiroga made a final bid to secure approval for the Enterprise of England – ‘I hold it certain that the root of all these evils is the queen of England; and that if she had to concentrate on keeping her own house in order, she could not make trouble elsewhere’ – but the rest of the council recommended an immediate resumption of hostilities in the Netherlands.⁴⁶

The king realized that he would not be able to mount a full-scale campaign against the Dutch if he also had to fight in the Mediterranean, and so he sent a secret agent back to Istanbul with orders to prolong the truce. Confident that the sultan would agree, on 11 September Philip signed orders for the Spanish veterans in Italy to return – but he did so with a caveat. ‘Make sure that everyone understands’, he commanded his brother, ‘that this decision is not intended to change anything agreed and settled’ in the Pacification of Ghent, ‘but rather that your intention is to respect and fulfil all the promises you have made.’⁴⁷

Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, the States-General defied Don John and invited their colleagues from Holland and Zeeland to join them in Brussels. The prince of Orange entered the capital from which he had fled a decade before, where (Don John reported angrily and perhaps enviously) ‘he was welcomed as if he were the messiah, and at his suggestion they have sent envoys to me with new demands that are totally unreasonable.’ Don John interpreted this to mean ‘that they want neither peace, nor God nor king’, but for the time being he followed his brother’s orders and conceded each of the new demands. On 21 September he retreated to Luxemburg, the only province that remained loyal to the king. That same month, in France, Catholic and Protestant leaders signed the peace of Bergerac, which ended their civil war and opened the way for an armed invasion of the Netherlands by the French Protestants. While ‘in this labyrinth’, Don John learned of Philip’s decision to send back the Spanish troops and resume the war. The news, he said, ‘has resurrected me from the dead’ and he lost no time in raising troops wherever he could find them. He

even asked the leader of the French Catholics, the duke of Guise, to release any Spanish volunteers who had served him during the civil war, and also to let him recruit a regiment of French infantry.⁴⁸

According to Pérez's later recollection, news of 'the envoys sent by Don John to the duke of Guise, and the secret talks in his private chamber' about raising a French regiment to serve in the Netherlands, only reached the king indirectly – making him 'very suspicious' because neither Don John nor Escobedo 'mentioned it or anything else about it'.⁴⁹ With troops under his command again, Don John became even more unreasonable, demanding that his brother provide one million ducats in cash, with regular instalments to follow, adding rather rudely 'remember, Your Majesty: I want the same funding that you provided to the duke of Alba and those who succeeded him, especially considering that the need is much greater now.' He also urged Escobedo, still at court, to maintain the pressure on his brother. Meanwhile his ally Quiroga informed the king that discontented vassals in Sicily 'have dared to say that the Dutch have shown them the way' to secure concessions from their sovereign, and Quiroga insisted that the Enterprise of England was more necessary than ever 'for the good of Christendom and so that the wicked will be punished as an example to the world'. Once again the king rejected the idea, because 'it now involves even greater difficulties, and so we need to examine it very closely. So you must give this much thought. I am doing (and will do) the same.'⁵⁰

Escobedo and Quiroga fared better with their other mission from Don John. The arrival of a fleet bearing unprecedented quantities of silver from America enabled the king to sign a General Settlement in December 1577 with the bankers affected by the Default Decree. Philip acknowledged that he owed almost 15 million ducats on the loans contracted between 1560 and 1575; and he sold church lands (with the pope's permission) and assigned bonds equivalent to two-thirds of this total. The bankers, for their part, accepted this haircut and agreed to provide loans worth five million ducats to Don John and Spain's other commanders abroad in regular instalments. The king still insisted that his policy towards the Dutch had not changed. As he explained in a letter dated 24 January 1578: 'My intention is not to punish or ruin [the Netherlands], but rather to make them obey

God and me. When they fulfil these two conditions, as I have promised, hostilities will cease and matters will return to the same state as under the late emperor, with forgiveness for all past deeds.’⁵¹ But one week later, Don John and his improvised army routed the Dutch and advanced on Brussels, forcing Orange and his allies to flee. The victor once again dreamed of making an advantageous peace in the Netherlands as a prelude to invading England, and he demanded that Philip send Escobedo back with instructions authorizing the necessary steps and enough money to achieve his ambitious goals. Instead, Philip authorized Antonio Pérez to murder Escobedo.

Murder most foul?

Madrid, calle de la Almudena, 31 March 1578

It was the Monday of Holy Week. At 9 p.m. on 31 March 1578, now the personal emissary of Don John of Austria, rode on horseback and deep in thought' along what is today calle de la Almudena, not far from the Alcázar, accompanied by two servants and a page carrying torches. He had been in the house of Doña Ana de Mendoza, princess of Éboli and widow of Ruy Gómez de Silva, 'a long time, until nightfall', and, as he approached his lodgings, six assailants suddenly attacked him. One of them gave 'a single sword thrust that went through his body from one side to the other' with 'a light sword, made in Castile'. Escobedo fell from his horse and bled to death before he had time to confess. Onlookers tried to apprehend the attackers, but although two of them lost their cloaks in the scuffle, they all escaped unrecognized into the darkness.¹

Philip was at the Escorial to celebrate Easter when he received a note from Mateo Vázquez early the following morning with news of the assassination. He replied: 'It was very good that you informed me at once about Escobedo. I received it while still in bed, and very soon afterwards Diego de Córdoba arrived with the news, which I found strange.' The news was indeed 'strange'. Although Madrid had seen much street violence since it became Philip's capital, as a foreign ambassador observed: 'such assassinations are not normal'. Indeed, as another ambassador

noted, Escobedo knew ‘all the instructions and secrets’ of both the king and his brother; and yet a well-organized gang had ambushed and murdered him in a crowded street not far from the royal palace. It was more than ‘strange’.²

Escobedo had recently been the target of at least three assassination attempts, using poison, for which a Morisco slave in his household had been tried and executed. Her fate made it all the more astonishing that no one was immediately charged, let alone punished, for having run him through in the street. Two weeks later, Orazio Maleguzzi, the ambassador of the duke of Ferrara, noted that two weeks of ‘very strict inquiries’ had ‘failed to uncover the least clue concerning the authors of the crime’, despite the fact that ‘it would be almost impossible for a criminal to hide, especially when so many were involved’.³

Maleguzzi was right: it was impossible – and, indeed, by the time he wrote all six assassins had escaped from Madrid and reached Aragon (where they were safe from Castilian magistrates) thanks to the assistance of several prominent people. The princess of Éboli, in whose house Escobedo spent his last hours on earth, appointed one of them as her accountant with a generous salary; Antonio Pérez provided two others with 100 gold crowns each; and the rest each received ‘a warrant and a letter signed by His Majesty granting him a bonus of twenty crowns a month and the rank of lieutenant’ in one of the Spanish regiments stationed in Italy. Although the recipients wondered whether the warrants were genuine, none experienced any problem in claiming their reward when they got to Italy – for the simple reason that Pérez had arranged, and Philip had approved, both their flight and Escobedo’s murder.

Accessory to murder

The king admitted his involvement in 1589, when he ordered Pérez to be tried for his part in the murder of Escobedo. He instructed his judges to find out ‘the reasons that led’ his former secretary ‘to act and give orders in the matter, and the reasons why His Majesty would have consented’; and when they reported that Pérez would not answer, Philip sent a holograph message that ‘commanded him to declare the reasons that existed for His Majesty to give his consent [*su consentimiento*] to the death of

Secretary Escobedo'. He added, 'for my own satisfaction, and for the sake of my conscience, I would like to know whether or not those reasons sufficed'.⁴

Exactly what were those 'reasons', and why did the king decide in 1589, but not before, that he 'would like to know whether or not those reasons sufficed'? Unfortunately for historians, none of the principals explained at the time why they believed that Escobedo must die. Two of the assassins made sworn depositions, but they did so several years later while they were on trial for the murder, and their accounts contain important contradictions. Pérez himself refused to talk until 1590, when, after eight turns of the rack, he told his judges that if they 'released him and give him some clothes' then 'he would tell them whatever they wanted'. He then stated not only that Escobedo and Don John had conducted clandestine negotiations with the pope and the duke of Guise, and had plotted to conquer England – assertions that can be verified – but also that Escobedo had boasted that after 'they had become rulers of England' he and his master 'would come and take over Spain, exiling His Majesty'. Pérez also produced a letter in which Escobedo insisted that Don John should leave the Netherlands and stage a coup in Spain:

Having observed the wisdom, prudence and good sense with which His Highness had behaved in everything, it seemed that he was a vassal appropriate for a position [at the king's side]: someone whom God in His mercy has provided as a staff for [Philip] to use in his old age, just as the Scriptures said. Although Don John could be of great service in the Netherlands or elsewhere, nowhere would be as appropriate as by His Majesty's side so that he could govern everything.⁵

Pérez claimed that he had shared these indiscretions with one of Philip's councillors, the marquis of Los Vélez, who 'having heard all this and having seen some relevant papers, declared that [Escobedo] was a dangerous man and that it would be wise to separate him from Don John'. According to Pérez, Los Vélez also stated 'that if Escobedo returned to the Netherlands, the whole world would shake; and that if he was arrested (as His Majesty wanted to do) Don John would take offence; and so the best thing would be to do something different, to poison him or something like that [*darle un bocado o cosa tal*]'. These, Pérez asserted, 'were the principal reasons presented to His Majesty' to justify the

judicial killing of Escobedo; and they evidently persuaded Philip to give his consent.⁶

Only one contemporary document confirms Pérez's assertion that Don John planned to return to Madrid and stage a coup: a previously unknown holograph note written by the duke of Alba to an ally at court in September 1577, when the council of State debated Don John's request that his nephew, Alexander Farnese prince of Parma, should join him in the Netherlands.

Don John wants [the prince] there so that when a vacancy opens up – and please God let it not be sooner – he can leave the prince there in his place and come here. This is the advice people here have given him: that he should come without awaiting permission from His Majesty and that here is where he should be, governing the affairs of His Majesty. You would do me a great favour if you would tell His Majesty what I think about this. His Majesty will do whatever he wants, but he should know that I am telling the truth. I cannot do more – although if I could, there is a lot more to say about this matter.⁷

Alba had clearly heard a rumour that 'some people' at court (whether Pérez or someone else) wanted Don John to return and 'govern the affairs of His Majesty', just as Pérez would later assert, and he sought to inform the king.

Although we lack similar contemporary confirmation, two more of Pérez's later assertions also seem plausible: the concurrence of Los Vélez, given that he was one of only two other ministers whom Philip consulted about how to handle his brother, and the marquis's insistence that Escobedo should be secretly poisoned instead of openly arrested (which would reveal to Don John that the king had discovered the planned coup). Moreover, there is abundant evidence that Philip was not opposed to authorizing the assassination of those whom he believed had betrayed him. He promised a handsome reward to anyone who would murder Prince William of Orange (duly paid to the family of the assassin, Balthasar Gérard) and later Antonio Pérez himself; and he had several lesser ministers secretly executed when convinced of their guilt.⁸

Philip might well have been persuaded to believe the worst about his brother. As an ambassador had put it a few years before, 'The king suffers from the same malady as his father: that is, suspicion' (chapter 4), and Don John's behaviour offered ample

grounds for suspicion: he had made unauthorized journeys to Spain; he had undertaken secret negotiations with the pope and with Guise; and he had unilaterally both signed and then reneged on a peace settlement with the Dutch. All this might have led Philip to believe that Don John and Escobedo intended to ‘come and take over Spain, exiling His Majesty’. Pérez, who had worked closely with Philip throughout his adult life, would certainly have known how best to exploit his master’s dark side in order to get approval to murder Escobedo – and probably no one would ever have known of their role had one of the attempts to kill him by poison succeeded. Only the public nature of the execution and the mystifying escape of the perpetrators revealed the existence of a plot.

The testimony of two of the assassins – Diego Martínez and Antonio Enríquez, respectively majordomo and former page of Pérez – provided a time frame for Escobedo’s last weeks. Martínez stated that ‘around Christmas 1577, about three months before the murder’ Pérez asked him for the first time: ‘Is there some way to kill’ Escobedo? On this occasion, Martínez ‘told him that he did not know, and that is how matters rested for some days’; but before long Pérez raised the matter again, and the two ‘spent several days discussing how it could be done; and we decided to give him a drink’ containing poison the next time Escobedo dined with Pérez. Martínez did so, but ‘it did not work’ and so ‘later we decided to give him something else, which we did: putting some powder into a stew while it was cooking’ ready for Escobedo to eat when he dined with Pérez. ‘This did not work either’, although this time Escobedo was sick and took to his bed. Martínez therefore told his master ‘that it would be better to stop, and that he did not understand why he was doing this.’⁹

Up to this point, Pérez had apparently withheld mention of the king’s approval of the murder, but to persuade Martínez to make a third attempt he now revealed that ‘the murder was necessary, because it was important for His Majesty’s service and so we had to find someone who would do the job’. At this Martínez replied incredulously:

‘What poor devils would dare to do it, because if they were caught and arrested they would be executed?’ And Antonio Pérez responded: ‘No they would not: even if the perpetrators were unfortunate enough to be caught, they would not be harmed because His Majesty would order

them to be spared. Take that from me.'

This persuaded Martínez to make one more attempt to administer poison, this time with the help of a boy who worked in his kitchen who went to Escobedo's house and placed 'a thimbleful of certain powders that Diego Martínez had given him' in a cooking pot. Escobedo (still recovering from the last attempt to kill him) realized what had happened and accused a Morisco slave working in his kitchen of attempted murder. She confessed under torture and was publicly executed. For the third time, Escobedo survived.¹⁰

Pérez now took the fateful decision 'to proceed by another path, which was to find a way of killing him [Escobedo] one night in a street, using a pistol or a sword or something,' and in January 1578 he asked both Martínez and Enríquez if they knew anyone 'who would be willing to stab a man to death'. Enríquez went to Barcelona and recruited his half-brother while Martínez found a swordsman named Insausti prepared to do the deed. All this took 'something like a month, or a month and a half', and so it was not until Holy Week that Martínez and his co-conspirators 'met together in a field outside Madrid to finalize how to carry out the murder'. They decided to acquire 'a light sword, made in Castile': the weapon that on Easter Monday Insausti used to deadly effect in calle de la Almudena.¹¹

If 'around Christmas 1577' Philip gave his consent to eliminating Escobedo by poison, did he also approve the change to another method of assassination a few weeks later? The change was critical because, although it proved surprisingly easy to cover up all three attempts to poison Escobedo, hiring six men to stab him in one of the most populous neighbourhoods of the capital on a public holiday was a high-risk strategy: unlike poison, there was no chance of either concealment or ambiguity; and even if they were successful, at least one assassin might later be captured and under torture would surely reveal that Pérez had recruited him and his associates with the king's consent.

Pérez stated during his trial that 'the king was so concerned' about how the murder of his secretary in public 'would alienate and outrage Don John' that he and Pérez agreed that 'if the murderers of Escobedo should be captured, Pérez would take responsibility and flee post-haste to Aragon as a criminal'.¹²

Although this statement, written down many years after the event, is the only direct testimony that the king explicitly approved the change of plan, two other pieces of circumstantial evidence offer support. First, just before the murder, Philip apparently signed warrants promoting three of the hired assassins to the rank of lieutenant and awarding them a salary bonus: six documents in all, each one duly copied into the government's official registers. Second, in 1589 Pérez wrote a series of anxious letters to the king about the success of Escobedo's sons in locating not only three of their father's assassins but also the pharmacist who had prepared the doses of poison previously used unsuccessfully. Pérez suggested that Philip should order his confessor, Fray Diego de Chaves, 'to seek a remedy for what may transpire' because, since these four men knew 'everything about this business, he will know best what should be done to avoid greater difficulties for both those under arrest and for us'. The juxtaposition of the name of the pharmacist involved in the plan to poison Escobedo, which the king had definitely approved, and of three of those involved in the actual assassination, argues that the king had approved that plan too.¹³

The balance of evidence therefore suggests the complicity of Philip in every aspect of Escobedo's murder: he had allowed Pérez to convince him that Don John and his secretary were traitors; that murdering Escobedo by any means necessary offered the only way to thwart their plans (implausible though those plans may now seem); and, finally, that the assassination should be carried out in public in his capital.

One crime: four motives

Since no reliable evidence exists that Escobedo was part of a plot to overthrow the king, why did Pérez want to murder him? What ulterior motives might he have chosen not to share with the king, either then or later?

Those who disliked Pérez – and they were many – later suggested that he wanted Escobedo dead so that he could not reveal to Philip some compromising information. Specifically, because

Escobedo could prove that Pérez accepted bribes; or

•

Pérez had promised a ‘significant reward’ to Escobedo, and when the king did not confer it, Escobedo blamed Pérez; or

•

Escobedo had evidence of an affair between Pérez and the princess of Éboli; or

•

Escobedo knew that Pérez had deceived the king concerning Don John’s plans.

Each of these charges had some plausibility, at least on the surface.

Pérez was undoubtedly guilty of the first charge: he had indeed accepted bribes. The secretary developed expensive tastes and he flaunted them, both at his city house in the Plaza del Cordón and after 1573 at La Casilla, an Italianate villa so lavish that it became a tourist attraction. Don Rodrigo de Castro, archbishop of Seville, ‘wondered greatly how Antonio Pérez found the money to do this, since his income was not much more than he received as his official salary’.¹⁴ The implication of Don Rodrigo’s statement was clear – Pérez financed the lavish lifestyle from bribes – and concrete examples abound. Thus one day in 1579 Luigi Dovara, the Tuscan ambassador, ‘went to the house of Antonio Pérez’ and delivered a letter from the Grand Duke. The secretary told him that ‘since there were still things to discuss, he wanted to meet me alone very early the next morning at his country house, where we would talk’. When Dovara arrived at La Casilla,

I found [Pérez] still dressing, but he bade me enter and ordered everyone else to leave. I told him that Your Grace was very unhappy that he had not yet contributed anything to the wonders of his country house, and that I had therefore brought him these gifts, which I then presented, having placed the two thousand crowns that you authorized in two pouches concealed in my tights.

It is unlikely that an ambassador travelling through the streets of Madrid with two pouches each containing 1,000 gold coins stuffed into his tights would have gone unnoticed, even in the early morning; and such blatant shake-downs – and evidence of many more soon came to light – make it improbable that Pérez needed to kill Escobedo simply to keep his bribes secret from the king, for

the simple reason that so many other people also knew about them.¹⁵

The second possible motive for murdering Escobedo arose from the promise made (with the king's permission) in Pérez's letters of 8 April 1576 that Escobedo would receive a 'significant reward' if he persuaded Don John to go to the Netherlands (chapter 13). Don John evidently found out about this promise, because he reminded his brother of it several times. For example, 'Escobedo has served you for so many years and in so many ways' that 'truly, Sire, he deserves more than a knighthood from Your Majesty in compensation, and since this reward would also please me I ask it of you again'. In April 1577 Pérez again raised the matter in two separate notes, but Philip replied: 'I prefer to reward those who do not importune me than those who do' and refused to confer any reward 'for the time being'. Pérez let the matter drop, but soon after his friend returned to court in July 1577 he reported to his master: 'Escobedo is very insistent in the matter of his knighthood: Your Majesty can see the threats he makes. To be frank, I think it would be better to give it to him so that he does not worry Your Majesty to death.' In October 1577, Don John mobilized Cardinal Quiroga, who likewise begged Philip to grant Escobedo a knighthood – but his efforts also failed: 'I will see what should be done at the right time,' the king stated coldly. This refusal apparently settled the matter. Escobedo no doubt felt deceived when he did not receive the 'significant reward' he had been promised; but he knew, as everyone else knew, that only the king could confer knighthoods. He would therefore have blamed Philip, not Pérez; and so, 'the reasons that existed for His Majesty to give his consent to the death of Secretary Escobedo' almost certainly did not include 'the matter of his knighthood'.¹⁶

As for a love affair between Pérez and the princess of Éboli, Escobedo certainly harboured some suspicions. When he visited the Madrid residence of Doña Ana:

Her chambermaid said that she could not speak with him, and when Escobedo asked her who was with the princess, they told him that it was Secretary Antonio Pérez. On one occasion the said Escobedo became angry and said: 'What business could the princess have to discuss with Antonio Pérez that would prevent me from entering?'

Given the strict rules of decorum expected of widows in Castile,

and especially the widows of grandees, it was a reasonable question. Furthermore, Escobedo was Ana's relative and he had served Ana for twenty years, carrying out delicate missions and receiving long and affectionate letters from her; and yet when he warned her 'that some people took a dim view of the entries and exits of Antonio Pérez' she replied 'that he had a dirty mind, and that squires should not meddle in such things'. Shortly after this exchange, Escobedo was murdered as he rode home from visiting the princess.¹⁷

Nevertheless, if Pérez arranged the assassination of Escobedo to prevent the discovery of an affair with the princess, one might have expected him to reduce the frequency and duration of their time alone together – but instead it increased. An outraged cousin of Ruy Gómez declared that the secretary 'visited the princess often and on some occasions was with her for several hours'. He also claimed to have seen 'much worse things that he would rather not declare: suffice it to say that relations between the two were not pure'. As in the case of the bribes, there was little advantage to Pérez in arranging the death of Escobedo to avoid suspicion of some liaison with the princess, because so many other people believed 'that relations between the two were not pure'.¹⁸

The fourth possible reason why Pérez may have wanted Escobedo dead is far more plausible: that the two had conspired, perhaps with the complicity of Don John, to deceive the king. The secretary admitted as much during his interrogation, explaining to his judges that 'letters and information normally passed between him and Escobedo as if His Majesty did not know what they exchanged, but he [Pérez] revealed and showed the king everything'. He also claimed that Philip 'ordered him to write to Escobedo with enough openness to reassure him and thus to discover his movements, and to make it appear that he was doing this without the knowledge of His Majesty; and among his papers may be found some memoranda from His Majesty in his own hand that approved this practice.'¹⁹

Some of these 'memoranda from His Majesty in his own hand' have survived. Thus in March 1576 Pérez informed Escobedo that he had 'resolved not to show His Majesty' two letters in which Don John 'stressed the appalling state of affairs over there [in Naples] and blamed it on the marquis of Mondéjar', the viceroy, 'something unworthy of the person who wrote it and of the person

to whom he wrote'. Pérez sent the two letters back, apparently unread by the king – but in fact Philip had not only read both of them but also explicitly approved of the deception as a way of convincing both Escobedo and Don John that they could safely share all their secrets with Pérez.²⁰ But this proves only that Pérez *sometimes* 'revealed and showed the king everything' that reached his desk concerning Don John, not that he *always* did so. Other documents tell a different story. Thus some months after Escobedo's death, Pérez jovially informed the Spanish ambassador in Paris, Juan de Vargas Mexía, who worked closely with Don John, that his recent letters 'gave great satisfaction to our master. He saw all of them – I mean, the ones he should see'. In another letter, Pérez instructed Vargas: 'It is very important to me that you should send the enclosed letter to Don John right away, saying that you received it with my letter of 12 May ... Even if you have to send an express messenger, make sure that it arrives before the rest of the letters for His Highness brought by this courier.'²¹ These original letters, preserved only because Vargas Mexía died in Paris and deposited his papers in a local convent, demonstrate that Pérez did not show 'our master' all incoming mail just as he did not always tell Don John the truth. In the words of his friend Quiroga, it seems that 'Pérez replaced correct words in correspondence with false ones'.²²

Most incriminating of all, in his letter to Escobedo on 16 April 1576, just one week after the package of letters crafted by the king to convince his brother that he must leave Naples immediately for Flanders, Pérez ordered that Don John should not proceed beyond Lombardy but wait there for further orders (chapter 13). Escobedo, then, had at least one secret that he could use to blackmail Pérez and perhaps around Christmas 1577, after five months of fruitless waiting in Madrid, he either threatened Pérez that unless the king approved Don John's participation in the Enterprise of England, he would leak the subversive letter of 16 April 1576 (and perhaps others); or else Pérez, knowing that the king would never give his approval, feared that such a threat might soon materialize. Given that either alternative would end his career, if not also his life, Pérez had considerable incentives to fabricate compromising letters from both Don John and Escobedo to persuade the king to give his consent to extrajudicial murder.

Escobedo's posthumous revenge

At first it seemed as though both Pérez and Philip would get away with murder: the 'light sword, made in Castile' performed perfectly in calle de la Almudena, and the six assassins all escaped to Aragon. Although Don John demanded revenge on 1 October 1578 he died of typhus, reducing the pressure to investigate who had murdered Escobedo. Nevertheless, the issue refused to go away, largely because of the extraordinary behaviour of Pérez himself. Admittedly, he took some elementary precautions when he heard that Don John might be mortally ill, instructing Escobedo's successor as secretary to keep 'my letters for Señor Don John', until 'I tell you otherwise, under lock and key, without anyone else seeing them ... And do the same with my letters to Escobedo.'²³ His behaviour in Spain showed no such prudence and, ironically, in the end this – rather than the bribes, the secret correspondence or arranging an assassination – brought him down. It also brought down the princess of Éboli.

Given her kinship and long association with Escobedo, it seems strange that Ana did not share in the universal outrage at his murder or urge the king to find the murderers. Instead, she engaged in a complex series of transactions with Pérez (sending him many expensive presents, making joint financial investments so complex that even the trial judges could not disentangle them); she named (on Pérez's recommendation) one of Escobedo's assassins as her accountant with a generous salary and fringe benefits, soon increased; and she even announced to her children 'that they should treat Antonio Pérez as their brother, since he was also the son of Ruy Gómez', conceived before the latter's marriage.²⁴ She also became involved in palace politics. In May 1578, two months after Escobedo's death, Mateo Vázquez complained to the king about 'the falsehoods and factions' of the court, 'and although I shrink from them to avoid giving them anything to talk about, they will not leave me alone. I have already drawn to Your Majesty's attention the ambition and conduct of the secretary who is always talking to the marquis' (which could only mean Pérez, the close associate of Los Vélez). The king did his best to soothe Vázquez's feelings.

Since you are always straightforward with me, as I know you are, you should take absolutely no notice of this. The best thing to do for the

affairs of God and the world is to shut your ears, and even your eyes, so that you do not notice ... Believe me: this is the simplest, least stressful and most sure path for everything, serving God and me. Since that is what you do already, you have nothing to fear.²⁵

Philip's unusually repetitive rescript no doubt reflected his own uncertainty. After all, 'shut your ears, and even your eyes' was precisely what he was doing in the Escobedo case. Vázquez did not intend to let this continue. Instead, he urged Pedro de Escobedo, son of the murdered secretary, to demand justice from the president of the council of Castile.

A few days later, the princess of Éboli counter-attacked, declaring that 'she would regard anyone as her enemy if, like Mateo Vázquez, they attempted to accuse' Pérez of 'the death of Escobedo'.²⁶ Vázquez raised the matter in a missive to the king in November 1578, which provoked the following furious reply:

Concerning what you wrote in the paper that arrived here – which I have burned – I have already told you before what I think, and I do the same again now. When the person you name in the paper [Pérez] talks to me about these matters, I will not listen if he goes beyond what concerns him ... You can speak to me, without him [Pérez] or anyone else knowing, so that I can see if these things have foundation or not. Say nothing about all this.²⁷

Vázquez now changed his strategy. Instead of acting like a minister complaining about a colleague, the following month he acted as a priest and composed a paper 'For Your Majesty alone' that bluntly set out the reasons why 'God is angry with us' and what would happen if the king failed to provide a remedy:

1.

'Your Majesty should endeavour to revisit past events, and when you do so pay special attention to see whether there were some that, whether for lack of good advice or other reasons, might lead Your Majesty to fear that they cry out to Our Lord for vengeance or satisfaction.'

2.

'If Your Majesty, with his great piety, prudence and experience, should find something in the manner of transacting public affairs (or in the persons who transact them) that deserves attention in order to enable you to attend to everything better,

then Your Majesty should attend to it.’

3.

‘May God guide Your Majesty in choosing good ministers, which is so important, because we know that when He wants to punish princes, He begins by blinding them in this.’²⁸

Playing on the king’s guilty conscience proved a shrewd strategy: 1578 had been a thoroughly depressing year for Philip. His heir Fernando, his brother Don John and his nephews Sebastian and Wenceslas had all died; and the renewed war in the Netherlands, though very expensive, had stalled. Vázquez expected that the king’s Providential philosophy would link these various misfortunes to his failure to provide justice in the Escobedo case, but two weeks later a spectacular event distracted everyone and paralysed the king’s government. On 10 January 1579 Philip banished the duke of Alba from court. The following day he and his wife left their quarters in the Alcázar, never to return.

The disgrace of the House of Toledo

Some observers had long expected this. In 1574, Philip set up a junta to advise him ‘how you think I need to act’ concerning ‘the excesses in justice, finance and war’ committed in the Netherlands under Alba and his son and heir Don Fadrique. The junta recommended a public punishment, but in the end the king’s nerve failed him: ‘Although it would be a great relief to me to take this public step, I do not think I can do it,’ he confessed.²⁹ The only action he took was to forbid Don Fadrique to enter Madrid, instead ordering him to proceed directly to his estates in La Mancha until further notice; however, the sentence was not ostensibly for misdeeds in the Netherlands but for something that had occurred at court eight years before.

In 1566 Don Fadrique, then a gentleman of the king’s bedchamber, had formed an illicit liaison with Magdalena de Guzmán and promised to marry her. There could be no doubt of this because his beloved possessed several of his love letters, in which he gave his ‘word and faith as a knight to marry you, if you wish it’.³⁰ Alba had other ideas: he persuaded the king to exile Magdalena to a convent, and to exile his son to the garrison of Oran until he could join him in Brussels. The duke also signed a contract obliging his heir to marry a cousin, María de Toledo, but

Magdalena and her relatives objected that Fadrique had already given his pledge to her, and they appealed to the king. Philip accepted the justice of their cause, but in September 1578 Alba assured his incredulous but obedient son that ‘His Majesty has given you permission to marry the said Doña María de Toledo, and so you may do so’. The following month, in the presence of many relatives, Don Fadrique married his cousin and consummated the union before returning to his place of exile.³¹

Although the Toledo clan tried to keep the matter secret, news soon arrived at court (possibly thanks to spies maintained by Antonio Pérez) and, on the king’s orders, Mateo Vázquez confronted the duke and asked him outright whether or not the marriage had taken place. Alba, he reported, ‘told me so many things that to relate them here would require a very long letter. He did not commit himself regarding the wedding; but I suspect that it has taken place.’³² This disobedience at last gave Philip the perfect excuse to punish Alba and his entourage for ‘excesses in justice, finance and war’ in the Netherlands and on 8 December he ordered guards to place Don Fadrique in close confinement. He also deprived him of his post as gentleman of the bedchamber and of some revenues he received from the treasury.

The disgrace of the House of Toledo offered Pérez a golden opportunity to settle scores. ‘Since the duke of Alba now stands convicted, the world is wondering what will happen to this man,’ he informed the king on 2 January 1579. Without pausing for breath he continued that Philip should order an exemplary punishment ‘because kings are never more regal than when they dispense justice and punishment’. Pérez stressed that ‘the duke has committed such a bold and defiant act’ and, he asked malevolently, ‘what else might he dare to do, if he remains unpunished for this one?’ He even drew an invidious parallel with Álvaro de Luna, a royal Favourite disgraced and decapitated in 1453, claiming that ‘in all the charges made against Luna, there was none that matched’ Alba’s crime. ‘When men of the calibre and qualities of the duke commit acts of defiance and do the things that he has done,’ Pérez continued, ‘there will be no one who does not follow suit, and no one who will not dare to do whatever he wants – just as during the reigns of King Henry [IV] and King John [II]’ – telling comparisons designed to remind Philip of the noble rebellions and plots that had rocked Castile to its foundations only

a century before.³³ A week later, the king not only sentenced Alba to exile for the rest of his life but also transferred some of his income from the royal treasury to Doña Magdalena de Guzmán, as 'her dowry and as recompense for the injuries she has received, since we can no longer honour her claims' to be betrothed to Don Fadrique. He also exiled other members of the House of Toledo from the court.³⁴

Six months later, when the king arrested her, the princess of Éboli speculated 'that it was her punishment for having rejoiced over the arrest of the duke of Alba'; but in fact she had brought about her own downfall by fomenting the enmity of the king's principal secretaries. At least in public, Vázquez declared himself anxious for a reconciliation with 'my lady the princess of Éboli' and Pérez, 'esteeming and praising him as I should, just as I have done and intend to do at all times and places'; but perhaps recognizing Vázquez's insincerity, they both rejected his olive branch.³⁵

The king was at a loss concerning how to reconcile his ministers and restore the smooth running of his government ('the more I think of it, the more confused I feel'), and in March 1579 he resolved to use a religious holiday 'to examine the matter closely. I shall also use the time to confess, take communion and ask God to enlighten and guide me, so that after Easter I may take the decision most suitable to His service, the discharge of my conscience, and the good of public affairs.' He concluded: 'perhaps at the same time God will also influence them [Pérez and the princess] to abandon the doomed path that they have chosen'.³⁶

He wished in vain. No sooner had Philip concluded his devotions than the warring factions took up arms again. Quiroga pressured his master to appoint Pérez to the vacant position of secretary of the council of Italy, while Vázquez continued to complain bitterly to the king that 'in public Antonio Pérez shows great hostility towards me, which scandalizes the court'. Once again, Philip promised action: 'I will consider the appropriate remedy and put it into effect, and I hope it will be appropriate', but the 'remedy' astonished the court (and no doubt Vázquez as well). Philip announced publicly that Pérez 'did not kill Escobedo', and 'promised to punish those who had falsely accused him'; while the president of the council of Castile warned Pedro de Escobedo that 'he should examine very carefully how he proceeded in this

matter because, since he had not proved his accusation, he would be punished *ad penam talionis* ["an eye for an eye"]. This, an ambassador noted, 'cooled things down considerably', since 'those who sought vengeance now realize that His Majesty values the services of [Pérez] as he deserves, and that the secretary will prevail over his rivals'.³⁷ He could not have been more wrong.

Faced by threats and ultimata from his two most powerful secretaries, and deprived by death and disgrace of most of his senior advisers, on 30 March 1579 (the eve of the first anniversary of Escobedo's murder) the king dictated a letter requesting Cardinal Granvelle to come and join him at court. Perhaps fearful that the cardinal would argue and drag his feet like Don John three years before, Philip added plaintively 'I desire and greatly need you to come as soon as possible'; and in case this did not suffice, he wrote a holograph postscript: 'The sooner you can come, the happier I shall be.' The Genoese ambassador immediately grasped the significance of this invitation. Noting that since only two councillors of state remained in Madrid, 'so that little business gets transacted', he predicted that once Granvelle arrived in Spain 'he will be omnipotent'.³⁸

Until his saviour arrived, Philip kept away from Madrid and his quarrelsome ministers as much as possible. As usual he spent Easter at the Escorial, where the monks noted that 'He passed many hours in his private chapel, day and night, before the Sacrament'. They speculated that 'no doubt God secretly sent him inspiration on what he needed to do'.³⁹ Nevertheless, Philip was now cornered. At an audience in May, he blurted out to the papal nuncio that 'everyone had abandoned him, and left him all alone, and yet he still had to think of everything'. The following month, Vázquez increased the pressure again. 'I have a terrible migraine so that I can no longer prepare summaries of incoming documents for Your Majesty,' he wailed, and although he claimed to be doing his best 'to deal with matters that need attention while there is still time', he wondered whether the king had thought of anyone who could do his job after he died of stress.⁴⁰ When this ploy failed to elicit the desired response, Vázquez threw caution to the winds and demanded that the king immediately arrest those responsible for the murder of Escobedo. 'Granted', he began disingenuously, 'that neither the princess nor Antonio Pérez are apparently guilty of the death', God still required the king to arrest 'the real killers'.

The king replied by pleading for more time to ‘examine more closely what path to take in dealing with the Escobedo business’. On 9 July he made one more effort to reconcile his secretaries, but only Vázquez agreed to ‘enter into negotiations to bring this business to an end’ – and then only in return for certain concessions: the king must punish Pérez for spreading baseless slanders; he must silence all others who had ‘assisted and fomented this enmity’, and ‘particularly the princess’; and no one must receive advance warning of their punishment.⁴¹

Vázquez had probably seen an intemperate note sent to Philip by the princess, complaining about the insinuations of Vázquez and others, ‘such as saying that Antonio Pérez killed Escobedo for my sake, and that he [Pérez] had such obligations to my family that when I asked him, he was obliged to do it’. She continued: ‘His boldness and disrespect have reached such a pitch that as both a king and a gentleman Your Majesty is obliged to make an example of this Moorish dog who serves you.’⁴² Philip dared not act until he knew that Granvelle was at hand, but on 25 July he returned to the Alcázar and demanded two concessions from Pérez: that he accept the post of ambassador to the republic of Venice and leave the court; and ‘that the said Antonio Pérez and Matheo Vázquez reconcile and become friends’. Pérez rejected both demands, and the princess unwisely sent another ‘message to His Majesty that if he did not dismiss Mateo Vázquez from his service, she would have him killed at the king’s feet’.⁴³

Vázquez evidently sensed which way the wind was blowing, because he now sent a bloodthirsty message of his own to the king that began: ‘I simply don’t know how that woman [the princess] can forget either the anger and justice of God, or that Your Majesty is here to carry them out’. More specifically, ‘she should remember what happened to Jezebel, the queen of Israel who persecuted the Prophets and died torn in pieces and eaten by dogs’. This was strong language for a priest, but Vázquez had only just hit his stride. ‘They say that Antonio Pérez is going around spreading false rumours: the Devil must be about to take him, since his deeds justify it. And since Your Majesty knows this, I beg you to defend and protect me.’⁴⁴

This time, ‘having confessed and taken communion’ in the chapel of the Madrid Alcázar, the king prepared himself for decisive action. He replied to Vázquez on 26 July with unusual

loquacity:

I am only staying here to take care of this matter, as I am doing – but I am only confiding this to you. I hope to do the right thing. There are certainly some strange people in this world ... Concerning that woman [the princess], what she says is less alarming than what she does not say ... As for the rest, I am taking the appropriate steps; and as I said, I am dealing with it. As I told you, this is why I am staying [in Madrid]: otherwise I would already have left, or would leave tomorrow.

That night, according to a chronicler, ‘between eight and nine o’clock’ Madrid experienced ‘an enormous hailstorm, the worst I ever remember seeing because most of the hailstones were larger than pigeon’s eggs’, but the king ignored the storm, imperviously reading and returning the dossiers received from his secretaries until late in the night. ‘I’m sure I have lots more to send you, but I can’t handle anything more now because it’s midnight and I need to eat dinner’ he informed Mateo Vázquez, before adding with an audible sigh of relief, ‘I believe Granvelle will arrive soon, and I think we can then tie up all the loose ends.’⁴⁵ It was now 27 July 1579. The cardinal reached the outskirts of Madrid the following day.

Madrid, Plaza del Cordón, 28 July 1579

Philip now sprang the elaborate trap he had prepared. First, he wrote a note to Pérez’s ally Antonio Mauriño de Pazos, who, as president of the council of Castile, held ultimate responsibility for all judicial matters but happened to be sick in bed. The king began disarmingly: ‘Because of your illness and my workload, I have not written to you recently about the business of the two secretaries.’ He then explained the ‘many inquiries that have been made to see if there was substance to the accusations about Mateo Vázquez’ made by Pérez and the princess; but, he continued, ‘we found nothing’. Therefore ‘I decided to clear up the matter, and the only way to do this was to secure the persons [of the two accusers]. I have therefore ordered that this be done tonight.’ The king concluded ‘it is proper that you know what is about to happen, which is why I am writing to you now, even though it is very late’ – but, he added disingenuously, ‘I have given orders that you should receive this message when you awake’, and he did not

allow the messenger to leave the Alcázar until the following morning.⁴⁶

Philip nevertheless needed accomplices in order to spring his trap, and at some point on the evening of 28 July he instructed two trusted officials to be ready for a secret mission: Álvaro García de Toledo, one of the magistrates with jurisdiction over the court, must prepare twenty armed men and a spare horse, while Don Rodrigo Manuel, captain of the royal guards, must muster his men and procure a carriage. Philip then finished his paperwork, and, as usual, his valets distributed it among his secretaries. The note attached to the dossier for Pérez read: 'I am returning to you the papers concerning Italy, with instructions on what to do about them. I am retaining those about Portugal, because I have not read them. I shall deal with your personal affairs before I leave – at least with the part that concerns me.' If Pérez pondered the meaning of that last cryptic phrase he did not ponder for long, because around midnight García de Toledo knocked at the door of his house in the Plaza del Cordón. Pérez had retired for the night, and when informed 'that His Majesty had ordered his arrest, he staggered and lacked the strength to put on his clothes. The magistrate almost had to force his servants to dress him.' Pérez mounted the spare horse, without his sword, and García de Toledo took him away under guard.⁴⁷ Shortly afterwards, a second drama unfolded. Don Rodrigo Manuel and his guards arrested the princess of Éboli and placed her, accompanied by just three of her ladies, in the waiting carriage and conveyed her to a cell in the fortress of Pinto. For the second time in six months, the king had summarily arrested and exiled a Spanish grandee.

Having accomplished what he had come to Madrid to do, accompanied by Mateo Vázquez Philip returned to the Escorial, where Granvelle awaited them. Back in the capital, the rest of his ministers, the diplomatic corps and the inhabitants of the city debated the significance of the amazing events of the previous night. In the words of one ambassador: 'These events have given us much to marvel at, seeing that in such a short time those who ruled the world now find themselves in misery.'⁴⁸ Sixteen months after his murder, Juan de Escobedo had thus obtained a measure of revenge, and Philip had managed to end the paralysis of his government while still concealing his involvement in the murder of his late brother's secretary – at least for the time being.

Years of triumph, 1578–1585

A king for Portugal

O Antonio Pérez: ‘I slept so badly last night that now, before lunch, I am falling asleep’ – as I think you will see in my comments and in the script of this note, because I’m sure I wrote some words while asleep.’ What had upset the king’s routine? He was at the Escorial when Pérez, in Madrid, forwarded the dramatic news that Moroccan forces had routed and killed King Sebastian of Portugal at the battle of Alcazarquivir. On hearing the news late on 12 August Philip ‘immediately retired to his chapel’ and then went to bed – but, as he told Pérez, he could not sleep.¹

The disaster did not come as a total surprise. Philip had celebrated Christmas 1576 with his nephew at the monastery of Guadalupe and discussed Sebastian’s plan to conquer Morocco, and he had promised to supply fifty galleys and up to 5,000 soldiers for the expedition. Although neither monarch managed to mobilize their resources in time for a campaign the following year, Philip apparently failed to inform his nephew that in the meantime he had sent a secret envoy, Giovanni Marliano, to Constantinople with full powers to prolong the armistice with the Turks (chapter 13). In February 1578, Marliano signed a ceasefire for the rest of the year that included not only the Spanish and Ottoman empires but also a host of nominated allies – including the rulers of Morocco – and informed Philip that if he sent suitable gifts, together with a formal embassy, the sultan might conclude a truce

of up to twenty years.

When this spectacular news reached Madrid, the king claimed to see God's hand in Marliano's success. 'Given the need to attend to Netherlands affairs,' he wrote,

it is really important to conclude this truce, so much so that without it I don't know how we can continue ... I have therefore decided that we should proceed with the matter and try to conclude it on the best terms possible – and quickly so that we can immediately take advantage of it – and also to ensure that no [Turkish] fleet will sail against us next year [1579].

The king also made clear his preference for a truce lasting twenty years (the maximum period mentioned by Marliano) that would bind not only the two monarchs but also their successors and their allies.²

Philip also wrote a holograph letter to his nephew that, while praising his sacred and glorious plan to 'propagate the Christian faith in the lands of the Infidel', nevertheless 'begged him to think very carefully before he acted'. Above all, since Sebastian lacked an heir apparent, Philip urged him not to participate in person. Also, Philip instructed Don Juan de Silva, his ambassador in Lisbon, to inform Sebastian of the ceasefire with the sultan and to point out that an attack on Morocco would jeopardize the truce. Philip hoped that Silva could save his nephew 'from his current illusions and from the danger in which he seems determined to place his person, possessions and reputation'. He was wasting his time: the following month Sebastian left Lisbon with a fleet carrying almost all of Portugal's nobles and some 17,000 troops. Silva, who accompanied the expedition, complained to his master 'that we are inexperienced, disobedient, ill-led, and without a commander except for King Sebastian, who has no minister with the standing to contradict him'. He added, 'I am sorry that I cannot provide Your Majesty with any optimistic prediction that does not involve a miracle.' No miracle occurred. Instead, on 4 August 1578, at Alcazarquivir, in Silva's bitter words, 'as was only to be expected [*conforme a la razón*], we suffered a miserable defeat and the loss of the king'.³

Philip's immediate concern was a possible Muslim counter-attack. On 13 August, despite his sleepless night he sent Secretary of War Juan Delgado a list of 'some precautions' required 'to place

ourselves in a state of defence at once' to 'protect the Andalusian coast as well as Portugal and our bases in Africa', noting proudly that 'I added a good number of them myself'.⁴ But what did the defeat and death of Sebastian mean for the Netherlands? Antonio Pérez tried to calibrate 'events here with events there', concluding that 'even if there was an abundance of money', Spain could not now 'complete the conquest' of the Low Countries. Given the unstable situation in the Mediterranean, he recommended trying to negotiate a new settlement with the Dutch. Philip agreed: 'Without doubt, it would be best to reach an agreement, provided it safeguards the Catholic faith, but even that presents a hundred thousand difficulties because the rebels now enjoy such an advantage that they will not want to concede anything that we want.'⁵

Sebastian's death also created dynastic problems. His obvious successor was his great-uncle Cardinal Henry, aged 67; but, since neither Henry nor his brothers (all deceased) had any legitimate sons, his closest legitimate male relative was Philip II. In his first consulta after hearing about Alcazarquivir, Pérez rejoiced over this propitious circumstance: 'although we cannot fail to feel regret, if the news is true it has good consequences,' he told the king, and shamelessly proceeded to evaluate the strength of each claimant to the throne; but the king remained cautious, since 'the matter seems more complicated'.⁶ Sebastian had left a regency council to rule Portugal in his absence, and on 23 August 1578 its members agreed that Henry should serve as 'governor and defender' of the realm until Sebastian's fate was known for sure. Five days later they proclaimed Henry king – albeit with little enthusiasm, given that in Portugal, 'nothing is done except to mourn our children and relatives and the cost of raising ransoms for them'. The ruler of Fez alone demanded three million ducats in exchange for the 6,000 captives he held, while other victorious Moroccan rulers held perhaps 8,000 more and looked forward to similarly generous compensation.⁷

The proclamation of Henry gave Philip time to win support both in Portugal and abroad for his claim to be heir presumptive and to prepare to fight in case he failed. On 25 August, he commissioned the duke of Alba (still in favour at court) and the marquis of Santa Cruz, his leading military and naval commanders, to draw up plans to capture Larache on the Atlantic coast of Morocco as a way of

forestalling any Muslim counter-attack. The two commanders responded with an ambitious plan that involved mobilizing almost all the resources of his Monarchy in the Mediterranean, to which Philip replied:

I see two, and perhaps three, major difficulties. The first is how we can leave Naples and Sicily so exposed, not knowing for certain whether the Ottoman fleet will come or not ... The second difficulty is what we should do about Portugal, [if Larache is taken] since it would become a Portuguese conquest. The third is that the campaign would cost a great deal ... yet we would still need to fund the war in the Netherlands as well.

A few days later, however, the king realized that the forces mobilized against one enemy could, in case of need, be used against another: 'I think it is good to take all these precautions, and find the funds for them, because it is good to be in a state of readiness for all eventualities, both against the Turks and also so that if France should declare war on us they will not find us unprepared.' Philip instructed Delgado to convene a committee of experts to prepare plans to assemble an amphibious force capable of achieving several goals, including the invasion of Portugal, but 'with great secrecy' so that no one 'can penetrate the mystery of the matter'.⁸

At this stage, Philip himself had not entirely 'penetrated the mystery'. On the one hand, he did not know whether Marliano had succeeded in prolonging the truce with the sultan into 1579, guaranteeing that his Mediterranean possessions would not be attacked by a Turkish fleet. On the other hand, in the words of Don Cristóbal de Moura (Philip's agent in Lisbon), Henry was 'old and exhausted' and 'might die very soon', obliging Philip to enforce his claim to Portugal at short notice. So although the extensive military and naval preparations required for an invasion could not be disguised, claiming that he planned either to attack Larache or to defend Italy enabled Philip to assert plausibly (when challenged by Pope Gregory XIII), 'I do not intend to mobilize against Portugal' – because should Henry's health improve, Philip could indeed attack Larache.⁹

A decade later Philip would once again repeatedly change his plans as he prepared to invade England, and in 1587–8 as in 1578–9, whether or not he deliberately sought to foster the impression of

undisciplined thinking, the ensuing confusion produced an important advantage: until almost the last moment, no one could be sure how he would deploy the forces that he had assembled. As an Italian ambassador put it as late as January 1580: 'They still say that His Majesty will travel towards Portugal, but I see no sign of any preparations that convince me that he will ... In short, this is a deception composed of so many elements, that it is impossible to predict with any confidence what the outcome will be.'¹⁰ How the king would have relished those words!

Many of Philip's ministers expressed great enthusiasm for uniting Castile and Portugal. The *Diálogo llamado Philipino*, a treatise composed to demonstrate the superiority of Philip's claim to the Portuguese throne, explained that he had a mission to unite the Iberian Peninsula because it would advance the union of God's people as a prelude to the recovery of Jerusalem for Christendom. In Lisbon, Moura saw Alcazarquivir as God's gift to his master: 'I trust in God's mercy that he will enlighten Your Majesty so that you will know how to choose the path that is best for your service and benefit of these kingdoms, because Divine Providence does not permit the sort of extraordinary event that has befallen this land without a very good reason.'¹¹ Although a messianic analysis like this may have appealed to Philip, it failed to impress the surviving Portuguese elite when they assembled to compare the competing claims of the five living descendants of King Manuel. Philip, only son of the Empress Isabel, Manuel's oldest daughter, clearly had a stronger claim than the duke of Savoy, son of Isabel's younger sister; but how did it compare with the claim of Catalina, daughter of Manuel's younger son, married to Portugal's premier noble, the duke of Braganza (himself descended from King Manuel's sister)? Catalina argued that the daughter of a younger son (herself) took precedence over the son of an older daughter (Philip). And what of Don Antonio, the son of one of King Manuel's younger sons? Although a charismatic figure, and one of the richest men in the kingdom, Don Antonio faced two obstacles: he had been taken prisoner at Alcazarquivir, and he was illegitimate. The first disadvantage was soon resolved: Don Antonio escaped from Morocco and, travelling through Spain incognito, re-entered Portugal, where he received a warm popular reception. His second obstacle was far more serious, especially after King Henry secured papal backing for a declaration of illegitimacy against his nephew

and banished him from the court.

Philip's claim also contained some weaknesses. The most serious, according to Moura, was the 'ancient hatred' of the Portuguese towards Castile: 'although many have mellowed, there are still many' who hate Spain. Therefore, he advised Philip, 'Your Majesty must keep a large army and galley fleet on standby for whatever happens' and 'on the day this King closes his eyes, they must converge' on Lisbon. Philip paid heed. Even as he accumulated favourable judgements of his succession claim from carefully selected theologians, he explained to Moura:

Concerning what you wrote to me about how important it is to be prepared, I have already informed you how we are arranging the necessary preparations for any eventuality with secrecy and dissimulation. And believe me when I say that although I want none of this to be needed, but rather that everything turn out right, I will neglect nothing.

He concluded, 'the ideal is on the one hand to press on with negotiations and on the other to maintain the fear that we may use force'.¹²

Philip used the same combination of 'negotiations' and 'fear' to persuade King Henry to recognize him as his heir before he died. After justifying his title at considerable length, he reminded his uncle menacingly, 'what would be a lawsuit between individuals between princes usually turns into war, with bloodshed, misery and the destruction of kingdoms'.¹³ But Henry turned a deaf ear, instead creating a committee of five governors to rule Portugal should he die before the country's legal experts had reached a decision on the succession. Philip therefore kept his secretary of war constantly by his side 'because I may find that the king [of Portugal] dies sooner than expected, which I think would stir up the affairs of that kingdom. So I think it is very important to get everything up to speed and keep it in such a state that, if we wanted, we would need to do nothing more than launch the campaign.'¹⁴ The very next day the last king of the House of Avis died, and the five governors whom he had appointed began to rule Portugal and its empire until a clear successor emerged.

Philip's finest hour

Philip learned of his uncle's death on 4 February 1580, and (according to the Venetian ambassador) for some days 'he withdrew from public view, handling no business except in writing' while he decided what to do next. 'Nothing else can be attended to until the matter of Portugal has been settled,' he warned his ambassador in Rome. Ten days later, Philip threw off his mask and signed orders to mobilize troops in Extremadura and galleys in Cádiz. He named Santa Cruz to command the fleet and planned to take command of the army in person, as he had done in the Netherlands two decades before. According to Moura, 'I am certain that the presence of your royal person will conquer more than two armies together,' and the Venetian ambassador agreed: 'nothing useful can be undertaken in the proposed campaign unless the king is present'. Nevertheless, he continued perceptively,

others say the opposite. Recalling that the king is already advanced in years, that he has indifferent health, and that few rulers – especially those of the House of Austria – live long, they fear that any change in lifestyle may cause harm ... and may even endanger his life, which would not only mean the loss of Portugal but would jeopardize all of Spain too.

One week later, somewhat more tactfully, the president of the council of Castile begged the king not to lead the army and thereby put at risk 'Your Majesty's royal person, and everything that depends on your continued life and health – which is the existence of your kingdoms and dominions, and the fate of the Catholic Church'. Instead, he recommended the appointment of the duke of Alba. The president recognized the 'just dislike that Your Majesty feels towards the duke', but begged him to overcome it.¹⁵

The king did not welcome this recommendation, but other ministers soon repeated it. For example, Delgado wrote a note that began 'I beg Your Majesty's pardon for what I am about to say,' but 'it seems to me that what matters most here is reputation' and that Alba should take charge of the army because 'he will strike terror into Portugal like no one else'. He concluded slyly, 'if Your Majesty would rather not write to him, preferring that I should go and explain to him Your Majesty's wishes and the current state of affairs and tell him to travel to the front in a coach or litter without coming here [to Madrid], I will do it.'¹⁶ How well Delgado

knew his master! Having ‘thought hard about what you wrote, since there was much to think about both for and against’, Philip accepted Delgado’s offer. It was therefore the secretary, not the king, who in February instructed Alba to leave his place of exile and set out for Extremadura to organize an army; and since the king refused to see Alba, Delgado met him en route and briefed him on his task. As Alba wryly observed ‘the king sent him off to conquer a kingdom dragging a ball and chain’.¹⁷

Cardinal Granvelle, once again Philip’s principal adviser, insisted on another important policy change: the king must not repeat his mistake during the Netherlands emergency of the 1560s and stay in his capital (chapter 8). Instead he must move to Extremadura, ready to enter Portugal as soon as it was safe to do so. In March 1580 Philip duly drew up a new testament and left Madrid for Badajoz, only a few miles from the Portuguese border, followed by his wife, his three oldest children and a handful of officials (he deliberately left most of his courtiers and ministers behind, to avoid giving the impression that Castilians would rule Portugal), and in May he moved to Mérida where, finally overcoming his ‘dislike’, he met Alba. The two men promptly spent three days closeted together finalizing strategy, and afterwards the duke joined the royal family in reviewing an impressive army. At this stage, Philip acted as commander-in-chief, communicating the password each night and arranging the disposition of his troops along the frontier, while Alba acted as his lieutenant. This display of force intimidated the Portuguese governors, who now paid homage to Philip as their sovereign both by right and Divine Providence; but on 19 June 1580 the supporters of Don Antonio proclaimed him king and the new ‘sovereign’ entered Lisbon, took possession of the royal palace and called on all Portuguese to obey him. The duke of Alba therefore led his army across the frontier and, encountering virtually no opposition, reached the Atlantic coast at Setúbal in just over two weeks. There they joined the naval task force that had just left Cádiz and undertook an operation of astonishing audacity: Alba and his 15,500 soldiers, 170 horses and 13 guns embarked on Santa Cruz’s 60 galleys and sailed across the mouth of the Tagus to Cascais – a journey of 125 miles. They landed three days later, and when Cascais refused to surrender, Alba’s troops assaulted and sacked it.

This act of brutality angered the king. In a holograph letter, he

instructed the duke to ‘make sure that there is no sack of Lisbon’ because ‘the outcry about it, the demand for recompense, and the damage will never end for as long as we live.’¹⁸ An outcry was exactly what Don Antonio hoped for, and he callously sought to provoke Alba to take the capital by storm; but as usual the duke preferred the indirect approach and outflanked his adversaries, while Santa Cruz sailed up the Tagus and took possession of the entire Portuguese navy at anchor. Lisbon paid a ransom of 600,000 ducats to escape a sack.

Alba now proudly reported to his master that ‘Here, sire, no one thinks about war any more’. Indeed, ‘Your Majesty can take possession and receive complete obedience. We have achieved this in two months less two days: Your Majesty’s army entered the kingdom on 27 June, and at midday on 25 August it was all yours.’¹⁹ As usual, the duke exaggerated. Don Antonio escaped and made a stand first at Coimbra and then at Oporto, which fell only in late October – and once again Don Antonio escaped. Alba regarded this as insignificant, but others drew a parallel with what had happened in the Netherlands in 1567, the king among them: ‘I think [Alba] said the same about the prince of Orange,’ Philip mused, ‘and so we should not relax until we have Don Antonio, dead or alive.’²⁰ He also worried about how to gain control of the eight Azores islands that had recognized Don Antonio as their sovereign.

Philip’s joy at all these victories was also dissipated by the death of Queen Anne and several courtiers, felled by an influenza epidemic. The king too became gravely ill, and although he managed to mount a horse and wear full armour as he entered his new kingdom in December 1580, ‘the sorrow and illness he had suffered could be seen in the paleness of his face’. He had to complete his journey in his coach. Nevertheless in April 1581 Philip appeared before the Portuguese Cortes at Tomar, where he was acclaimed king and received the oath of allegiance from his new subjects. It was undoubtedly his finest hour. According to Mateo Vázquez, an eyewitness, ‘clothed in brocade, with the sceptre in his hand, His Majesty looked very fine. Don Diego de Córdoba said he looked like King David’ (see plate 37).²¹

Philip did not enjoy his coronation – ‘As you know, they want to dress me in silk brocade, very much against my will,’ he informed his daughters (‘against my will’ because he still wore mourning for

Anne) – but he worked hard to win the affection of his new subjects. He had already abolished the customs posts in Castile that collected taxes on all goods crossing the border, and now he persuaded the Cortes at Tomar to abolish them on the Portuguese side. He also kept a careful eye on protocol: at the frontier he made sure that all the Castilian officials travelling with him laid down their insignia of office; and in 1581, having approved a warrant requiring assistance to an ambassador about to travel from Lisbon to Barcelona, the king scratched out his signature. He explained: ‘This warrant, saying “From here to Madrid and from there to Barcelona” will not do. It must read “from the frontier between the kingdoms of Portugal and Castile to Madrid and from there to the frontier between the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon”. Let it be done that way.’ The king also made sure that his ministers transacted all business concerning Portugal in Portuguese, and he did his best to master the language himself. According to a Spaniard who felt ‘as if we were in Turkey’, the king’s new subjects ‘have made him learn the language more by force than by choice with their constant importuning’.²²

The changing balance of power

Although the new king of Portugal strove to preserve the status quo in domestic matters, he lost no time in exploiting the advantage afforded by the union of crowns to tilt the international balance of power in his favour. In 1580 he had authorized Marliano, still in Istanbul, to renew the armistice with the sultan and thus preserve the peace in the Mediterranean while he annexed Portugal; and in 1581, despite the efforts of French and English agents at sabotage, Marliano signed a three-year extension of the truce. News of this agreement outraged Gregory XIII and he threatened to revoke the Three Graces (royal taxes on the Spanish Church: chapter 11) ‘as a punishment for having made the truce’. Philip responded with the same passive-aggressive combination he had used with previous pontiffs. Did the pope not realize that the truce was merely ‘a pause while we increase our strength for war’? Why did His Holiness grant financial benefits to the king of France, ‘who is permanently at peace with the Turks’,

so that he can make war for a time with the heretics, which will in the end produce agreements prejudicial to the Holy See itself, but denies

them to me, who both placed my patrimonial estates in the Low Countries at risk in order to preserve and maintain our holy Roman Catholic faith in them, and also spends and exhausts so much of the revenue from the other dominions that God has given me in advancing His cause?

In short, ‘Why should I be held to a different standard from everyone else?’ After the complaints came the threats: ‘Since I cannot keep on for long without financial assistance, nor overcome my [Dutch] rebels, who are no less rebels against God, and reduce them to His obedience and mine, if the pope denies me these funds [the Three Graces] and deprives me of the resources I need, he will make it impossible for me to achieve these goals.’ Two weeks later, the king made the threat more direct. If Gregory deprived Philip of the tax revenue, he ‘should reflect that this will force me to do something that I would never want to do under any circumstances’: namely, to make peace with the Dutch Protestants. ‘If His Holiness fails to do something that he has such an obligation to do, then I will be blameless before God and the world in whatever I have to do.’²³

Once again Philip’s tactic worked. Gregory renewed the Three Graces – but only at a price: Philip must promise to invade Ireland. In the first flush of capturing Lisbon intact, the duke of Alba wrote expansively that ‘if Your Majesty wants to campaign in North Africa’ – something the duke had always discouraged while in the Netherlands! – ‘this is a good time to do so’. Philip seized on this rash suggestion and, in the margin of the letter, ordered the creation of a committee ‘to decide what we should write to the duke about the Irish expedition’. Philip later explained to Alba that ‘some days ago His Holiness wrote to me and has insisted several times that he wants to undertake the conquest of England ... and that a good way to do this would be to land in Ireland’. In return, Philip continued, the pope ‘will not only grant me the Three Graces’ but was also willing ‘to give his name to the venture, so that I do not need to declare myself’. He asked Alba to ‘examine the project with the prudence and zeal with which you normally handle such matters’ and then ‘consider what is best, draw up plans and send them to me’.²⁴ In September, Philip provided a fleet to convey to Ireland 800 Spanish and Italian volunteers assembled and paid by the pope; but shortly after they arrived, Elizabeth’s forces surrounded and massacred almost all of them.

Philip now shifted his attention to the Azores where all but the largest island, São Miguel, had declared for Don Antonio, who strove to consolidate his position with foreign assistance. In 1582, Filippo Strozzi (who had led a French naval contingent to Holland a decade before: chapter 11) assembled an expeditionary force that included English and French contingents and began the conquest of São Miguel. Philip's forces had relieved Oran and Malta in the 1560s, recaptured Tunis in 1573 and taken Lisbon in 1580, but conquering the Azores presented a very different challenge because they lay a thousand miles west of Portugal. The marquis of Santa Cruz, who possessed extensive experience of combined operations, nevertheless assembled men, munitions and ships in Lisbon for the first-ever attempt to dislodge an enemy protected by the Atlantic Ocean. On 26 June 1582, St Anne's Day, he engaged Strozzi in the first known battle between fleets of sailing warships. According to a veteran of Lepanto, it was fought 'with the greatest fury ever seen', and in the end Strozzi lost ten ships and well over a thousand men, many of whom Santa Cruz summarily executed as rebels.²⁵ Although this victory recovered São Miguel, the rest of the archipelago remained defiant. The king would need to organize a new amphibious operation.

Muzzling Antonio Pérez and the princess of Éboli

When Philip left Madrid in 1580, he left Granvelle to act *de facto* (although not *de iure*) as governor of Spain, as Cardinal Tavera had done during the absences of his father (chapter 1). Granvelle, as well as the presidents and secretaries of every council, sent consultas to the king in Lisbon, and a week or more later received them back with his rescript. Many of them concerned Antonio Pérez and the princess of Éboli, both of them still under arrest.

After a month's confinement in the house of García de Toledo, Pérez allegedly felt 'so depressed that his host feared for his sanity or his life' and a hostile observer unkindly suggested that he was now so desperate for rehabilitation 'that if His Majesty ordered him to serve Mateo Vázquez as a lackey', Pérez would accept. Such reports induced the king to allow Pérez to return to his own home, where he swore a solemn oath 'that neither he, nor his servants nor his supporters would do any harm to Mateo Vázquez'.²⁶ But the ex-secretary remained under house arrest, and in December

1580 Antonio Mauriño de Pazos, president of the council of Castile and Pérez's staunch ally, informed the king that 'confinement and not being able to exercise as he used to do' meant that the ex-secretary suffered from 'depression and indisposition through indigestion, so that the doctors fear serious consequences'. The king replied grudgingly: 'If [Pérez] needs exercise for the sake of his health let him go to the orchard near his house [La Casilla] – but he must not enter the house or anywhere else. He can only be outside, near his orchard, for exercise.' Four months later Pazos tried again, pointing out that Pérez only 'desires what all those in prison desire, which is liberty', and he begged the king 'to show him the mercy that Your Majesty shows to everyone'. Philip remained unsympathetic: 'It seems to me that I overheard somewhere that Pérez and the princess of Éboli still exchange messages, which is no good for either of them.' He insisted that Pazos 'with secrecy and dissimulation' – those words again! – 'must find out if there is any truth in this; and if there is, put a stop to it'.²⁷

Instead, reports reached the king that 'in the house of Antonio Pérez there is much excessive card playing, with thousands of ducats changing hands' and that he 'retains a box in a theatre where they perform plays, furnished with silk hangings and seats, and that he pays thirty reals a day for the said box'. One particular rumour angered the king. 'They say that Antonio Pérez goes out accompanied by sixteen pages, some armed with swords, and other people walk close to him like bodyguards,' he complained to Pazos, concluding: 'It would be more appropriate to protect Antonio Pérez by locking him up' – a clear reprimand. Pazos responded by pointing out the glaring anomaly in Pérez's situation: 'If Antonio Pérez has served Your Majesty so badly that he deserves to have his head chopped off, there are plenty of judges able and willing to do it'; but the king replied mysteriously that 'if we could proceed in the matter with an open trial, we would have done so from the first day'.²⁸

The president apparently still did not realize that his master could not allow either Pérez or the princess of Éboli 'an open trial', because to do so would reveal his own role in the murder of Escobedo, and that the king had already embarked on a different course of legal action. While still in Madrid, Philip wrote a secret letter 'in my own hand' instructing a trusted minister 'to collect

evidence with complete secrecy and discretion' on whether all of his secretaries had 'discharged their duties as they should'. When the minister died, in June 1581 Philip wrote another secret missive 'in my own hand' entrusting the task jointly to Rodrigo Vázquez de Arce, a member of the Suprema who had accompanied him to Portugal, and Tomás de Salazar, a member of the Suprema who remained in Madrid. This time, however, Pérez was the only secretary to be targeted, and Philip provided a list of witnesses to be interviewed in secret.²⁹

The Tuscan ambassador, Luigi Dovara, was the first to give evidence. In May 1582, he testified under oath that four years before, in order 'to cultivate the friendship of Antonio Pérez' he had given him 4,000 ducats in the name of the Grand Duke. Then, 'asked what other things he knew and had heard about the said Antonio Pérez', Dovara named many other Italians at court who had given Pérez bribes, and the nature of each one. The judges also took secret depositions from others who had known (and, it emerged, had hated) Pérez for decades, and in August Philip informed them that he needed 'more time to verify and refine the faults that were emerging about Pérez'. Therefore, 'since it is possible to conceal what should not be known or discussed by setting up a *visita* [a tribunal of inquiry], I have decided that we should leave Antonio Pérez in his present situation and carry out all the necessary investigations about him in secret'. After much circumlocution and repetition, Philip concluded: 'Now you must burn this paper'.³⁰

Pérez was therefore unaware of his peril when, in September 1582, he once again demanded an open trial – according to Pazos, 'Even if the outcome is that he should lose his head, Pérez would be content'. The king continued to ignore the plight of his ex-secretary, but two months later he took dramatic action regarding the princess. In a supremely patronizing letter, the king wrote:

Princess of Éboli, my cousin: Bearing in mind, as I should, the long and good service of your husband, Ruy Gómez de Silva, and desiring for that reason to reward and look out for his children, it is necessary for the conservation of his memory, his estates and his wealth to take a different course in his affairs – and in yours – than the one that has prevailed until now. Since you need to concentrate on the good of your soul and your peace of mind, which you can scarcely do when you have to attend to so many and such diverse matters, I have decided to relieve

you of the care and custody of [all your children].

Therefore, the king continued, he had named one of his own officials ‘to be their guardian and tutor, and also to serve as administrator and chief judge of their fiefs until further notice, giving him full powers by virtue of my office of king and sovereign lord’. The princess would henceforth live under house arrest in her palace at Pastrana. These changes would take immediate effect, and the king demanded obedience ‘without any retort, because I will tolerate none’. It was a sentence of civil death against which there could be no appeal.³¹

‘The world is not enough’

Having settled the fate of Pérez and the princess to his satisfaction, in spring 1583 Philip left Lisbon and returned to Spain where he concentrated on planning a campaign to recapture Terceira, in the Azores. First, he had to deal with the pretensions of Santa Cruz, who ‘wants the rank of grandee, the office of Captain-General of the Ocean Sea, and a major grant of land’. The king conceded them all, ‘although it is outrageous’, but his Instructions to the marquis stressed (somewhat unkindly), ‘what matters now for your reputation and mine is that you get the job done this time’. He also insisted on ‘exemplary punishment’ for all who opposed him: ‘If anyone should now resist me, and take up arms against me, they cannot avoid judgment under the Laws of War’: that is, they must be summarily executed.³² Exactly one year after his naval victory, Santa Cruz arrived at Terceira with an amphibious force twice as large as the previous one – more than 15,000 men and almost 100 ships – and his Spanish veterans stormed ashore and swiftly captured the island, subjecting it to a three-day sack. The rest of the archipelago now surrendered. At last Philip was master of Portugal and its entire empire.

Santa Cruz’s triumph unleashed a wave of euphoria throughout the Iberian Peninsula, to which the king was not immune. On hearing that the crowning victory had again occurred on St Anne’s Day, Philip and Mateo Vázquez immediately spotted the coincidence. Apart from intervention by the saint, Vázquez wrote, ‘It has just crossed my mind that it must have been the late Queen Anne, our sovereign lady, beseeching God for victory.’ The king

agreed: 'Although St Anne must have played a large part in these successes, I always thought that the queen must have had a share in them. And what gives me greatest pleasure is that it seems this victory is an indication that there is something in what you say.' Shortly afterwards Philip commissioned his painters at the Escorial to prepare both a picture of St Anne for an altar in the monastery and two frescoes in the royal apartments to commemorate Santa Cruz's spectacular victories (see plate 38).³³

Other celebrations of the union of crowns took a more aggressive tone. An ambassador in Madrid reported that 'A royal sculptor has received orders, it is said directly from His Majesty, to make some medals with designs that show his lordship over Portugal and the entire Atlantic Ocean'; while a courtier proposed the motto *Nothing is ever hidden*, 'so that all will know that the sun never sets on the kingdoms now unified' under Philip's rule, 'because as night falls in our hemisphere it is daytime in the other'.³⁴ A medal struck in 1583 showed the king's head with the inscription 'Philip II, king of Spain and New World' on one side, and on the other the uncompromising legend NON SUFFICIT ORBIS ('The world is not enough'), a motto first applied to Alexander the Great (see plate 39). This bold device soon came into general use as the logo of Philip's global empire. When an English party broke into the governor's mansion in Santo Domingo in 1586 they saw the royal arms of Spain atop the globe, with a scroll 'wherein was written these words in Latin NON SVFFICIT ORBIS'. The English found this a 'very notable marke and token of the vnsatiable ambition of the Spanish King and his nation'.³⁵

David or Goliath?

Such ambitious claims were not limited to words and images. In August 1583, euphoric from his double victory in the Azores, Santa Cruz urged the king to 'look to God, since the cause is so just and so much His' and remember that

victories as complete as the one God has been pleased to grant Your Majesty in these islands normally spur princes on to other enterprises; and since Our Lord has made Your Majesty such a great king, you should follow up this victory by making arrangements for the invasion of England next year ... It is not right that while Your Majesty is in this world a heretical woman who has caused so much harm to that

kingdom should live and reign.

Philip accepted this view. He thanked Santa Cruz ‘for all you wrote in your holograph letter, offering yourself to lead a new campaign, which you suggest for next year. These are matters that cannot be discussed with certainty now, because they depend on the timing and the events that will take place between then and now’; but he promised ‘to speed up the construction of ocean-going galleons’ in the shipyards of Portugal and northern Spain, and he asked the marquis to draw up feasibility studies for the conquest of England.³⁶

Santa Cruz swiftly assembled a dossier that advocated a landing in irresistible force close to London, since it was both the seat of Tudor power and easily accessible from the sea. In addition, the marquis noted, once his expeditionary force landed in the Thames estuary, reinforcements would be readily available from the Army of Flanders. But before he could devote proper attention to this, Philip received an extraordinary proposal from Pope Gregory XIII: that he should marry Mary Stuart. The Spanish ambassador in Rome explained to a colleague in Madrid that the pope believed ‘that in this way [Philip] can once more become king of England’, adding defensively that ‘the pope expressly told me to write this to His Majesty, but through embarrassment I have chosen to do so through you.’ When the king read the letter he could scarcely contain himself: ‘I do not feel any embarrassment at being told what should be done,’ he told his ambassador, ‘but I do feel it with something so inappropriate as this – the more so because I know that I could not fulfil the obligation of governing that kingdom [of England] or of going there, having so many other duties that it is impossible to fulfil even those as I would wish.’³⁷ The king was no more eager to marry Mary Stuart than he had been to marry Elizabeth Tudor twenty-five years before. Instead, he asked the duke of Parma, his nephew, whether he could prepare and launch from the Netherlands an invasion that would eliminate the queen.

Parma did not rule out the possibility, but given the risk of French assistance to the Dutch during his absence he urged the king to allow him to complete the reconquest of the Netherlands before turning upon England. This evidently impressed Philip, and for the next three years he dropped most other projects in order to concentrate on the Netherlands. For example, for almost a year his

advisers had discussed measures to expel the Moriscos from Castile 'in a great expulsion, just as had been done to the Jews' a century before, 'which should be carried out as soon as the fleet returned from Terceira' in autumn 1583. But since 'this required many soldiers, and freedom from other concerns that might cause distraction', when the victorious fleet returned, 'the plan was abandoned. Instead, it was decided to send the troops aboard the fleet to the Netherlands.'³⁸ In addition, the king built up an impressive war chest. In 1584 a group of visitors touring the Madrid Alcázar marvelled at the room containing 'the king's private treasury with six huge chests containing coins, each said to hold four hundred thousand ducats. Besides these we saw a further six boxes, holding a very great sum of marked gold, and these are kept untouched against any grave necessity.'³⁹ The king did not intend to squander these assets. In spring 1582, apparently for the first time, he ordered his treasury officials to prepare an imperial budget for an entire year (June 1582–June 1583). The sums required were large – 2.4 million ducats for the Netherlands; 1.8 million for the Azores – but Don Hernando de Vega, president of the council of Finance, predicted a small surplus. Philip was not convinced:

Obviously, more will be needed to get us through 1583, because the total in the budget is scarcely enough for the first half of the year, although it might be possible to anticipate something from 1584 in the second half of 1583. In the end, however, everything will collapse if we fail to find adequate funds. Take a look and discuss it with the secrecy that you can see the matter requires.⁴⁰

In June 1583 – the point at which Vega's budget ended – the king took his fiscal planning somewhat further. In the Netherlands 'the present necessity is so great', he informed Vega, 'that it would be of the greatest importance to be able to provide at once some 400,000 or 500,000 ducats; and for the future it would be very good to arrange a [regular] provision by months, from 150,000 to 200,000 ducats per month'. The president promised to 'meet Your Majesty's obligations in such a way that you will scarcely need any other treasury officials'; but if he expected that his confidence would end the king's nagging, he was wrong. 'Finding this money is really, really important,' Philip began his rescript, and 'so I charge you to do everything with great speed, because time is of

the essence; otherwise, our efforts will be in vain'. Then his tone softened slightly: 'It is good that you have begun to discuss this large provision [of money]. So proceed with it and ensure that you do not forget about it, since it will be the remedy and relief of everything for the two years to come, 1584 and 1585.'⁴¹

Parma did not spend all of the funds he received from Spain on his troops. He used 25,000 ducats for a very different purpose: rewarding the relatives of Balthasar Gérard, one of the king's Burgundian subjects who, on 10 July 1584, assassinated Prince William of Orange, whom Philip had declared an outlaw to be captured or killed at will. The immediate reaction at the court of Spain to Gérard's deed was ecstasy. 'With the dawn this morning came the news about Orange,' Granvelle (in Madrid) crowed to the king: 'Our Lord must want to achieve something really good in the Netherlands since he has removed the keystone of the rebellion.' Mateo Vázquez also rejoiced when the news reached the Escorial: 'The death of Orange is great news, and I hope that God in his mercy will now draw those wars to an end, because Your Majesty deserves it; and if there must be wars let them be abroad and not at home.' Philip replied: 'Everything is just as you say: it seems to be a wonderful opportunity, and I trust in God that things in the Netherlands will work out well.' The following day, Granvelle noted a happy coincidence: Orange's death had occurred exactly one month after that of the duke of Alençon and Anjou, titular head of the Dutch rebels: 'Alençon died on 10 June; and Orange on 10 July; and if the 10th of this month [of August], St Lawrence's Day, should see the death of Alençon's mother [Catherine de' Medici] the world would lose little.'⁴²

This rejoicing proved premature. The duke was the last male member of the house of Valois and, because Salic Law limited royal succession to the male line, the Protestant Henry of Bourbon, king of Navarre became the new heir presumptive to the French throne, which raised the spectre of an openly hostile regime in Paris. Philip had to react. For many years he had offered the duke of Guise funds to sustain a paramilitary organization, 'the League', dedicated to ensuring that a Catholic would succeed Henry III. As soon as Philip learned of Anjou's death, he increased Guise's payments, and promised full military intervention should civil war break out. In return, the duke promised to further Philip's designs elsewhere in Europe.

Spain began to reap the benefits of this initiative almost immediately. In March 1585, isolated and intimidated, Henry III signed a treaty with Guise that ceded several important towns to the League and promised to work towards the extirpation of Protestantism in France. Meanwhile Philip agreed that Duke Charles Emmanuel of Savoy should marry his daughter Catalina. The ceremony took place in March 1585, and a year later Catalina gave birth to the king's first grandchild, a son. Since both the infant's grandmothers belonged to the House of Valois, he was also a potential heir to the throne of France. At the same time, in the Netherlands Parma used the regular supply of troops and treasure from Spain to blockade the major towns of the South Netherlands, and one by one they surrendered: Brussels, Ghent, Bruges, Mechelen and finally, in August 1585, Antwerp.

These military and diplomatic triumphs thoroughly alarmed Queen Elizabeth, because if Philip gained control of France, Portugal and the entire Netherlands, Protestant England was doomed. Her secretary of state, Sir Francis Walsingham, prepared 'A plott for the annoying of the king of Spayne' that consisted of a trade embargo with the Spanish Netherlands; seizing Spanish vessels off Newfoundland; sending England's most successful naval commander, Sir Francis Drake, to raid the West Indies; and providing assistance to Philip's Dutch and Portuguese rebels. For a while the queen hesitated: thus although she gave Drake money to raise a fleet of over thirty vessels and 1,600 men, she forbade them to leave port; and while she welcomed the Portuguese pretender, Don Antonio, to her court, she gave him no funds. Her only unequivocal action was to place an embargo on all English trade with the Spanish Netherlands in April 1585, provoking Philip to retaliate: the following month he issued a proclamation that ordered the arrest of all foreign ships in the ports of the peninsula, with the sole exception of the French. The decision proved a disaster, because when a party of Spanish officials tried to arrest the English vessel *Primrose*, the master decided to fight his way out, taking with him to England not only the Spanish boarding party but also a copy of the proclamation.

Elizabeth and her ministers studied the exact wording of the proclamation, and immediately noted that it affected only ships from Protestant lands. Interrogation of the Spaniards captured aboard the *Primrose* offered little reassurance: one of them

informed his captors that ‘hearing that the Hollanders seake ayde in England and fearing [lest] they shalbe ayded’, King Philip ‘meaneth by this arreste to feare the Englishe from ayding them’. Even more alarming, an intercepted letter from a Spanish merchant in Andalusia to his partner in Rouen spoke unequivocally of ‘the state of war that exists between us and England’.⁴³

These revelations followed Elizabeth’s discovery of a conspiracy to assassinate her and enthrone Mary Stuart in which Spanish ambassador Don Bernardino de Mendoza was so clearly implicated that early in 1584 she expelled him. Orange’s assassination shortly afterwards confirmed that Philip would stop at nothing to eliminate his foes, and so Elizabeth resurrected Walsingham’s ‘Plott’. In June 1585, shortly after the return of the *Primrose*, she ordered an English squadron to sail to Newfoundland and attack the Iberian fishing fleet and authorized any of her subjects affected by the embargo to make good their losses by plundering ships sailing under Philip’s colours. In August, Elizabeth signed a formal treaty with envoys sent by Philip’s Dutch rebels that obliged her to provide over 6,000 regular troops for their army, pay one-quarter of their defence budget and supply an experienced councillor to lead their army; and she allowed Drake to leave Plymouth with his thirty ships and 1,600 soldiers.

In October 1585, Drake’s men ravaged villages in Galicia for ten days, desecrating churches, collecting booty and taking hostages. This was far more than ‘A plott for the annoying of the king of Spayne’: it was an open declaration of war on Philip. The monarch who at Tomar had ‘seemed like King David’ now began to resemble Goliath.

‘The most potent monarch in Christendom’

MANY of Philip II's subjects celebrated the fact that the union of crowns with Portugal made him the ruler of an 'innumerable, not to say infinite, multitude of kingdoms, lordships, provinces and various dominions in all four quarters of the world', forming 'the greatest empire that has been seen since the creation of the world'. This unprecedented aggregation of power also impressed others. The king of Spain, wrote one fearful Englishman, was 'the most potent monarch in Christendom', who 'hath now got a command so wide, that out of his dominions the sunne can neither rise nor set'. According to another, Philip had become 'A prince whose empire extended so farre and wide, above all emperors before him, that he might truly say, *Sol mihi semper lucet*: the sunne always shineth upon me'.¹

‘Doctors are terrible people’

Who was the ‘me’ upon whom the sun always shone? In 1582 the Netherlander Philippe de Caverel provided a vivid description of his sovereign after an audience in Lisbon. ‘He is of less than average height,’ Caverel began, ‘with broad shoulders and chest, and a large, pale face’ with prominent red lips, ‘especially the lower one, a sign of his Habsburg ancestry. His eyes are somewhat red, like those of a man who reads and works a lot, even at night.’ His beard and his hair were entirely white, ‘which seems a little

premature' (the king was then 56 years old). When Philip returned to Madrid the following year, according to the French ambassador 'the king begins to age', and 'his face is not as fair, showing that his spirit must be borne down by cares, making him more melancholy than he used to be'; while Cardinal Granvelle noted that his master 'wore his beard a little longer than most people, and rounded in the same way that the emperor's used to be. Since it has gone white, he now resembles the said emperor strongly.'² But the resemblance stopped there: Philip would live to be 71, whereas his father died aged 58.

Several lifestyle choices explain the king's longevity. Once he ceased to take part in tournaments, around 1562, the king suffered only minor accidents – such as the day he got on a boat and 'my leg went into the place where the mast goes' and 'I scraped my shin, which hurt a lot for a while' – and except for the influenza that nearly killed him in 1580, he was seldom seriously ill until he turned 60 in 1587. Like everyone else, of course, he experienced numerous minor health problems. Above all, the long hours sitting at his desk, and the lack of fibre in his diet, meant that he often suffered from constipation and piles, which explains the 'rings made of bone which are said to be good for haemorrhoids' in the inventory of his possessions after his death. The same source records a 'silver goblet for the purges to be administered to His Majesty', while the accounts of the palace pharmacy show frequent resort to both emetics and enemas. In a letter to his children he described how he took one cordial every morning 'which tastes awful because it contains rhubarb' and another every other day that contained agrimony.³ The king also preserved his health by eating carefully, exercising regularly and paying close attention to personal hygiene. As his valet later observed, Philip 'was by nature the most clean, tidy and fastidious person that has ever walked on the earth'. The 'Inventory of the Late King's Goods' contains striking evidence of this. He owned a toothbrush made of ebony inlaid with gold; a box containing toothbrushes and sponges; a bowl to hold tooth powder and toothpaste; and (when these precautions failed) 'five large instruments for pulling teeth' and 'a gold wand with rounded ends to cauterize teeth'. He also owned special instruments to clean out his ears and scrape his tongue, a hairbrush and a brush to clean combs, and nail scissors and a manicure set – all of gold or silver.⁴

Despite these preventive measures, stomach bugs sometimes laid low ‘the most potent monarch in Christendome’. In summer 1581 he told his daughters that ‘I have not felt well recently: I don’t know whether it’s because I ate a lot of melons the other day’ but ‘I have been in bed for two days’. Two years later, ‘while I was hearing Mass, my stomach started churning’; and in 1588 ‘when I got up today I felt a terrible pain in my stomach or my gut, I’m not sure which, but one or other of them hurt a lot’.⁵ The king also suffered his fair share of winter ailments. One night in February 1576 he provided Mateo Vázquez with a comprehensive medical bulletin: ‘I still have the congestion in my chest, which exhausts me; and although my arthritis hurts from time to time, it does not make my head ache – but my cold certainly does!’ In December 1584, he reported that ‘my cold has prevented me from returning these papers to you, although I really wanted to do so; and now I can do even less because I have a terrible headache’. ‘I cannot handle any further business just now,’ he complained in February 1587, ‘because I have a terrible cold – which I already had last night. I am certainly not fit to read or write.’ When more papers nevertheless arrived the king lost his temper and scribbled on the dossier (as he sent it back): ‘Look what I get to cure my cold!’⁶

Sometimes his complaints suggest hypochondria – in 1573 Philip told the duke of Alba that ‘I think the stress I feel about what is happening [in the Netherlands] is partly to blame for my fever’; and in October 1588 he told Mateo Vázquez that ‘I have got a terrible cough and cold, and I am convinced it comes from the papers because as soon as I pick them up I start to cough’ – but severe stress can indeed induce physical problems.⁷ In addition, the king could not handle his paperwork when ‘I have gout [*la gota*] in my right hand’ or ‘His Majesty still has gout in his right wrist’ – and because he was right-handed this prevented him from writing.⁸ In later years, he lay in bed for half an hour each morning while his valet gently massaged his legs and feet to ease the pain. It seems likely that Philip suffered from the same sort of arthritis as his father, who also had periodic bouts of debilitating ‘gout’.

In general, although Philip kept several doctors on his payroll, he was often reluctant to accept their advice because (as he put it) ‘Doctors are terrible people’.⁹ In 1572, when his nine-month-old son and heir fell ill and the court doctors blamed his wet-nurse,

Philip showed contempt for their diagnosis – or rather, diagnoses: ‘The doctors have submitted so many different opinions, both about medicines and cleanliness, that no one can know which to trust’. Shortly afterwards the king convinced himself that (as with architects, theologians and others) he knew best: ‘It would be better to avoid clysters and bloodletting, which are sometimes very bad, and with a stable regime one could achieve the same result with less risk.’ When the doctors insisted on administering their classic procedures, the king counter-attacked: ‘We should think carefully before allowing any clyster for the prince or his wet-nurse, which may upset rather than benefit them.’ The king’s claim to medical omniscience had not abated two decades later. In September 1590 many courtiers at the Escorial fell ill, and one of them asked that the sick should receive two loads of ice from the special ‘ice wells’ created by the king high in the Guadarrama mountains. Philip disagreed: ‘I think the doctors should rather stop fruit and snow being taken by some of the sick ... I do not take drinks with ice. It does more harm than good to everyone else at that time of year.’¹⁰

Drowning in paperwork

His robust health allowed the king to insist (as Philippe de Caverel noted during his visit to Lisbon) ‘on seeing practically everything’. Therefore, the king’s periodic complaints about exhaustion continued. ‘There have been so many meetings, and they have eaten up so much of my time, that I can’t do any more now. It is already very late,’ he complained to Vázquez in February 1584, adding ‘I have never seen business pile up so often.’¹¹ A few months later, the faithful secretary suggested that business might not ‘pile up’ quite so fast if one of the small group of trusted councillors who normally accompanied the king read through the *consultas* sent by a particular council before forwarding them with a recommendation. The king warmed to this idea: ‘I will approve those where you endorse their recommendation, and you will note or draft a reply when you do not approve – and all before I see them. I will see them when I sign them.’ Vázquez promised obsequiously that ‘in order to bring Your Majesty some relief, I want to work day and night, just like your humble slave’, and now proposed that each of the chosen councillors should spend half an

hour a day with the king in order to resolve outstanding matters. Philip voiced misgivings at the mention of meetings:

Even this will take up a lot of time, because I will have to spend half an hour with you [inquisition and patronage], and the same with the count of Chinchón [Aragon and Italy], with Don Juan de Idiáquez [state], with Antonio de Eraso [America and treasury], and with Don Cristóbal [de Moura] for Portugal – which does not leave me much time. But not having to write out my decisions will be a relief.¹²

The following year the king made another change: he recalled Don Juan de Zúñiga, the son of his old governor, to preside over this group of senior ministers, which became known as the *Junta de Noche* (the Night Committee) because it met every evening to discuss the consultas prepared by each council that morning, adding a summary and a suggestion for action, so that the king could immediately identify the issues that required his personal attention.

The hidden king

A senior minister observed perceptively at this time that ‘Our Master loves peace and quiet, and likes to govern and control the world in silence, relying on people who do the same.’ Indeed, ‘we have ample proof that, among these, the people he likes best are those who make the least noise.’¹³ In an effort to secure ‘the least noise’, after his return from Portugal Philip spent far less time in his capital. He now passed almost every summer and the major religious holidays at the Escorial, with lengthy visits in spring to Aranjuez and in autumn to the Pardo. While in Madrid, Philip’s architectural alterations to the Alcázar created a complex of private rooms so that he scarcely appeared in public except for major court ceremonies and major religious festivals. In 1587 an observer noted that Philip ‘takes refuge in the apartments recently completed’ – and ‘his success can be seen from the fact that he avoids audiences there better than either in the Pardo or the Escorial’. The historian Luis Cabrera de Córdoba agreed: ‘Even at Easter and Christmas, he does not attend Mass in the royal chapel, hearing it in his oratory with as little fuss as if he were not in the palace.’ The king now travelled between his various residences ‘secretly in his coach with the curtains drawn’ so that he could not

see his subjects and they could not see him.¹⁴

The king could not hide from his paperwork, however, although as before his insistence on dealing personally with ‘trivia’ was partly to blame. Thus in 1586 he devoted entire days to preparing his Proclamation on Etiquette, a document that declared in minute detail the styles of address to be used by his subjects – not only between lords and vassals but even between parents and children – and specified who could and could not use the form ‘vos’. It also established the correct form of address for senior ministers, nobles, clerics, each member of the royal family and the king himself – who insisted that instead of ‘Sacra Católica Real Majestad’ everyone must now address him as ‘Señor’ (the same as addressing God). Philip kept revising drafts of the proclamation until even he was at a loss for words: in the clause that determined the weighty issue of who would have the right to place coronets above their coats of arms, he finally gave up on the syntax, telling Vázquez in frustration: ‘Put whatever seems best – “para” or “por” – because I can’t decide’. That was on 11 September 1586, but the king continued to fuss over the details for almost another month, and even when he returned the final text to Vázquez on 8 October he retained some misgivings: ‘Here is the signed version: getting it done was no mean feat, given all there is to do. Although a word or two remain uncertain, I think we can stop editing because it does not matter at all.’¹⁵ ‘It does not matter at all’? After preparing so many drafts, even the patient Vázquez must have ground his teeth.

Perhaps the king’s obsessive attention was justified in this case, because the Proclamation on Etiquette outraged courtiers and ambassadors alike, while the pope placed it on the Index and threatened the king with excommunication. But did the king really need to decide in person other apparently inconsequential matters at this time, including the disposition of the church benefices vacated by the death of Cardinal Granvelle; who should travel in which coach and how he should be greeted in each town on the royal Progress to Zaragoza; and who should be chosen as cook in his children’s kitchen, a post that attracted twenty applicants?

With so many trivia (*menudencias*) to distract and drain him, the pile of consultas awaiting the king’s attention grew inexorably. In 1588, when Vázquez told Philip that he had 800 consultas to review and resolve, Philip replied wearily that things were not

nearly so bad: the unread consultas around his desk numbered 'only' 300. A few days later, one of the valets responsible for managing those unread documents begged his colleague, 'please stop sending papers until His Majesty is able to deal with them. It is torture for some of us here to read the letters and other papers that arrive from so many sources, and to write, write, write!'¹⁶ The following year the general of the Jeronimite Order, whose predecessors had enjoyed direct access to the king during the construction of the Escorial, complained to Vázquez that an earlier letter to the king had not been answered. Philip answered sadly: 'The blame for the delay is mine, because with the pressure of business I have not yet been able to see it or order a reply. You had better tell the general this: that one cannot always do what one wants.' The situation deteriorated yet further after Vázquez's death in May 1591. Three months later, his successor as private secretary complained that several important papers had not been returned with a decision, and once again Philip apologized: 'I am very sorry that the pressure of business should be such that it does not leave me time to see to these things, or many others that I should do, but I cannot manage any more. However I shall do everything possible.'¹⁷

'The lack of leaders'

The loss of a trusted minister like Vázquez was one of Philip's worst nightmares. When in 1577 the secretary made a three-day pilgrimage to Barajas and asked the king's permission to retire and serve God there, Philip was horrified. 'Village life is very good for the body,' he conceded, 'but for the soul I believe that one can serve God much better here [at court], especially in something so important and necessary as helping me, because without lots of help I don't know how I could carry such a burden.' He concluded briskly: 'And so I am very confident that you will gladly [continue to] shoulder your part of the burden'. When, three years later, a council president succumbed to the influenza epidemic that swept Castile, Philip again complained selfishly that if he died 'he will be a great loss to me. It's simply dreadful how many are falling by the wayside and how few remain.'¹⁸

The king 'worried about those who are falling by the wayside' in part because of 'the difficulty of finding suitable people to fill

vacant posts', or (as he put it) the 'lack of leaders' (*falta de cabezas*). When a complaint arrived from Naples about the need to choose better officials because 'they hold the king's honour and conscience in their hand,' Philip scribbled grumpily: 'If deeds were as easy as words in these matters, and if I were God and knew everyone's inner nature, this would be easy; but we are men, not gods.' In 1572, a senior official charged by the king with evaluating candidates to serve as president of the council of Castile disqualified almost everyone for one reason or another: Dr Martín de Velasco was a distinguished canon lawyer and an able minister, but he has 'children and grandchildren'; Don Antonio de Padilla was not tall enough ('his height counts against him because public figures, such as presidents, should adequately represent royal authority'); and so on.¹⁹ At least Philip did not discriminate on the basis of background. A surprising number of his senior advisers were either illegitimate (Antonio Pérez, Mateo Vázquez, Juan de Ovando, Antonio Gracián) or had Jewish ancestors (Gonzalo Pérez, and probably Diego de Espinosa) – circumstances that would have prevented their rise to prominence in other walks of life. The king came to appreciate the talents of others through their fathers (Granvelle was the son of Charles V's principal adviser on foreign affairs; Don Juan de Idiáquez, Pedro de Escobedo and Antonio Pérez were all sons of royal secretaries; Don Luis de Requesens and Don Juan de Zúñiga were the sons of the king's governor) or their uncles (Juan Vázquez de Molina, nephew of Francisco de Los Cobos, and his nephew Juan Vázquez de Salazar; Don Francisco de Bobadilla, nephew of the count of Chinchón). He also made use of senior clerics as council presidents (six of Philip's eight presidents of the council of the Indies and all Inquisitors-General) and even as viceroys; and he appointed many less eminent clerics as council secretaries (Gabriel de Zayas as well as Gonzalo Pérez and Mateo Vázquez) and ambassadors (Álvaro de la Quadra and Diego Guzmán de Silva, both sent to Protestant England).

Most of Philip's viceroys and ambassadors came from the ranks of the Spanish aristocracy, however – although this often presented the king with difficulties. In 1575, when trying to find the right candidate to serve as viceroy of Naples, 'having thought about it a lot over the past few days, it seems to me that the person most appropriate – or, to put it better, with fewest drawbacks, because I find no one without them – is the marquis of

Mondéjar ... I find so many drawbacks in all the rest,' the king sighed, 'that I dare not name any of them.' Four years later, when reviewing a long list of noblemen proposed by Vázquez as majordomo for the queen, the king again complained: 'I will think about them, and about any others who occur to me, because I really want to get this right,' but he added wearily, 'undoubtedly I will not find the person I would like to find. Instead I have to choose from the ones available.'²⁰

In the first half of his reign, Philip addressed the problem of 'lack of leaders' by increasing the ranks of the aristocracy: he created six new dukedoms (all of them for Ruy Gómez and his allies), nineteen new marquisates and two new earldoms (many for members of the new ducal families and the rest for established noble families, such as the Zúñiga); but for the rest of his reign he created only six new titles of nobility and left vacant numerous positions in the royal household normally held by nobles (no Master of the Horse after 1579, no majordomo after 1582 and so on). The catalyst of this change seems to have been the defiant behaviour of the duke of Alba (chapter 14) combined with the plan of some grandees to protest about the arrest and imprisonment of the princess of Éboli without trial. The president of the council of Castile relayed to the king a warning from a grandee that some of his colleagues, assembled in Madrid to swear loyalty to the new prince of Asturias, 'had resolved to petition Your Majesty after the ceremony to set the princess free'. Pazos told the grandee 'that I was not sure this was wise, and advised him to think about it carefully'. The king's reply was both firm and dismissive: 'You gave a good reply,' he said. 'This would have been very ill-advised ... Make sure you take appropriate steps to prevent them.'²¹

Many aristocrats already regarded royal service as unattractive. Some flatly refused to accept the posts that Philip offered them, while others agreed to serve only after protracted haggling for major rewards. Thus in 1568 Philip asked his former chief page, Don Luis de Requesens, to serve as lieutenant-general of the Mediterranean fleet, but he initially demanded in addition the post of viceroy of Sicily. When the king demurred, Requesens requested (and received) the rank of councillor of State and War, a guarantee that his son would succeed him as Comendador Mayor of Castile, plus a grant of 15,000 ducats in cash and an annual salary of

10,000 ducats, and ‘1500 for the gentlemen who would accompany him’. He accepted only when he had got his way. Five years later, Requesens refused to accept appointment as governor-general of the Netherlands until Philip promised to provide further cash incentives and permission for his daughter to marry a grandee.²² Another egregious case of blackmail occurred in 1588, when the king appointed the duke of Medina Sidonia as Captain-General of the Ocean Sea. In a letter to Mateo Vázquez, with whom he expected (correctly) that Philip would discuss the matter, the wealthiest aristocrat in Spain claimed that if he accepted the post he ‘would leave my family deeply in debt, with a young wife and four children, the oldest of them only nine years old. Sacrificing myself like this’ for the king’s service, the duke continued, ‘causes me acute pain’ – and to ease that pain, he asked for the grant of large estates to two of his sons ‘before I embark’. The duke’s brazenness irritated Philip, who told Vázquez: ‘Write him a warm letter assuring him that whatever may happen to him – and I hope that God will show him favour – I will look after his children as they deserve even if he should die on this campaign.’ He added: ‘This is just to you: I intend to grant the estates to his two sons when he returns, and also if he dies (which I hope to God he will not), but I do not want you to tell him or anyone else this for now.’²³

‘Only a hair’s breadth separates the king’s smile from his dagger’

Even when suitable nominees agreed to serve, some of them later disappointed, deceived and occasionally betrayed the king. In all such cases, he proved implacable, giving rise to the popular saying that ‘Only a hair’s breadth separates the king’s smile from his dagger’. He imprisoned Antonio Pérez and banished Prior Don Antonio de Toledo, and although both of them had worked by his side for years the king refused to see them ever again. In 1570 he approved the judicial murder of Baron Montigny, who had served the king and his father as courtier and diplomat since 1548 (chapter 8) and in 1578 of Juan de Escobedo, a prominent royal minister for twelve years (chapter 14). Six years later he arrested Don Martín de Acuña, who had helped to negotiate the first Hispano-Ottoman truce, and when Acuña confessed under torture to selling state secrets to the Turks the king sentenced him to be

secretly strangled in his cell. Philip nevertheless continued to favour the families of these offenders. The wife and children of Pérez received a state pension until they died; Pedro de Escobedo became a royal secretary; Acuña's son inherited part of his father's state pension and his brother became Philip's ambassador to Savoy. This was typical. According to Fray Diego de Chaves, who probably knew Philip better than anyone, 'His Majesty never dismissed anyone unless they had committed some fault, but rather honoured and promoted those who served him.' He 'felt obliged and bound by his reputation and honour', Chaves added, 'to avoid giving the impression that he had erred in making an appointment, or that a minister had not deserved the rewards that he had bestowed in the past'.²⁴

Philip made use of three mechanisms to keep his officials honest: his own direct scrutiny; administrative review; and the Inquisition. Apart from insisting that his ministers write directly to him in letters 'to be placed in the king's hands' (chapter 4), Philip also allowed discontented subjects to send a formal delegation to court at his expense. Thus in 1579 the king reminded the viceroy of Naples that 'it has never been, nor is it now, my wish or intention to deny our vassals direct access to Us, provided they have a just cause'. Delegations from all over the Monarchy took advantage of this dispensation, and despite the obstacles posed by distance the king showed special concern that 'we should receive and be informed of anything that concerns' his subjects in America.²⁵ Moreover, thanks to his insistence on signing in person all the letters and warrants issued in his name, Philip sometimes spotted an injustice or abuse. Thus the son of an official of the council of the Indies used his inside contacts to steal several hundred ducats of silver off a ship newly arrived from America in 1580. He was found out, and sentenced by the council to four years' exile and a fine of fifty ducats, which it later halved on appeal. This was extremely lenient, but the condemned man unwisely appealed to the council again and, no doubt out of respect for his father, they recommended further clemency to the king. Although the consulta was one of perhaps hundreds placed on Philip's desk that day, it caught his eye. 'The offence was serious,' he reminded the council, 'and deserved severe punishment. Seeing that the sentence has already been moderated on appeal – which should not have happened – there is no reason

to reduce it now by a single day.’²⁶

The second mechanism used by Philip to keep his officials honest consisted of two types of administrative review. All executive officers of the Spanish Monarchy faced a period of scrutiny, known as a *residencia*, immediately after their turn of duty ended. During this public process a royal judge (normally the official’s successor) investigated any charges of misconduct, and afterwards submitted his report to a special committee of the council of Castile (the *Cámara de Castilla*), which then prepared a *consulta* for the king. Of almost 600 *consultas* on *residencias* into the performance of *corregidores* (chief magistrates) of the cities of Castile conducted in the course of Philip’s reign, some 75 recommended punishment – more than enough to keep others on their toes. The *residencia* was routine and universal, but whenever the king suspected malfeasance, he commissioned a more searching investigation known as a *visita*, carried out in secret so that an official often only found that he was under investigation when he was charged. Philip employed this procedure against a few leading ministers (like Francisco de Eraso and Antonio Pérez) and a larger number of lesser officials suspected of corruption. In his history of the king’s reign, Cabrera de Córdoba recorded the fate of a treasury official who, although apparently ‘a very capable minister’, had built a house far beyond his means. Philip ‘set up a rigorous *visita* that suspended him from office and fined him 11,000 ducats. He lost royal favour so completely’ that when ‘the president of the council of Finance interceded for him, the king replied “Take note: that man is dead.”’²⁷

If these instruments of control proved inadequate or inappropriate, Philip could always turn to the Inquisition. In 1559 he allowed the Holy Office to prosecute Fray Bartolomé Carranza, the man he had appointed regent of Spain and guardian of his son should he die, and for the next three years he allowed Inquisitors to interrogate his ministers, his sister and even himself on the friar’s conduct (chapter 7). Two decades later, the Inquisitors intercepted a letter from Don Bernardo de Bolea, vice-chancellor of Aragon and thus the senior official of the kingdom, which included some phrases of questionable religious orthodoxy. Anxious to ‘keep my conscience clear’, the king suggested that Inquisitor-General Quiroga consult the royal confessor, and the two clerics suggested that Bolea make a ‘spontaneous’ self-denunciation to an Inquisitor,

who would impose ‘the appropriate penance. This should all be done in secret so that nobody will know.’ In this way, the king upheld the dignity of the office while reminding a prominent minister that his thoughts as well as his deeds must be pure.²⁸ Philip thus wrote the truth when he assured Quiroga in 1574 that ‘I will always favour and further the affairs of the Holy Office, because I fully understand the reasons and obligation to do so, and for me more than anyone’. Again in 1592, after the intervention of the inquisitors of Zaragoza in the trial of Antonio Pérez provoked the revolt of Aragon, the king declared that ‘the principal reason that led me to take the matter so seriously’ was that he wished to demonstrate to all his subjects that they must ‘obey and respect the Holy Office’.²⁹

The supreme lawgiver

Although Philip thus deferred meekly to the Holy Office, he insisted on having the last word in all other judicial matters because, as Mateo Vázquez put it, ‘Your Majesty is the embodiment of the law.’ The king acted as supreme lawgiver in four distinct areas, starting with the royal domain. Thus when the count of Cifuentes built a watermill on the Tagus just upstream from his palace at Aranjuez, Philip complained that it reduced the water available for the royal gardens and asked the count to remove it, and when he refused in 1569 the king sued his vassal in the local court at Toledo. Two years later, the judges decided in his favour, but the count of Cifuentes immediately appealed the case to the chancery at Valladolid. This clearly irritated the king (whose beloved gardens continued to suffer) and he wrote a peremptory note ordering the judges ‘to deal with this matter with diligence and care so that it may be settled as quickly as possible because it is our personal suit and affects our royal patrimony and treasury’. The king intervened directly in another case involving his domain in 1569. A guard at the Pardo palace caught two poachers red-handed with seven rabbits. The poachers drew their swords, half killed the guard, and escaped. Philip himself sentenced the two poachers to death (for resisting arrest, not for poaching: ‘There is no doubt that poaching is not a capital offence,’ the king admitted) and also banished the poachers’ wives from their village for two years – albeit with some reluctance:

‘With wives one has to be moderate, on account of the obligation they have to their husbands in such matters’, and furthermore ‘a wife should not lose what should be her own because of a crime committed by her husband’. But these wives had been caught poaching with their husbands, and so they must pay. The king was determined to protect his game, and (like other landowners) he called constantly for more vigilance, more prosecutions and harsher penalties.³⁰

Conversely, the king sometimes intervened in the legal system to exercise his prerogative of mercy. Every Good Friday, his almoner presented ‘many cases of men condemned to death who had been forgiven by their victims so that the king could absolve them of the legal consequences too ... And he pardoned them.’ Philip did the same to celebrate events which he saw as special favours from God. Thus after the victory of Lepanto and the birth of Prince Fernando in 1571 ‘the king joyfully issued a general pardon to all prisoners in Spain and America who had not committed a crime against others’; and eight years later, when he entered Portugal as king, he freed the prisoners in the jail of each town through which he passed.³¹

In this, the king exercised the same prerogative of mercy as other heads of state, but he also acted as ‘the embodiment of the law’ in two further ways. Whenever his judges found gaps in the law, Philip formulated general rules because, as he once wrote, ‘When experience reveals major obstacles in the execution of some law, the king can and must suspend and annul it’; and in 1575 he reminded the president of the council of Castile that ‘although enforcing justice is our principal obligation, the manner in which we do it also matters’.³² On the other hand, he sometimes used his ‘absolute royal power’ to override existing legislation. Thus in 1559 he signed a codicil to his testament that explicitly overrode the *Siete Partidas*, the fundamental law of Castile, concerning the age at which, should he die, his ‘son and universal heir’ Don Carlos could start to rule: should the prince remain unmarried at that time, he would remain a minor until age 20, as the *Partidas* stated, but if he should then be married, then ‘as king and sovereign, recognizing no superior in temporal affairs’, Philip declared this part of the *Partidas* should ‘cease and have no force’: Don Carlos would exercise full powers at once.³³ The king occasionally used a similar formula to justify a questionable action. In 1557 he

authorized two ministers to conclude an alliance ‘by virtue of our own will, personal knowledge, and absolute royal power that we wish to exercise in this matter as king and sovereign, recognizing no superior in temporal affairs’; and in 1582 he deprived the princess of Éboli of ‘the care and custody’ of her children in spite of the explicit terms of the testament of her late husband Ruy Gómez, ‘as king and sovereign, to whom such authority belongs’.³⁴ He also issued hundreds of warrants rehabilitating those condemned by the Inquisition (or their descendants). Thus in 1589 Joan Sánchez, son of a man ‘condemned for the crime of heresy’ by the Inquisitors of Murcia, protested to the king that he ‘was disqualified from holding public office in these our realms’: Sánchez now asked for a dispensation so that he could ‘exercise criminal jurisdiction’. The king first consulted ‘our council of the Inquisition; which gave its approval’, and thereupon signed a warrant ‘by virtue of our own will, personal knowledge, and absolute royal power that we wish to exercise in this matter’ that allowed Sánchez to hold public office ‘notwithstanding any laws and proclamations to the contrary’.³⁵

Such elaborate rationales remained rare: normally Philip saw no need to explain why he should not disobey his own laws whenever he considered it necessary, even when ordering the extrajudicial execution of Escobedo (chapter 14), William of Orange (chapter 17), and others. But this was a two-way street: some of the king’s enemies also resorted to extrajudicial execution. The first known attempt to murder Philip occurred in London in 1556 when a group of conspirators planned to stab him and Queen Mary to death at a tournament. In 1580, while the king resided in Badajoz, ‘a young Portuguese woman asked to speak to the king. When the guards asked her what she wanted, she said she came to demand justice, and so they let her through’; but when she approached the king ‘someone lifted her sleeve and she was found to be carrying a dagger. Later, closer examination revealed that she also had a knife’. Shortly afterwards, while in Lisbon, another ‘young woman’ brought Philip a written warning that his enemies were digging a mine to explode under the church where he normally worshipped: he at once sent courtiers to investigate, and they found it. In 1586 Philip ‘gave an audience to a Portuguese woman, and it was subsequently found’ that she ‘had plotted to stab the king with a sharp dagger which she had concealed in her pilgrim’s staff’.³⁶

The king offered an easy target to assassins. The duke of Alba warned him more than once 'that it seemed a mistake for His Majesty to come' to the Escorial 'alone and without guards, since his movements in this lonely place were so predictable'; while the assassination of Escobedo reminded a courtier that in 1492 'in Barcelona, a man stabbed King Ferdinand, great-grandfather of Your Majesty' and he trembled with fear when he saw Philip 'in the courtyard' of the Escorial 'alone and entirely without everything that could and should generate fear and respect in the mind of someone with wicked intent'.³⁷ But Philip showed no fear. Although (as his critics asserted) he normally tried to keep a low profile, whenever he made a public progress he entered every town and city mounted on a horse, alone in the middle of large crowds; and a funeral oration in 1598 reminded mourners how the late king 'used to sleep safe and sound beneath windows that opened on to the street; how he used to walk in the fields alone and without guards; how he gave audiences unarmed and alone'.³⁸ The king sometimes joined his subjects in their devotions. On his progresses, he attended Mass every day in a local church or convent; and on Ash Wednesday in 1585, walking through the streets of Zaragoza, he met a religious procession coming the other way and at once moved aside into the crowd, fell to his knees bareheaded, and remained there in the midst of his subjects in silent respect until the Sacrament had passed. In 1592, on his last great Progress, Philip sat with his children among the students as they listened to public lectures at the university of Valladolid.

The king's two bodies

Philip, like all monarchs, had 'two bodies': public and private. Although he apparently appeared in public only once 'dressed in brocade with his sceptre in his hand' – on the day he was sworn king of Portugal (plate 37) – he often demonstrated his majesty in other ways. When he visited Córdoba Cathedral in 1570, and found that the embalmed corpse of his ancestor Alfonso VIII (died 1214) lay in an open sarcophagus 'he removed his hat not only in respect but with reverence', and when he noticed that the corpse lacked the sword it used to hold, 'he handed over his own sword for the purpose, observing that it was inappropriate to give the king, his lord, a sword that did not belong to a king.' Three years

later, on learning that in Peru his officials had begun to enter 'places with a standard and canopy [*palio*],' he wrote angrily: 'these are royal insignia and ceremonies, which only the king in person can use'. He ordered the viceroy 'to desist from now onwards, without any exception'. The king also insisted on the 'royal we' in all legislation 'intended to be permanent and observed by the kings who would succeed him', especially 'in such things as "we order and command", because "we" has always been used thus'.³⁹

Normally, however, Philip preferred the 'dignity through understatement' advocated in Castiglione's influential *Book of the Courtier*: that is how he appears at the height of his power in the 'state portrait' of 1587, done when he was 60 (see plate 40). Although he had a new suit of clothes made every month, the design and the colour – black – remained the same. Sometimes the king 'dressed down' even further. In 1559, the English ambassador reported that Philip received him dressed 'very playnly', just 'cladde in a plaine blacke cloke with clothe cappe'; while one of the monks at the Escorial later noted that the king attended services 'looking just like a physician' (not a parallel the king would have relished, given his contempt for physicians), adding 'He did not even wear a sword.' In 1585, when Philip met his future son-in-law, the duke of Savoy, for the first time he arrived 'dressed in black without any pomp, except for his insignia of the Golden Fleece'; and although everyone else was refulgently dressed at the betrothal of his daughter, 'the king looked very ordinary, dressed in black cloth just like the citizens'.⁴⁰

Even when attired 'very playnly', however, Philip had the power to intimidate the people he met. When she entered his presence, Teresa of Ávila reported that 'I felt completely confused when I started to speak to him, because he fixed his penetrating gaze on me and seemed to see deep into my soul ... so that I lowered my eyes and told him what I wanted as quickly as possible.' Whenever Ambassador Leonardo Donà scheduled an audience, he spent hours beforehand 'reading and re-reading more than ten times' the letters and instructions that he had received in case Philip should ask him a question about them. In his funeral sermon, a court preacher noted that 'with a sideways glance he sent some men to their graves' and asked rhetorically 'how many great scholars, how many valiant captains, were unsettled, trembled, and mute in the

presence of His Majesty?’⁴¹

In part this was a facade. The king often displayed a lack of self-confidence by obsessing about ‘getting things right’ (*acertar* was one of the commonest terms in his vocabulary). He assured Inquisitor-General Quiroga that ‘I want to get everything right, especially in matters where religion is concerned’; ‘I want so much to get right the appointment of a president [of the council of Castile]’; and ‘I shall not cease to think about everything, to make sure we get it right’ – three examples taken from his correspondence with a single minister in a single year, 1576. The king’s anxiety remained undiminished with the passage of time. In 1592 he thanked the Suprema for ‘the great care you take in matters that are so important for the service of God, myself, and the authority of the Holy Office (because it is impossible to separate them), so that we can get things right’; while two years later he announced that ‘I have been thinking for some days about the choice of Inquisitor-General, greatly desiring to get it right’.⁴²

The failure of leadership

The king’s anxiety to ‘get it right’, which compelled him to take all important decisions himself, created a system of government that resembled a panopticon, in which only the person at the centre can see everything. Although this arrangement has obvious appeal for that individual, it also creates obvious dangers. The primary task of a ruler, like the leader of any corporate organization, is to define clear objectives for their enterprise, develop a plan for achieving those objectives and then systematically monitor progress by adjusting the plan to circumstances whenever necessary. Their task is to ask the ‘open questions’ – what, when and why – and visualize how the enterprise should evolve over the next few years; they must also choose and coach subordinates to realize these goals, and delegate execution to them. Policy should never be confused with execution: leaders set goals and give directions, while managers implement them.

According to modern organizational theory, the least efficient and least successful corporate system is the ‘crisis management’ model, in which the leader attempts to do everything in a dictatorial and secretive manner, reduces employees at all levels to simple functionaries and then, overwhelmed by the burden of


responsibility, restricts the goals of the organization to coping with each successive challenge and trying to avoid mistakes. This style of leadership, sometimes termed a 'zero defects mentality', was the one adopted by Philip. Thus before giving his final approval for any major action, he waited until he believed everything was perfect. In 1571, as the Venetian ambassador in Madrid waited anxiously for Spain's galleys to put to sea and join the fleet of the Holy League (chapter 11), he noted with irritated fascination the king's insistence that, 'Where naval warfare is concerned, every tiny detail takes up the longest time and prevents voyages, because not having oars or sails ready, or having insufficient quantities of ovens to bake biscuits, or the lack of just ten trees or masts, on many occasions holds up for months on end the progress of the fleet.' Moreover, once the last oar, sail, oven and mast had been assembled, the king expected everything to happen like clockwork.⁴³

This assumption was of course wholly unrealistic, given the limitations imposed by sixteenth-century technology and communications – but three factors blinded Philip to this critical defect. First, the king maintained the largest and best information service in Europe. A Netherlands envoy at court in 1566 warned his master back in Brussels: 'As Your Lordship knows, nothing happens there that is not immediately known here'; while eight years later an astute Italian ambassador deemed that the information at the king's disposal 'was such that there is nothing he does not know'.⁴⁴ Philip maintained permanent embassies in Rome, Venice, France, Genoa, Vienna, the Swiss Cantons and Savoy (also in Lisbon until 1580 and in London until 1584) as well as temporary missions elsewhere when occasion required; and whereas the ambassadors and ministers of most other European states normally sent one dispatch each month to their principals, Philip expected at least one dispatch each week – and sometimes more. In 1557, when he learned that a French army might attempt to relieve St Quentin, he ordered his commander at the siege to 'send me news by sending three or four messengers here, flying at top speed', and 'to this end, to keep post horses ready night and day'. Six years later, he informed his envoy at the council of Trent that 'there should be nothing, great or small, that is done or even contemplated in the council without you knowing all about it'. In 1588, during the Armada campaign, the king instructed his agents

to provide a constant stream of news 'because now is the time to advise me of everything minute by minute'.⁴⁵

Philip's ministers obliged. The king informed the duke of Alba during the invasion of Portugal in 1580 that 'I want you to let me know every day what is going on', and the duke obliged by sending two, three and even four letters a day; while his ambassadors and their spies penetrated and reported to him almost every secret in Europe. Thus in the 1560s, his officials in either London or Paris managed to obtain a map of the French settlements in Florida (which greatly assisted Philip's subsequent campaign to destroy them: chapter 7), while in the 1570s his ambassador in England 'paid 90 ducats to a person whom he sent on the ship on which Sir Humphrey Gilbert sailed to America', and this unknown agent provided a treasure trove of information that helped Philip to thwart all attempts to discover the Northwest Passage.⁴⁶ In the 1580s the chief papal cipher clerk, the English ambassador in Paris and the comptroller of Queen Elizabeth's household (to name just the most prominent) all accepted Spanish bribes in return for valuable intelligence.

The efficiency of Philip's archivists in storing and classifying all this information constituted the second factor that sustained their master's mistaken conviction that he had an unlimited capacity to 'get it right'. The king created and maintained several repositories: one in Barcelona for papers relating to the crown of Aragon; one in Naples for the muniments of the viceroyalty; one in the church of St James in Rome for papal briefs and bulls in his favour; and another in the fortress of Simancas for the papers of Castile and the central government. These were all 'working archives': between 1583 and 1593 the royal archivist at Simancas received almost 300 requests for copies of items in his collection, 35 of them from Philip himself – one of them a request for a document that proved that the crown had the right to nominate all deans in the kingdom of Granada. His archivist found a bull of 1493 that proved the point, and Philip smugly sent a copy to his ambassador in Rome.⁴⁷



14. Requests for copies of documents received by the archive of Simancas, 1548–99. In its first half century, the royal archive at Simancas received petitions for copies of one or more of its documents from 154 commoners, 112 nobles, 79 royal officials, 77 communities – and 35 from the king himself. Over one-third of the requests concerned documents generated by the council of Castile, while another fifth involved America. Almost half the requests came in the decade 1583–93.

The final element that reinforced Philip's dangerous belief in his omniscience was the superb courier service at his disposal. The contract made by his father with the Taxis (or Tassis) family created chains of postal stations that linked Spain with Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, and every week scores of official messages passed safely along those chains. This network could be expanded whenever the need arose. Thus in 1567 the duke of Alba established a new postal chain, with two horses at each relay station, from Milan to Brussels during his march to the Netherlands along what would later be called the Spanish Road, providing an alternative link with Spain whenever war rendered passage through France unsafe. As Giovanni Ugolini has observed, a letter could travel faster than anything else in the early modern world.⁴⁸ In 1566, when rebellion broke out in the Netherlands, individual couriers managed to convey messages from Brussels to the king in eleven, ten and, in one case, just nine days (an average

speed of almost a hundred miles on horseback each day). Five years later, news of the victory of Lepanto covered over 2,000 miles in three weeks (again an average speed of almost a hundred miles a day); and the following year a galley carrying letters from Philip's fleet in Messina reached Barcelona – almost a thousand miles away – in only eight days.

The superior quality of Philip's information network frequently placed foreign ambassadors at the court of Spain at a disadvantage because Philip knew about developments before they did. On 15 October 1569, for example, Philip summoned Ambassador Fourquevaux of France to an audience and announced 'with a smile on his face' that his master's army had won a major victory over the Protestants at Moncontour, near Poitiers: a special messenger from his agent in Lyons had just arrived with the news. Confirmation of the victory came on the 21st with an express courier sent by the Spanish ambassador in France, but Fourquevaux did not hear about it from his own government for some days.⁴⁹ The king even managed to embarrass the ambassadors of the republic of Venice, whose information-gathering service was the envy of Europe. On 6 June 1571 a royal messenger from Rome brought news that the representatives of Spain, Venice and the Papacy had just concluded a league dedicated to the defeat of the Ottoman Turks eighteen days earlier; a papal courier arrived with confirmation on the 10th; but the Venetian ambassador, Leonardo Donà, received word from his own government only on the 28th. Later that year, although Donà was the first ambassador to receive a full account of the victory of Lepanto, when he arrived to share the news with the king he discovered that Philip had got word of it half an hour before.

Of course, the system did not always function that well. As Philip grumbled on one occasion, 'couriers either fly or sleep'. For example, of thirty-two letters from Madrid received by the Spanish ambassador in Paris during the year 1578, the fastest took only seven days; half of the total took between ten and fourteen days; and one took 49 days – a spread of between one and seven weeks. Unfortunately for Philip, no correlation existed between the urgency of a message and the speed of its arrival. In 1558, news of Charles V's death at Yuste on 21 September reached Philip in Brussels only on 1 December, while news of his wife Mary's death in London on 17 November did not reach him until 7 December.

The king's decision to launch a surprise attack on Algiers in March 1566 was totally impracticable by the time his letter detailing the plan reached the commander of his Mediterranean fleet, who was to play a key role, because the courier carrying the letter took two months to find the fleet. Likewise, the letter containing Philip's decision in July 1573 to switch from a policy of 'hard war' against the Dutch to one of conciliation miscarried because it took six weeks to reach the Netherlands. During the Iconoclastic Fury of 1566, the governor of the outlying province of Friesland, trying to secure help from the central government in Brussels, found that 'messengers on foot go faster'; while the chronic insecurity of the roads in the south of France sometimes compelled the Spanish ambassador in Paris to entrust dispatches to ordinary travellers on foot because they were less likely to be stopped and searched. The information and command system of the Spanish Monarchy had literally slowed to a walk.⁵⁰

All statesmen resemble the captain of a riverboat: they can maintain steerage way only so long as their ship moves faster than the current. Philip's insistence on acquiring ever more data, feeding his illusion that this enabled – entitled – him to micromanage both policy and operations, paradoxically slowed down his ship of state and thus diminished his control. The king seemed aware of this problem earlier in his reign: he either briefed his principal lieutenants in person or at least entrusted his instructions to a minister capable of explaining his intentions in detail; and he sometimes delegated the final decision on critical operational issues to those whom he tasked with implementing them. Thus in 1557, during the siege of St Quentin, he wrote to his field commander, 'These matters cannot be decided here in a timely fashion, and because opportunities and events change by the hour' he conceded that 'you can put into effect whatever you see to be most appropriate and necessary for the success of this venture'. A decade later, he provided the duke of Alba with extremely detailed instructions on the policies to follow in the Netherlands, but then added the vital concession: 'I delegate all these matters to you, as the person who will be handling the enterprise and will have a better understanding of the obstacles or advantages that may prevail.' And in 1574 he granted Alba's successor, Don Luis de Requesens, similar latitude: 'This is what seems best to me but you, holding responsibility for these things,

will do what you see to be most fitting for my service, and for the advancement of what lies in your hands.’⁵¹

In 1585, Mateo Vázquez advised a colleague that in decision-making one should do ‘what used to be said to ambassadors’, namely (and here he shamelessly imitated the king’s style, employing the ‘vos’ form): ‘You who are on the spot and hold the matter in your hands, will see and do what you understand to be most appropriate’ – but the key phrase was ‘used to’. Philip now drafted the crucial documents that explained policy to his subordinates in Madrid or the Escorial and then sent them by courier to those tasked with execution. ‘Waste no time in complaints and questions,’ he commanded, but instead ‘Believe me, as one who has complete information on the present state of affairs in all areas.’⁵² This was ridiculous. Even if the king had possessed ‘complete information on the present state of affairs in all areas’, it would have been of little use because by the time his instructions reached their destination ‘the present state of affairs’ would have changed.

Philip never seems to have recognized these limitations, even during crises that expanded dramatically the number of urgent decisions required; and yet, in the words of an eminent contemporary strategic analyst:

There is only so much that any human can absorb, digest and act upon in a given period of time. The greater the stress, the more individuals will ignore or misrepresent data, mistake and misconstrue information, and the greater will be the prospects for confusion, disorientation and surprise.

In short, ‘More information from more sources, made available more quickly than ever before, equals system overload.’ In the sixteenth as in the twenty-first century, ‘Processing and transmission technologies far outstrip our ability to assimilate, sort and distribute information.’⁵³ Even if, as Don Juan de Silva speculated irreverently in 1589, ‘His Majesty’s brain must be the biggest in the world’, events would show that it was still too small to micromanage an empire on which the sun never set.

PART V

THE KING VANQUISHED

The ‘Enterprise of England’, 1585–1588

Spain under attack

Soon after his election as pope in April 1585, Sixtus V mentioned to the Spanish ambassador in Rome his zeal to commission some outstanding enterprise for the Catholic Church, such as the conquest of England. The ambassador dutifully informed his master, but Philip angrily scribbled on the back of the letter, ‘doesn’t [the reconquest of] the Low Countries seem “outstanding” to them? Do they never think of how much it costs? The English idea lacks substance.’¹

For a while, Sixtus obligingly shifted his attention elsewhere, but in August 1585 he again called on Philip to invade England. Once more Philip rejected the idea, albeit slightly less firmly. After emphasizing the cost and the long duration of the war in the Netherlands – ‘entirely to avoid concessions over religion’ and ‘to maintain obedience there to God and the Holy See’ – the king urged his ambassador to impress upon the pope the strategic dilemma that faced him.

Let His Holiness judge whether I can undertake new enterprises, with this one [the Dutch war] in its current state ... because one cannot deal effectively with more than one thing at a time; and let him consider whether reducing the pressure there [in the Netherlands] for anything else would be right, or a service to Our Lord ... because the war is fought against heretics, which is what the pope wants. He should not

think me idle as long as it continues.

Nevertheless, Philip conceded, 'If God is pleased to end that war, as (with His favour) one may hope, then there would be a way to satisfy the pope's holy zeal in some other area.'²

The news that Sir Francis Drake and his English expeditionary force had sacked Galicia (chapter 15) transformed the king's position: in the words of the Imperial ambassador in Madrid, 'With this act the English have removed their mask'. Although initially Philip could do nothing – 'you must realize that the event was so unexpected that we can provide you with no help from here', he apologized to his officials in Galicia – the question was no longer whether he would counter-attack but when and how that counter-attack would take place. Philip commissioned his principal adviser on foreign affairs Don Juan de Zúñiga to prepare a thorough review of Spain's security priorities in the light of Drake's attack.³

Zúñiga's response represented Spanish strategic planning at its best. He first identified four major enemies – the Turks, the French, the Dutch and the English – and then reasoned that the Ottoman sultan, previously Spain's foremost antagonist, had committed so many resources to a struggle with Persia that Philip need only maintain a defensive posture in the Mediterranean; while the French, also once a major threat, now seemed so thoroughly mired in their own civil disputes that although it might be necessary to intervene at some stage to prolong them, the cost to Spain would probably not be high. This left the Dutch and the English. The former had been a thorn in Philip's flesh since the rebellion of 1572, because every Spanish success had been counterbalanced by a reverse; but although costly and humiliating, at least the problem remained confined to the Low Countries. The English menace was quite different. It had arisen recently and it threatened the entire Hispanic world, because Elizabeth had provided support to the Dutch and to the Portuguese Pretender, Don Antonio, as well as to Drake. Zúñiga argued that since England had now openly broken with Spain, 'to fight a purely defensive war is to incur a huge and permanent expense, because we have to defend the Indies, Spain and the convoys travelling between them'. He therefore asserted that an amphibious attack in overwhelming strength on Elizabeth's realms represented not only the most effective form of defence but the cheapest. He also

argued that although the immediate diversion of resources to the Enterprise of England (as the venture was called) might temporarily halt the reconquest of the Netherlands and increase the vulnerability of Spanish America, these risks must be taken because English aggression threatened the entire Spanish Monarchy.⁴

Events soon vindicated Zúñiga's analysis. English troops paid by Elizabeth arrived in the Netherlands and her Favourite, the earl of Leicester, became governor-general of the rebellious provinces; meanwhile Drake continued his destructive progress through the Canaries and the Cape Verde Islands to the Caribbean, where he sacked Santo Domingo. In Madrid, Cardinal Granvelle fretted that 'the queen of England makes war on us so boldly and dishonestly, and that we cannot get our own back', while in Lisbon the marquis of Santa Cruz composed a *Discourse* that reviewed various ways to guard against the possibility of further attacks by Drake.⁵ By contrast Archbishop Don Rodrigo de Castro of Seville, who had worked with the king to re-Catholicize England in the 1550s, roundly condemned such craven and pusillanimous responses. What was the point, he enquired, of concentrating on Drake, a fine sailor with a powerful fleet? Surely the best way to end the English menace would be to attack England while its leading admiral was absent from home waters. 'If we are going to undertake a campaign against England,' he thundered, 'there will never be a better time.' The king agreed, scribbling on the dorse of Castro's letter 'The decision has already been taken.'⁶

It had indeed: on 24 October 1585, scarcely two weeks after Drake's forces landed in Galicia, Philip informed the pope that he would, after all, accept the invitation to undertake the conquest of England. The king sounded only two notes of caution. First, 'although His Holiness and His Majesty agree and are of the same mind about this enterprise, the lack of time (since putting the venture into effect requires extensive preparations) excludes the possibility of doing it in 1586, and so it will have to be delayed until 1587'. Second, because the total cost of the venture might exceed three million ducats, at a time when the war in the Netherlands already stretched Spain's finances to the limit, the king emphasized that although he was 'happy to contribute what he can, it cannot be more than a third – or at the most a half – of the cost. The rest will have to come from [Rome]'.⁷ Once Philip

received reassurance on this score, in December 1585 he invited his nephew Alexander Farnese, prince and later duke of Parma, fresh from his triumphant reconquest of most of Flanders and Brabant, to devise a suitable strategy for invasion.

The ‘masterplan’

It was one thing to decide that the Tudor state must be eliminated and quite another to achieve it. The king knew from his history lessons as a boy, as well as from his experience as Mary Tudor’s consort, all about successful seaborne invasions of England. Some consisted of a combined operation by a fleet strong enough to defeat the opposing English navy while shepherding across the Channel an army sufficient to accomplish the conquest, just as William of Normandy had done in 1066. Others involved mounting a surprise assault, as Henry VII (Elizabeth’s grandfather) had done in 1485, likewise with spectacular success. Yet other invaders had assembled an army in secret near the Channel while launching a diversionary assault elsewhere to draw off most of England’s defenders, leaving the mainland relatively open to invasion by the main force. That all three possible strategies received consideration in 1586–8 reflects great credit on the vision and competence of Philip and his ‘national security advisers’; that the king eventually tried to undertake all three at once does not.

Confusion commenced in February 1586, when Santa Cruz sent an eloquent paper arguing that the best way to defend the Iberian world would be an amphibious attack on England, which he offered to command. Philip immediately instructed the marquis to prepare and send ‘a paper showing the way in which you believe this could be effected, should circumstances permit’.⁸ The following month Santa Cruz sent a detailed discussion on logistics, entitled ‘The fleet and army that it seems would be necessary to assemble for the conquest of England’. It prudently omitted both the precise strategy and the exact target envisaged, because ‘the business is such that it is absolutely impossible to deal with or discuss it in writing’, but the immense quantity and nature of the munitions specified – 510 ships, carrying 55,000 infantry and 1,600 cavalry, with all their supporting equipment, munitions and artillery – made his intentions clear enough. He aimed to emulate William the Conqueror and invade in overwhelming strength.

Meanwhile, in Brussels, Parma completed and dispatched his own detailed plan for invading England, as requested by the king the previous year. The 28-page assessment began by regretting the lack of secrecy surrounding the king's intentions, asserting that even ordinary soldiers and civilians in the Netherlands now openly discussed the Enterprise of England. Nevertheless, he believed that three basic precautions might still ensure success. Philip must have sole charge 'without placing any reliance on either the English Catholics, or the assistance of other allies'; he must also ensure that the French could not interfere, either by sending assistance to Elizabeth or by intervening in the Netherlands; and he must command enough troops and resources to defend the Netherlands from attack after the assault force had left. Parma offered to lead 30,000 infantry and 500 cavalry drawn from the Army of Flanders across the Channel aboard a flotilla of seagoing barges in a surprise attack on England. He felt sure that the invasion could be undertaken with a fair chance of success, provided his precise intentions remained a secret, 'given the number of troops we have at hand here and the ease with which we can concentrate and embark them in the barges, and considering that we can ascertain, at any moment, the forces which Elizabeth has and can be expected to have, and that the crossing only takes 10 to 12 hours without a following wind (and 8 hours with one)'. 'The most suitable, close and accessible point of disembarkation,' he concluded, 'is the coast between Dover and Margate', which would permit a rapid march on London. Only two paragraphs of the letter addressed the possibility of naval support from Spain, and even then only in the context of 'the worst possible scenario': that somehow details of the plan leaked, forfeiting the element of surprise and allowing Elizabeth to mobilize her forces to prevent a landing. In that case, Parma suggested, perhaps Santa Cruz and his fleet could 'create a diversion which will draw the English fleet away from the Channel'. This corresponded to the third alternative strategy for invading England: a naval decoy to facilitate an attack by a relatively unprotected invasion army.⁹

Parma entrusted his assessment to a special messenger who only arrived at court in late June. By then, the Spanish capital was in turmoil. Mateo Vázquez complained to the president of the council of Castile, responsible for law and order, that

the people of Madrid are talking very freely about the damage done by the Englishman Francis Drake, using brazen and careless words, implying that we failed to take appropriate steps to stop him. This raises the suspicion that someone is trying to unsettle people, instead of stressing the great prudence and wisdom with which His Majesty has acted and is acting to do everything possible.

The president replied suavely (and revealingly) that ‘although there are always some wicked people and unquiet spirits everywhere, in this case I do not believe that those who talk about this do so because they are wicked’. Rather ‘everyone can see how much England and the Englishman Francis Drake affect public affairs here’, and so naturally people talked about it. He therefore suggested that Philip should create a special committee to discuss (and be seen to discuss) ‘all matters of state and war that involve the English’.¹⁰ But ‘open government’ was not the king’s style. Instead, he passed Parma’s assessment to Zúñiga.

After due deliberation, Zúñiga advised the king to embrace a more ambitious version of Parma’s strategy. He should concentrate a fleet of 120 galleons, galleasses, galleys, merchantmen and pinnaces, together with an army of 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry in Lisbon, and launch them against either Waterford in Ireland or Milford Haven in Wales. At the same time, Philip should send reinforcements to the Army of Flanders, ostensibly to tie down the Dutch and English forces in Holland but really to cross the Channel in small boats in preparation for a surprise march on London while Elizabeth’s forces tried to destroy the distant bridgehead established by the Armada. Given that Spain would gain no advantage from the direct annexation of England (‘because of the cost of defending it’), Zúñiga recommended that the newly conquered realm should be bestowed upon a friendly Catholic ruler. He suggested Mary Stuart, after she had married a dependable Catholic prince such as Parma.¹¹

These suggestions formed the basis of the comprehensive invasion strategy, henceforth called (for security reasons) ‘the masterplan’. In July 1586, Philip had sent it to both Parma in Brussels and to Santa Cruz in Lisbon, and although no such document has so far come to light (if indeed the plan was ever committed to paper) its contents can be deduced from subsequent correspondence. Santa Cruz would lead an Armada from Lisbon in the summer of 1587 – one year later – carrying all available troops

together with the heavy equipment (above all, a powerful siege train) needed for a successful attack on London. He would sail first to Ireland and secure a beachhead to distract Elizabeth's naval forces and neutralize their potential for resistance; then, after some two months, he would suddenly leave Ireland and make a dash for the Channel. At that point, and not before, Parma would embark the main invasion force of 30,000 veterans on a flotilla of small ships secretly assembled in the ports of Flanders, and cross to Margate on the Kent coast shielded by the Armada, which would maintain local command of the Narrow Seas. Parma's men, reinforced by the soldiers and the siege train aboard the fleet, would then advance on London and seize it – preferably with Elizabeth and her ministers still there.

One wonders whether Philip realized the enormous risks inherent in the masterplan. Santa Cruz's initial proposal contained much merit: the 1588 campaign proved that, once they got an Armada to sea, the Spaniards could move 60,000 tons of shipping from one end of the Channel to the other, despite repeated English assaults. Likewise, the successful landing at Kinsale in 1601 showed that an amphibious force from Spain could capture and hold a beachhead in southern Ireland. Parma's counter-proposal of a surprise landing in Kent also had much to recommend it: time and again, his troops had shown their mettle under his leadership, and Elizabeth's army, largely untrained and taken by surprise, would have found it difficult if not impossible to repel the Army of Flanders once it got ashore. The failure of the Enterprise of England ultimately arose from the decision to unite the fleet from Spain with the army from the Netherlands as the essential prelude to launching the invasion.

Why did he make this crucial error? Philip had participated in two victorious campaigns at the beginning of his reign (chapter 3) and in the early 1580s he had approved both the daring transfer of a large army and its equipment from Setubal to Cascais, a sea journey of 125 miles, and the dispatch of two amphibious forces to capture islands over 1,000 miles from the Iberian Peninsula (chapter 15). He also possessed direct experience of the route his invasion forces would follow: in 1554 he had sailed from Corunna to Southampton, a journey he completed in just one week, and over the next three years he crossed the Channel three times. But once he returned to Spain, the king remained an armchair

strategist: technical, tactical and operational considerations were a closed book to him. Moreover, since he refused to return to Lisbon and supervise the assembly of the fleet in person, as some of his advisers suggested, Santa Cruz had to wait at least a week to receive approval of each decision he referred to the king. Parma, for his part, had to wait at least four weeks. Furthermore, Philip declined to brief either of his commanders properly. Both received the masterplan by courier, so they could not insist that Philip explain precisely how the two large and totally independent forces, with operational bases separated by over 600 miles of ocean, could attain the accuracy of time and place necessary to accomplish their junction; or how the vulnerable and lightly armed troop transports collected in Flanders could evade the Dutch and English warships stationed offshore expressly to intercept and destroy them. Finally, since both Zúñiga and Granvelle, the only ministers in Madrid who possessed the authority and the knowledge to raise objections, died in the autumn of 1586, no one insisted that Philip must devise a 'Plan B'.

Instead the king signed a stream of commands mobilizing the resources of his Monarchy to put the masterplan into effect. Officials in all ports must embargo any merchant ship deemed suitable to transport troops and munitions and send them to Lisbon; captains must raise troops in Spain to serve on the Armada; the viceroys of Naples and Sicily must send troops along the Spanish Road to reinforce Parma as well as supplies, ships and more soldiers to join Santa Cruz.

The Armada takes shape

The enormous cost of the Enterprise of England forced the king to economize elsewhere. In 1586, he rejected a proposal from the council of the Indies to improve the defences of the Caribbean in the wake of Drake's depredations. 'No one regrets the damage and no one desires a remedy more than I do, if only we had a way to execute it as we wish,' he informed the council, 'but your plan presents a lot of problems, and the biggest one is the lack of money with which to pay for it.' He likewise vetoed a proposal to build a fortress at Mombasa in East Africa, and a call from the settlers of the Philippines to invade China: the reason given in each case was the need to concentrate all resources on taking

down the Tudor state.¹²

The king also deployed other means to weaken and isolate Elizabeth. He prohibited all trade from England to Spain and Portugal – English goods arriving even on neutral shipping would now be regarded as contraband – and he encouraged several plots hatched by groups of English Catholics to murder Elizabeth and replace her with Mary Stuart. He promised to send assistance from both Spain and the Netherlands to the plotters led by Anthony Babington ‘with the greatest possible speed as soon as he knew that the venture had succeeded’, confident that ‘God would be pleased to permit what they plan, since the time has perhaps arrived for Him to advance His cause’.¹³ But Elizabeth already knew all about Babington’s plot and, as soon as she had sufficient evidence, she had the participants arrested, tortured and executed. Mary also went on trial for treason, and she died on the scaffold in February 1587.

Philip’s involvement in Babington’s plot infuriated Elizabeth, and she ordered Drake to return to the Iberian peninsula and do as much damage as he could to prevent or at least delay the various parts of the Armada from joining together. In April 1587, a powerful English fleet entered the harbour of Cádiz, where it captured or destroyed over twenty vessels as well as food supplies and stores accumulated for the Armada. Given that sixteenth-century Europe enjoyed few food surpluses, it proved almost impossible to obtain large supplies at short notice, and Philip found it hard to replace the provisions destroyed. Worse still, after he had ‘singd the king of Spain’s beard’ (as the English put it), Drake spent a month interdicting all sea traffic between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic; then he left for the Azores, proclaiming his intention of intercepting the returning treasure fleets from America and India. To avert this calamity Philip ordered Santa Cruz to head for the Azores to protect the fleets, which carried treasure and merchandise worth 16 million ducats, and escort them back to the peninsula in safety. Although the marquis succeeded, he returned to Lisbon only on 28 September 1587.

So much stress caused Philip’s health to collapse. In May 1587, one of the ministers trying to coordinate Armada logistics complained that ‘a lot of time is being wasted in consultations, and His Majesty is slow to respond; so we are losing time that cannot

be recovered'; while a month later, one of the king's valets lamented that 'His Majesty's eyes are still running, his feet tender, his hand weak – and the world is waiting'.¹⁴ The king's insistence on supervising every decision himself meant that his indisposition left a gap at the centre of power that no one could fill; and when he did resume control in September, he abandoned the masterplan and signed detailed instructions ordering both Santa Cruz and Parma to follow another totally – fatally – different strategy.

Philip now commanded the marquis 'to sail in the name of God straight to the English Channel and go along it until you have anchored off Margate head, having first warned the duke of Parma of your approach'. Then came a crucial ambiguity: 'The said duke, according to the orders he has received, on seeing the passage thus made safe by the Armada either being off the said headland or else cruising in the mouth of the Thames (if time allows), will immediately send across the army he has prepared in small boats, of which (for transit alone) he has plenty.' Until Parma and his men had made their crossing, the Armada 'should do nothing except make safe the passage, and defeat any enemy ships that might come out to prevent this'.¹⁵ This left several critical questions unanswered. Above all, would the Armada approach the ports of Flanders to cover the embarkation of Parma's army or were the invasion barges expected to meet the fleet in open waters? If the former, how would the deep-draught ships of the Armada negotiate the shallows and sandbanks that fringed the Flemish coast; if the latter, how could a fleet cruising offshore protect the exposed barges from the waiting Dutch or English blockade ships?

The parallel set of instructions sent to the duke of Parma also evaded these vital questions. 'I have decided', the king told his nephew, that the marquis of Santa Cruz 'will sail in the name of God straight to the English Channel and go along it until he has anchored off Margate head'. The king promised Parma that the fleet would send advance warning of its approach and, he continued, 'you will be so well prepared that, when you see the Narrow Seas thus secured, with the Armada arriving off the said headland [Margate] ... you will immediately send the whole army over in the boats you have prepared'. The king once again promised that, until the army was safely across, the Armada would concentrate solely on maintaining a clear passage, and he

commanded Parma not to stir from the Flemish coast until the fleet arrived. But on how Parma would cross the forty miles that separated Dunkirk from Margate, the king wrote not a word. It was, to say the least, an unfortunate oversight.¹⁶

Nevertheless, now that his mind was made up, the king would tolerate no further delays, objections or even queries. Once again, he sent his detailed and inflexible instructions to both Lisbon and Brussels by courier, rather than with a personal messenger empowered to brief his theatre commanders on their role, answer their questions or provide feedback on the state of their readiness and morale. Instead he told Parma to stop complaining:

I cannot refrain from reminding you that, apart from the initial idea of this enterprise and the selection of yourself to command it (which were my decisions), everything else connected with your end of the plan, including the resources prepared, were according to your own instructions of which you alone were the author. Moreover, for its preparation and execution, I have given you in great abundance everything you have asked me for.

Parma must put the plan into execution without further question or delay.¹⁷ Santa Cruz received the same treatment as soon as he brought his storm-battered fleet back to Lisbon. He must stop complaining and set sail for Flanders: 'There is no more time to waste in requests and replies: just get on with the job and see if you cannot advance your departure by a few days.' As the days slipped by, the king lamented that 'so much time has been lost already that every further hour of delay causes me more grief than you can imagine. And so I charge and command you most strictly to leave before the end of the month.'¹⁸ Letters of exhortation – wheedling and hectoring by turns – left the king's desk for Lisbon almost daily.

The Venetian ambassador in Madrid, who obtained a copy of one of Santa Cruz's measured refutations of these unrealistic tirades, speculated on why the king would refuse to believe his most experienced admiral. He came up with three reasons, all linked to Philip's temperament and style of government. First, it was 'difficult for him to change plans, once he has decided on something'. Second, Philip's supreme confidence 'in his good fortune' led him to assume that God would reward his efforts if only he performed his own part to the full. Finally, the king's

knowledge of international affairs led him to see operations in each theatre as part of a wider context, which increased his anxiety to act before he lost his diplomatic advantage.¹⁹

Although Philip never saw this analysis, he would surely have agreed with it – but he would have added a fourth reason for urging haste: the cost of delay. Each day the Armada lay inactive cost 30,000 ducats for the fleet and a further 15,000 ducats for Parma's army. Funds for even the basic tasks of government ran so low that Philip began to demand weekly statements of the amount of money in his treasury and personally determined which obligations he could meet and which must wait (see plate 41). He now realized that 'I need to close the door to everything except raising money', and he drummed into his councillors that 'finding money is so important that all of us must concentrate only on that and on nothing else, because whatever victories we may win, without money I do not know what fruit they will bear (unless God performs a miracle)'.²⁰

The constant delays and the extraordinary inconsistency of Philip's planning process nevertheless brought one important advantage: it confused and frustrated not only his subordinates but also his enemies. At different times, the king gave serious consideration to a landing in Scotland, a surprise attack on Ireland or the Isle of Wight, a sudden solo assault by Parma's army on the coast of Kent – as well as an amphibious assault from Lisbon on Algiers or Larache instead of on England. The ambassadors and spies at the court of Spain detected each proposal and counter-proposal, and duly reported it to their principals, creating a cacophony of background 'noise' that disguised the king's real intentions. Few could accept that the most powerful monarch in Christendom could be so irresolute; still less did they imagine that after so much apparent vacillation he would adopt the most obvious of all strategies, the one that everyone had been talking about for months, and choose for his target the most obvious landing zone – the exact spot where the Romans, the Saxons and others had landed before.

Philip scored another remarkable success in maintaining Elizabeth's diplomatic isolation. The keystone of this policy was the paralysis of France, where his agents increased their subsidies to the duke of Guise, who in return agreed to engineer a general rebellion by the Catholic League the moment he heard that the

Armada had left Lisbon. The Catholics of Paris began to take over the city in May 1588, and when King Henry III deployed his Swiss Guards to preserve order the inhabitants of the capital erected barricades and forced him to flee. The ‘Day of the Barricades’ made Guise the master of Paris and shortly afterwards he became ‘lieutenant-general of the kingdom’. The Imperial ambassador in Madrid observed with admiration:

At the moment, the Catholic King [Philip] is safe: France cannot threaten him, and the Turks can do little; neither can the king of Scots, who is offended at Queen Elizabeth on account of the death of his mother [Mary Stuart] ... At the same time, Spain can be confident that the Swiss cantons will not move against him; nor will they allow others to do so, since they are now his allies.

In short, he opined, no foreign power could now stop Philip executing the Enterprise of England.²¹

Nevertheless, new problems constantly arose, including the king’s own ill health. Philip was now 60 and at Christmas 1587 he fell ill again and took to his bed. For four weeks, he lacked the strength to govern his empire – or his Armada. But the enforced idleness seems to have restored some of the king’s legendary prudence, and he now took more rational steps to save both the Armada and the Enterprise for which it had been created. To ascertain the true state of the fleet in January 1588 he dispatched a special envoy to Lisbon, who reported a state of utter chaos: Santa Cruz was seriously ill and deeply depressed, trying to command from his sickbed a shambles of unseaworthy ships and rotting supplies and (more critical because less easily cured) dispirited and disillusioned men. Obviously, Santa Cruz must go.

‘The largest fleet since the creation of the world’

The king now took a decision that has been much criticized in retrospect but which made excellent sense at the time. What the Armada needed, if it were to sail at all, was not another fighting admiral but someone with the determination and the administrative skills to turn the chaos at Lisbon into a coherent fighting force. Such a man was Don Alonso Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno, seventh duke of Medina Sidonia.

The duke’s qualifications were impeccable. He had amply

proved his administrative talents both in governing his own vast estates and in supervising the dispatch of the huge fleets sailing from Andalusia to America; and he had recently overseen with great efficiency the outfitting and dispatch of the ships and supplies assembled for the Armada in Andalusia. Although he lacked combat experience, the duke had raised and led an army during the Portuguese campaign of 1580, and commanded the relief force whose expeditious arrival had saved the town of Cádiz from being sacked during Drake's 'beard-singeing' exploit in 1587. His rapid response on that occasion earned widespread praise. The Venetian ambassador in Madrid considered that the duke had been the only man who kept his head in the crisis, while Secretary of State Gabriel de Zayas told a colleague 'if my opinion counted for anything, I would make [Medina Sidonia] president of the council of the Indies and member of the council of State'.²² Furthermore the duke knew the strategic aims of the Armada, having spent some weeks at court in autumn 1587 discussing with ministers the conduct of the impending war with England. Finally, and equally important, he was the head of one of Spain's foremost aristocratic families: none of the senior officers already serving in the Armada (several of whom had proposed themselves to Philip as suitable successors to Santa Cruz) could feel any resentment or injustice in serving under the seventh duke of Medina Sidonia.

The duke was at his castle at Sanlúcar when he opened an unexpected and unwelcome letter signed by the king on 11 February announcing that, since Santa Cruz was now too ill to lead the Armada, he must leave for Lisbon at once and take charge. Given the current state of the Armada – and few knew better than the duke how chaotic that state was – Medina Sidonia did everything he could to be excused. Initially, he pleaded that ill health, poverty and inexperience disqualified him from command, all of which the king dismissed as misplaced modesty; but he might have paid more attention had he seen a second letter written by the duke. This time, Medina 'drew to Your Majesty's attention many relevant reasons to show why I should not undertake this service – not to avoid hard work but because I see that the attack on such a large kingdom, with so many allies, requires far more forces than those that Your Majesty has assembled'. The duke had evidently reached the same conclusion as Parma and Santa Cruz before him – that the Enterprise of

England, as currently conceived, was doomed to failure – but his cogent rationale never reached the king.²³

Don Juan de Idiáquez and Don Cristóbal de Moura, in constant attendance on the king, handled the immense quantity of paperwork generated by the Enterprise of England. Nothing of consequence concerning the Armada bypassed them. When, in the course of their duties, they opened Medina Sidonia's frank letter, they were appalled. 'We did not dare to show his Majesty what you have just written,' they chided the duke, adding: 'Do not depress us with fears for the fate of the Armada, because in such a cause God will make sure it succeeds.' Here was another striking example of 'groupthink' at the Spanish court: those in charge of policy-making systematically belittled or rejected all discordant views – but this time the policy-makers also issued a palpable threat. Everyone knew (they reminded the duke) that he had been offered command of the Armada, so that to refuse it now would lead to accusations of ingratitude, selfishness, even cowardice. 'Remember that the reputation and esteem you currently enjoy for courage and wisdom would entirely be forfeited if what you wrote to us became generally known (although we shall keep it secret).'²⁴ Dismayed by this naked blackmail, Medina Sidonia asked for an audience with the king, but – as usual – Philip refused. The duke therefore tried to wrest substantial concessions from his master before reluctantly travelling to Lisbon, where he found a cheery letter from the king reassuring him that 'If I were not needed so much here, to provide what is necessary for that [enterprise] and for many other things, I would be very pleased to join [the Armada] – and I would do so with great confidence that it would go very well for me.'²⁵

The duke's reaction to this message has not survived, but a senior officer of the Armada, Martín de Bertendona, complained to Philip acidly: 'I really wish that Your Majesty could be present' at debates on how best to prepare for the Enterprise, 'because it would be very different to discuss them in Your Majesty's presence, where you could not fail to hear the truth, than to discuss them there [at court] where those who understand and those who do not can all give their opinions'. But, Bertendona concluded serenely (and undoubtedly sarcastically), 'since it is your Majesty who has decided everything, we must believe that it is God's will'.²⁶

Nevertheless, under Medina Sidonia's efficient and courteous direction, aided by his willingness to seek the opinions of his more experienced subordinates, the fleet became seaworthy in less than two months. The ships already at Lisbon were repaired and several new ones added, while sick soldiers and sailors were nursed back to health, until by May 1588 the 104 ships and scarcely 10,000 troops that the duke had found at his arrival had risen to 130 vessels and almost 19,000 troops. Provisions and water were stowed according to a carefully planned turnover system, and each ship received a printed set of pilotage instructions and a standardized chart of the Channel approaches. On 28 May 1588 the duke led the great Armada down the Tagus to the open sea, ready to sail towards the 300 small ships and 30,000 veterans assembled by Parma in Flanders. At this point, Philip's forces far outnumbered those of his enemies.

The king and his minsters believed with absolute confidence that the Armada would solve all the strategic problems that faced the Monarchy. In a message to the Cortes of Castile in January 1588, written in his own hand, the king reminded the deputies that 'You all know that the Enterprise that I have undertaken for the service of God and advancement of our Holy Catholic Faith is also for the benefit of these kingdoms, because it is the same cause'. A month later, Idiáquez and Moura assured Medina Sidonia that 'now that all wars and ventures have been incorporated in this Enterprise', the invasion and conquest of England would solve all Spain's problems.²⁷

This was rousing rhetoric, but once they moved from theory to practice, Philip and his advisers became vague. Above all, the instructions drawn up for Medina Sidonia on 1 April 1588 failed to make clear exactly how he could achieve his ambitious objectives. In part, the document repeated the orders issued to Santa Cruz the previous September, commanding the duke to lead his fleet directly to 'the appointed place' (almost certainly the anchorage of the Downs), there to 'join hands' with Parma and his army; but just how to do this became lost in measures to curb the immorality of the fleet's sinful human cargo on such a saintly enterprise. The king specified all the necessary steps to ensure there was no blasphemy, drinking, gambling, feuding or sodomy aboard any of his ships, but he maintained a deafening silence on tactics: how, exactly, should the rendezvous be effected, and how, precisely,

could the Armada secure local command of the sea while Parma and his vulnerable troop transports crossed the Channel? A few sentences did indeed touch on the second point, but their implications were more alarming than illuminating:

There is little to say with regard to the mode of fighting and the handling of the Armada on the day of battle ... [but] it must be borne in mind that the enemy's objective will be to fight at long distance, in consequence of his advantage in artillery, and the large number of artificial fires with which he will be furnished. The aim of our men, on the contrary, must be to bring him to close quarters and grapple with him, and you will have to be very careful to have this carried out.

To all of this, the king concluded, 'you will have to take such precautions as you consider necessary'. We may admire the king's tactical insight on this problem; but at the same time we must censure him – as no doubt his unfortunate commanders censured him privately – for his total failure to suggest a solution.²⁸

For three months, such oversights remained academic because the Armada made such slow progress. Despite all the duke's preparations at Lisbon, provisions soon started to run out. Some of the food was putrid, and had probably been so from the start, while Medina Sidonia's success in increasing the size of the fleet meant that the rest was inadequate. The duke reluctantly cut the daily biscuit ration to one pound and reduced the issue of meat. The Armada's unexpectedly slow progress intensified the problem still further. On 20 June, since the fleet had only advanced as far as Cape Finisterre, the duke saw no alternative to putting in to Corunna to take on new supplies, but a sudden and violent tempest struck part of the fleet as it tried to enter the harbour, scattering some vessels as far afield as the Scilly Isles, off the tip of Cornwall.

This disaster broke Medina Sidonia's spirits. He composed two long and detailed appeals to the king that boldly restated the sweeping objections he had voiced at the time of his appointment to 'attacking such a large kingdom, with so many allies'. Despite his best efforts, he feared that 'the strength of the Armada remains inferior to that of the enemy', and yet the whole fate of the Monarchy 'depends on the success or failure of this campaign, to which Your Majesty has committed all his resources – ships, artillery, munitions'. If these assets were lost, they would take 'much time' to replace. Moreover, once he got to sea, Medina

Sidonia had found that 'the soldiers are not as well-trained as they should be' while 'I find few, indeed hardly any officials who understand and know how to carry out their duties. I write this from personal experience', he added, perhaps in a swipe at Idiáquez and Moura: 'so let no one deceive Your Majesty by saying something else.'²⁹

The king learned of this setback in the midst of another bout of ill health brought on by pressure of work. 'I have to spend so much time on incoming papers,' he lamented, 'that I believe it is making me ill ... Please tell some of the ministers in Madrid to moderate the number of papers they send.' Nonetheless he knew what he must do, telling Mateo Vázquez, 'It will require a lot of time and effort to find all the money that has already been spent, and will have to be spent, so that nothing will be left for me to do in what we have begun.' Ensuring the success of the Enterprise 'is so important that it now leaves me little time to do or think of anything else'.³⁰ He therefore gave Medina Sidonia's pessimistic assessment his immediate and undivided attention.

When the duke started to read the royal reply to his letters, the colour must have drained from his cheeks:

Duke and cousin. I have received the letter written in your own hand, dated 24 June. From what I know of you, I believe you have brought all these matters to my attention solely because of your zeal to serve me and the desire to succeed in your command. The certainty that this is so prompts me to be franker with you than I should be with another ...

After this terrifying start the rest of the missive, although firm, was considerate and mild in tone. Having restating the original reasons for the undertaking, Philip systematically demolished the duke's objections and doubts with his own perverse logic: 'If this were an unjust war, one could indeed take the tempest as a sign from Our Lord to cease offending Him; but being as just as it is, one cannot believe that He will disband it, but will rather grant it more favour than we could hope.' The English had no allies and their forces (despite the fears of his doubting commander) remained inferior to those of Spain. With a following wind the fleet could be in the Channel within a week, whereas if it remained in Corunna it represented a sitting target, liable either to be destroyed at anchor or blockaded in port while the English ravaged the unprotected Iberian coasts and captured the next treasure fleet. 'I have

dedicated this enterprise to God,' concluded Philip, with a command that brooked no further dissent. 'Pull yourself together, then, and do your part.'³¹

On this occasion, the king's obstinacy was surely correct. Disbanding the fleet before it had gained its objective would achieve nothing except to waste all his resources and tarnish Spain's reputation. Moreover, the English fleet might indeed easily descend on Corunna, just as it had done the previous year on Cádiz, and wreak havoc as the fleet lay helplessly at anchor. So far, therefore, so good; but unfortunately for his plans, Philip also seized the opportunity offered by the delay to resume micromanagement of the campaign. He had received a copy of a letter to Parma written by Medina Sidonia just after he left Lisbon, reporting that 'I assembled all the pilots and nautical experts aboard the fleet who are familiar with the coast of England and asked them to decide in which port there we could all shelter' while he waited for news that Parma had his forces ready. Events would reveal the wisdom of this 'Plan B', but Philip forbade it. 'The main point [of the plan] is to go on until you join hands with the duke my nephew,' he chided Medina Sidonia, 'and proceed to the agreed location and make safe the duke's transit.'³² The Armada must not halt in any port on its way to pick up Parma's waiting troops. The central weakness of the king's operational strategy thus remained intact.

At least this verbal spanking restored Medina Sidonia's confidence. On 21 July 1588 he led the Armada to sea once more, and on the 30th, with the English coast in sight, he ordered the 130 ships under his command to deploy in a half-moon battle order that measured three miles from one tip to the other. Spain's enemies now ruefully recognized that they faced 'the largest fleet that has ever been in these seas since the creation of the world' and 'the greatest and strongest combination, to my understanding, that ever was gathered in Christendom'. Meanwhile, Philip concentrated on prayer: according to the friars of the Escorial, he and the royal family knelt for three hours each in relays before the Holy Sacrament to ensure the success of the Enterprise. After all the crises and 'tests' sent by God, the king felt calm and confident that 'nothing on my part remains to be done', and he told Idiáquez: 'Things hang in the balance: not just these affairs [of northern Europe] but of all areas.'³³

For a time, it seemed as if ‘the balance’ had tipped in his favour. Repeated attempts by Elizabeth’s navy to break the Armada’s formation failed, and on 6 August 1588 it dropped anchor off Calais, just twenty-five miles from Parma’s forces at Dunkirk and within sight of the designated landing area at the Downs. It remained there for thirty-six hours, and Medina Sidonia might justifiably have felt that he had indeed ‘done his part’. Unfortunately for him, for the men aboard the Armada and for Spain, thirty-six hours were not long enough.

Both Medina Sidonia and Philip seem to have expected that the Armada would maintain reliable communications with Parma after it had put to sea – an assumption that betrays a fatal lack of familiarity with the realities of naval warfare (one cannot imagine Santa Cruz making the same elementary mistake). It never seems to have occurred to either the duke or his master that messengers from the fleet had either to run the gauntlet of hostile ships lurking in the Channel or else to make for the French coast and hope to find a relay of horses ready to convey them overland to Flanders. It was foolish to assume that they would arrive – let alone return with an answer – much before the fleet reached ‘the appointed place’. In the event, none of the couriers sent to advise Parma of Medina Sidonia’s progress reached him in time to do much good. The envoy dispatched on 31 July, when the fleet was drawing level with Plymouth, could not make sail until the following morning, and only reached Parma’s headquarters early on 6 August. Later that same day the messenger dispatched off the Isle of Wight on 4 August arrived. Yet by then the Armada was dropping anchor off Calais, just over the horizon – though Parma did not learn this for another day. So although Medina Sidonia repeatedly expressed regret at his slow progress, and sought to increase his speed exactly as Philip had exhorted him to do, from Parma’s perspective he arrived much too soon.

Given this breakdown in communications, Parma could not possibly have embarked his men aboard his small ships by 6 August, ready to ‘join hands’ with Medina Sidonia, because he did not know until that day that the Armada had even entered the Channel, let alone that it had reached Calais. Nevertheless Parma had prepared a meticulous embarkation schedule, and on 2 August, on learning that the Armada had arrived off the Lizard, he placed his forces on alert; and on the 6th, on learning that the

fleet's approach continued, all units began to move to the ports. Over the next thirty-six hours, almost 27,000 men managed to embark without mishap – no mean feat for any army in any age – but by then the Armada had, in the unkind words of a contemporary Dutch historian, ‘vanished into smoke’.³⁴

On the evening of 7 August, the English launched eight fireships against the Armada anchored off Calais. Most captains simply cut their cables and fled – only to find that the strong currents which prevail in the Narrow Seas made it impossible for them to regain their positions and re-anchor. At a stroke the Armada had been transformed from a cohesive and still formidable fighting force to a fragmented gaggle of panic-stricken ships. The next morning, English warships managed to break into the Armada's close order and inflict catastrophic damage on several vessels. The following day, Medina Sidonia gave the order for the fleet to sail back to Spain on what one of his officers grimly called ‘the voyage of Magellan that we have begun’ around Scotland and Ireland – a journey (for those who survived it) of some 3,000 miles.³⁵

Counting the cost

The first certain news concerning the Armada's failure to ‘join hands’ with the Army of Flanders arrived at court on 31 August, and Philip immediately sought to regain control of the situation with his pen. He informed Medina Sidonia, wherever he might be, that ‘the news of the defeat before Calais ... worries me more than you can imagine’, and he ordered Idiáquez to prepare a detailed memorandum telling the duke what he should do if the Armada had taken refuge in Scotland or elsewhere (refit, and discuss ways of effecting the invasion the following year), or had started on the journey back to Spain (put some troops ashore in Ireland and create a bridgehead for operations the following year). On 15 September, he issued even more unrealistic orders: Medina Sidonia must land in Scotland, ally with the local Catholics and winter there. Philip had finally recognized the need for a ‘Plan B’. This unusual willingness to contemplate alternative strategies reveals, perhaps more clearly than anything else, that the king's self-confidence had received a shattering blow. When he read the draft of a reply to Parma, expressing the hope ‘that we may yet perform the service that we wanted to dedicate to God and to regain the

reputation that is now in jeopardy', the king underlined the passage. 'Think whether it might be better to delete this', he told his secretary, 'because in what we do for God, and what God does for us, there is no gain or loss of reputation. It is better not to talk about it.'³⁶

On 3 September a courier from France brought more detailed news concerning the Armada's defeat and northward flight. The disconsolate cipher clerks and ministers debated which of them should break the news to the king. The choice fell upon Mateo Vázquez, but even he broached the subject with great trepidation and indirectly, choosing to forward a tactless parallel drawn by a courtier: 'When we consider the case of King Louis IX of France, who was a saint and was engaged on a saintly enterprise [the Seventh Crusade in 1250], and yet saw his army die of plague, with himself defeated and captured, we certainly cannot fail to fear greatly for the outcome' of the Enterprise of England. Vázquez suggested that yet more prayers be said to stave off a similar disaster. This proved too much for the king: 'I hope that God has not permitted so much evil,' he scribbled angrily on the letter, 'because everything has been done for His service.'³⁷

In October, after reading some painful accounts by Armada survivors, Philip wrote, 'I have seen all this, although I think it would have been better not to see it because it hurts so much'; and the following month, when he learned of further losses, he predicted:

Very soon we shall find ourselves in such a state that we shall wish that we had never been born ... And if God does not send us a miracle (which is what I hope from Him), I hope to die and go to Him before this happens – which is what I pray for, so as not to see so much misfortune and disgrace.³⁸

In all, perhaps 15,000 men – almost half the soldiers and sailors who had embarked on the Armada – perished during the Enterprise of England, and at least one-third of the ships, together with their equipment and armament, never returned to Spain. Philip lost almost all his experienced naval commanders; and the venture had absorbed 10 million ducats to no effect.

On top of these material losses, Philip had suffered a major moral setback. As early as June 1588, when storms scattered the fleet, the papal nuncio in Madrid wondered whether 'these

impediments that the devil creates' might be a sign that 'God does not approve of the enterprise'; and in November he noted that the pointless loss of so many ships and men had 'disturbed everyone, since they can almost openly see the hand of God raised against us'.³⁹ Even the monks of El Escorial, normally Philip's greatest supporters, came to see the Armada campaign as his greatest failure. Fray Jerónimo de Sepúlveda considered it a misfortune 'worthy to be wept over for ever ... because it lost us the respect and good reputation that we used to have among warlike people ... The grief it caused in all of Spain was extraordinary: almost the entire country went into mourning ... People talked of nothing else.' According to his colleague Fray José de Sigüenza, 'it was the greatest disaster to strike Spain in over six hundred years' because, quite apart from the destruction of human and material capital and the loss of reputation, the king's policies had plunged Spain into an open war with England as well as with the Dutch and their other allies that would last long after his death.⁴⁰

Philip at bay, 1589–1592

Some prayer and much thought’ the eminent Jesuit Pedro de Ribadeneira, one of the most vocal supporters of the Enterprise of England, composed a remarkable analysis of the disaster and sent it to one of the king’s close advisers. Although Ribadeneira accepted ‘the absolute necessity of continuing with the war and seeking the enemy, unless we want them to seek us and make war on us at home’, he argued that the king must address some urgent broader issues:

The judgements of God are most secret, so that we cannot know for certain the purpose of his Divine Majesty in the extraordinary fate he has decreed for the king’s powerful fleet. Nevertheless, seeing that the cause was so much His, and was undertaken with such a holy intent, and was so much desired and assisted by the whole Catholic Church, the fact that He was not moved by the pious prayers and tears of so many and such great devotees makes us fearful that there are serious reasons why Our Lord has sent us this affliction.

‘So,’ Ribadeneira continued, ‘it is both necessary and advisable to seek and consider the causes that may have moved God to punish us in this way’ and allowed ‘a group of damned souls like the English’ to administer such a ‘great scourge and punishment’ on Spain in general and on Philip in particular. Foremost among these causes were ‘the public sins and scandals, especially if committed by notable people who should be setting an example’ and, since Philip ‘could so easily emend and correct these excesses with a

single example, if he fails to act in this matter Our Lord may well ask him to explain why'.¹ Philip lost no time in making an 'example' to remove 'public sins and scandals': he instructed his judges to indict Antonio Pérez for the murder of Juan de Escobedo.

The trial of Antonio Pérez

In 1582 Philip had sentenced the princess of Éboli to permanent house arrest in her palace at Pastrana, and he had authorized the collection of evidence against Pérez by two judges (chapter 15). As in all *visitas*, the judges proceeded in secret until, in June 1584, they presented Pérez with a list of forty-one separate charges covering his activities since 1571 and demanded immediate answers under oath. Thirty-nine of the charges required him to explain how he had acquired particular sums of money or specific articles, but the last two concerned his work as secretary of state. Pérez began his response by welcoming the chance to establish his innocence, after 'five years of not being heard', and then pointed out the irrelevance of allegations concerning events after his arrest, since he no longer transacted official business. He had a ready answer for all but the two charges of professional misconduct, which read:

That the said Antonio Pérez did not maintain secrecy, as he had sworn to do, but instead revealed secrets in different ways to different people, writing letters that contained details of confidential business; and that when he decoded letters addressed to His Majesty, for personal motives he added, changed and removed items.

In his response to these charges, Pérez adopted the same strategy as Bartolomé Carranza a generation before (chapter 7): he denied everything and called upon the most eminent men in the kingdom to testify in his support, starting with the king.

He calls as a witness in his defence His Majesty King Philip, Our Lord; Don Gaspar de Quiroga, cardinal of Toledo, primate of Spain, chancellor and Inquisitor General, member of His Majesty's council of State; and the Reverend Friar Diego de Chaves, His Majesty's confessor and a member of his council. He requests that they should be summoned and examined according to the law, within fifteen days.²

At this point, if not before, 'His Majesty King Philip, Our Lord'

must have realized that in order to refute such serious allegations, Pérez would seek to incriminate him; and if he still missed the point, shortly afterwards a letter arrived from Antonio Enríquez, the leader of the assassins, explaining how

Antonio Pérez had deceived him wickedly, telling me that Your Majesty had ordered us to kill Escobedo, which subsequently turned out to be totally untrue. Instead he wanted us to do it for some private end of his own. I would never have agreed to do it unless I was deceived into thinking that Your Majesty had ordered it.³

For the first time, someone explicitly had linked the king with the murder – and yet instead of acting on this detailed denunciation Philip signed a warrant that authorized an annual payment to Pérez of 500 ducats for ‘the salary granted to him as secretary of state’ and 400 more ‘as a cost-of-living allowance, during His Majesty’s pleasure’.⁴ Philip’s generosity to a disgraced minister now accused of thirty-nine charges of taking bribes, two of betraying state secrets and one of orchestrating a murder and blaming it on the king is breathtaking; but it seems that the king aimed to lull his ex-secretary into a false sense of security, because one month after signing the warrant, two magistrates arrived at Pérez’s home and conveyed him ignominiously in handcuffs and shackles to the fortress of Turégano (Segovia). Philip now approved the judges’ sentence on Pérez: two years in prison, ten years’ exile from the court; the return of all the bribes specified in the charges; and a fine of 20,000 ducats.

This concluded the first act of the process to ‘verify and refine the faults that were emerging about Pérez’, but almost immediately the second act began. Rodrigo Vázquez de Arce (a member of the council of Castile and one of the ‘visitors’ appointed by the king) met Enríquez, who repeated under oath his detailed account of exactly when and how Pérez, claiming to obey the king’s orders, had orchestrated the murder of Escobedo. The truth could not be concealed for much longer, and so both Pérez and Philip took steps to protect themselves. The ex-secretary, claiming that one of his captors ‘had received orders from His Majesty to poison him’, tried to escape from Turégano to Aragon; but he failed. This triggered various responses. Royal officials sold many of Pérez’s belongings at public auction, arrested and imprisoned his wife and family (who had planned the escape), and seized his

personal papers.⁵ Suspecting that some significant papers had slipped through his hands, Philip authorized the president of the council of Castile to offer Pérez's wife, Doña Juana Coello, her freedom if she surrendered all messages written in the king's hand still in her possession. Doña Juana immediately saw the danger. 'Sir,' she asked the president, 'if these accursed papers contain my husband's alibi in the Escobedo affair – that His Majesty ordered Antonio Pérez to do what we now know – what shall we do without them, and without some certificate from His Majesty to protect us against our many enemies?' Fray Diego de Chaves, not only royal confessor but also her kinsman, stepped in and offered his personal assurance that as soon as she surrendered the documents the king would improve conditions both for her and for Antonio. After thinking about it for a few days, Doña Juana handed over 'two sealed caskets' filled with confidential papers.⁶

Philip kept his word and allowed Pérez to rejoin his family and to live once again in relative freedom in Madrid, and in September 1587 he even ordered that 'Antonio Pérez should be paid all his salary arrears since the end of 1584'. This evidence of continuing royal favour so infuriated Pedro de Escobedo, Juan's eldest son, that he took the law into his own hands and sent some 'men to capture or kill Diego Martínez [another assassin] and any other servants of Antonio Pérez who had killed his father'.⁷ This time, in marked contrast to his inaction in 1578, Philip immediately ordered his judges to bring to justice those who 'in contempt of me and without fear of the law, treacherously killed Juan de Escobedo in this my city and court of Madrid'. He also authorized Vázquez de Arce to use 'the enquiries you have already made in this matter' – that is, the secret testimony taken in 1582 – to interrogate any and all suspects, and, 'if necessary to clarify matters, you may use the torture or torments allowed by law on any person or persons you choose'.⁸

On 30 August 1588, for the first time, Vázquez de Arce demanded that Pérez answer under oath detailed questions about his role in the murder of Escobedo. Yet again, the process ground to a halt, perhaps because Philip still hoped to avoid a public trial at which the full truth about his involvement would become public; but, if so, this hope evaporated on 2 September 1589, when Pedro de Escobedo formally accused Pérez of complicity in the murder of his father – a charge that made a public trial

unavoidable.

The king now made what seems like a blatant attempt at entrapment. Chaves, who was with the king at the Escorial, sent Pérez an unsolicited letter of advice ('I have been thinking deeply about whether, in the name of charity, it would be acceptable to give advice to someone who did not ask me for it'). 'In order for you to be delivered from close confinement and all the pointless troubles you have suffered,' he wrote, 'it seems to me that there is no better path than to tell the truth about what happened concerning the murder they ask about, and about who ordered it' – but, the confessor continued, Pérez must say no more. The secretary should admit to his part in the murder 'without stating the causes that existed for ordering it: you must not enter into particulars about this'. Chaves concluded his remarkable letter by addressing a specific concern raised by Pérez: whether he should settle with Pedro de Escobedo out of court. Chaves approved, but only on condition that 'this must be done without involving His Majesty'. Perhaps imprisonment had dulled Pérez's acumen because, despite the obvious danger, he followed Chaves's advice. A few days later he signed a binding agreement to pay 20,000 ducats to Pedro de Escobedo, who in return would withdraw his accusation of murder, affirming that 'he pardoned everyone because it pleases God to end lawsuits and quarrels, and because some important people had intervened had asked him to do so.'⁹ By accepting forgiveness from the plaintiff, the ex-secretary admitted his guilt in the assassination of Juan de Escobedo, but he received no pardon from the king and his judges.

Pérez soon discovered his error. In December 1589 Philip ordered that his former secretary 'state the reasons for the death of Escobedo' – precisely what Chaves had instructed him *not* to do – and Vázquez de Arce announced:

Having informed the King Our Lord that Antonio Pérez seems to have ordered the death of Juan de Escobedo with the blessing and knowledge of His Majesty, it seems necessary that this consent should feature in the legal defence of the said Antonio Pérez ... [His Majesty] therefore wants to know from the said Antonio Pérez the said reasons together with the supporting evidence for them, because he was the one who knew the facts and communicated them to His Majesty.

Pérez's guards received orders 'not to let him speak or

communicate with anyone, nor speak to him themselves, on pain of death'.¹⁰

Pérez clung to Chaves's advice and insisted for as long as he could that he must preserve 'the secrets of his profession' despite the king's insistence that he should divulge them but on 23 February 1590, after eight turns of the rack on his arms, he confirmed everything that Antonio Enríquez had said. Three months later, Vázquez de Arce sentenced him to be 'hanged, drawn and quartered, with confiscation of all his goods' for murder, 'for revealing secrets of the affairs and business of state entrusted to him, and for falsely deciphering the letters that he forwarded to His Majesty'.¹¹ He pronounced the sentence in vain. On 19 April 1590, realizing that without the 'accursed papers' that contained his alibi he was doomed, Pérez escaped from prison and crossed the frontier into Aragon, where Castilian judges had no jurisdiction.

Pérez's flight had serious repercussions for the princess of Éboli. Fearing that she too might escape, Philip sent orders to Pastrana to confine her to a single apartment and to place strong grilles on all the windows. Ana protested 'they are putting me in an Inquisition cell', and 'it is not possible that His Majesty would either wish or permit this' – but she erred: she remained in her 'Inquisition cell' at Pastrana until she died in 1592.¹²

Philip's dramatically different treatment of the two people arrested on the same night in 1579 perplexed contemporaries and continues to puzzle historians. Why did the king stop short of prosecuting Pérez and the six assassins who he knew for certain had 'treacherously killed Juan de Escobedo'? Chaves offered a revealing rationale for extrajudicial killing in his letter to persuade Pérez to admit his role in the death of Escobedo. 'As I understand the Law,' the confessor explained,

A secular prince who holds the power of life over his subjects can take it away for a just reason through a formal trial, and he can also do so without trial if there are witnesses [to the crime] ... If the prince should incur blame by proceeding irregularly, that is not true of the subject whom he orders to kill someone else who is also his subject, because we assume that the prince acted with just cause, in the same way that the Law presumes all actions of a sovereign prince are just.¹³

According to this rationale, if Philip gave his consent to the

extrajudicial killing of Escobedo, he must have ‘acted with just cause, in the same way that the Law presumes all actions of a sovereign prince are just’ – provided the ‘witnesses’ had told him the truth.

The king evidently doubted that Pérez had told him the truth as early as 1580, when he set up the *visita*, and those doubts had deepened by 1581 when he drew up in his own hand a list of witnesses to be interrogated. And yet when the following year Vázquez de Arce informed Philip that he had concluded ‘this business of the princess and Antonio Pérez’, although Philip decreed civil death for the former, he forbade open condemnation of the latter (chapter 15). Perhaps Philip had decided to alternate rewards and punishments because (as Henar Pizarro Llorente pointed out in her perceptive biography of Cardinal Quiroga) ‘other people close to Antonio Pérez knew about the plans to assassinate Escobedo’, including the secretary’s wife and ‘the Two’: Los Vélez and Quiroga.¹⁴ They were not alone. The six assassins certainly heard about the king’s involvement from Pérez’s majordomo; almost certainly Chaves heard about it from the king himself during confession; and probably the princess of Éboli heard about it from Pérez, who seems to have shared all his secrets with her. Moreover, since all the major protagonists maintained considerable households, their servants might have overheard indiscretions and gossiped about them. The expanding circle of those who knew the truth prevented the king from using the same ‘power of life’ against Pérez as he had used against Escobedo.

Perhaps Philip hoped that the death of his awkward prisoner in confinement would resolve his dilemma: such, after all, was the fate of many prisoners, and Pérez would then take the truth about Escobedo’s murder to the grave. But if Philip harboured such hopes, he abandoned them in 1588 when he finally ordered Vázquez de Arce to start a regular trial. But why did he do so then? Although the king left no explanation, perhaps the fate of the Enterprise of England had led him to the same conclusion as Ribadeneira: that he ought to ‘eradicate public sins and scandals, especially if committed by notable people’. Was it a coincidence that Vázquez began to interrogate Pérez about the assassination in late August 1588, just as news arrived of the Armada’s failure to ‘join hands’ with Parma’s army waiting in Flanders? And might the decision to encourage Pérez to confess his guilt in September 1589

reflect the loss of reputation resulting from the king's failure to prevent the landing of English troops in both Spain and Portugal?

'We are in a state of open war'

Philip had done his best to protect the peninsula. When in November 1588 he received a consulta that urged him to create a new expeditionary force that would 'sail straight to England and find a way to conquer it', he

rejoiced greatly to read all that these papers said, which corresponds perfectly with what one might expect from those who said it, and with the desire that has inclined me to this enterprise since the beginning, for the service of Our Lord, the defence of His cause and the benefit of these realms ... I shall never fail to stand up for the cause of God and the well-being of these kingdoms.

Shortly before this Philip summoned delegates from the Cortes of Castile to the Escorial, and gave a short speech. 'What led me to undertake this campaign,' he reminded them, 'was the service of God, and the good and security of Christendom.' Now, the king continued, 'we are in a state of open war' and 'our enemies are well defended and we fear that they might come here to do some damage'. He concluded: 'This obliges us to make great and excessive expenditures, or risk terrible harm.' Philip sent the delegates back to Madrid with a memorial 'entirely written in His Majesty's hand' that repeated these details.¹⁵ In December 1588, the Cortes received another personal message from the king stating that 'he would like to inform and tell them the exact amount required to achieve our objectives; but we do not know, precisely, what sum we would need'. Nevertheless, since the failed campaign had cost 10 million ducats, and 'since we need to supply what we lack, and undertake an offensive war', Philip feared that the cost could be no less.¹⁶

The king's decision to communicate with the Cortes 'orally and in his own handwriting (an extraordinary and unprecedented thing)', produced a favourable impression and they agreed to provide Felipe with taxes worth eight million ducats – soon known as the *Millones* – 'for the defence of the faith and of his realms'. The Cortes also believed that the best way to achieve these objectives was by invading England because, 'if we defeat this

enemy it will end the war in the Netherlands, which has been and still is so expensive for Your Majesty and these kingdoms, because England provides them with the means to carry on'. Therefore, they hoped 'the army and navy that you send on this campaign will aim to attack and conquer, and in achieving its goal will recover past losses and the reputation of our nation'.¹⁷ But first Elizabeth managed to strike another blow.

In May 1589, Sir Francis Drake returned to Galicia at the head of a large Anglo-Dutch fleet. He put ashore an expeditionary force – something the Spanish Armada had failed to do – that first sacked Corunna and then anchored near the mouth of the Tagus while English soldiers marched on Lisbon. Although the troops soon turned back, their audacity infuriated the king, and on 23 June he appealed to the Cortes for more money, given 'how important it is for my service and God's to punish the boldness of the enemy'. That same day, however, Philip revealed how little he had learned from previous failures in command and control. Martín de Bertendona, Spain's senior surviving admiral, had come to court to advise his sovereign 'in case there is to be a campaign against England', but Philip characteristically replied: 'you can tell me all about it in writing, since I do not have time to hear about it in person'.¹⁸

Shortly afterwards, the strategic scene changed again with the assassination of the French king. In many ways Henry III had served Philip's purposes well. Although fundamentally hostile to Spain, Henry lacked the resources to do much harm: his Protestant and his Catholic subjects despised and distrusted him in almost equal measure, and the royal treasury lay empty. Since Henry, like his brothers, sired no legitimate male children, upon his murder in August many of his French subjects and all of his Protestant neighbours immediately recognized his nearest male relative, the Huguenot leader Henry of Bourbon, as King Henry IV. Philip could not accept this. 'My principal aim is to secure the well-being of the Faith in France and to see that Catholicism survives and heresy is excluded,' he reminded the duke of Parma. 'And so, if in order to ensure this exclusion and to aid the Catholics so that they prevail, you see that it is necessary for my troops to enter France openly', they must invade. Philip fully recognized the strategic consequences of this decision:

The affairs of France create obligations that we cannot fail to fulfil because of their extreme importance; and since we must not undertake too many things at once, because of the risk that they will all fail (and because my treasury will not allow it), it seems that we must do something about the war in the Netherlands, reducing it to a defensive footing.¹⁹

Mateo Vázquez, at least, saw that these economies would not suffice. The winter of 1589–90 had been long and hard, followed by a bad harvest, and in February 1591 he received another self-pitying lament from his master complaining about ‘melancholy, which is a very bad thing, although the current situation and what is happening in the world promotes it; and I cannot avoid it entirely, because I am pained to see the state of Christendom today’. Mortally sick and perhaps for that reason more outspoken, Vázquez scolded Philip that he could not continue to ignore the fact ‘that the population is declining, and in such a way that many reliable people who have come from various parts of the kingdom say that it is a marvel to meet anyone in the smaller villages, so that sowing and harvesting are rapidly coming to an end’. He therefore argued that Philip must cease spending the resources of Castile so prodigally on foreign wars, and instead find alternative sources of revenue. ‘If God had intended Your Majesty to heal all the cripples who come to you to be cured, He would have given you the power to do so; and if He had wished to oblige Your Majesty to remedy all the troubles of the world, he would have given you the money and the resources to do so.’ If the king persevered with the same expensive policies, Vázquez continued relentlessly, ‘Everything may collapse at once for lack of money’. Philip addressed this passionate complaint with remarkable equanimity – although of course he rejected it. ‘I know you are moved by the great zeal you have for my service to say what you did,’ he gently chided his minister.

But you must also understand that these are not matters that can be abandoned by a person who is as conscientious about his responsibilities as you know me to be, because they depress me and matter to me more than to anyone. Taken together, they involve far more problems than people think ... Moreover, these issues involve religion, which must take precedence over everything.²⁰

Philip did not dispute the material evidence of impending disaster;

rather, his faith-based political vision led him to ignore it. Vázquez's prediction that 'everything may collapse at once' came true a few months later, when rebellions broke out in both Castile and Aragon.

Castile, Sicily and Aragon in revolt

The trouble began in March 1591 in Madrid when the Junta de Policía, recently created by the king 'to promote the benefit and growth of this city of Madrid and to ensure that it is clean, beautiful and safe', issued a decree that imposed a fine of three ducats on all craftsmen who 'move their offices, goods, equipment or anything else into the street, or come out of their shops to work there'. Three ducats was a substantial sum and, because 'there is no appeal to any court from this junta', a group of craftsmen sent a petition directly to the king asking him to suspend the decree. The king was at the Escorial, 'and so they could not speak with him', whereupon several thousand artisans marched through the streets of the capital shouting 'mercy and justice'. One group 'raised a banner and marched to the beat of a drum' to the Alcázar. Only when Don Cristóbal de Moura emerged and 'said he would tell the king about it in due course' did the crowd disperse, allowing the magistrates to arrest and imprison the leading demonstrators. Four received two hundred lashes followed by four years rowing the king's galleys, while others received six years of exile.²¹

Not long after order returned to the streets of Madrid, protests against new taxes surfaced in Toledo, Seville and Ávila. Meanwhile in Sicily, where the failure of the harvest made the situation especially volatile, the nobles in the Parliament refused to consent to any further tax – but since they lacked the support of the clergy and the towns, after some negotiations and threats (which included moving a cavalry regiment to the outskirts of the capital) the leaders of the movement were isolated and arrested. The 'revolt' was over in a matter of weeks. By contrast the revolt that began in Aragon in May 1591 lasted almost a year, and its suppression required the king to deploy 14,000 troops and spend almost 1.5 million ducats.

The revolt fed upon two separate disputes. The first concerned the enmity between the Moriscos, most of them settled farmers, and the Old Christian sheep ranchers who lived in the Pyrenean

foothills, known as Muntanyeses. Their periodic confrontations culminated in 1588 with the massacre of Moriscos in the county of Ribagorza, a strategic and substantial fief ruled by the duke of Villahermosa, committed by Muntanyeses reinforced by the charismatic Lupercio Latrás, the head of a bandit gang who had defied royal authority for almost two decades. Philip responded by sending troops into Ribagorza, both to protect the Moriscos and to punish their enemies. Latrás escaped but was soon arrested by officials of the crown of Castile. Although he claimed that as an Aragonese he was not subject to the laws of Castile, the king imprisoned him in Segovia castle and after a secret investigation had him executed there for treason.

The second conflict gathered momentum in 1589 when Philip sent the marquis of Almenara as his special representative to persuade the local elite of Aragon to accept a viceroy who was not born in the province, hoping that an official without local ties would govern more effectively. Many Aragonese saw the attempt to appoint a ‘foreigner’ as viceroy – together with the invasion of Ribagorza and the summary execution of Latrás – as part of a comprehensive royal attack on Aragon’s *fueros* (local laws), and the kingdom’s foremost aristocrat, the duke of Villahermosa, drew up a manifesto inviting his colleagues to form a league for the defence of the ancient constitution.²²

Philip and his Aragonese vassals, equally confident of the justice of their cause, were thus already set on a collision course when in April 1590 Antonio Pérez crossed the border from Castile and arrived in Zaragoza, the kingdom’s capital. Since his father Gonzalo was Aragonese, the disgraced secretary knew that a legal process known as *manifestación* afforded him a measure of protection against the crown. An Aragonese subject who ‘manifested’ that he was the victim of arbitrary persecution by the state could demand a hearing in the court of the Justiciar of Aragon (‘essentially an ombudsman’, in the felicitous phrase of Teofilo Ruiz, who ‘was the jealous defender of Aragonese liberties and privileges’).²³ Pérez also knew that while the Justiciar considered each case, he guaranteed the safety of the defendant; and that defendants had the right to demand that their accusers surrender to the Justiciar any goods they had confiscated. Pérez therefore demanded both a hearing by the Justiciar, Juan de Lanuza, and the return of the ‘two sealed caskets’ of documents

that his wife had delivered to fray Diego de Chaves, claiming that they would prove his innocence.

Philip ordered his lawyers to accuse Pérez before the Justiciar of the same charges for which he had been convicted in Castile, and he sent a copy of the principal documents that had led to that conviction; but Pérez responded by producing documents of his own that appeared to reveal his master's complicity in the death of Escobedo, and he sought to print them in a memorial drawn up in his defence. Since no printer in Zaragoza would take on the work, Pérez hired a team of scribes who made some thirty manuscript copies, which he distributed to 'many judges, knights and other people' throughout Spain and Italy.²⁴ Fearing that this might not suffice to convince the Justiciar of his innocence, Pérez attempted to flee across the border to Béarn, the Protestant stronghold of Philip's arch-enemy Henry of Bourbon. Although he failed, this move allowed the Inquisitors to accuse Pérez of heresy and to demand his removal from the Justiciar's prison to their own custody. Philip instructed Almenara to assist in the process, which took place on 24 May 1591.

Almost immediately, Zaragoza erupted in violence. Rioters ran through the streets 'with drawn swords shouting "Liberty"' and demanding the return of Pérez to the Justiciar; a mob of 3,000 angry Aragonese surrounded the Inquisition's headquarters and threatened to burn it down; another mob injured Almenara so badly that he died of his wounds two weeks later.²⁵ According to an Aragonese loyalist in July 1591, the noble league formed by Villahermosa now 'raised the cry of "liberty" to further excite the general population' while 'those familiar with the history of the current and past rebellions in the Netherlands and Italy used their knowledge to avenge themselves for the injustices that they attributed to the king'. He concluded: 'I firmly believe – and I am not imagining this – that unless there is an immediate response with a firm hand and rapid punishment, this revolt will be like the Netherlands.' Another royalist soon echoed the same sentiments: the Aragonese 'are losing the respect due to God and His Majesty, and if His Majesty does not immediately intervene we will have another Dutch Revolt'.²⁶

Other royalists warned that the revolt of Aragon would unleash opposition to Philip elsewhere. The duke of Gandía, the king's cousin, provided a particularly disturbing domino theory of what

might happen ‘if the troubles of Aragon continued’:

What security will we have that the Portuguese will remain peaceful, and what will happen in Italy when people see us here preoccupied and tangled up with wars at home? You already know what is happening in the Netherlands, France and England, and everyone knows that the king cannot afford to get involved in any more wars, since his resources are so exhausted and depleted by past and present ones.

The king’s advisers in Madrid agreed: ‘Prudent government is required to avoid all domestic disturbances,’ they reminded him. ‘This empire has expanded so much precisely because we have enjoyed peace at home and fought our wars far away.’ Yet everyone seemed to overlook the issue that Philip regarded as most important: the rioters had failed ‘to obey and respect the Holy Office’. He therefore saw the use of force as unavoidable.²⁷

As it happened, Philip had overwhelming force at his disposal. He had begun to mobilize troops in Castile for an invasion of France, and he could easily divert them to suppress the troubles in Aragon as they marched towards the Pyrenees. In July 1591 he therefore informed his ministers that he had resolved to use force to pacify Aragon ‘even if it means going there myself’, because ‘we have done the same for the sake of religion in the Netherlands, and more recently in France, which is not even mine; so you can see how much greater is my obligation to attend to my own dominion, especially in one that is so near’. He ordered the Justiciar of Aragon to send Pérez back to the Inquisition on or before 24 September 1591; but once again, when the officials of the Holy Office attempted to transfer the prisoner, crowds filled the streets and men ‘with drawn swords ran among the rioters shouting “Long live Liberty” in very loud voices’. Thirty people perished in the violence, with many more wounded.²⁸

Philip now sent a menacing letter to the cities of Aragon, reminding them that ‘since the army I have raised to enter France for the service of God and the good of Christendom is now ready, I am obliged (albeit with regret) not to send it abroad but instead to use it to restore peace at home’. Meanwhile Justiciar Juan de Lanuza invoked a *fuero* from 1461: ‘The Aragonese can and may take up arms against any hostile foreign forces that enter their kingdom, even if they act against their own king or crown prince if they should enter in that way.’ Philip responded by reassuring his

Aragonese subjects that ‘my army will not enter to overthrow your laws, but will pause on its way to campaign in France to support and facilitate the maintenance of justice by those born in the kingdom’ – unaware that the previous day the Justiciar, having declared that the king had broken the *fueros*, had summoned its towns and cities to send troops to assemble at Zaragoza on 5 November, ready to fight.²⁹

But Lanuza, too, acted in ignorance: Philip had already ordered 17,000 Castilian troops to move to the border with Aragon, and on 6 November they entered the kingdom and marched towards Zaragoza. Since only a few towns responded to the call to arms, Lanuza had just 2,000 men and foolishly, instead of using them to prepare Zaragoza to withstand a siege while he waited for reinforcements, he decided to meet the royal army in battle. As soon as his followers saw how heavily they were outnumbered, most fled. Pérez, who had remained in hiding in the capital since the September riots, now decided to make another attempt to escape to Béarn, and this time he succeeded – luckily for him, since Zaragoza surrendered without a struggle. A small band of rebels, including Lanuza and the duke of Villahermosa, took refuge in a nearby fortified town, but at the end of the month, reassured by the moderate behaviour of the royal army, they too surrendered. They miscalculated: Philip ordered the arrest of the Justiciar and his leading associates, and on 20 December one detachment of Castilian troops led Lanuza to the gallows in Zaragoza’s Main Square, where he was beheaded, while another detachment escorted Villahermosa to prison in Castile. Philip also authorized the arrest of all those involved in the murder of Almenara and all those denounced for challenging the Inquisition’s authority.

In Madrid a special ‘Junta of Aragon’, which included Inquisitors as well as members of the councils of Castile and Aragon, submitted a long list of crimes, suspected offenders and appropriate punishments. Philip rejected this comprehensive plan for vengeance and instead called for a policy of clemency that ‘would calm the spirits of all those in the kingdom who are suspicious and nervous that my ministers and the inquisitors are going to prosecute them’.³⁰ Nevertheless, as earlier in the Netherlands and in Portugal, Philip’s definition of ‘clemency’ was narrow: in January 1592 he outlawed as traitors almost 150 of his

subjects (including Pérez), any clerics who had taken part in the riots, any lawyers who had advised resistance, and the captains of the troops who had joined Lanuza to oppose the royal army. Philip appointed Vázquez de Arce, Pérez's nemesis, to punish any offenders who had sought refuge in Castile; he sent special judges from Madrid to Zaragoza to try offenders there; he created a special tribunal to deal with the towns that had sent support to Lanuza; and he offered a reward for the capture of the 'principal leaders' who had fled, above all Pérez.

In March 1592 the count of Chinchón, who handled Aragonese affairs at court, informed his nephew Don Francisco de Bobadilla, commander of the army of occupation, that the king 'says you would do him a great service in arranging by all means at your disposal to capture or kill Antonio Pérez. You may offer fourteen, sixteen and even twenty thousand ducats to anyone who brings him in alive; and up to eight thousand to anyone who brings you his head.'³¹ Although Bobadilla was happy to pursue Pérez and a few other leaders, he urged Philip to be merciful to the rest, citing the obvious parallel: 'I do not need to cite examples from Greek and Roman history, but only the one that caused Your Majesty so much trouble: the Netherlands'. Even 'a great general like the duke of Alba, commanding a powerful army' had not managed to subdue 'the Dutch, who are by nature humble and simple people'. So, Bobadilla asked the king rhetorically, what would happen if he provoked the Aragonese, 'a people by nature haughty, angry and daring, who are accustomed to settling things by force of arms, which they use and carry as soon as they are strong enough to do so'. Don Francisco accompanied this outspoken letter with an even more forthright note to Chinchón: 'The Netherlands are in their current state because of hatred for the Tenth Penny' – the sales tax that Philip had forced Alba to impose against his better judgement (chapter 11) – 'and if we follow the same path in Aragon, without doubt we will immediately repeat here what has happened in the Netherlands'.³²

The journey to Tarazona

Perhaps Don Francisco's analogy found its mark, because shortly afterwards Philip embraced the same 'path' he had followed in Granada and Portugal, and had intended to follow in the

Netherlands: he resolved to make a personal visit to the pacified region. But as usual he wanted the punishment of those guilty of rebellion to take place before he arrived, and also as usual he insisted on micromanaging the process, especially in ‘the matter of Antonio Pérez, because His Majesty is very sure that he will be surrendered alive, and so he wants to abort any current plans that just aim to kill him’ – that is, the king would deal only with those who offered to deliver him alive.³³ Once again, the king miscalculated. It would have been relatively easy to murder Pérez (several people offered to oblige), but Philip’s insistence on securing the person of his principal opponent allowed Pérez, just like William of Orange and Don Antonio before him, to slip away. The ex-secretary therefore survived to coordinate military attacks on Aragon from France and also to propagate in his numerous writings a devastating portrait of Philip as a fickle, mendacious, petty, vindictive and rather obtuse tyrant.

Meanwhile the prisons of Zaragoza became so full that both the Inquisition and the royal judges had to release on parole ‘the less guilty’ in order to concentrate on interrogating the rest, often under torture, so that (in the king’s words) ‘we will get things right and find out the truth’. The king took a keen personal interest in some interrogations. Thus after his agents captured Miguel Donlope, a rebel leader who had fled to Béarn and then rashly re-entered the kingdom, Philip wrote: ‘I was very pleased to learn of his capture’ and he instructed the Inquisitors ‘to keep him under very close guard and make sure to get out of him everything that he knows’. Two months later, after studying the transcript of Donlope’s interrogation, the king wanted to know more: ‘Write to tell the Inquisitors to squeeze Miguel Donlope until he reveals the people to whom he sent [from Béarn] the boxes of books mentioned in the 17th charge against him; and with whom he corresponded, because in the 20th charge it says that he received some letters meant for others.’ A little later, Philip monitored equally closely the case of Rodrigo de Mur, leader of a faction in Ribagorza. ‘This was a very good and very important arrest’ he announced when he learned of his capture by the Inquisitors of Toledo; and when, shortly afterwards, Mur appealed to the Suprema for better treatment, Philip resolved ‘It would be safest to prevent him from writing anything.’³⁴

The king also took a personal interest in testimony that

incriminated the duke of Villahermosa, whom he had imprisoned in Burgos castle. As he moved towards Aragon, however, Philip decided to stay in Burgos, and since protocol forbade him to stay under the same roof as a disgraced grandee, he had Villahermosa moved to the royal fortress at Miranda de Ebro – where, after just a few days, ‘he died after a brief illness’. Villahermosa’s brother, the count of Luna, noted pointedly that this happened ‘before his relatives even knew the duke was sick’. Although he stopped short of accusing Philip of judicial murder, Luna noted that ‘at the very least’ his brother’s death ‘was convenient’. Royal apologists did nothing to allay such suspicions, affirming that the duke was guilty of treason and that ‘it is obvious that if someone is rightly condemned to death, there is no reason to conceal it’.³⁵ This was the same argument that Chaves had deployed three years before – ‘A secular prince who holds the power of life over his subjects can take it away for a just reason through a formal trial, and he can also do so without trial if there are witnesses [to the crime]’ – and by the summer of 1592 many witnesses had incriminated Villahermosa. Although Philip asserted that the duke had died of natural causes, and no contrary evidence has surfaced to contradict him, twenty years earlier Philip had likewise insisted that Montigny died of natural causes after a ‘brief illness’ even though, beneath the Franciscan habit in which he was hastily buried, the baron’s neck bore the marks of the garrotte applied on the king’s express orders (chapter 11)

Between them, the Inquisition and the royal judges took the lives of at least forty Aragonese rebels and imposed corporal punishment and banishment on sixty others. Many of them suffered the further ignominy of having their houses razed and their goods confiscated. But when the Suprema asked permission to try eleven more suspects *in absentia*, the king refused. ‘Although all eleven of those mentioned in this memorial are certainly guilty, I think we should delay the verdict’ until ‘we know how things are in that kingdom, and what would work best to end the troubles, which I hope will be a great service to Our Lord’.³⁶

After a leisurely progress through Old Castile and Navarre, Philip now made his sixth visit to the kingdom of Aragon (see plate 42). In November 1592, for the last time in his life, ‘he descended from his coach and mounted a horse that was entirely white, richly caparisoned, under a rich canopy’ to make his

ceremonial entry into Tarazona, where the Cortes of the kingdom awaited him. This majestic gesture astonished the royal entourage:

We all rejoiced to see such an entry, because it was unusual to see the king mount a horse at the advanced age of sixty-six or so. After all the illnesses and setbacks that he had suffered, it seemed to us a notable achievement, but his great and magnanimous heart managed to endure all these toils and tribulations in order to win over and pacify the people who had so recently been so hostile.³⁷

By the time the king arrived, the Cortes of Aragon had been in session for some weeks and had already made some of the concessions he desired: agreeing that legislation required only majority approval, not unanimity; incorporating the county of Ribagorza into the royal domain; and amending the *fueros* to make it more difficult for a person suspected of treason to shelter behind them, as Pérez had done. Now they also recognized the royal right to appoint a ‘foreigner’ as viceroy and swore obedience to the prince as their next ruler. The king, for his part, issued a general pardon and refused yet another demand from the Suprema to condemn still others who had challenged its authority. He informed the Inquisitors:

To avoid further delay, I decided to publish in Zaragoza a pardon on behalf of the Holy Office and to state that no one else will be summoned. And that is what I did. With this, with the punishments thus far, and with the good laws that remain in that kingdom, I trust in Our Lord that its people have been taught a lesson and will now take good care to obey and respect the Holy Office.

The king maintained that upholding the authority of the Inquisitors formed ‘the principal reason that led me to take the revolt so seriously’. Since he had now done so, it was time to move on.³⁸ Nevertheless, the royal army remained in the kingdom for another year to implement a number of further measures intended to secure loyalty. It conducted a census of Moriscos, confiscating from them 8,000 firearms and numerous lesser weapons; it protected the engineers who built a network of fortresses, castles and watchtowers in the Pyrenees to prevent any stealth attack by Pérez’s supporters from France; and it oversaw the construction of a vast citadel to protect the headquarters of the Inquisition.

As he made his way back from Tarazona to Madrid, despite the

exceptional cold ('I would venture to say,' wrote Jehan Lhermite, 'that neither the Netherlands nor Germany has experienced worse cold than we felt there, with continual hail and snow'), the king had good reason to feel satisfied. His prompt and firm reaction to the revolt of Aragon ended the dangerous wave of rebellions in Spain: not only would there be no more uprisings during his reign, there would be no more for a generation. Moreover, when Catalonia rebelled in 1640 and appealed to its neighbour for aid, Aragon remained loyal.

According to Lhermite's meticulous calculation, the king and his entourage had travelled 500 miles over the previous eight months and on 30 December they returned safely to the capital. Philip immediately went 'to the monastery they call *Las Descalzas* to see and greet his sister the Empress and her daughter the Infanta Doña Margarita' and then he spent the rest of the winter as usual in the Alcázar.³⁹ Despite these indications of normality, the journey to Tarazona represented a watershed in Philip's reign. It left the king drained. There was no question of him riding into Madrid on 'a horse that was entirely white, richly caparisoned, under a rich canopy': instead, he entered his capital slumped in the back of his coach with the blinds drawn. Never again would he take personal command of a crisis, and he would read few incoming papers with intense and sustained scrutiny. As he neared his sixty-seventh birthday, the king's grip on power began to fail.

Towards the tomb – and beyond, 1593–1603

A hardening of the arteries

In the life of the ageing Philip II as little more than ‘hunting, buildings and gardening’ – a view implicitly endorsed by the Jeronimite monks at the Escorial, the king’s ‘ordinary residence from Easter to All Saints Day’: they filled their chronicles with descriptions of how and when he hunted, reviewed architectural plans and enjoyed his gardens. Beyond the convent, however, criticisms of the king and his policies had a sharper edge. According to the royal chronicler Antonio de Herrera, the revolts in Castile, Sicily and Aragon in 1591

gave rise to speculations full of doubt and fear. The good regretted the toil and the reverses; the others, through hatred of the current state of affairs, which they considered miserable, rejoiced and blamed the king who amid all the dangers was wasting his time on activities and matters of little importance, affirming that if he were gone everything would improve.

In 1595 a saying began to circulate: ‘If the king does not die, the kingdom will die’, and by then the king’s failing health fuelled speculation that he might die soon.¹

Monsieur de Longlée, the long-serving French resident at the court of Spain, had reported in July 1586 that Philip ‘looks older

and more pensive' because 'his gout causes him pain', and indeed the king lay in bed incapacitated for several weeks that summer. The following year, Philip informed his daughter Catalina that 'I have not been able to walk for five or six days and was confined to bed because I twisted my knee. What gives me most pain is my hand, which has prevented me from writing or doing anything else with it for several days. That is why I have not written to you. And my eyes are not too good either.'² In March 1588, Philip again apologized to Catalina for 'not writing to you' because 'my gout started earlier than usual – I have now had it for two months' – and 'I still walk with a stick'. In addition, 'they have drawn blood once, and also purged me, so I have been very tired and very thirsty. All this has left me very weak, and I take a long time to do everything.' Longlée noticed that 'His Majesty is thinner', and portraits of the king at this time show him with tired eyes and hollow cheeks – the latter probably reflecting the loss of his remaining teeth, often by extraction, 'and removing one of them hurt a lot' (see plate 43).³

'Hurt a lot': like his contemporaries, Philip had no painkillers or antibiotics, and it was primarily to reduce the constant pain in his limbs from 1595 that he resorted to a 'special chair for the gout', with movable positions from almost vertical to horizontal. The chair 'allowed him to rest and to take the weight off his limbs whenever he left his sickbed'. On many days Philip now 'stayed seated in the chair from the time he arose in the morning until he went to bed at night', wearing light clothes over his nightgown, and he 'lay there as if he were in his own bed, since the seat was wide and deep' (see plate 44).⁴

The king's mind, as well as his body, began to deteriorate, and he now complained not just that he lacked time to take decisions (as he had always done) but also that he lacked time even to think about taking them. When Mateo Vázquez made the admirable suggestion that the president of the council of Castile should hold office for only three years, just like other senior officials, the king replied wearily: 'There is much food for thought here, and I will think about it – although there are so many other things to think about now that I don't know how I stay sane. God help us.' Yet still Philip refused to relinquish power. As Nuncio Camillo Caetani put it in 1594: 'although the king is old and constantly sick', nevertheless 'he wants to be involved in all business matters' and,

as he had always done, he ‘consults few people before he embarks on prolonged, difficult and dangerous affairs’.⁵

The dispatches of Caetani, the only diplomat who still received personal audiences, reveal that the king went through a pattern of ‘ups and downs’ during his last years. Thus in April 1596, the nuncio reported that on some days Philip ‘transacts the normal amount of reading and writing’ and even ‘wrote a letter to His Holiness in his own hand’; while in June he watched the bullfights staged in the square outside his palace, where ‘the whole city saw him on a stage, walking without assistance or a cane, sitting and getting up, wearing his sword and ordinary clothes for five hours’. At an audience the following month, by contrast, Caetani found ‘His Majesty much more downcast and weak than usual, indeed more than I have ever seen him’. His face ‘was emaciated and his eyes lacked their usual sparkle’, and he ‘showed great weakness in speaking and moving’.⁶

Letting go

This cyclical pattern is the key to understanding the last years of the reign. Intervals of relative health enabled Philip to retain ultimate control of the policies pursued by his ministers, while awareness that illness might incapacitate him at any moment led to some important administrative innovations to ensure that the central government functioned smoothly even without the king’s direct participation. In Madrid, a committee of experienced ministers called the Junta Grande (the ‘Big Committee’) summarized and evaluated the consultas sent by each central council before sending the dossier to the Junta de Noche of senior ministers who (as before) accompanied the king. The juntas added their recommendations before each item arrived on Philip’s desk. This procedure reduced a multi-page consulta to a single line and twenty consultas to a single page. Jerónimo Gassol, who became secretary of the Junta de Noche after the death of his brother-in-law, Mateo Vázquez, in 1591, handled both the recommendations of the Junta de Noche and the documents marked ‘to be placed in the king’s hands’ (chapter 4). Normally the king dictated his rescript to Gassol, and then added his initials, but he could and did still demand more information or advice before reaching some decisions. ‘Tonight or tomorrow, communicate this to the three

ministers who were in the Junta, who will know more about this,' Philip instructed Gassol on one consulta, 'so that before I get up Don Cristóbal [de Moura] can tell me what they advise so that, once I know that, I can make up my mind.'⁷

In September 1593, Philip decided to double the size of the Junta de Noche (henceforth known as the Junta de Gobierno), and he added his nephew Albert, who had served as viceroy of Portugal since the king's departure a decade before. Albert now returned to Madrid where he both gave audiences and received ambassadors in the king's name; but he did not preside over the Junta, an honour the king reserved for Prince Philip, albeit always accompanied by his governor, the marquis of Velada. Philip instructed the Junta de Gobierno that in matters 'in which you already know more or less what I want – investigating faults, supervising the execution of decisions already taken, distributing modest rewards and promotions, and making lesser appointments' – it should 'send me the resolution directly, either written in the margins or on the dorse of the consultas, so that I can initial them'; but he retained greater control over 'more serious matters, such as the administration of the treasury, raising loans' and defence. In these cases, 'send me your recommendation on a separate paper so that I can write or dictate the appropriate decision. After that, as soon as I return the paper communicating what I decide on each matter, you can put the rescript and resolution on each consulta and send them back to me; and I will get the prince my son to initial them' before Gassol returned each consulta to the relevant council for implementation.⁸

Philip later refined this system. After the death of Fray Diego de Chaves in 1592 the king's ministers begged him to 'name a confessor because many matters of conscience arise and we do not know who to consult about them': eventually Moura's nominee, Fray Diego de Yepes, became the royal confessor and to him Philip henceforth sent specific proposals to see if they could be implemented 'in good conscience'. In addition, the king increasingly communicated his orders through Moura. At first he did so clandestinely. Thus in October 1594, he instructed Moura to 'tell Gassol to write a rescript on this consulta that corresponds to your paper of advice, making it seem that it is my opinion and not yours, and then let him send it to me to initial'.⁹

These administrative changes achieved three goals. First,

although Philip retained the ultimate decision in ‘more serious matters’ for much of the time, when he fell ill Moura deputized for him, having become the royal Favourite in all but name. Moreover, whatever the king’s state of health, the Junta de Gobierno transacted routine government business in an orderly fashion – and, should he die suddenly, it would oversee the orderly transfer of power to his heir. Above all, the junta served as a ‘collective tutor’ to the prince: just like his father at the same age, by presiding over the daily meetings of senior ministers the heir to the throne learned how to rule the dominions that would soon be his.

In contrast to these sensible domestic changes, Philip persevered with the same disastrous foreign policies as before. In October 1596 he ordered his admiral, Don Martín de Padilla, to lead the Atlantic fleet painstakingly created in the wake of the Armada in an attack on Ireland. When Padilla pointed out the risks of setting forth so late in the year Philip deployed the same sort of spiritual blackmail that he had used in the past against Alba, Santa Cruz and Medina Sidonia.

You must leave immediately in the name of God and do what I have ordered in the voyage and in the whole campaign. Although I realize that the season is advanced, and that this poses risks, in this we have to trust in God (who has done so much for us). To stop what we have begun now would be to show weakness in His service.¹⁰

Padilla complied but, just as he had predicted, storms struck his fleet soon after it set sail, causing the loss of many ships and some 2,000 men.

Although Philip failed to harm Elizabeth in 1596, the queen again managed to inflict severe damage on him. For two weeks in July, an Anglo-Dutch force occupied Cádiz, and then burned it – taking with them numerous hostages and two royal galleons, as well as destroying ships and property worth four million ducats before moving north, apparently intending to attack Lisbon. As Don Juan de Silva, charged with the defence of Portugal, bitterly observed: ‘A king of Spain can preserve his reputation without capturing London’ but ‘it cannot be preserved or recovered if we lose Lisbon in the same way we lost Cádiz’. Given that the Portuguese refused to serve under the Castilian commander appointed by the king, it was perhaps fortunate for Philip that the

English sailed for home without putting his 'reputation' to the test.¹¹

King versus Cortes

As usual, failure did not shake Philip's determination 'to put our trust in God': he continued to fight multiple enemies on multiple fronts, even though his wars cost roughly twice his total revenues. He therefore reconvened the Cortes of Castile and asked them to vote yet more taxes to fund his foreign wars, but the assembly that began in May 1592 lasted twice as long as any of its predecessors, largely because some deputies defied their king. Senior ministers reminded the Cortes that 'His Majesty had exhausted all his royal patrimony, and on top of that he owes thirteen million ducats in unsecured loans' and 'that all the resources and devices on which His Majesty might rely for the preservation and defence of these realms' were exhausted; but instead, they found, 'almost all the deputies wish to beseech Your Majesty most insistently that, before anything else, you order a reduction in war expenditure, both in the Netherlands and elsewhere'.¹² One deputy bluntly stated that 'although the wars with the Dutch, England and France are holy and just, we must beg Your Majesty that they cease', while another urged 'Your Majesty to abandon all these wars, making the best terms that you can'.¹³

Philip had never taken criticism well, and he now delivered a biting reprimand to the doubting deputies: 'Tell them that these wars are necessary and unavoidable unless Spain is to suffer the miseries that afflict other parts of Christendom,' he instructed one of his ministers, who must also insist that

they should and must place their trust in me, in the love I have for these kingdoms, and in the long experience I have in governing them, [and accept] that I shall always do what is in their best interests. Speak to them at length in this vein and advise them that they are never, on any pretext, to come to me with such a suggestion again.¹⁴

In addition, Philip offered some deputies bribes in return for a favourable vote and intimidated others with summary arrests and house searches. He even sent a message to 'forewarn the theologians' of all towns represented in the Cortes 'that if the deputies should turn to them for advice, they may include in their

opinions a full account of my obligations, and the reasons why we must find a remedy for the needs that face us' (and he sneakily demanded that the theologians share with him what they discovered).¹⁵ Instead of winning over 'the troublemakers' (*los dificultosos*, as the government termed its critics), however, the king's combination of intransigence and interference fostered an 'organized opposition with a coherent political agenda' in the Cortes: an agenda that I. A. A. Thompson has termed 'Castile first'. By spring 1596 the opposition had become so articulate and inflexible that some ministers favoured dissolving the Cortes so that 'we might convene others who are not so attached to their pretensions or so smart'.¹⁶

Then came the Anglo-Dutch assault on Cádiz. According to historian Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, 'This episode was perceived in Spain as a national disgrace and an irreparable humiliation that produced a wave of pessimism and sadness.' Shortly after hearing the news, Philip composed a strongly worded 'I told you so' rebuke to the Cortes.

The experience we are now beginning to suffer in our homeland shows how advantageous it would have been to keep our enemies tied down in their homeland when we had the chance, and how important it would have been to be able to do so now, if we had not run out of resources ... You cannot find a better defence for your own homeland than to make war abroad. Everyone can clearly see and understand that whatever wars I have waged abroad have been to maintain the calm, peace and quiet of these kingdoms, and to keep away from them the misfortunes that war brings.¹⁷

Suitably chastened, the deputies now voted new taxes, but they attached numerous conditions: that the money could be used only to pay for the defence of Spain, not for any foreign war; that the Cortes itself must oversee collection and disbursement of the funds; that the king and his heir must 'promise and obligate themselves and their successors to the inviolable observance' of all the concessions; and that any breach of these and other conditions would put an end to tax collection. The king refused: 'Even if I and my successors wanted to comply with some conditions, it would be impossible.'¹⁸ While the king and the Cortes haggled, Philip's wars continued to drain his resources. Even before the sack of Cádiz the marquis de Poza, president of the council of Finance, described

Spain's impossible financial and strategic position to Moura just as bluntly as had the 'troublemakers' in the Cortes:

His Majesty must see that it is impossible to carry on as we are, because although we have already spent all His Majesty's revenues until the year 1599, his expenses continue and even increase, so that even if his revenues were unencumbered, we could not carry on. To do this, one only needs to know what I know: that His Majesty must either reduce his expenditure voluntarily until things improve, or else find a way to achieve the impossible.

A few days later he added despairingly: 'Even if we escape from this obstacle, we will inevitably encounter another one tomorrow because each day is more impossible than the last.'¹⁹

The borrower from hell

To anyone who had lived through the fiscal crisis of 1574–5, such language could mean only one thing: another bankruptcy. Given that 'here we are drowning tied back-to-back' (in Moura's colourful phrase) on 13 November 1596, 'since loans are now so hard to find, and the total that we now owe' to bankers exceeded 14 million ducats, Philip signed another Default Decree that suspended all interest payments and confiscated the capital of all outstanding loans. Castile had become the world's first serial defaulter on sovereign debt and Philip had become, in the phrase of a recent book, 'the borrower from hell'.²⁰

The decree produced the predictable chaos. In Spain 'all trade ceased and it was feared that many merchants would be ruined', while in the Netherlands Philip's commanders received orders that

If the [Dutch] rebels attack you, then you and the officers and soldiers with you should still do what is expected of honourable men; but if you find that you face intolerable pressure before relief can reach you, then rather than sacrifice yourself, I charge and command you to make the best terms you can.²¹

When the Cortes complained about the hopeless situation, the king again replied 'I told you so':

It grieved His Majesty more than anyone that his needs have caused this Decree, without any way to avoid it. If His Majesty could defend this kingdom with his own body alone he would do it; but since this cannot

be done without money, and since he has none, the said Decree was unavoidable. In addition, part of the cause lies in the delay of the Cortes in providing him with assistance.²²

Such rhetoric did nothing to solve the underlying problems, since Philip's wars continued to cost double his revenues and, as Moura put it, 'however much more we acquire, the more we have to defend and the more our enemies want to take from us'. While Philip poured his resources into France in a vain attempt to prevent Henry of Navarre from becoming king, a small but well-trained Dutch army captured one Spanish-held stronghold after another, doubling the size of the Republic by 1598.²³

Philip's difficulties in securing troops, fleets and the funds to sustain them during the last decade of his reign were not entirely of his own making. An episode of global cooling caused freak weather conditions. According to James Casey, 'The 1590s were a decade of extremely bad weather' in Spain: the chronicles and tithe records for Valencia and Murcia revealed 'an exceptional run of wet years between 1589 and 1598'.²⁴ Andalusia also suffered an unparalleled sequence of extremely wet years between 1590 and 1593 and again between 1595 and 1597. Further north, the problem was not too much rain but too little: a series of tree rings from Navacerrada, high in the Guadarrama mountains that divide Old and New Castile, reveals that the lowest annual precipitation ever recorded in the past millennium occurred during the 1590s. At the same time, an epidemic of bubonic plague moved inexorably south from the port-cities of Cantabria. In Mateo Alemán's bitter novel *The Life of Guzmán de Alfarache*, as the hungry narrator travelled from Cazorla to Madrid in 1598 he observed grimly that

people gave little charity, and no wonder because the year was generally sterile; and if it was bad in Andalusia, it was worse as one entered the kingdom of Toledo, and the further inland the worse the scarcity. That was when I heard people say: 'God save you from the plague descending from Castile and hunger rising from Andalusia.'²⁵

The widespread misery led Fray Diego de Yepes to send Philip a hard-hitting analysis of the situation that came close to spiritual blackmail. 'Since Your Majesty's indispositions prevent me from saying some things in person,' the confessor began, 'I cannot avoid

saying them in writing.’ After detailing concrete examples of negligence and malfeasance in government, he concluded:

God has entrusted the conservation of the Catholic faith and the expansion of the Christian religion to Your Majesty, and since they both depend on the sound government, justice and prosperity of these kingdoms of Spain I hope you will be pleased to arrange matters so that on the Day of Judgment (which is not far off), you can appear in the presence of God confident that you have done everything possible.

When nothing improved, Yepes sent an equally stark warning to Moura that fighting wars and rising taxes at a time of dearth ‘will bring down our world’. He also deployed spiritual blackmail on his colleague:

Your Lordship can see where this leads. The poor cry out, but His Majesty does not hear them, nor does he want to hear me. I simply do not know what to do. May God in His mercy protect Your Lordship, whom the world blames for all this (along with me)... I beg Your Lordship to look into this carefully, and advise His Majesty, because I have had no luck in writing or speaking to him.²⁶

Exit strategies

Such defeatism, coupled with the news that Elizabeth, Henry IV and the Dutch leaders had signed a triple alliance against Spain and now sought to coordinate their attacks, convinced Philip and his most trusted ministers that they must make peace at any price. Despite the objections of a committee of theologians that it was contrary ‘to the law of conscience’ they concluded a general settlement with those affected by the Default Decree by which, in return for resumption of interest on the confiscated capital of their earlier loans, a consortium of bankers signed new loans worth over seven million ducats to fund one last campaign.²⁷ Philip also empowered Albert, now his governor-general in the Netherlands, to undertake indirect peace negotiations with England. At first, the king tied his nephew’s hands – ‘you will conduct yourself in this matter in such a way that you do not close the door to peace, but do not open it either’ – but later conceded broad powers, similar to those he had conferred on his lieutenants in the first half of the reign: ‘Since you know about everything, you will be able to derive the best possible advantage; and since I have delegated everything

to you, I have nothing more to say except that I await news of what happens.’²⁸ Philip also accepted a papal offer to mediate a settlement with Henry IV of France, who saw peace with Spain as the best way to end the French civil war and consolidate his domestic position. The peace of Vervins, signed on 2 May 1598, largely confirmed the terms agreed at Cateau-Cambrésis thirty-nine years before, permitting Philip and his advisers to present it as a successful outcome since Spain sacrificed little territory.

Shortly afterwards, in Madrid, the king approved the marriage treaty between his daughter Isabella Clara Eugenia and Albert; and then, together with her and Prince Philip, he signed an act that ceded limited sovereignty in the Netherlands to Isabella and Albert. Spanish influence was limited to defence, foreign policy and matrimonial affairs (if Isabella should die before her brother, leaving no heirs, he would succeed her; if she had a daughter, then the daughter should marry the king or prince of Spain, in order to reunite the Monarchy). In August 1598, in Brussels, Albert assumed power in Isabella’s name and left for Spain to marry her, joining en route the prince’s bride-to-be. The king had at last followed his father’s advice and partitioned his inheritance.

When seeking a bride for his son, the king had as usual confined himself to Habsburg candidates, eventually narrowing his search to the three teenage daughters of his cousin, Archduke Charles of Styria. He requested portraits of all three (almost impossible to tell apart) but his first choice, the oldest, died almost immediately. Her mother obligingly offered to send both her younger daughters to Spain, where Philip could choose one as his daughter-in-law and keep the other in reserve in Las Descalzas Reales. Her prescience was soon vindicated. Philip requested the pope’s dispensation for his son to marry the older surviving archduchess despite ‘the multiple degrees of consanguinity and parentage’ that existed between them (cousins on both their mothers’ and their fathers’ sides), but no sooner had the pope complied than she too died, forcing Philip to request an identical dispensation for his son to marry her only remaining sibling, Margarita, then just thirteen years old. Once again the pope obliged; Margarita and the prince married in May 1599, and she lived long enough to give birth to five children, all of whom survived into adulthood. The future of the Spanish Habsburgs at last seemed secure.²⁹

‘My children and my grandchildren’

Although Philip died six months before his son’s wedding, he already had grandchildren. In April 1588 he congratulated his daughter Catalina ‘you have done very well to have three fine children in just three years’. The previous day, he noted, ‘was your wedding anniversary and that night you began an activity at which you evidently excel, judging by its fruit’ – a surprisingly vulgar reference to his daughter’s sex life. The following year Philip received not only descriptions but also paintings of the new family members. ‘I was delighted to read what you wrote about my grandsons, and to receive the little book that the duke [of Savoy] sent me containing your portrait and theirs – although I would much prefer to see you and them, because I’m sure I would enjoy their pranks’ – a surprising comment, since Philip had shown little interest in the ‘pranks’ of his own children. But his love for Catalina was unfeigned and profound, and when news arrived of her death in childbirth in 1597 he wept and howled and grieved so long that one of the monks at the Escorial believed that it ‘deprived the king of many days of life and health’.³⁰

The king’s love for his older daughter was also unfeigned and profound. After Catalina left Spain, Isabella was ‘normally with her father’, visiting him every day after dinner, travelling with him, and sometimes even signing letters in his name when arthritis prevented him from signing himself.³¹ This makes the cruel fate that the king planned for her ‘if she is not married at the time of my death’ doubly remarkable. In a secret codicil to his testament of 1594 he wrote, ‘I declare and command that she may choose as her residence, until she marries, either the Alcázar of Segovia or the palace at Tordesillas’. Although the king went on to praise the ‘great virtues and qualities that God has given her’, and affirmed ‘the love I have and owe to such a daughter’, he still planned to exile her from her only living relatives (her brother Philip at court, and her aunt María and cousin Margarita in Las Descalzas Reales) to either the fortress where Lupercio Latrás (and many others) had been imprisoned and executed or the palace where his grandmother Juana had languished in solitary confinement. Although Philip’s survival for four more years saved Isabella from this fate, his decree displayed extraordinary insensitivity towards a daughter ‘whom I love so tenderly on account of her virtues and because she has been such good company for me’.³²

Philip's plans for her brother, the prince of Asturias, were more conventional and reflected his unhappy experience with his first heir, Don Carlos. When in 1585 the king created a household for Prince Philip, then seven years old, the new governor, Don Juan de Zúñiga (son and homonym of the king's own stern governor) reminded his master that 'I have seen the damage that arose from the factions in the household' of Don Carlos, so 'it would be best for the servants of His Highness to be allies of his governor, so that this danger does not arise'.³³ The king evidently paid heed, choosing the rest of the prince's servants primarily for their loyalty, rather than for their talent. The prince's tutor, García de Loaysa Girón, exemplified the loyal mediocrity that Philip promoted. On hearing of his appointment, someone who claimed to have been Loaysa's 'intimate and devoted servant' for thirty years lamented that although the new tutor knew all about

languages, mathematics, astrology, logic, philosophy, metaphysics, theology ... he is ignorant of a thousand other things. He has never learned to speak with a woman, whether good or bad; what to do with playing cards; ... or that there are more streets in Alcalá than the one that leads from his house to the church and the university.³⁴

The writer could hardly have identified more accurately those skills that Philip would *not* want his heir to learn! Chatting up women, playing cards and being street-wise (especially in Alcalá) were precisely the vices that (in the king's mind) had ruined Don Carlos.

Perhaps Philip over-reacted – surrounding his son with servants who were worthy but dull and whose first loyalty was to the king increased the attraction to the prince of an older courtier devoted to *him*: Don Francisco de Sandoval y Rojas, count of Lerma and marquis of Denia – but that development lay in the future; for the time being, Loaysa's pedagogy produced admirable results. In 1594 Philip allowed his son to sign 'I the prince' (*Yo el príncipe*) on routine letters and warrants, countersigned by a royal secretary 'By order of His Majesty, and of His Highness in his name'. Three years later, according to the nuncio, 'The prince already takes a full part in government' and 'every day provides evidence of his increasing discretion and valour'. All this, he concluded, 'promises a wonderful new Golden Age'. Nevertheless, the nuncio continued, although the prince affixed his signature, 'all the documents are

drawn up by order of His Majesty, so that there is little difference or distinction between the prince's signature and the stamp which used to be used in the king's name'. Moreover, when the king was sick Moura acted as 'arbiter of the affairs of all his kingdoms, of his councils, of his armies, of his fleets, of his ministers, of his treasury'.³⁵

Philip did his best to ensure there would be continuity after his death. 'I am very satisfied with Don Cristóbal de Moura,' he wrote in a paper of instruction to his son during his last illness, 'and with the other ministers whom I keep at my side' (that is: the Junta de Gobierno); but

As a ruler, you must employ the services of everyone, each in his own office, without becoming the servant of any individual. Instead you should listen to many, and keep your opinion of them secret so that you remain free to choose the best, acting as master and leader. This will bring you prestige, whereas the opposite [course] will squander it because instead of commanding, which is what kings do, you will be commanded.³⁶

Philip also prepared two more personal papers of advice for his son. One was 'something that St Louis king of France prepared for his son, just before his death' three centuries before: Philip transcribed it in his own hand and gave it to his confessor, with orders to pass it on to his son after his death. It contained many platitudes about faith (love God and avoid sin; confess regularly; advance the Catholic faith and obey the pope; attend Mass and hear sermons regularly) and justice (the prince should neither speak nor hear ill of others; should allow no blasphemy; should uphold the law; and should favour the poor). Some of St Louis's other pious injunctions coincided with Philip's own outlook: 'If you are thinking of undertaking anything of importance, share it with your confessor or some other pious men of exemplary life so that you will know what you should do'; 'when you suffer adversities, endure them with courage and consider that you richly deserved them, and that way you will learn from them'; 'Do not make war, especially against other Christians, without good cause and counsel'; 'As far as you can, preserve peace.'³⁷

Philip kept a final paper of advice in a special casket. A little before his death, he asked for the casket and took out the 'paper that it contained and gave it to the prince, saying: "You will find

here the way to rule your kingdom”’. In essence the document was an attempt to tie his son’s hands, even though he was already 20. The king reminded him:

With the love of a father who is so fond of you and so wants you to get things right, and with the experience I have of all the men who will serve you, I have talked to you, among other things, about the persons I think worthy of promotion, whom you can trust and use for the well-being of these kingdoms. I remind and advise you to remember well what I have told you. I think you will find it useful.³⁸

None of Philip’s instructions on ‘how to rule your kingdom’ contained the sort of detailed advice provided to him by his own father half a century before; but this is not surprising because, both in 1543 and 1548, Charles wrote when he was far away and feared he might die before he saw his heir again. Philip, by contrast, lived under the same roof as his son and he explicitly referred to ‘what I have already told you’. He did not need to write it all down.

From Madrid to Purgatory, via the Escorial

In May 1597 Philip turned 70, and like many septuagenarians, he spent more time sick and more time asleep – ‘Every day, His Majesty gets up after lunch and goes to bed after dinner,’ Velada noted – and everything he did took more time. Thus the journey from Madrid to the Escorial, which the king had once managed on horseback in a day, could now take a week, and when he arrived sometimes ‘he had to go straight to his sickbed’.³⁹ Any setback that threatened the king’s health alarmed his courtiers because (as one of them put it) as soon as Philip died ‘we are on another stage and all the characters in this play will be altogether new’. When ‘the old king leaves us’, he continued lugubriously, ‘another era begins, and we do not know how it will be’. The harbingers of change were everywhere. During the fiesta of St John in June 1598 the prince of Asturias took the future duke of Lerma with him to the bullfights in Madrid’s Plaza Mayor, and they watched together ostentatiously from a window. Everyone could see that Lerma sat ‘very close to His Highness’s chair’ and that ‘the prince ignored all the other courtiers’.⁴⁰ Uncertainty about the future paralysed the affairs of the Monarchy. According to Velada, ‘the councillors feel

they can no longer tell the king everything, so they try to prolong and postpone everything'; and although 'the prince our lord orders and resolves what needs to be done, as long as his father lives he does so with great respect and moderation'.⁴¹

This uncertainty did not continue for long. A few days after the fiesta of St John, although his doctors advised him to rest, Philip left Madrid for the last time, 'prepared to go and die in his royal monastery of St Lawrence' which, Fray José de Sigüenza claimed, he had decided long before would be 'his glorious tomb'. The king travelled there 'in the same chair that they used to carry him around the palace, carried by four boys' and, to avoid the intense heat, he only travelled in the evenings. This time, instead of resting after his arrival, the king immediately travelled 'all round the buildings in his chair, from top to bottom, leaving nothing unseen. Such dramatic changes in his health left his doctors amazed.'⁴² On 22 July 1598 Philip took to his bed, but for some weeks he still managed to transact business. He nominated several prelates to vacancies; he gave many of his personal servants handsome rewards; he appointed some officials to positions in the household of his future daughter-in-law, Margarita; and he pardoned some prisoners, including some of those involved in the revolt of Aragon. He even showed mercy to 'the wife of Antonio Pérez: provided she retires to a monastery, she can leave prison, and she can receive back the property that belongs to her, and her children may inherit their share of it'.⁴³

On 17 August, although in great pain and helplessly incontinent, Philip gave a final audience to Caetani, who 'found him in bed, immobile and extremely weak, but with all his senses alert and an admirable composure of spirit'. The nuncio first invited the king to 'ask pardon for all his faults, sins and errors that he had committed through malicious and false information and advice' (perhaps a reference to the murder of Escobedo?). Then he shamelessly exploited his advantage to offer the king, on behalf of the pope, substantial spiritual benefits if he would grant the pope certain disputed jurisdictions in his dominions (chapter 5):

I begged only one thing from His Majesty in order to remove all the impediments and obstacles that stood in his way [to heaven]: namely that he should make a clear declaration that he wanted to settle and resolve the jurisdictional problem in all his kingdoms and dominions, that he should give the Church what was really its due, and that he

should tell the prince of his intention.

Despite the excruciating pain, his fear of Purgatory, and the ignominy of lying in his own excrement, Philip firmly rejected this naked attempt at blackmail:

His Majesty told me, with a smiling face and a fearless spirit, that he was greatly pleased by my visit, that his illness was serious and he was prepared to die, that he submitted himself to the judgment of God on whether he would live or die, and that he wanted nothing more than to die in a state of grace and seek forgiveness for his sins.

He then stated that ‘he was resolved to settle these matters of jurisdiction, that his intention had always been that the Church and the Apostolic See should get respect and reverence, and the prince would do the same ... Up to this point,’ the nuncio continued, ‘I understood everything he said, because he made a great effort to speak loudly and clearly,’ but afterwards, ‘although he spoke many other words on this matter, I missed them because he lacked the strength and said them in a confused and obscure manner.’ The king had not lost his grip, however. Two days later, with shaking hand, he signed a document expressing his desire to resolve the ‘conflicts between the ecclesiastical and secular jurisdictions’ – but instead of unilaterally giving ground as the nuncio requested, Philip proposed that the pope and he should ‘sort everything out through the intercession of some respected, knowledgeable and upright people who would dispassionately clarify what appertained to each of the parties’. And ‘if Our Lord should call me before this can be done, I charge and command the prince my son to follow through – making clear that he should not agree to anything prejudicial to the royal jurisdiction where it is founded in truth’. Philip thus remained true to his father’s instructions fifty years before: ‘to behave with the submission of a good son of the Church ... without giving them any just cause for offence with you. But do this without any prejudice to the pre-eminences, prosperity, and peace of the said kingdoms.’⁴⁴ It was an impressive display of Philip’s iron resolve even as his death approached.

On 1 September, Philip signed a document granting permission for the marriage of Isabella Clara Eugenia, but it proved to be his last act as king. He continued to lie incontinent on the bed in his

tiny study in the Escorial, unable to move and unable to bear being touched because sores developed all over his emaciated body. Sometimes the doctors caused so much pain as they treated them that 'he cried out that he could not stand it'. He sometimes asked them 'to stop for a moment and at other times pleaded that they should treat him more gently', and during one especially painful procedure he announced 'that he was going to die in their hands'. According to his valet, Jehan Lhermite, 'the stench that emanated from these sores', and also from his soiled bed, constituted 'a different kind of torment, on account of his lifelong concern with personal hygiene'.⁴⁵

Although he could not move, the king could still watch and listen, and his devotions during his final illness reveal a great deal about his personal faith. Guided by his confessor, Philip studied certain passages of the Bible (especially the Psalms and passages from the Gospel that emphasized forgiveness: the redemption of Mary Magdalene; the return of the Prodigal Son; pardoning the thief on the Cross) and the spiritual works of two subjects whom he had known personally: Luis de Granada from Spain and Louis de Blois (Blosius) from the Netherlands. Isabella and Yepes took turns reading out extracts from Blosius, and the king repeated them, often several times – particularly passages about how human anguish as well as Christ's Passion can redeem penitent sinners. Physical suffering in this life, Blosius suggested, lessened the sinner's punishments in the afterlife, and perhaps his intense and repeated meditation on such passages helped the king to endure the constant pain.

Philip also found spiritual comfort in images. Although today his apartment at the Escorial is almost bare, during his last illness the king 'had crucifixes and relics surrounding his bed and on all the walls'. His devotion to them is revealed by an anecdote told by Lhermite: 'One day His Majesty was lying sick in his bed and he suddenly needed to urinate. Before taking the urinal, he asked me to cover with a curtain an image he revered of Christ before Pilate and another of the Virgin that hung near his bed' – evidence that Philip saw these images as capable of experiencing the events around them. As Carlos Eire has pointed out, 'To him they were silent, supernatural witnesses and companions.'⁴⁶ The same was true of the thousands of relics which the king had assembled at the Escorial, and every day the monks brought a different selection to

his bedside, where he revered and kissed them and had them placed on his sores. One day, after a 'great display of these heavenly treasures', their custodian 'thought he had finished and started to take them away, when the king said "Look: you have forgotten the relics of such-and-such a saint, and you have not brought it for me to kiss!"' When pain or exhaustion caused Philip to lose consciousness, the Infanta Isabella found that the only sure way to rouse him was to say loudly "Don't touch the relics!", pretending that someone was near to one, and the king immediately opened his eyes'.⁴⁷

The king also continued his normal devotions. From his sickbed he followed the services celebrated at the high altar of the basilica and he had holy water sprinkled on his face and body, confident in the Church's teaching that it could wash away venial sins. He spent much time listening to a succession of preachers (when they tired, he would command 'Fathers, tell me more!') and he confessed frequently (on one occasion he took three days, apparently reviewing the sins of his entire life). He received extreme unction twice, and took communion until his doctors warned that he would be unable to swallow the host.

Philip had prayed that he would be fully conscious during his last moments of life and his prayers were answered. On the night of 12 September he underwent a paroxysm so powerful that those around his bed 'thought he had died, but he suddenly opened his eyes with an unusual liveliness'. He began to laugh softly, realizing that he was about to die fully conscious. He asked for his parents' crucifix 'and held it with a fervour and devotion' that amazed everyone. Then 'he kissed it several times and afterwards he also held a consecrated candle from Our Lady of Montserrat, on which you could see the image of the Virgin herself, and kissed it too'. For two hours he focused on the crucifix and the candle until at five o'clock on 13 September 1598, 'as dawn broke in the east' and 'as the seminary choristers were singing Mass', Lhermite, Sigüenza and several others watched as their king 'gave two or three gasps, and his saintly spirit left him to enjoy eternal life'.⁴⁸

The king is dead! Long live the king!

Looking back in 1605 on the king's death, Sigüenza invoked the already popular trope that Philip had ruled 'an empire on which

the sun never set’.

With the dawn of that most happy day, which was a Sunday, the new king assumed power. He began to govern the greatest empire under the sun, because if he had sent letters announcing the news [of his father’s death] from the point where the sun rises to where it sets, returning to the same place, he would have found his own subjects to receive them everywhere.⁴⁹

Everywhere the late king’s subjects went into mourning. In Brussels, a funeral service took place on 29 December, the fortieth anniversary of the service there for Charles V; in New Spain and in the Philippines (appropriately enough, given Philip’s lifelong support for the Holy Office) the Inquisition organized the royal exequies. Many of Spain’s allies also arranged splendid commemorations. In Florence, the Grand Duke commissioned an impressive iconographic programme that included twenty-four enormous paintings by local artists of different episodes from the king’s life; while in Rome, Pope Clement VIII paid tribute to the fact that ‘His Late Majesty never wished to grant freedom of conscience’.

Because he wanted to make the subjects of other rulers follow the Catholic faith and obey this Holy See, he encumbered his royal patrimony and spent all the wealth that came to him from America and all the revenues provided by Castile throughout his long reign. One could therefore say that the king’s entire life was a constant struggle against the enemies of our Holy Faith.⁵⁰

Some of his Late Majesty’s subjects felt less enthusiasm for the ‘constant struggle’ that had consumed their patrimony too. Some inhabitants of Madrid immediately fretted about the expense – ‘mourning His Majesty, whose death is now confirmed, will cost us an arm and a leg’ – and, indeed, as soon as they got the news, only six hours after the event, the city council ordered:

All people of every degree and quality shall wear mourning for the king our lord, who is in glory, within three days. Women will put on black bonnets and shall wear no dresses of silk. Those who cannot afford to wear mourning or a *caperuza* [a special pointed hat] shall wear a hat without trimmings as a sign of sorrow.⁵¹

Since all the Spanish kingdoms had already recognized Prince

Philip as their next ruler, his succession was automatic, and on 11 October 'the city of Madrid raised the standard of the new king'. A week later, hooded and clothed in black, young Philip III presided over two days of funeral ceremonies in the royal convent of San Jerónimo, with a vast catafalque modelled on the Escorial, illuminated by a thousand huge candles while 1,500 more candles lit the church.

Historian Carlos Eire has argued that 'the death of no other monarch or public figure in early modern European history ever attracted as much attention as that of Philip II', basing his assessment on the survival of over forty printed funeral sermons and descriptions of local commemorations of the late king. Salamanca, a university town, held a poetry competition with prizes for the best Latin epigram and the best Spanish sonnet to celebrate the late king's achievements.⁵² But few other cities could afford such splendour. In Palencia, the magistrates decreed that everyone should go into mourning and, as in Madrid, 'those who could not afford this should wear a hat without trimmings'; but, in view of the general poverty, the magistrates of Palencia added that those who could not afford a hat 'should wear something black on their heads'. In Cádiz, still recovering from the 'destruction and damage done by the English fleet' in 1596, the magistrates discussed 'where we might find money to comply with our obligation to wear mourning and perform the ceremonies' and struggled to pay for the damask to make 'the royal standard required to celebrate the new king's accession'. They tried to economize by recycling 'the timber used for the catafalque to make the stage on which we will raise the standard' but when they eventually 'tried to auction off the timber, no one came to buy it'. In desperation, 'they tried to make some carpenters buy' the wood but such was the prevailing poverty that 'they did not want to pay a single penny for it'.⁵³

Only Seville staged exequies that rivalled those of Madrid. When news of Philip's death arrived, the council determined 'to put on the greatest spectacle ever seen', and to this end black drapes and flags went up all around the city, driving up the price of black cloth until the magistrates had to impose price controls. A magnificent catafalque, modelled (like that in Madrid) on the Escorial and illuminated with over 2,000 candles, stood in the midst of the darkened cathedral to serve as the focus when, on 26

November, the city's clergy, magistrates, judges and Inquisitors filed in to take part in the ceremony. As their eyes grew accustomed to the light, however, the various groups of dignitaries noticed subtle differences in the quality and quantity of seats assigned to them. Arguments broke out among them until, in the middle of the funeral Mass, the Inquisitors excommunicated the magistrates because they would not vacate their superior seats. The ceremony ended in chaos. Eventually the council of Castile resolved all the precedence disputes and Seville re-staged its solemn exequies at the end of December. This time everything transpired without incident until a 'swaggering poet' declaimed a sonnet 'To the catafalque of King Philip II in Seville' that scandalized the audience:

I swear to God, such grandeur leaves me stunned,
and I'd give a doubloon if I could describe it!
For who is not filled with wonder, or does not marvel
at this splendour, at this great structure?

By the living Christ! Each part is worth
more than a million. Isn't it a shame
that it will not last a century. Oh great Seville,
Rome triumphant in spirit and in riches!

I'll bet that the dead man's spirit
has today abandoned Heaven,
where he rests eternally, to enjoy this spot.

A braggart overheard these words and said:
'What you say, gentleman soldier, is true,
and anyone who says otherwise is lying.'

And then straight away (*incontinente*)
he put on his hat, brandished his sword,
glanced around and stole off. And that was that.⁵⁴

The scandal arose not only from the blasphemy of uttering oaths in a church, but also from the general sarcasm about the amount of money spent on ephemera ('such grandeur leaves me stunned'; 'each part' of the temporary catafalque of wood and cardboard 'is worth more than a million'). Worse still, the poem was scatological: the term *incontinente* (a double entendre in Spanish) reminded everyone of the late king's terminal diarrhoea, described

in every account of his final agony. Yet the ‘swaggering poet’ knew from personal experience what it meant to serve the late king as a ‘gentleman soldier’: his name was Miguel de Cervantes.

Many other Spaniards, male and female, bitterly criticized the late king. Two days after his death, the pious Luisa de Carvajal y Mendoza shared with a friend her hope that ‘God will guide [Philip III] for the good of the Church, so that he can prevent the ruin of the kingdom’. The following month, Iñigo Ibáñez de Santa Cruz, secretary of the marquis of Denia (the Favourite of the new monarch and soon to be duke of Lerma), wrote a comprehensive guide to ‘The causes of the ignorant and confused government in the time of the late King Philip II, our lord’. Ibáñez excoriated not only the excessive cost of Philip’s foreign policy (‘thirty million wasted in the bogs of Flanders’ and ‘as much again’ in the fruitless wars against France and England) but also his addiction to ‘trivia’ (*menudencias*): he was ‘one of those men who know a lot about a little but is totally ignorant about everything else’. He also ridiculed the late king’s personal habits (‘a friend of women, paintings, beautiful gardens, big buildings, and intricate apartments’ with a taste for ‘perfumes and aromatic scents and other feminine things’) and his alleged dependence on mediocre ministers (like Mateo Vázquez and Don Cristóbal de Moura). ‘Oh wretched Spain,’ Ibáñez concluded, ‘wretched Monarchy: lost, ruined and wasted.’⁵⁵

That same month, Balthasar Álamos de Barrientos, an ally of Antonio Pérez, composed a blistering ‘Discourse to the King Our Lord about the current state of his realms’ that almost parodied Charles V’s ‘Political Testament’ just half a century before (chapter 2). Álamos de Barrientos noted the hostility of almost all the Monarchy’s neighbours. France now boasted a powerful king who ruled a unified state and sought every opportunity to foster a war in Italy that would weaken Spain further. England’s inveterate hatred had led it to support Spain’s rebels, to interlope in the Americas and even to launch direct attacks on the peninsula. The independent states of Italy, even the Papacy, all resented Spanish dominance and longed to see it end. Álamos also described at length the discontents of the new king’s subjects, with open rebellion in the northern Netherlands, vehement anti-Spanish sentiment in the south, and discontent in Portugal, Spanish Italy, Aragon and the Americas. This left Castile to carry the entire

burden of empire, but ‘the cities of the kingdom lack men, the smaller villages are totally depopulated, and hardly anyone is left to work the fields’. Therefore, Álamos continued, ‘nowhere is free from this misery, and no one has the wealth and abundance that they used to have’; and he blamed this ‘primarily on the burden of taxes, and the fact that the yield is spent on foreign wars’.⁵⁶

The chorus of critics included several clerics, starting with some of those who delivered sermons at memorial services for the late king. In November 1598, Fray Lorenzo de Ayala, preaching in Valladolid (the late king’s birthplace), noted:

Our Catholic King died after a drought that lasted almost nine months without a break, revealing that the earth had declared itself bankrupt – just like an unsuccessful merchant. At the same time, the price of everything in Castile increased as supplies ran short, coinciding with the collapse of public health throughout the kingdom and opening the door to plague in many areas.

‘These disasters,’ he concluded ominously, ‘were harbingers of the greatest catastrophe Spain has ever suffered since our Patriarch Tubal, grandson of Noah, settled here.’ A few months later a Jesuit, Juan de Mariana, published a political treatise that included a remarkable section explicitly attributing the failure of the Armada to the sins of its creator:

A few years ago, we sent a great fleet to the shores of England and we sustained a wound, an ignominy, which the passage of the years cannot efface. That was a punishment for the sins of our nation but, unless memory fails, God was also enraged by the vile lusts of a certain prince who had forgotten the sacred personage he was, in his advanced age if not senility; and the rumour spread at that time that he had indulged himself immoderately in lasciviousness.

In 1600, Martín González de Cellorigo, a lawyer who worked for the Inquisition, published a memorial arguing that the ‘decline of Spain’ (a term he invented) had begun under Philip, so that the country ‘is today in a state that we all believe to be worse than ever before’.⁵⁷

Even some of the late king’s close collaborators agreed. Two weeks after Philip’s death the Venetian ambassador heard Don Martín de Padilla, captain-general of the Ocean Sea, ‘declare that the world would see what Spaniards could do, now that they have

a free hand and are no longer subject to a single brain that thought it knew all that could be known and treated everyone else like a blockhead'. Padilla was scarcely less outspoken when he addressed the new king directly:

I grieve to see that, because we lack the funds, we undertake campaigns with such weak forces that they serve more to irritate our enemies than to punish them; and the worst is that, whatever we may say, we eternalize the wars so that they become an infinite burden, and the problems that stem from these wars are both major and endless.⁵⁸

From Purgatory to Paradise

Not all Spaniards shared this pessimism, however. The marquis of Velada, one of those present at the king's death, entertained no doubt that 'His Majesty died like a saint this morning'; while according to another eyewitness, 'it is entirely credible that after such a life and such a death we may count His Majesty as a saint'.⁵⁹ Somewhat later, 'various pious individuals, through divine revelation, saw the soul of the most prudent king enter Paradise, after being in Purgatory' – but the 'pious individuals' failed to agree on the time frame. A Carmelite nun claimed it took place after only eight days; while a chaste maiden claimed to have seen the king's soul ascend exactly fourteen days after his death. Five years later, at Marchena in Andalusia, Sor María de la Antigua saw in a vision on three consecutive Sundays a 'fire' in the sky which, she claimed, 'the whole world saw'; but she only learned its significance later when she heard about the vision of Fray Julián de San Agustín (or Alcalá), a pious Franciscan who by then had over 600 miracles to his credit.⁶⁰ It had taken place near the village of Paracuellos de Jarama:

One day in late September in the year 1603, [Fray Julián] said in front of five witnesses that at 9 p.m., or a little later, two red clouds would appear in the sky, one in the east and the other in the west, and they would unite; and at the moment they united the soul of the Catholic King Philip II of glorious memory would leave Purgatory and enter Paradise.

Having made this prophecy, according to Fray Antonio de Daza (who wrote a short biography of his fellow Franciscan), Fray Julián retired to pray,

And the aforementioned witnesses affirm that when he said these things, the sky was clear and serene, and remained so until 9 p.m., or a little later, when two red clouds appeared in the east and in the west, so bright that the night seemed like day because you could see the houses and streets as clearly as if the sun was in the clouds.⁶¹

This vision became so celebrated that in the 1640s the painter Bartolomé Esteban Murillo commemorated it on a canvas for a Franciscan convent in Seville, showing Fray Julián, the five witnesses and the eerily illuminated streets of Paracuellos de Jarama, as well as Philip entering Paradise (see plate 45).

However, a striking anomaly troubled Daza. Although the late king ‘always strove to exalt the faith and extirpate heresy’, and although he had suffered terrible agony during his last illness,

Four years passed between his death and the time when Fray Julián had this revelation and made his prophecy – more than enough time, in our opinion, taking into account also the many prayers and Masses said throughout his dominions for his soul, to purify it in Purgatory, so that thus purified it could be with God for ever.

In his account of a similar vision by another Franciscan, this time of Charles V’s soul ascending to Paradise ‘four years after his death’, Daza had no doubt about the cause of the delay: it was ‘because he did not punish Luther when he had the chance’.⁶² But why had Charles’s son, who had never hesitated to burn heretics and never compromised with heresy, been detained in Purgatory? Daza could not answer his own question, and he was not alone. Hundreds of people have tried to evaluate the place of Philip II in history and legend, some seeing him as a saint and a hero who deserved a prominent place at God’s right hand, others as a sinner and a villain who deserved to rot in Hell.

Epilogue

Agent and structure

In his funeral sermon for Philip II in October 1598, Dr Aguilar de Terrones used an elaborate simile to remind his hearers of the magnitude of the tasks faced by the ruler of the first global empire in history.

The life of a king resembles that of a hand-loom weaver ... You may think that the weaver's life is easy, because he works at home, sheltered, close to his loom; but in reality the task is very hard. He labours with his arms, but see his feet working the pedals while his eyes remain glued to the cloth lest it become tangled. His attention is divided among the many threads, some going here and others there, keeping his eye open in case any should break so that he can immediately tie it ... Such is the life of a king: writing with his hands, travelling with his feet, his heart attached to threads – one to Flanders, another to Italy, another to Africa, another to Peru, another to Mexico, another to the English Catholics, another to preserving peace among Christian princes, another to the problems of the Holy Roman Empire. So much attention required by the various states and threads! Is the thread to the Indies broken? Hurry up and tie it! Is the thread to Flanders broken? Run and fix it! Such a busy life, divided among so many threads: how was it possible [for our king] to do so much in so short a time? Oh what excellent regal qualities, found in no one else.¹

Perhaps because his congregation included the new king, Philip III, Aguilar de Terrones's sermon accentuated the positive and omitted the fact that the late royal 'weaver' had left an empire engaged in two costly and inconclusive wars abroad, a major economic crisis at home and several 'broken threads' (the seven

provinces of the Netherlands still in rebellion). Other observers believed that he left his Monarchy far weaker than he had found it, and for this they advanced two distinct explanations.

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A problematic inheritance. Some blamed the size and composition of the Monarchy: it had become too big for its own good, impossible to defend. The failures were therefore in essence structural: neither Philip nor any other ruler could have held his inheritance together.

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A problematic king. Others argued that the problem was not that Philip lacked sufficient resources but that he had used them inefficiently in the pursuit of impossible goals. A monarch with superior political skills could have succeeded where Philip failed – or, in modern parlance, they blamed agent rather than structure.

At first sight, the first explanation – that Philip ruled an indefensible state – seems more plausible. In the aphorism of the age: *Bella gerant alii. Tu, felix Austria, nube* ('Others make war; you, happy Habsburgs, marry') and, over time, the strategy of 'matrimonial imperialism' pursued so successfully by the dynasty created a structure that, in both political and territorial terms, was unsustainable. The union through marriage first of Austria and Burgundy, and then of Castile (with outposts in North Africa and the Americas) and Aragon (with outposts in Sardinia, Sicily and Naples), and finally of the Holy Roman Empire as well, placed half of Europe, and before long much of Central and South America too, in the hands of Charles V. Yet the emperor and his siblings formed the only common denominator of these far-flung possessions, which boasted no common language or currency, no common institutions or laws, no overall defence plan or integrated economic system. It was, perhaps, unrealistic to expect that a single monarch could ever rule all these territories effectively – especially when the same 'matrimonial imperialism' that created the vast inheritance also produced a diminished gene pool that impaired the ability of its rulers to produce competent successors (chapter 10).

Periodically, Charles contemplated a partition of his possessions by detaching Germany and the Netherlands from Spain and Italy;

but he never followed through until 1555, when he allowed his son Philip, now king of England and soon to be king of Spain, to renounce his rights of succession to the Empire because (he assumed) England could henceforth guarantee the security of the Netherlands. But the death of Mary Tudor in 1558, combined with Charles's renunciation of the Empire to his brother Ferdinand that same year, left Flanders dangerously isolated. In 1567, the French ambassador in Madrid observed that 'the king has so many regions to worry about that he cannot deal with all of them', and the situation became worse after Philip became king of Portugal in 1580. The concentration of so much territory under a single sceptre destroyed Europe's balance of power and caused France, England and the Dutch Republic to make a common alliance against Philip.²

Soon after the king died, some of Philip's advisers expressed despair about the underlying strategic situation. In 1602, one of Spain's leading diplomats, the duke of Sessa, confided to his colleague, Don Baltasar de Zúñiga:

Truly, sir, I believe we are gradually becoming the target at which the whole world wants to shoot its arrows; and you know that no empire, however great, has been able to sustain many wars in different areas for long ... Although I may be mistaken I doubt whether we can sustain an empire as scattered as ours.

The 'empire on which the sun never set' had thus become the target on which the sun never set. And yet just two years later, in another confidential letter, Sessa shared with Zúñiga a very different analysis of the underlying problem facing the Spanish Monarchy. 'What I resent is that we flit so rapidly from one area to another, without making a major effort in one and then, when that is finished, in another,' the duke lamented. 'I do not know why we eat so many snacks but never have a real meal. I would like to join everything together, so that we could perhaps do something worthwhile – either in Ireland or in North Africa – but I fear that, as usual, we shall do both and thus only lose time, men, money and reputation.'³

Sessa was by no means the first to suggest that Philip's main problem was not a lack of resources but rather a failure to deploy his existing resources effectively. After learning the fate of the Armada in 1588, the Jesuit Pedro de Ribadeneira had asked why

‘such enormous resources as those available to His Majesty should have achieved so little’. Three years later Mateo Vázquez tried to convince Philip that if God ‘wanted to oblige Your Majesty to provide remedies for the problems of the world he would give Your Majesty strength and resources to do so’. The Cortes of Castile went even further: ‘The delegates are inclined to beg Your Majesty, with great insistence, that before doing anything else you give orders to reduce expenditure on war, in the Netherlands and elsewhere’ (chapters 18 and 19). Why did the king invariably refuse to listen to such advice?

Messianic imperialism

Philip’s initial triumphs – the spectacular victories at St Quentin and Gravelines; the favourable peace of Cateau-Cambrésis – seem to have convinced him that he was invincible while doing what he perceived as God’s work. They led him to break off truce talks with the Ottoman sultan: ‘Since there is peace between the king of France and myself,’ he informed his ministers a few days after ratifying the agreement, ‘it seems to me that for now it is not in my interest to negotiate or conclude a truce’ with the Turks. God wanted him to fight infidels (chapter 7). This proved a catastrophic miscalculation: a peace or truce in 1559 would have left the western Mediterranean virtually a ‘Christian lake’ whereas by 1577, when Philip eventually secured a ceasefire, the sultan had conquered Tunisia and brought Morocco into his orbit. Belief that he was doing God’s will also led Philip to persist in his attempts to ‘capture or kill’ Elizabeth Tudor, despite the fact that her forces captured or destroyed Spanish ships and merchandise every year and sacked several of Philip’s possessions, culminating in the humiliating capture and sack of Cádiz in 1596, while Spain did little harm to her and her subjects. When peace finally came in 1603–4, after eighteen years of suffering and sacrifice, Elizabeth’s successor James Stuart refused to concede Philip’s three principal war goals: withdrawal of all English garrisons from Dutch towns, toleration for England’s Catholics and recognition of Spain’s exclusive right to trade with America. Intervention in France to shore up the Catholic cause likewise brought Philip no permanent gains, even though the succession of civil wars that weakened his hereditary rival gave him advantages enjoyed by no other Spanish

ruler, before or since. Admittedly, in 1593, Henry of Navarre found it expedient to convert to Catholicism in order to win broader support both at home and abroad; but a few days after signing peace with Spain in 1598, he granted his Protestant subjects freedom of worship, guaranteed by numerous garrisons paid by the central government.

On the day Philip died, the papal nuncio in Madrid drew up a 'score card' of the king's achievements and singled out for special praise his 'assistance to the Catholics ... without looking after his own interests'. Although he saluted the king's achievements in England and France, he devoted more attention to the Netherlands, where the late king had 'spent vast treasure in fighting the rebels and in upholding the Catholic Faith, because he did not wish to make a peace with his subjects if it involved conditions deleterious to the Catholic Faith'. Philip agreed. In his own words, 'rather than prejudice the Faith or God's service in the slightest way, I will lose all my dominions and a hundred lives if I had them'. At Breda in 1575, the king broke off talks that had resolved almost all outstanding issues because he would not concede the religious toleration demanded by his rebellious subjects. Two years later he reneged on the Perpetual Edict and resumed the war; and he broke off peace talks with his rebels in 1579 and again in 1589 – all in order to maintain intact 'the claim His Majesty has made and the reputation he has won at the cost of so much treasure and so many lives never to make the slightest concession in religious matters'.⁴ This was no understatement: one contemporary claimed that the cumulative cost of 'all the wars that Spain has waged since the time of King Pelayo [d. 737], both at home and abroad' was less than Philip's expenditure on war 'during his forty years' reign'.⁵

It may seem strange that so many reverses, despite the investment of so many resources, failed to persuade Philip to change his policy. Sir Thomas Wilson, an English observer in the Netherlands in 1574, perceived two reasons: 'The pride of the Spanish government and the cause of religion' – a combination of motives that Philip would have called 'religion and reputation'.⁶ Wilson was correct: no political leader likes to admit defeat and thereby lose 'reputation', and the greater the resources invested in a struggle the harder it is to walk away. Philip was no exception. As he observed in 1575: 'I have no doubt that, if the cost of the

war [in the Netherlands] continues at its present level, we will not be able to sustain it; but it would be a great shame if, having spent so much, we lost any chance that spending a little more might recover everything.’⁷

Moreover, again like other political leaders, Philip always seemed more disposed to take risks in order to avoid losses than to make gains. It was relatively easy for him to withdraw his forces from the imperial fief of Finale Liguria in 1573, even though (as his sister María astutely reminded him) ‘This accursed reputation makes us take leave of our senses – and sometimes reality’, because Finale had never belonged to Philip.⁸ By contrast, ‘reputation’ was very much at stake whenever the territories he had inherited were concerned, not least because in a composite Monarchy weakness towards vassals in one area might encourage defiance by those in others. In 1566 his ministers reminded him that not only would failure to regain royal control over the Netherlands ‘place at risk the reputation of Spain’ throughout Europe but also that ‘if the troubles in the Netherlands continue, Milan and Naples will follow’. A decade later they argued that concessions to the Dutch would endanger ‘the obedience of other vassals who, it is greatly to be feared, would take it as an inspiration for their own rebellion, at least in the dominions we have conquered, like Naples and Milan’, and that resuming the war in the Netherlands was the only way to uphold ‘the honour and reputation of Your Majesty which is your greatest asset’ when dealing with foreign powers.⁹

Drawing strength from failure

Although Philip was not the only ruler to display extreme reluctance to admit defeat, ‘the cause of religion’ made him react to setbacks in unusual ways. The Holocaust survivor Primo Levi, an acute observer of human nature, observed that ‘few are the men who draw moral strength from failure’ – but Philip was one of them.¹⁰ His unswerving piety repeatedly led him to see failure or even outright defeat merely as a sign that God was testing him: provided he persevered along the righteous path he had chosen, the king felt sure that a miracle would bridge any gap between his interpretation of God’s purposes and the resources available to attain them. His confidence on this point never wavered. As early

as 1559 he declared that ‘since this depends solely on the will of God, I can only wait for whatever He is pleased to grant; and I hope that, since He has removed worse obstacles from my path, He will also remove this one, and give me the means to sustain my kingdoms, so that they will not be lost’ (chapter 7). Although an unexpected setback, such as the failure of the Armada, might temporarily depress his spirits, he soon managed to see a silver lining. Thus, shortly after telling one minister in autumn 1588 that ‘I hope that God has not permitted so much evil, because everything has been done for His service’, and that ‘I hope to die and go to God before this happens’, he stated that ‘I shall never fail to stand up for the cause of God and the well-being of these kingdoms’ and promptly started to plan a new invasion of England (chapter 18).

His faith led Philip both to embrace unrealistic initiatives and to refuse to abandon or change them if they failed. Thus in September 1571, after eighteen months of bombarding the duke of Alba with long hortatory letters urging him to overthrow Elizabeth Tudor, Alba’s logistical objections finally made an impression – but Philip now argued that, even if correct, the duke’s concerns were irrelevant.

Although your influence with Us is so great, and although I hold in the highest esteem your person and prudence in all things, and especially in the matter in which you are engaged and occupied, and although the arguments you put to Us are so convincing, I am so keen to achieve the consummation of this enterprise, I am so attached to it in my heart, and I am so convinced that God our Saviour must embrace it as His own cause, that I cannot be dissuaded, nor can I accept or believe the contrary. This leads me to understand matters differently [from you] and makes me play down the difficulties and problems that spring up; so that all the things that could either divert or stop me from carrying through this business seem less threatening to me.

Philip argued that logistics (the area of Alba’s expertise) formed only one element of the Enterprise of England:

With a matter as important as this one, it does not seem right to engage in detailed consideration of the problems that would arise if we made mistakes and failed, without counterbalancing it with the benefits and advantages that success would bring – and it cannot be doubted that in terms of religion and politics, as well as of reputation and of all the

other goals that I can and must try to achieve, those [benefits and advantages] would be so great and obvious that not only do they make me support and favour the cause, but they oblige and almost compel me to do so.

In short, ‘although it cannot be denied that we will encounter some obstacles and difficulties, they are outweighed by many other divine and human considerations that oblige us to take these risks and more’.¹¹

Philip subjected Medina Sidonia to similar spiritual blackmail when in June 1588 the duke invoked the storm that had just scattered the Armada as an excuse to abandon the Enterprise of England. ‘If this were an unjust war, one could indeed take this storm as a sign from Our Lord to cease offending Him,’ the king thundered, ‘but being as just as it is, one cannot believe that He will disband it, but rather will grant it more favour than we could hope.’ At this point the duke gave up his opposition and led the Armada to disaster. We do not know if Medina Sidonia later reminded Philip ‘I told you so’, but one of his English opponents later did it for him. According to Sir Walter Raleigh, who had helped to defeat the Armada, ‘To invade by sea upon a perilous coast, being neither in possession of any port, nor succoured by any party, may better fit a prince presuming on his fortune than enriched with understanding.’¹²

Enter Dr Freud

But why, exactly, did Philip not only ‘presume on his fortune’ but also draw strength from his failures so that he often managed to repeat them? Although his faith in Providence clearly played a part, the king’s inflexibility (and a measure of cognitive dissonance) also arose from his distinctive personality. It is usually risky for historians to psychoanalyse men and women long dead, but Philip offers a striking example of the ‘obsessional’ or ‘obsessive-compulsive personality’ – as it happens, one of the easiest types to identify. Obsessional people (and they are numerous) often display the following characteristics to a greater or lesser degree. They are

- stubborn and obstinate yet indecisive;

- inflexible and emotionally over-controlled;
- absorbed by detail yet unable to delegate;
- hard-working and industrious yet not necessarily very efficient;
- religious and austere;
- devoted to fairness and justice, but often in a rigid way;
- humourless and opposed to change.

This biography offers countless examples of Philip exhibiting all these characteristics, and many more could be provided. All reinforced the king's inflexibility in the face of failure.

Obsessional people also share a number of other personal characteristics that are harder to document. They usually

- hate dirt and keep themselves very clean;
- love routine, order and punctuality;
- enjoy collecting but are often mean and reluctant to part with their possessions;
- have a low sexual drive and are little attracted to the opposite sex.

In Philip's case, evidence for these subjective attributes is also copious. On the first, the king's valet Jehan Lhermite noted that Philip 'was by nature the most clean, neat and tidy person that has ever lived on this earth, to such an extent that he could not tolerate without annoyance a single tiny spot on the walls and floor of his apartments'. On the second, Lhermite commented that clocks 'completely controlled the life of the good king, because they regulated and measured his life, dividing it by the minute, determining his daily actions and occupations' (chapter 6). A good example of the third characteristic – meanness – occurred in 1571, when he sought a jewel to send to Mary Queen of Scots. Instead of

giving her a precious stone from his own collection, Philip ordered an official to 'send here the ones that belonged to the prince' Don Carlos. Then, after checking through his late son's jewel collection, Philip selected a fine ruby set in a ring and sent that to Mary Stuart.¹³ Finally, although the king engaged in at least one illicit liaison as a teenager, after he turned 20 he seems to have shown limited interest in sex.

The causes of the obsessional personality remain unclear. Sigmund Freud attributed it to over-strict toilet training (and therefore termed it the 'anal personality'), but it more likely develops through over-strict upbringing. Philip's childhood was certainly closely regimented: as he was their sole male heir, his parents could scarcely avoid a cloyingly protective attitude towards him – especially after the death of both his brothers in infancy. The empress panicked every time her remaining children, and especially Philip, suffered the slightest illness; and although she died in 1539, and although Charles V was often absent, his governor Don Juan de Zúñiga micromanaged every moment of the prince's life, determining exactly what he could and could not do (including when he could and could not sleep with his first wife, María Manuela). Moreover, even when absent, Charles set no ordinary paternal standards for his son to live up to: the emperor was an apparently decisive man of action and the victor of numerous campaigns; an instinctive leader and cosmopolitan traveller fluent in five languages; a master of the adroit phrase and gesture, equally at ease in the harsh glare of public ceremonies or the unbuttoned company of his intimates. Yet this heroic ruler had only one legitimate son to inherit and govern his vast empire and Philip's long apprenticeship, which lasted from 1543 until Charles's death in 1558, heightened the young man's awareness of the need for success and of the disgrace of failure. He was thus saddled with a crushing psychological burden of self-expectation, and a daunting compulsion to prove himself worthy of his father and of his mission. Sir John Elliott was surely correct to see 'the heavy burden, not only political but also psychological and spiritual, of his dynastic heritage' as the key to his personality.¹⁴

Not surprisingly, Philip came to harbour a deep insecurity about his capacity to play the public role expected of him by society, by his family and by himself; and, long after the death of both his parents, his lack of self-esteem continued to surface in unexpected

ways. In 1563, aged 35, when his plan to lay the foundation stone of San Lorenzo de El Escorial ran into difficulties, Philip declared 'I'm totally confused' and 'I'm ready to entrust it to the nuncio and not go myself'. On this occasion, he eventually overcame his insecurity and participated; but three years later, just after the birth of his first daughter, he became so anxious about carrying the baby in his arms to the font that he practised, 'walking from one side of his room to the other with a large doll in his arms', only to delegate the task to his brother Don John (page 162).¹⁵

Whatever its causes, people with obsessional personalities are poorly equipped to serve as war leaders because directing hostilities demands efforts of such magnitude that it leaves few reserves of energy or insight to deal with other problems. This limitation assumed a special importance in the case of Philip, since he spent all but six months of his reign fighting his enemies, sometimes several at the same time. In the early years, to be sure, the king allowed his lieutenants a measure of discretion. 'We have decided to refer this matter to you, as the person who is on the spot and can see what is best for the service of God and ourselves,' he informed his viceroy of New Spain in 1557 concerning the settlement of Florida. He even delegated (albeit with great reluctance) the decision on whether or not to invade England in 1571 to the sceptical duke of Alba: 'You must guide and direct this according to what you see as best for the service of God and ourselves: I entrust it to your hands, with great confidence that you will act with the zeal, care and prudence that such an important matter requires.'¹⁶ This flexibility disappeared in the 1580s. Instead, Philip forbade the marquis of Santa Cruz, a fighting admiral with a lifetime of experience, to depart from the detailed instructions he had prepared for the Enterprise of England. The marquis must 'believe me, as one who has complete information on the present state of affairs in all areas' and follow his orders without the least deviation.

The king deluded himself. Even though his information network was the best available, by the time each piece of news reached his desk, the 'present state of affairs' would have changed. This delusion displayed an alarming failure to grasp the immense complexity involved in any major 'combined operation'; worse, it fatally exacerbated Philip's messianic imperialism. When Santa Cruz objected to 'the risk incurred by sending a major fleet in

winter through the Channel without a safe harbour', the king responded loftily that 'since it is all for His cause, God will send good weather'.¹⁷ This was indeed (as Sir Walter Raleigh put it), the outlook of 'a prince presuming on his fortune' rather than one 'enriched with understanding.'

Contingency and chance

No hegemony lasts for ever. Creating and preserving a global empire is always difficult – especially given the distance and fragmentation, the information overload and the absence of common institutions, language, laws and goals that characterized Philip's Monarchy. Difficult, however, does not mean impossible: the Italian political philosopher Giovanni Botero, writing around 1590, argued that the king's various dominions, although separated from one another, 'should not be deemed disconnected', because 'they are united by the sea. There is not a dominion, however distant it may be, that cannot be defended by naval force.'¹⁸ Despite all the structural problems, and despite the king's obsessional personality, Philip came remarkably close to achieving success in his major ventures. With but a minimal rewrite of history (or, in Philip's terms, with only a 'minor miracle') the outcome could have been very different. In the case of England:

- Had Mary Tudor died in 1571, aged 55 like her father (let alone in 1585, aged 69 like her sister) instead of in 1558, aged 42, England surely would have remained faithful to both the Catholic faith and the Habsburg dynasty.
- Had Philip managed to make the journey from Brussels to London that he planned in March 1558, and persuaded Mary to recognize Elizabeth as the next sovereign, perhaps married to Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy, England almost certainly would have remained Catholic and pro-Habsburg.
- Finally, if Philip had adopted a strategy (any strategy) for the conquest of England in 1588 that did not require the Armada to join with Parma's army before the invasion, or had a fighting admiral such as Santa Cruz been in charge, it might have secured a bridgehead in southern England or Ireland and forced

Elizabeth to abandon the Dutch. This would have allowed Philip's forces to subdue the entire Netherlands, and still left abundant resources to deploy in France after the assassination of Henry III in 1589.

Similarly, in the case of the Netherlands:

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Had Philip returned at any point between 1561 (when opposition to the new bishoprics scheme united his opponents) and 1571 (when economic recession and Alba's oppressive regime made a new rebellion highly likely), the wars might have been entirely avoided.

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Had Alba accepted the terms offered by Haarlem at the end of 1572, instead of insisting on unconditional surrender, the other rebellious towns might have sought terms, ending the revolt (an outcome that even William of Orange considered inevitable).

In each of these counterfactual scenarios, avoiding the drain of prolonged wars on Philip's treasury would have enabled him either to intervene more effectively elsewhere or to use his prodigious resources to develop the economic and cultural life of Spain.

Other minimal rewrites of history might likewise have allowed Philip to achieve more of his goals. Above all, had either Sebastian of Portugal or Henry III of France not met with violent deaths while childless, Philip could have continued to benefit from their incompetence, or could have exploited further royal minorities if they had left young heirs. Either outcome would have improved the overall security of Philip's own Monarchy, because his enemies would have lacked the incentive to form a coalition against what they perceived as a Spanish bid for European mastery.

Each minimal rewrite would surely have produced dramatic consequences, because Philip already held so many advantages. The resources at his disposal, human and material, grew prodigiously in both Europe and America throughout his reign; and so did the king's ability to mobilize them. The resources of his opponents, by contrast, dwindled. England was ruled by a woman who (although an adroit politician) lacked a clear successor, had limited revenues which she disposed of, and needed to

accommodate a large and discontented religious minority; Germany's Protestant and Catholic rulers refused to cooperate with each other, causing constitutional paralysis in the Holy Roman Empire; France dissipated its vast resources in religious wars; the Ottoman sultans became bogged down in a war against Persia. Moreover, rarely was the view from the Escorial totally bleak: failure in one of Philip's enterprises often coincided with success in another. Thus in 1571–2, beside the failure of his plan to 'kill or capture Elizabeth', his humiliating retreat over Finale, and the resurgence of revolt in the Netherlands, Philip could proudly set the resounding victory of Lepanto, the birth of a healthy heir and the massacre of St Bartholomew. Against the losses in the Netherlands he could set the annexation of Portugal and the expansion of his power in America and the Philippines. Fortune (or, as he would have said, God) often smiled on Philip and pulled victory from the jaws of defeat. Thus in 1565, some months before he heard that French Huguenots had created a colony in Florida, Philip signed a contract authorizing Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to assemble and arm a fleet for service in the Caribbean. This allowed the king's forces to destroy the settlers before they had established a defensible base. Likewise, between 1577 and 1584, the sultan renewed a truce in the Mediterranean four times, allowing Philip to mobilize the resources necessary to annex Portugal and the Azores, and to reconquer the South Netherlands, without fearing a stab in the back. Finally, in 1591 the revolt of Aragon broke out just after Philip had raised an army to intervene in southern France, allowing him to deploy this force to crush the uprising within a week.

These 'alternative histories' take us to the heart of the enigma of Philip II. To return to the extended simile of Dr Aguilar de Terrones: if the duties of a king resembled those of a weaver, then Philip's failure to achieve more of his dynastic and confessional goals stemmed not from the structure of his loom, the texture of his cloth, or the fragility of its individual threads, but rather from the limitations of the weaver. 'Such a busy life, divided into so many threads' did indeed require the king 'to do so much in so short a time' – and he simply could not keep it up. Perhaps a final visit to San Lorenzo el Real de El Escorial helps to explain why. The king was inordinately proud of its construction, and so by using it to assess his achievements we are choosing a metric that

Philip himself would have welcomed.

First we must salute the astonishing overall achievement: one of Europe's largest buildings was conceived, constructed and completed in a single generation – and yet, as Fray José de Sigüenza (author of the first history of the complex) boasted, 'the edifice does not appear to have been built of different elements, but rather made out of a single rock on account of the great uniformity of colour, grain and juxtaposition of its stones'. Even foreigners considered the complex 'the most magnificent palace of all Europe' (John Eliot, 1593); 'superior to any other building now existing in the world' (Venetian ambassador, 1602); 'the greatest and best laid out structure in Europe' (the ambassador of Lucca, 1618).¹⁹ But such perfection came at a high cost. The same Venetian ambassador noted that construction 'has taken thirty-five years of continuous work and over ten millions in gold'. Sigüenza, however, asked pointedly: did those ducats 'go up in smoke or end up outside Spain? No.' Instead, he noted, most of the money went to 'officials in Toledo, who supported their households and families', and 'to the workers in Galapagar, Robledo and Valdemorillo' who 'hewed a rock, carried some stones, made some brick, dug some soil, and transported them' all to El Escorial. These 'trickle-down' economic benefits led Sigüenza puckishly 'to wish that our kings would undertake even bigger projects than this one' instead of spending their money abroad.²⁰

Sigüenza's proto-Keynesian economic analysis nevertheless omitted the opportunity costs inherent in the hours that Philip devoted to this project. Examples abound in this book: he got out his scissors to excise from a letter the description of some sin committed by a novice at the monastery; he personally allocated the cell to be occupied by each friar; he visited 'the quarries where the stones were cut to watch them be loaded and unloaded' in person so 'he could see everything for himself'; he demanded that a 'model of the choir stalls' be brought all the way to him in Badajoz, so he could check that it conformed to the design he had chosen. He never relinquished this microscopic control: in 1590, his anxiety 'to locate the crucifix' correctly in the basilica 'involved His Majesty going up and down the stairs two thousand times'. The process took six days.²¹ Every hour that Philip devoted to such details while seated at his 'loom of state' compromised his ability and drained his energy to 'run and fix' any thread that broke.

As the papal nuncio in Spain complained in 1587, 'His Majesty wants to see and do every single thing himself, yet that would not be possible even if he had ten hands and as many heads'. So although his inflexible faith played an important part in preventing the king from attaining his goals, equally critical were the obsessive complexes created by his upbringing and his inability (in the words of Don Juan de Silva) to make 'some division between those [affairs] that he should deal with himself and those that he cannot avoid delegating to others'.²² This combination undermined Philip's ability to deal with the deluge of problems that inevitably confronted the ruler of fifty million subjects in a global monarchy almost constantly at war. No one could excel as both clerk of works for the Escorial and as a world statesman. The very skill sets that equipped Philip so superbly for the first task, allowing him to produce 'the Eighth Wonder of the World', fatally compromised his ability to succeed at the second, as ruler of the first empire in history on which the sun never set.

Abbreviations

AA	Archivo de la Casa de los Duques de Alba, Biblioteca de Liria, Madrid, with <i>caja</i> and folio
ACA	Arxiu de la Corona de Aragó, Barcelona
CA	<i>Consell d' Aragó</i>
ACC	<i>Actas de las Cortes de Castilla</i> , 17 vols (Madrid, 1861–91)
ACP	Archivo de los Condes de Puñonrostro, Carmona
Boh	<i>Bohadiu</i> Don Francisco de Bobadilla
ADE	<i>Archivo Documental Español: Negociaciones con Francia</i> , ed. M. Gómez del Campillo, 11 vols (Madrid, 1950–64)
AGI	Archivo General de Índias, Seville
IG	<i>Iniferente General</i>
AGNM	Archivo General de la Nación, México
CRD	<i>Cédulas reales duplicadas</i>
AGPM	Archivo General del Palacio Real, Madrid, Sección histórica
CR	<i>Cédulas reales</i>
AGRP	Archives Générales du Royaume/Algemeen Rijksarchief, Brussels
PA	<i>Papiers d'Etat et d'Audience</i>
CG	<i>Collection Gachard</i>
AGS	Archivo General de Simancas
CC	<i>Canara de Castilla</i>
CH	<i>Consejos y Juntas de Hacienda</i>
CSR	<i>Casas y Sitios Reales</i>
DCT	<i>Directorio General del Tesoro, Inventario</i>
NE	<i>Negociación de Estado</i>
GA	<i>Guerre Antigua</i>
PR	<i>Patronato Real</i>
AHN	Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid
CS	<i>Consejos Suprimidos</i>
LI	<i>Legación</i> (with <i>legajo</i> or <i>libro</i> and folio)
OM	<i>Órdenes Militares</i>

~~AMH~~ Archivo Histórico de Protocolos, Madrid

~~ADP~~ *Don Francisco de Álava y Beamonte. Correspondencia inédita de Felipe II con su embajador en París (1564–1570)*, ed. P. and J. Rodríguez (San Sebastián, 1991)

~~AM~~ Archivo Municipal

~~AMAE (M)~~ Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid

~~AEESS~~ Archivo de la Embajada Española cerca la Santa Sede

~~AMAE (P)~~ Archive du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris

~~MDDE~~ Mémoires et documents: Fonds Divers, Espagne

~~APC~~ Acts of the Privy Council

~~AR~~ Algemeene Rijksarchief, The Hague

~~ARS~~ Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Rome

~~ASC~~ Archivo de la Casa de los Marqueses de Santa Cruz, Madrid, with *caja* and *expediente*

~~ASF~~ Archivio di Stato, Florence

~~DU~~ *Ducato di Urbino, Classe I*

~~MP~~ *Mediceo del Principato*

~~ASG~~ Archivio di Stato, Genoa,

~~AS~~ Archivio Segreto

~~ASMa~~ Archivio di Stato, Mantua

~~AG~~ Archivio Gonzaga

~~ASMo~~ Archivio di Stato, Modena

~~CD~~ *Cancellaria Ducale, Sezione Estero*

~~ASN~~ Archivio di Stato, Naples

~~AST~~ Archivio di Stato, Turin

~~LM~~ *Lettere Ministri*

~~ASV~~ Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Rome

~~LP~~ *Lettere principi*

~~NS~~ *Nunziatura Spagna*

~~ASVe~~ Archivio di Stato, Venice

~~SDS~~ *Senato: Dispacci Spagna*

~~BAV~~ Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome

~~UL~~ *Ulpianes Latini*

~~VL~~ *Vulcani Latini*

~~BCR~~ Biblioteca Casanatense, Rome

~~BL~~ British Library, London, Department of Western Manuscripts

~~Adl~~ *Additional Manuscripts*

~~CoM~~ *Cotton Manuscripts*

~~Eg~~ *Egerton Manuscripts*

~~BMB~~ Bibliothèque Municipale, Besançon

~~Ms. Granvelle~~ *Cabinet des Manuscrits, Collection de Granvelle*

~~EMA~~ *La Malla del Mar Océano*, ed. J. Calvar Gross, J. I. González-Aller Hierro, M. de Dueñas Fontán and M. del C. Mérida Valverde, 3 vols (Madrid, 1988–93)

~~BNE~~ Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid, Sección de Manuscritos

~~BNF~~ Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris, Section des Manuscrits

~~Fonds~~ français

~~Manuscrit~~ espagnol

~~Bozza, C.~~ *Philippe II a sus hijas*, ed. F. J. Bouza Álvarez (2nd edn, Madrid, 1998)

~~BN~~ Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, Geneva

~~Collection~~ Manuscrite Édouard Favre

~~BRM~~ Biblioteca Real, Palacio de Oriente, Madrid, Sección de Manuscritos

~~BRBM~~ Bibliothèque Royale/Koninklijke Bibliotheek, Brussels, Section des Manuscrits/
Afdeling Handschriften

~~BSLE~~ Biblioteca del Real Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial, Manuscript
Collection

~~BZ~~ Biblioteca de Zabálburu, Madrid, Manuscript Collection (with *carpeta* and folio)
Cuadernos de León van der Essen) of Léon van der Essen containing transcripts of materials
in the Archivio di Stato, Naples, subsequently destroyed

~~CCG~~ *Correspondance du Cardinal de Granvelle 1565–1586*, ed. E. Pouillet and C. Piot,
12 vols (Brussels, 1877–96)

~~CDGV~~ *Corpus Documental Carlos V*, ed. M. Fernández Álvarez, 5 vols (Salamanca, 1974–
81)

~~CMPC~~ *Correspondance de Marguerite d'Autriche, duchesse de Parme, avec Philippe II*, ed. L.
P. Gachard, 3 vols (Brussels, 1867–81)

~~CMPT~~ *Correspondance française de Marguerite d'Autriche avec Philippe II*, ed. J. S.
Theissen and H. A. Enno van Gelder, 3 vols (Utrecht, 1925–42)

~~CODEN~~ *Colection de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, 112 vols (Madrid,
1842–95)

~~CODEN América~~ *Colection de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y
organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas en América y Oceanía*, 42 vols
(Madrid, 1864–84)

~~CSPS~~ *Calendar of State Papers: Spanish*, ed. J. A. Bergenroth and others, 19 vols
(London, 1862–1954); and *Calendar of Letters and State Papers relating to English
affairs preserved in, or originally belonging to, the archives of Simancas: Elizabeth*,
ed. M. A. S. Hume, 4 vols (London, 1892–9)

~~CSPV~~ *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts relating to English Affairs existing in the
archives and collections of Venice*, ed. H. F. Brown and others, 38 vols (London,
1864–1947)

~~DH~~ *Play Bartolomé Carranza. Documentos históricos*, ed. J. I. Tellechea Idígoras, 7 vols
(Madrid, 1962–94)

~~DHME~~ *Documentos para la historia del monasterio de San Lorenzo El Real de El Escorial*, ed.
J. Zarco Cuevas, G. de Andrés and others, 8 vols (Madrid, 1917–62)

~~Dnè~~ *Corrispondenza da Madrid dell' ambasciatore Leonardo Donà (1570–1573)*, ed.
M. Brunetti and E. Vitale, 2 vols (Venice–Rome, 1963)

~~Douais~~ *Letres de M. de Fourquevaux, ambassadeur du roi Charles IX en Espagne, 1565–
72*, ed. C. Douais, 3 vols (Paris, 1896–1904)

~~Encinas~~ *Relatorio Indiano recopilado por Diego de Encinas (1596)*, ed. A. García Gallo, 4
vols (Madrid, 1945–6)

~~Epistolario~~ *Epistolario del III duque de Alba*, ed. duke of Berwick y Alba, 3 vols (Madrid,

1952)

FBP Felipe II. *La biografía definitiva*, by G. Parker (Barcelona, 2010)

FCM-AH Fundación Casa Ducal de Medinaceli, Toledo, *Archivo Histórico*

Gachard, V *Collection des Voyages des souverains des Pays-Bas*, ed. L. P. Gachard, IV (Brussels, 1882)

GCP *Correspondance de Philippe II sur les affaires des Pays-Bas*, ed. L. P. Gachard, 5 vols, (Brussels 1848–79)

GCPG Gonzalo Pérez, *secretario de Felipe II*, by A. González Palencia, 2 vols (Madrid, 1946)

GRM *Retraite et mort de Charles-Quint au monastère de Yuste. Lettres inédites*, ed. L. P. Gachard, 3 vols (Brussels, 1854–6)

GvP *Archives ou correspondance inédite de la maison d'Orange-Nassau*, ed. G. Groen van Prinsterer (1st series, 8 vols and supplement, Leiden 1835–47; 2nd series, I, Utrecht, 1857)

HIST A Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna

ISA, A *Altamira Papers*, Hispanic Society of America, New York, Manuscript collection, *Altamira Papers*, with box, folder and document

INTT Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais, Torre do Tombo, Lisbon

TSO, CG *Tratado do Santo Ofício: Conselho Geral*

IVADU Instituto de Valencia de Don Juan, Madrid, Manuscripts (with *envío*, *carpeta* and folio)

KB, HS Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague, Afdeling Handschriften

KML Knaples Manuscript Library, Santa Barbara, California

MSP, CR *María Grdonia Papers: Cartas de reyes*

LEP *Le Petit Passetemps*, ed. C. Ruelens, E. Ouverleaux and J. Petit, 2 vols (Antwerp, 1890–6, facsimile reprint, Geneva, 1971)

Longlée *Documents diplomatiques de M. de Longlée, résident de France en Espagne, 1582–90*, ed. A. Mousset (Paris, 1912)

Maura *Memoria de Felipe II y el episodio de la Armada Invencible*, ed. G. Maura Gamazo, duke of Maura (Madrid, 1957)

MUSI Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu

NA National Archives (formerly Public Record Office), Kew

SP *State Papers*

NMM National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, Manuscript Collection

ÖLA Österreichisches Landesarchiv, Linz

KB *Enghüller Briefbücher*

Oria *Armada Invencible. Documentos procedentes del Archivo General de Simancas*, ed. E. Herrera Oria (Valladolid, 1929: Archivo Histórico Español, II)

Périers *d'État du Cardinal de Granvelle*, ed. C. Weiss, 9 vols (Paris, 1841–52)

RAG, AP Rijksarchief Gelderland, *Archief van het Huis Berg*

RAH Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, Colección de Manuscritos

Riba *Correspondencia privada de Felipe II con su secretario Mateo Vázquez 1567–91*, ed. C. Riba García (Madrid, 1959)

Sede *Correspondencia diplomática entre España y la Santa Sede durante el pontificado de*

San Pio V, ed. L. Serrano, 4 vols (Madrid, 1914)

Sigüenza, La fundación del Monasterio de El Escorial, vol. III of his *Historia del Order de San Gerónimo* (1605; Madrid, 1988)

TM-Mc Morgan Library and Museum, New York, Manuscript Collection

ER Arzobispo Carranza: *'Tiempos Recios'*, ed. J. I. Tellechea Idígoras, 4 vols (Salamanca, 2003–7)

UB Leiden-LS Pap Universiteitsbibliotheek, Leiden, *Afdeling Handschriften Papieren*

Note on sources

This biography draws on six major categories of primary sources, some printed but most available only in manuscript.

1. The Altamira collection

By 1860, José María Osorio de Moscoso, sixteenth count of Altamira, had inherited the archives of several noble Spanish families, creating perhaps the richest private collection of documents from the reign of Philip II. It included the papers of Philip's private secretaries: Antonio Gracían y Dantisco (1571–6), Mateo Vázquez de Leca (1573–91) and Jerónimo Gassol (d. 1605). The private secretaries handled three distinct types of documents for the king: his correspondence with senior ministers about a wide range of business; letters and memorials 'to be placed in the king's hands'; and archives left by other senior ministers when they died (starting with those of Cardinal Espinosa, whom Vázquez had served as secretary). At some point, the count-duke of Olivares (Favourite and chief minister of Philip IV) realized the importance of these papers and appropriated them. From there, they eventually passed to the counts of Altamira, where they joined the papers of several of Philip II's ministers, including Don Luis de Requesens, Don Juan de Zúñiga, the marquis of Velada and the duke of Sessa.

Disaster struck in 1869: to pay the debts of the last count, his executors auctioned off his collection of paintings, armour, relics and books, and also his archives. Luckily, the Madrid bibliophile José Sancho Rayón salvaged as much of the archives as he could. He persuaded the Basque bankers Mariano and Francisco de Zabálburu to acquire thousands of documents, and the entire collection in the Biblioteca Francisco de Zabálburu has been digitized, so that every folio can be consulted, enlarged, improved and (if desired) printed out in the library reading room.¹ Guillermo de Osma likewise acquired several thousand Altamira documents, which he placed in the Instituto de Valencia de Don Juan,

which he founded in Madrid. This collection, too, has been digitized so that it is now possible to ‘search’ the entire collection by name, subject and date.² Two other people who acquired significant parts of the Altamira collection in 1870 soon transferred them abroad. Frédéric Disdier, brother-in-law of the last count, sold over 200 volumes to the British Library (then the British Museum Library) where they became *Additional Manuscripts* 28,334–28,503 and 28,262–28,264. Paul Chapuys, librarian of the last count of Altamira, took thousands more documents from the collection back to his native Geneva, and when he died they passed to a friend, who presented them to the Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire of the city.³

Until very recently, it seemed as if these four collections contained the bulk of the Altamira papers, but Sancho Rayón had retained some 3,000 documents from the collection, and at his death in 1900 the marquis of Jerez de los Caballeros acquired not only Sancho Rayón’s marvellous collection of rare books but also ‘a few packets of old papers’. Two years later the marquis sold his books and the ‘old papers’ to the noted American Hispanist Archer M. Huntington, who deposited them in his personal vault at the Hispanic Society of America, which he had founded in New York. After Huntington’s death, these items officially entered the Society’s collection but remained uncatalogued until 2012, when a major grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation enabled Bethany Aram, Rachael Ball and me to sort, identify and catalogue the Society’s thirty-two boxes of Altamira papers.⁴

This dispersal of the Altamira papers means that some papers have disappeared, perhaps for ever, while the rest lie scattered between five or more repositories. This creates two problems. First, the size of the surviving collection is still prodigious: Carlos Riba García published roughly half of the memoranda exchanged between Philip II and Mateo Vázquez contained in one of the 200 Altamira volumes in the British Library, thus providing a unique flavour of the collection – but doing so filled 436 printed pages. Publishing the entire Altamira collection would therefore fill thousands of volumes.⁵ Second, dispersion means that the various memoranda written by Philip II to his senior ministers on the same day are now scattered between at least five archives, even though many documents often refer to others in the collection. Thus, a letter or consulta addressed to the king may today be in Geneva, while Mateo Vázquez’s cover note is in London, and Philip’s rescript is in Madrid or New York. Producing a modern ‘concordance’ of the Altamira collection represents the most urgent task that faces historians of Philip II today.

2. Government archives

The Altamira collection contains mainly documents exchanged between

Philip and his trusted advisers on matters of importance to *him*: historians must look elsewhere for his exchanges on other matters. Most consultas from the fourteen central councils that advised him, as well as the letters and reports sent to the king by his ministers around the world, are currently archived according to topic as follows:

•

Council of State (AGS *Estado*) is organized geographically, with one series for each European country ruled by the king (Aragon, Castile, the Netherlands, Milan, Naples, Sicily and so on) or governed by others (England, France, Germany, Portugal, Rome, Savoy and so on), plus ‘Armadas y Galeras’ (about the Mediterranean fleet) and ‘Despachos diversos’ (including numerous registers of the secretary of state’s outgoing correspondence).

•

Councils of Italy (Naples, Sicily, Milan, Sardinia) from 1554–5, *Portugal* from 1582, and the Netherlands (*Flandes*) from 1588, all form part of AGS *Secretarías Provinciales*, which contains routine administrative correspondence.

•

Council of War: AGS *Guerra Antigua* contains papers about the defence of Spain by land and sea, about the garrisons in North Africa and, after 1580, about the defence of Portugal.

•

Council of Finance: letters and papers addressed to the king ‘in the hands of his secretary of the treasury’, and consultas about them, form the series AGS *Consejos y Juntas de Hacienda*. The audited accounts of those who disbursed government funds or who provided government loans will be found in four AGS series: *Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas*, *Contaduría del Sueldo*, *Contadurías Generales* and *Dirección General del Tesoro*.

•

Council of the Indies: AGI (Seville) *Indiferente General* contains many of the consultas of the council to the king.⁶ The council’s correspondence with viceroys and other officials in America is organized geographically (AGI *México*, *Perú* and so on); its judicial responsibilities form the series AGI *Justicia*.

•

Council of Castile (Consejo Real): divided between AHN (Madrid) *Consejos Suprimidos*, AGS *Patronato Real*, AGS *Patronato Eclesiástico* and AGS *Cámara de Castilla* (the last three series that contain many important papers unrelated to the council, such as the testaments of the royal family).

- *Council of Aragon: ACA (Barcelona) Consejo de Aragón.*
- *Council of the Orders: AHN Órdenes Militares.*
- *Council of the Inquisition: AHN Inquisición.⁷*
- *Junta de Obras y Bosques: divided between AGS Casas y Sitios Reales and AGP Sección histórica. (Cédulas reales, 2–9, contain 10,000 pages with register copies of royal warrants issued by the Junta, 1548–98.) AGS CSR also contains accounts for the households of members of the royal family, beginning in 1535 with the registers of Philip’s household as prince: AGS CSR 36.*

None of these series is complete. In 1559, the ship carrying the royal archive back to Spain from the Netherlands sank, destroying the records of the king’s administration since he left Spain five years earlier; many important documents after 1559 form part of the Altamira collection; a few more have found their way into the wrong series.⁸ Other documents were looted by the French in the nineteenth century (although, by express order of Adolf Hitler, the German occupation authorities returned almost all of these to Simancas in 1942).⁹ Finally, although Philip and the archivists of Simancas sought to collect the official papers of all his councillors when they died, they did not always succeed (see section 4 below).

Starting in 1992, *Archivos Españoles en Red* has made available online tens of thousands of documents in the various public archives of Spain from the reign of Philip II, so that someone in (say) Columbus, Ohio, can locate, read and print them out, without a reader’s card and without charge, even at times when the archives that hold the originals are closed.¹⁰

Each overseas territory governed by Philip possessed its own institutions and generated separate records, permitting historians to study the implementation of the king’s policies on the periphery – but unfortunately, there too, losses have often been heavy. The archives of several institutions in Naples and Milan that contained correspondence with Philip perished in World War II, either in whole or in part; while the Spanish institutions created in the Netherlands by the duke of Alba and his successors have left scarcely any archival trace before 1596, except for the council of Troubles (AGRB *Raad van Beroerten*). In Mexico, by contrast, two sets of documents in AGNM show how royal power functioned in a major outpost of Philip’s Monarchy. The first nine volumes in the series *Mercedes* (appropriately entitled *Libros de Gobierno*) contain registered copies of apparently all the orders issued by the viceroy before 1570, many of them rehearsing the royal letter or warrant (*cédula*)

demanding action. Moreover, the first three volumes of the series *Cédulas reales duplicadas* list hundreds of orders sent by Philip II to his officials, above all the viceroy and Audiencia, sometimes with a note of the action taken. The Historical Archive at Goa, capital of Portuguese India, likewise contains virtually all the letters received from Philip in the 1580s and 1590s (filed in the *Livros das Monções*); but few documents there illuminate either the execution of his orders or the policy debates in Goa on how to govern outposts that stretched from Sofala to Nagasaki during his reign.

3. The correspondence of the king with his family

Charles V and his son exchanged many letters between 1543, when Philip (as he later put it) ‘began to govern’, and the emperor’s death in 1558; but most concerned only official business. Occasionally Charles wrote in his own hand, and he frequently added a holograph postscript, but the topics covered rarely included personal details. CDCV published the majority of these exchanges, with more from 1556–8 in GRM. There is one important exception: Charles’s two secret instructions for his son in May 1543. Ms B 2955 of the Hispanic Society of America in New York contains the original of both items, covering 48 folios, all written (and heavily corrected) in the emperor’s own hand – the longest documents he ever wrote. Ball and Parker, *Cómo ser rey*, provide a critical edition.

Personal details abound in the holograph letters written by Philip to his aunt Mary of Hungary, to his sister María and to her husband Maximilian, all of which survive in Vienna; in the holograph letters of his sister María to Philip (which he annotated) in the Biblioteca de Liria in Madrid; and in his correspondence with his cousin Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy, and to a lesser extent with his son-in-law Charles Emmanuel of Savoy.¹¹ Philip explicitly referred to the letters he exchanged with his wives, but virtually nothing survives. We know that just after Mary Tudor’s death he congratulated his agent in England ‘for having burned all my letters to the queen’, and he probably did the same when the others died. Only two personal letters from any of his wives survive, both in draft and both from Mary Tudor. Philip also wrote often to his mothers-in-law, Catherine of Portugal and Catherine de’ Medici, but no one has yet compiled a list of these letters, as well as those sent to other sovereigns. Rayne Allinson calendared and analysed Philip’s letters to his sister-in-law Elizabeth Tudor, two of them holograph.¹²

The most revealing family letters of the king were those sent to his daughters, Isabella Clara Eugenia (born 1566) and Catalina Michaela (born 1567). Fernando Bouza has published the 133 surviving letters written by Philip when he was separated from his daughters; and although the king burned the letters that they sent to him while he was in Portugal,

he carefully kept those received from Catalina after she left Spain in 1585, as well as drafts of many of his replies.¹³

J. I. Tellechea Idígoras published all of Philip's personal correspondence with his 'spiritual father', the pope, in two series: *Felipe II y el Papado*, contains almost 500 letters written by the king in the course of his reign, many of them holograph; *El papado y Felipe II*, contains almost 550 papal briefs addressed to the king, mostly in Latin with (after 1566) some Italian holographs.

4. Papers of principal ministers

Several of Philip's ministers retained their correspondence with the king.

- *Don Juan de Zúñiga and Don Luis de Requesens*. Although the executors of both brothers followed their orders to burn sensitive papers at their death, they have left the largest private collection of 'state papers' from the reign: over 800 bundles and books of documents. Most of the papers of the brothers became part of the Altamira collection (see above).¹⁴ In addition, most of their family papers, including those of their father, the king's governor Don Juan de Zúñiga y Avellaneda, are today in the Arxiu del Palau-Requesens in Molins de Rei.¹⁵

- *Cardinal Granvelle*. The cardinal died in Madrid in 1586 and left a huge archive. Most of his papers are now divided between BMB and the BR Madrid, but many other archives (notably AGS and the various parts of the Altamira collection) conserve important caches of the cardinal's letters, while AGRB *Manuscripts divers* 5459 and 5460 contain hundreds of Granvelle's memoranda to the king and members of the Junta de Noche between 1579 and 1584.¹⁶

- *The third duke of Alba*. Most of the extensive archive of the duke, only partly published, remains in the library of his descendants in the Palacio de Liria in Madrid.¹⁷

- *The seventh duke of Medina Sidonia*. Although most of the letters and papers of the seventh duke remain in the ducal archive at Sanlúcar de Barrameda, the Karpeles Manuscript Library in Santa Barbara, California holds three volumes of *Cartas Regias* covering 1587–93 (and much other material from those years).¹⁸

- *The first duke of Feria*: Twenty-nine letters written entirely in Philip's hand to the count of Feria between January 1558 and May

1559 – the earliest known example of Philip’s habit of ‘letting off steam’ by writing to his confidants – are today in the Fundación Casa Ducal de Medinaceli, Toledo, *Archivo Histórico* 166 R–7.

•

Margaret of Parma and her son Alexander Farnese. The papers left by Philip’s sister and nephew have suffered a double tragedy: much correspondence ended up in the Archivio di Stato in Naples, where German soldiers burned a large part of it in 1943 – although the transcripts made by the Belgian historians Louis Prospère Gachard and León van der Essen survive. The rest of their papers, in the Archivio di Stato, Parma, suffered severe damage from damp and many documents are today difficult to read.¹⁹

•

Andrea and Juan Andrea Doria. Vargas-Hidalgo, *Guerra y diplomacia*, published hundreds of letters sent by the king and his ministers to his principal Mediterranean admirals between 1552 and 1598. (Down to 1573, Vargas Hidalgo also printed letters and other documents sent by the Dorias to the king.)

•

Philip explicitly ordered his executors to burn the letters of his confessors, Fray Diego de Chaves and Diego de Yepes, ‘written by them to me, and by me to them’, and apparently only three originals now survive (one from Chaves and two from Yepes) – but their aggressive tone is highly revealing (and explains why the king was so keen to destroy the rest).²⁰

Three of the king’s senior advisers wrote autobiographies, all available in print and all offering important insights into what it was like to work for Philip II.

•

Shortly after he fled into exile after the collapse of the revolt of Aragon in 1591, Antonio Pérez published *Un pedazo de historia de lo sucedido en Zaragoza* in Pau, headquarters of Henry IV. He republished it with additions in 1592 with the title *Pedazos de historia o relaciones*, and in 1598, in Paris, shortly after learning of the death of Philip, he published a far longer version entitled *Relaciones de Antonio Pérez* together with a second volume entitled *Cartas de Antonio Pérez*. Both enjoyed great success, no doubt because they included the text of consultas exchanged with Philip that made the king seem petty, mendacious, and stupid. Unfortunately for historians, all editions contain the same defect: Pérez ‘edited’ many if not all of the documents he published in order to make them vindicate his claim that Philip had ‘framed’ him for the murder of Juan de Escobedo. Nothing published by

Pérez can be trusted unless it can be independently verified.²¹

- *Don Luis de Requesens* either wrote or dictated a 'Life' that provides a candid portrait, starting with memories of growing up as the prince's playmate and senior page and ending in 1570.²²

- *Diego de Simancas*, 'Vida y cosas notables', composed between 1577 and 1583 (when he died), offers three insights into the world of Philip II: first, he unconsciously revealed the vanity, prejudices and factions that poisoned the court; second, he provides some 'insider' accounts of meetings (down to where each councillor sat and how they cast their votes); finally, he recorded in detail his conversations with the king.²³

In addition, *Bartolomé Carranza* worked closely with Philip in England and the Netherlands between 1554 and 1558, when he returned to Spain as archbishop of Toledo. The following year the Inquisition arrested Carranza on suspicion of heresy, and a complete transcript of his trial exists from 1559 until 1567, when Pope Pius V evoked the case to Rome. The late Professor José Ignacio Tellechea Idígoras published 334 documents from the transcript, down to spring 1563. By then, the king himself and some sixty of his courtiers had made sworn depositions that not only revealed the factional strife that caused Carranza's downfall but also provided details on life at Philip's court in both England and the Netherlands, a period for which we lack many official documents.²⁴

5. Diplomatic correspondence

Twelve governments maintained resident ambassadors at the court of Spain throughout the reign: the emperor, the pope, Ferrara, France, Genoa, Lucca, Mantua, Parma, Savoy, Tuscany, Urbino and Venice. In addition, England maintained a resident envoy until 1568, as did Portugal until 1580. The dispatches and reports of these diplomats fill important lacunae in the surviving government records and also provide vivid detail on the decision-makers. The dispatches of a few ambassadors have been published *in extenso*: for France, those of Laubespine (1559–62), St Sulpice (1562–5), Fourquevaux (1565–72) and Longlée (1582–91); for Venice, those of Donà (1570–3).²⁵ In addition, summaries of all letters from English agents at Philip's court after 1558 are available in *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth* (15 volumes to 1585, when the outbreak of war virtually closed the peninsula to Elizabeth's diplomats);²⁶ while summaries of letters from Venetian envoys abroad (as well as the deliberations of the Senate) that contain material relating to Elizabethan England fill volumes VI to IX of the *Calendar of State Papers Venetian*.

Many other diplomatic sources are available in print. The closing 'Relations' made by each Venetian ambassador to the Senate after his tour abroad, some of them a hundred printed pages and more, have been published twice, once in a haphazard and incomplete form in the nineteenth century, and in their entirety by Luigi Firpo in a complete collection of *Relazioni* organized by country: volume VIII of Firpo's series prints the Relations delivered by all Venetian envoys at Philip's court between 1557 and 1598. Luciano Serrano printed the entire diplomatic correspondence between Rome and Madrid between 1565 and 1572; Anna Maria Voci printed many dispatches of Nuncio Niccolò Ormanetto (1572–7) concerning Don John of Austria and the Enterprise of England; Natale Mosconi did the same for many dispatches of Nuncio Cesare Speciano (1586–8), as did Tellechea Idígoras for those of Camillo Caetani (1594–8).²⁷

Publication of the dispatches of the long-serving Imperial ambassador of this period, Adam Dietrichstein (1563–73) – in the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv Vienna, with more material in the Rodinný Archiv Ditrichšteinu in the Moravian State Archives at Brno – has now begun. Strohmayr, *Korrespondenz*, published the 126 surviving letters (most in German, but some in Spanish and Latin) exchanged between Dietrichstein and the Imperial court, 1563–5. Since Dietrichstein served not only as ambassador but also as governor (*ayo*) of Archdukes Rudolf and Ernest at the court of Spain, his dispatches are unusually intimate and interesting. The dispatches of his successor Hans Khevenhüller (1574–1606) remain unpublished (although most of the originals survive in Vienna, as do his own registers of outgoing letters in the Oberösterreichisches Landesarchiv in Linz); but his detailed Diary has been printed in both German and in Spanish translation.²⁸

As for the rest, the diplomatic dispatches in the archives of Florence (for Tuscany and part of Urbino), Genoa, Lucca, Mantua, Modena (for Ferrara), Parma, Turin (for Savoy), the Vatican (for the nuncios and also part of Urbino) and Venice remain in manuscript. So do those of French ambassador Jehan de Vivonne, seigneur de St Gouard (1572–82) and of the Portuguese ambassador Francisco Pereira who, perhaps because he was Ruy Gómez's uncle, ranks as the best-informed diplomat ever to reside at the court of Spain.²⁹

6. Eyewitnesses

The king refused to write his own memoirs and after 1559 he did not commission biographies, two things that his father had done, but he allowed three eye-witness accounts of his early travels to be published:

Philip's progress from Spain through Italy and Germany to the Netherlands in 1548–9 as minutely recorded by Vicente Álvarez (first published in 1551) and by Juan Cristóbal Calvete de Estrella (1552). Calvete de Estrella, *El felicísimo viaje*, ed. P. Cuenca (Madrid, 2001), reproduces both accounts, together with colour reproductions of the triumphal arches erected in Antwerp to greet the prince and other works of art commissioned to celebrate the journey.

•

Andrés Muñoz, *Viaje de Felipe II a Inglaterra*, a short pamphlet originally published in Zaragoza in 1554, was reprinted by Pascual de Gayangos (Madrid, 1877) together with other pertinent documents on the reign of Philip I of England.

Eleven other people who knew Philip personally recorded considerable personal detail and anecdotes about him – even though none were published during the king's lifetime.³⁰ Seven were laymen – three professional historians, three court officials and a diplomat – and four were monks at El Escorial:

1.

Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, the king's history tutor, compiled a *Historia de Felipe II, rey de España*, covering 1556 to 1564 (first published in 1780; printed in Latin original and Spanish translation in his *Obras Completas*, IV (Pozoblanco, 1998)).

2.

Juan de Verzosa, keeper of the Spanish archives in Rome, wrote *Anales del reinado de Felipe II*, covering 1554 to 1565, first published by J. M. Maestre Maestre (Madrid, 2002).

3.

In 1585 Philip invited Antonio Herrera y Tordesillas to 'look into how one could write his glorious life, but after some discussion it seemed more modest to do this through a general history of the world beginning in the year 1559'. Herrera's *Historia General del Mundo del tiempo del Rey Felipe II, el Prudente*, although it started only in 1559, took over 1,000 pages to cover the rest of the reign, appearing in three volumes between 1601 and 1606. The epithet 'the Prudent' was Herrera's suggestion.³¹

4.

Jehan Lhermite, a royal valet from Antwerp, maintained a *Passetemps* that covered 1587 to 1602, with several arresting drawings of courtly life (see plates 24 and 42 in this volume).

5.

Luis Cabrera de Córdoba grew up at court, where his father had also served, and after 1585 he participated in some of the events he

described in his *Historia de Felipe II* (Madrid, 1619, for the period to 1583; 4 vols, Madrid, 1876, for the whole history, the second part from a copy; the whole work reprinted in 3 vols: Salamanca, 1998).
6.

Cristóbal Pérez de Herrera, one of the king's doctors, printed a *Eulogy* of his master in 1604 that covered almost 300 pages and included several poems (including a sonnet by Lope de Vega).

The only history of the king written by a diplomat who knew him remains unpublished:

7.

In 1600 Orazio della Rena, secretary of the Tuscan embassy in Madrid, completed a eulogistic *Compendium of the life of Philip II*. His 700-page manuscript constitutes the first complete history of the Prudent King: his master, the Grand Duke, prohibited publication.³²

The four monks of the Escorial who left written accounts all spent time with Philip:

8.

Fray Juan de San Gerónimo, *Memorias*, covered 1563–92. This was published – alas without many of the illustrations in the original – in *CODOIN VII*.

9.

Fray Antonio de Villacastín, *Memorias*, covered 1562–94: a short account by the master of works at San Lorenzo de El Escorial who talked to the king face-to-face on a regular basis, published in *DHME*, I, 11–96.

10.

Fray Juan de Sepúlveda, 'Historia de varios sucesos y de las cosas notables que han acaecido en España, y otras naciones, desde el año de 1584 hasta el de 1603', published in *DHME*, IV. Since the surviving manuscript is poorly organized and full of errors, Julián Zarco Cuevas (the editor) rearranged it into a single chronological account. Although it is still occasionally repetitive, Sepúlveda portrayed Philip as more human than any other eyewitness (except perhaps Lhermite): in his account, the king hunts, laughs, watches plays, eats with the monks, and always shows 'remarkable curiosity' about people and things.

11.

Fray José de Sigüenza, *La fundación del Monasterio de El Escorial* (volume III of his 'Historia del Orden de San Gerónimo', 1605), deals with the king's relationship with the Escorial throughout his

reign, but only after 1575 was he an eyewitness of the events he described. Sigüenza clearly had access to the accounts composed by his three colleagues, whom he sometimes quoted verbatim (without acknowledgement.)

For those who crave more information, Geoffrey Parker, *Felipe II. La biografía definitiva* (Barcelona, 2010), contains additional material on every aspect of the king and his world, but it does not include any documents from the Hispanic Society of America's *Altamira Collection*, which feature prominently in this volume, because they were only discovered and catalogued in 2012.

Notes

Preface

1.

Rodríguez-Salgado, 'Felipe II en su aniversario', 9: 'Confieso que he pasado más tiempo con Felipe II que con ningún otro hombre, y puede decirse que le he dedicado los mejores años de mi vida.'

2.

IVdeDJ 61/306, 339 and 360, and BL *Addl.* 28,350/315–26, all undated billetes exchanged between Philip and Hoyo written over the winter of 1562–3 about the 'zahorí'; García Tapia, 'El Escorial', 420–1, about the 'necesarias'(with more examples in chapter 6).

3.

Gardiner, 'Prescott's most indispensable aide', 99, Gayangos to Prescott in 1843; Prescott, *History*, I, iv; Riba, 36, Philip to Vázquez, 30 May 1576; ASVe *SDS* 20/68, Lippomano to Venice, 14 Apr. 1587.

4.

Ball and Parker, *Cómo ser rey*, 158, Charles to Philip, Palamos, 6 May 1543, holograph. See chapters 4 and 16 for examples of decisions that have left little or no documentary trail.

5.

AGS *Estado* 153/68, 72 and 77, Velasco to Gabriel de Zayas, 27 July 1571 and 1 and 9 Aug. 1571; BL *Addl.* 28,336/76, Velasco to Cardinal Espinosa, 9 Aug. 1571. See chapter 11 for more details.

6.

Voltaire, *Essai*, II, 431–2 (published in 1756); Watson, *History*, II, 408 (published in 1777).

7.

Bouza, 'Felipe II sube a los cielos', 301 n. 2; Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 113.

8.

Kamen, *Philip*, 320 (citing Fernand Braudel, *Mediterranean*, II, 1244). To be fair, Kamen had retreated from this extreme position by 2004, when he reviewed James Tracy's biography of Charles V: 'Historians have too easily given in to the view that the emperor was able to do very little in the face of the vast scenario facing him. Now ... we can agree with Tracy that a great deal was in fact done: "Charles V did make a difference"' (*Renaissance Quarterly*, LVII (2004), 242). The argument of this biography is that Philip II, too, 'did make a difference'.

9.

AGS *Estado K* 1490/44, Philip to Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy, 22 July 1557; AGS *Estado* 146/147, Pérez to Philip and reply, and [10] Apr. 1565; IVdeDJ 44/127, Philip to Mateo Vázquez and reply, 16 Apr. 1575; Bouza, *Cartas*, 85, Philip to his daughters, 1583.

10.

AHN *Consejos* 4416/101, Herrera to Don Luis de Salazar, 15 Dec. 1599, letter and image.

Chapter One: Apprenticeship, 1527–1543

1.

Vilar Sánchez, 1526, 42–3, citing a Portuguese envoy who had accompanied the bride to Seville.

2.

Brewer *et al.*, *Letters and papers*, IV.2, 1127, Dr Edward Lee to Henry VIII, 30 Sep. 1526.

3.

Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, 'El príncipe', 886.

4.

Zúñiga, *Crónica burlesca*, 141 ('El emperador y Felipito su hijo están buenos'); Rodríguez Villa, *El Emperador*, 359, Salinas to Ferdinand, Valladolid, 28 May 1527.

5.

Rodríguez Villa, *El Emperador*, 363, Salinas to Ferdinand, Valladolid, 19 Aug. 1527.

6.

March, *Niñez*, I, 122–3, Leonor de Castro to Charles, 15 Nov. 1530; and 46, Pedro González de Mendoza to Charles, undated but spring 1531.

7.

Ibid., I, 47, González de Mendoza to Charles, 15 and 30 Apr. and 20 May 1531.

8.

Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, *Aprendizaje*, 182, quoting Francisco de Encinas.

9.

Rodríguez Villa, *El Emperador*, 499–500, Martín de Salinas to Ferdinand, Madrid, 14 Sep. 1530.

10.

Alonso Acero and Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, ‘Alá’, 119 (‘Mucho me aprietas, Hulano; cras me besaría la mano’, based on an exchange in *La Jura de Santa Gadea*).

11.

Fernández de Oviedo, *Libro de la Cámara Real del Príncipe Don Juan*, 1–3; March, *Niñez*, I, 230, Zúñiga to Charles, Madrid, 11 Feb. 1536.

12.

Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, *Aprendizaje*, 77, quoting Francisco de Monzón, *Libro primero del espejo del príncipe christiano* (Lisbon, 1544).

13.

March, *Niñez*, I, 68–70, 72, Silíceo to Charles, 26 Nov. 1535, 25 Feb. 1536 and 19 Mar. 1540.

14.

Ibid., I, 227 and 230, Zúñiga to Charles, 25 Aug. 1535 and 9 Feb. 1536.

15.

AGS CSR 36 fo. 7, 'Memoria de las cosas de oro y plata'; and Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, *Aprendizaje*, 101–2; March, *Niñez*, II, 344, Doña Estefania de Requesens to her mother, 28 Oct. 1537.

16.

BL Addl. 28,354/51–2, 113, 176, marquis of Ladrada to Philip, and rescript, 25 Oct. and 23 Dec. 1570, and 5 Apr. 1571; AHN *Inq. libro* 101/695–7, Hernando Arenillas de Reynoso to Philip, 4 Dec. 1594, with rescript.

17.

Gachard, 'Charles-Quint', 625n: Mary of Hungary to Charles, 9 June 1538.

18.

CDCV, II, 32–43, Charles's Instructions to Philip, 5 Nov. 1539. All quotations come from this source.

19.

March, *Niñez*, I, 249, Zúñiga to Charles, 25 June 1541.

20.

Ibid., I, 237, 241, 247, 259 and 261, Zúñiga to Charles, 25 Feb. and 19 May 1540, 24 Mar. 1541, 10 Sep. 1543 and 4 Feb. 1544; AGS CSR 36 fo. 8, unfol., payments of 23 Dec. 1540.

21.

March, *Niñez*, I, 248–9, Zúñiga to Charles, 25 June 1541.

22.

AGS CSR 106/470–1, warrant in favour of 'el bachiller Christobal de Estrella', 4 Feb. 1541.

23.

AGS CSR 36 fo. 8/237v, records the purchase.

24.

Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, *Felipe II: la educación*, 605, report by the prince's tutor Vargas Mexía.

25.

March, *Niñez*, I, 248–9, Zúñiga to Charles, 25 June 1541; Ball and Parker, *Cómo ser rey*, 151–2, Charles to Philip, 4 May 1543.

26.

AGS *Estado* 393/36, Zayas to Philip and rescript, 'Good Friday' [= 17 Apr.] 1576.

27.

Alonso Acero and Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero. 'Alá', 118; Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, *Aprendizaje*, 147–9; AGS *CSR* 36 fo 8, unfol., payment of 30 June 1544.

28.

AGS *CSR* 35/22, list of musicians in the prince's chapel, 11 Sep. 1543.

29.

AGS *CSR* 36 fo. 8, entry for 23 June 1540.

30.

Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, *Aprendizaje*, 154–6, on the heraldic innovations; March, *Niñez*, I, 247 and 249, Zúñiga to Charles, 24 Mar. and 25 Aug. 1541.

31.

March, *Niñez*, II, 285 and 335, Doña Estefanía de Requesens to her mother, Madrid, 9 Sep. 1535.

32.

BL *Cott. Ms Vespasian C VII/171–4*, 'Poder para Castilla', 1 May 1543.

33.

CDCV, II, 86–7, 'Instrucción General', and AGS *PR* 26/83, 'La restricción del poder del príncipe', both signed by Charles in Barcelona, 1 May 1543.

34.

Ball and Parker, *Cómo ser rey*, 149–53, Charles to Philip, Palamos, 4 May 1543, holograph, the source of all quotations from this document.

35.

CDCV, II, 179, 'Bodas de Felipe'; Bouza, *Locos*, 196, quoting the chronicler Alonso de Santa Cruz; March, *Niñez*, I, 262–3, Zúñiga to Charles, 4 Feb. 1544; and Bouza, *Locos*, pp. 78–9, Don Luis Hurtado de Mendoza, Spanish ambassador in Portugal, to Carlos, 21 Nov. 1544.

36.

Ball and Parker, *Cómo ser sey*, 154–9, Charles to Philip, Palamos, 6 May 1543, holograph, the source of all quotations from this document.

37.

Fernández Álvarez, 'Las instrucciones políticas', 175, Francisco de Eraso to Philip and reply, 20 Feb. 1559; *DH*, I, 319–22, testimony given under oath by Philip, 11 Jan. 1560; BZ 144/39, Mateo Vázquez to Philip II and reply, 28 Dec. 1574.

38.

March, *Niñez*, I, 255, Zúñiga to Charles, 8 June 1543; Fernández Álvarez, *Felipe II*, 675, Tavera to Charles, 8 June 1543; March, *Niñez*, I, 304, Charles to Zúñiga, 1 May 1543; *CDCV*, II, 157, Cobos to Charles, 7 Aug. 1543 (Charles agreed on 27 Oct. 1543; Martínez Millán, *La corte*, II, 102).

Chapter Two: A Renaissance prince, 1543–1551

1.

CDCV, II, 172–3 and 183, Charles to Philip, 27 Oct. and 15 Nov. 1543.

2.

Ibid., II, 189–93, Philip to Charles, 4 Feb. 1544, minute. Although it seems unlikely that the prince, still only sixteen, would have composed such a defiant letter, he signed it and no doubt sympathized with its content.

3.

BNE Ms 10,300/116–33, Los Cobos to Charles, Aranjuez, mid-July 1544, copy.

4.

Chabod, '¿Milán o los Países Bajos?', 336, Philip to Charles, 14 Dec. 1544.

5.

CDCV, II, 300–1, Philip to Charles, 14 Dec. 1544 [misdated 24 Dec.].

6.

March, *Niñez*, I, 74–5, Silíceo to Charles, 6 Aug. 1543.

7.

AGS CSR 36 fo. 1/28v–29, various cédulas of July 1544; Édouard, *L'empire*, 29–32; Frieder, *Chivalry*, 42–8; AGS CSR 36 fo. 1/85–6, cédulas of 18 July and 7 Aug. 1546; Fallows, *Jousting*, 392, quoting Luis Zapata de Chaves.

8.

Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, *La 'Librería Rica'*, 74–5.

9.

March, *Niñez*, I, 321–2, Charles to Zúñiga, 24 Dec. 1544.

10.

Ibid., I, 323–6, Charles to Zúñiga, 17 Feb. 1545.

11.

Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, *Felipe II, la mirada*, chap. 7, on Philip's 'rebeldía juvenil'.

12.

Cabrera de Córdoba, *Historia*, III, 1270; BR Ms II–587/43, from the *Tratado del príncipe instruido*, composed by Don Francisco de Gurrea y Aragón, duke of Villahermosa, around 1615.

13.

CDCV, II, 408, Philip to Charles, Valladolid, 13 Aug. 1545.

14.

Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, *Aprentizaje*, 166, prints part of the document, presented to Philip in a private ceremony of investiture on 16 Sep. 1546.

15.

Kamen, *Philip*, 29, Philip to Charles, 20 Dec. 1546.

16.

Calvete de Estrella, *Felicísimo Viaje*, 607 (*Relación* of Vicente Álvarez).

17.

All quotations from CDCV, II, 612–15, Charles to Philip, Augsburg, 9 Apr. 1548.

18.

Martínez Millán and Carlos Morales, *Felipe II*, 387, quoting Antonio Pérez and García de Loaysa.

19.

Calvete de Estrella, *Felicísimo Viaje*, 45 (Calvete), 610 and 619 (*Relación* of Álvarez); Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, 'Ver y conocer', 55, 72 and 77, Ludovico Strozzi to duke of Mantua, Genoa, 1 and 9 Dec. 1548.

20.

Calvete de Estrella, *Felicísimo viaje*, 630 (Álvarez).

21.

Morel-Fatio, 'La vie', 285. See page 29 above for a criticism of Philip's jousting skills.

22.

Calvete de Estrella, *Felicísimo viaje*, 424 (Antwerp).

23.

Lanz, *Correspondenz*, III, 17, Charles to Mary of Hungary, 16 Dec. 1550.

24.

IVdeDJ 55/IX/97–8, Mateo Vázquez to Philip, and reply, 17 June 1586.

25.

HHStA *Spanien: Hofkorrespondenz*, Karton 1, mappe 4/23 and 27, Philip to Maximilian, 16 and 25 Sep. 1551.

Chapter Three: The changing face of empire, 1551–1558

1.

CDCV, III, 359–69, 377–90 and 617, Philip to Charles, Toro, 27 Sep. 1551, Madrid 24 Nov. 1551 and Valladolid, 2 Sep. 1553; Fernández Álvarez, *Felipe II y su tiempo*, 761, count of Buendía to Philip, 2 Sep. 1552.

2.

CDCV, III, 420, Charles to Philip, 9 Apr. 1552.

3.
Ibid., 423–35, Philip to Charles, undated.
4.
RAH *Salazar y Castro Ms A-51/107v-108*, Philip to Don Luis de Ávila, Monzón, 6 Oct. 1552.
5.
CDCV, III, 579–80, Charles to Philip, 2 Apr. 1553.
6.
AGS *Estado* 807/29, Charles to Philip, 30 July 1553.
7.
CDCV, III, 636–9, and CODOIN, III, 451–3, Charles to Philip, 16 and 26 Dec. 1553, and 21 Jan. 1554.
8.
Adams and Stephens, *Select Documents*, No. 264, ‘Act for the Marriage of Queen Mary to Philip of Spain, 1554’ (1 *Mary*, sess. 3, c. 2. 4).
9.
AGS *Estado* 807/36–2, ‘Escriptura ad cautelam’, 4 Jan. 1554.
10.
CODOIN, III, 473–7, Mary of Hungary to Philip, 4 Feb. 1554.
11.
CDCV, IV, 109–10, Philip’s Instructions to Juana, 12 July 1554.
12.
Fernández y Fernández de Retana, *España*, 344, Philip to Antonio de Rojas, c. 20 July 1554.
13.
Malfatti, *The accession*, 141 and 144, Barahona to his uncle Antonio, in the form of a diary. Many historians have debated the language in which the spouses conversed: Barahona’s eyewitness testimony settles the matter. Other details from Elder, *Copie*, sigs Aiv and Bi.
14.
Muñoz, *Viaje*, 97.
- 15.

Ibid., 77–8 (Muñoz’s account) and 118 (letter of Oct. 1554).

16.

CSPSp, XIII, 2, 6, Ruy Gómez to Francisco de Eraso, 26 and 29 July 1554; BR MS II–2257, Francisco de Ibarra to Granvelle, 13 Apr. 1559.

17.

CSPSp, XIII, 102, Renard to Charles, 23 Nov. 1554; and *ibid.*, 124, Mary the Queen to Charles, 20 Dec. 1554, holograph; Gachard, *Voyages*, IV, 20–1.

18.

CSPV, VI part 1, 147–9 and 177–9, Giovanni Michiel to Venice, London, 5 Aug. and 3 Sep. 1555.

19.

APC, V, 53, Order of 27 July 1554 – the first act of the new regime: ‘Anno primo et secundo Philippi et Marie Regis et Regine’.

20.

CSPV, VI part 1, 176 and 190, Pole to Philip, Richmond, 2 and 16 Sep. 1555, register copies. (Mary and Martha appear in St Luke’s Gospel, 10: 38–42, 11: 20 and 12: 1–8.)

21.

Tytler, *England*, II, 485, Memorandum of early Sep. 1555. For the council’s compliance, see *APC*, V, 219–20 and 257–8, orders authorizing Admiral Howard to investigate the state of the fleet and repair defective ships (6 Jan. 1556), and to move the navy to Portsmouth and build new ships (30 Mar. 1556).

22.

DH, III, 29–30 (question 63) and 186 (answer); Redworth, ‘Matters impertinent’, 606, citing Lord Pembroke to Lord Shrewsbury, Jan. 1556.

23.

DH, II, p. 568, testimony of Carranza, 4 Sep. 1559 (‘hizo él encarcelar e quemar más de 450’ heretics); Duffy, *Fires of faith*, 7.

24.

DH, III, 23, testimony of Carranza; and 185, sworn testimony of Philip in the Carranza trial, 14 Oct. 1562.

25.

GRM *Introduction*, 87, n. 1, 'Sommaire description' of the ceremony. Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle (1517–86) is referred to as 'Granvelle' throughout this book.

26.

GRM *Introduction*, 98.

27.

Epistolario, I, 258, Alba to Ruy Gómez, Milan, 11 July 1555.

28.

CODOIN, II, 430–1, Philip II to Ferdinand, 20 Nov. 1556.

29.

Fernández Álvarez, *Felipe II*, 764, Philip to Juana, 17 Sep. 1556; AGS *Estado*, 112/226–9, Juana to Philip, 21 Nov. 1556; GRM, II, 184–5, royal cédula of 28 Apr. 1557.

30.

Kervijn de Lettenhove, *Relations politiques*, I, 54–9, Instructions to Ruy Gómez, 2 Feb. 1557.

31.

BL *Addl.* 28,264/10–12v, Philip to Emmanuel Philibert, Brussels, 27 July 1557, cyphered but with a holograph postscript by the king.

32.

BL *Addl.* 28,264/17–19 and 26–7, Philip to Emmanuel Philibert, Cambrai, 6, 7 and 9 Aug. 1557, cyphered but with holograph postscripts by the king.

33.

Tellechea Idígoras, *Carranza y Pole*, 263, Carranza to Villagarcía, 28 Aug. 1557; AGS *Estado* 153/103, Feria to Zayas, 9 Aug. 1571, the eve of the fourteenth anniversary of the battle, written at San Lorenzo de El Escorial.

34.

Sigüenza, 8. See also chapter 7.

35.

HSA *Altamira*, 7/VI/36, 'Traslado de una carta que Christóbal Vázquez de Ávila escribió', 30 Aug. 1557; *CODOIN*, II, 496, 'Relación'

sent by Philip to Ferdinand, 29 Aug. 1557; Kamen, *Philip*, 70, Philip to Juana 2 Sep. 1557.

36.

Cabrera de Córdoba, *Historia*, I, 144; Verzosa, *Annales*, pp. 62–3.

37.

AGS *Estado K* 1490/78, Philip to Charles, 28 Aug. 1557.

38.

AGS *Estado K* 1490/98, Philip to Emmanuel Philibert, Brussels, 21 Oct. 1557.

39.

AGS *Estado* 128/326 Charles to Philip, Yuste, 15 Nov. 1558, with a holograph postscript; and 317, 'Relación de cartas del emperador a Su Magestad.' Eraso endorsed both documents

40.

Kervijn de Lettenhove, *Relations politiques*, I, 116–17, Philip to Lord Wentworth, Brussels, 2 Jan. 1558.

41.

Tellechea Idígoras, *Carranza y Pole*, 268–9, Carranza to Villagarcía, 20 Jan 1558. The 'engraved on my heart' story first appeared in Foxe's *Actes and Monuments* of 1563 – a hostile source, to be sure, but it has a ring of truth about it.

42.

Kervijn de Lettenhove, *Relations politiques*, I, 120–1, Philip to Pole, 21 Jan. 1558, and Instruction to Feria, 28 Jan.; *ibid.*, 153, Feria to Philip, 10 Mar. 1558; and 191–4, Feria to Philip, 18 May 1558.

43.

FCDM *AH* R7–5, 9 and 10, Philip to Feria, 18 Feb., 17 Mar. and 5 Apr. 1558, all holographs.

44.

FCDM *AH* R7–4 and 6, Philip to Feria, 30 Jan. and 27 Feb. 1558, both holograph.

45.

CODOIN, LXXXVII, 40–3, Feria to Philip, Greenwich, 1 May 1558; FCDM, *AH* R7–12 and 13, Philip to Feria, 7 and 14 May 1558, both

holograph.

46.

Brunelli, *Emanuele Filiberto*, 46–7 (Philip ‘very happy’) and 72–3 (council debate).

47.

Kervijn de Lettenhove, *Relations politiques*, I, 269, Philip to the English commissioners, 30 Oct. 1558; Brunelli, *Emanuele Filiberto*, 101–3 (entry for 26 Oct. 1558).

48.

Rodríguez Salgado and Adams. ‘The count of Feria’s dispatch’, 319–20, Feria to Philip, 14 Nov. 1558; Kervijn de Lettenhove, *Relations politiques*, I, 277, Assonleville to Philip, Westminster, 7 Nov. 1558.

49.

Malfatti, *The accession*, 149, Juan de Barahona to his uncle, 25 Oct. 1554; Hegarty, ‘Carranza and the English universities’, 160, John Jewel to Heinrich Bullinger, 20 Mar. 1559.

50.

Brunelli, *Emanuele Filiberto*, 109 (entry for 12 Nov. 1558); FCDM AH R7–19, Philip to Feria, 25 Nov. 1558, holograph; GRM, I, 447–8, Philip to Juana, 4 Dec. 1558. Mary of Hungary died on 18 Oct. 1558.

51.

TR, II, p. 523, Fresneda to Cardinal Caraffa, 11 Dec. 1558; FCDM AH R7–27, Philip to Feria, 27 Dec. 1558, holograph.

52.

AGS *Estado* 128/340, Philip’s comment to Francisco de Eraso on the dorse of a letter from Mary of Hungary dated 10 May 1558.

53.

AGS 29/35 Codicil signed by Philip, Ghent, 5 Aug. 1559.

Chapter Four: The king at work

1.

Although this chapter contains examples from the whole reign, it focuses on the period before 1580; after that the king changed his administrative style. Chapter 16 focuses on the later part of the reign.

2.

Paris, *Négociations*, 49, bishop of Limoges to the cardinal of Lorraine and the duke of Guise, Ghent, 27 July 1559; Firpo, *Relazioni*, VIII, 670, Notes by Donà, 1574; Iñiguez de Lequerica, *Sermones funerales*, fo. 15, sermon by Dr Aguilar de Terrones, 19 Oct. 1598.

3.

FCDM AH, R7–10, Philip to Feria, 5 Apr. 1558, holograph; AGS, *Estado* 527/5, Philip to Gonzalo Pérez, with replies, 24–25 Mar. 1565; IVdeDJ 53/VI/51, and BZ 142/9, Philip to Mateo Vázquez, with replies, 15 May 1577 and 29 Nov. 1578.

4.

Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley, 'Debt policy', 192.

5.

McNamara, *In retrospect*, xvii.

6.

HSA *Altamira* 1/1/4, Vázquez to Philip, and reply, undated but 1578.

7.

NA SP 70/136/38, Henry Cobham to Lord Burghley, Madrid, 14 Nov. 1575; ASVe SDS 20/68, Lippomano to the Doge of Venice, 14 Apr. 1587; Birch, *Memoirs*, 82, Anthony Standen to Lord Burghley, 8 Sep. 1592.

8.

RAH *Salazar y Castro Ms A-1/107v-108*, Philip to Don Luis de Ávila, Monzón, 6 Oct. 1552; HSA *Altamira* 1/1/40, Bernardo de Bolea, vice-chancellor of Aragon, to Philip, undated but 1572; BL *Addl.* 28.262/599–601, Antonio Pérez to Philip and reply (undated, but 1577); Muro, *La princesa*, Appendix 36, Pazos to Philip, with rescript, 12 May 1579; AHN *Inq. libro* 249/534v–535, Philip to the bishop of Cartagena, 9 Mar. 1588, register copy.

9.

BL *Addl.* 28,399/20, Philip to viceroy of Sicily, 20 Jan. 1559.

10.

Escudero, *Felipe II*, 459–60; TMLM Ms 12,9960, Antonio Pérez to Philip, and reply, 30 Nov. 1574; BL *Eg.* 1506/92–4, Quiroga to Philip, and replies, 15 and 19 Nov. 1578.

11.

IVdeDJ 55/XI/ 149–150, Vázquez to Philip, and reply, 4 Aug. 1588; BL *Addl.* 28,262/137, Philip to Antonio Pérez, 12 Feb. 1577.

12.

BL *Addl.* 28,263/7, undated Philip memorandum (first two examples); Escudero, *Felipe II*, 477; and IVdeDJ 55/X/181, Philip to the duke of Albuquerque, Oct. 1587, draft; AHN *Inq. libro* 284/107, Quiroga to Philip, and reply, 21 Apr. 1577.

13.

DH, III, 404–5, testimony by Philip, 13 Oct. 1562 (Carranza case); BL *Addl.* 28,263/432, Vázquez to Philip and reply, 11 Aug. 1587 (Miguel de Piedrola, a Plaza Prophet).

14.

IVdeDJ 53/3/65 and 51/170, Philip to Vázquez, with rescripts, 8 June 1574 and 20 July 1575; IVdeDJ 56, paquete 6–2, unfol., Hernando de Ávalos to Vázquez, with royal apostil, 25 Mar. 1576.

15.

HSA *Altamira* 1/III/7, Philip to Vázquez, Madrid, 18 Nov. 1573. Philip's confusion on the subject should not surprise us: even economists and economic historians today cannot agree about the king's fiscal situation: compare (for example) the incompatible analyses published early in 2014 by Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley, 'Debt policy', and Drelichman and Voth, *Lending*.

16.

IVdeDJ 53/4/169 and 53/3/76, BL *Addl.* 28,699/103, and Riba, 105–6, Philip to Vázquez, and replies, 12 Sep. 1575, 26 July 1574, and 22 and 23 Apr. 1577.

17.

BZ 144/11, Vázquez to Philip, 20 May 1574. HSA *Altamira* 5/1/13 'Señor Maximiliano' of Austria to Jerónimo Gassol, 27 Dec. 1586.

18.

HSA *Altamira* 5/III/17, Vázquez to Juan Fernández de Espinosa, 12 Jan. 1586; BNF Ms. *Esp.* 132/179–80, Pérez to Juan de Vargas Mexía, 26 Jan. 1579; Oria, 152, Idiáquez and Moura to Medina Sidonia, 22 Feb. 1588; BL *Addl.* 28,377/110v, Poza to Moura, 7 Sep. 1595.

19.

TMLM Ms 129961, Philip to Vázquez, 3 Oct. 1578; Tellechea Idígoras, *El ocaso*, 105–7 and 286–8, ‘Juicio sobre Felipe II’ by Caetani, Madrid, 13 Sep. 1598.

20.

Paris, *Négociations*, 558–60, Memorial of the French ambassador in Spain, 26 Sep. 1560.

21.

Serrano y Sanz, *Autobiografías*, 199–201, ‘Vida y cosas notables’ of Dr Diego de Simancas. Simancas was right: Quiroga had indeed boosted Pazos, someone almost unknown to the king: AHN *Inq. libro* 284/71–2, Quiroga to Philip, and reply, 4 Mar. 1577.

22.

BL *Addl.* 28,399/20, Philip to the viceroy of Sicily, 20 Jan. 1559, copy (apparently the first use of the technique); BZ 141/108, Philip to Mateo Vázquez, 1 May 1586 (the ‘offender’ was the viceroy of Navarre).

23.

Escudero, *Felipe II*, 531–2, Gassol to Philip and rescript, 14 Nov. 1594.

24.

BZ, 144/33, Vázquez to Philip and reply, 6 Dec. 1574; IVdeDJ, 51/17, Philip to Vázquez, 17 July 1573; IVdeDJ, 21/716, royal apostil on a letter of Fray Antonio de San Pablo to Vázquez, 17 Nov. 1581.

25.

Donà, 350, letter to Venice, 23 Aug. 1571; Firpo, *Relazioni*, VIII, 669.

26.

GCP I, 358, Pérez to Tomás de Armenteros, 30 May 1565; AA 56/63, Zayas to Alba, 30 June 1567.

27.

Paris, *Négociations*, 66, bishop of Limoges to Francis II, 4 Aug. 1559.

28.

MHSI, *Borgia*, III, 482, Borja to Philip, 5 May 1559; AGS *Estado*, 148/181, count of Chinchón to the governor of Lombardy, 12 Dec.

1566; AA 44/81–3, Dr Juan Milio to Juan de Albornoz, 12 June 1571; Douais, II, 88, Fourquevaux to Catherine de Médici, 6 July 1569.

29.

IVdeDJ 81/1251, Requesens to Zúñiga, Nov. 1572. See Janis, *Groupthink*, on the costs of administrative practices like those fostered by Espinosa.

30.

AMAE (P) *MDFDE* 239/126–35, Philip to Don Diego de Covarrubias (undated but Oct. 1572), copy; Secret Instruction of Charles to Philip, 6 May 1543 (chapter 1).

31.

BZ 144/1, Vázquez to Philip, undated but Mar. 1573.

32.

DHME, V, 57 and 81 ('Diurnal' entries for 7 Oct. 1572 and 5 Mar. 1573); Poole, 'The politics of *Limpieza de Sangre*', 382.

33.

BZ 144/16 and 141/9, and BL *Addl.* 28,263/222, Philip to Mateo Vázquez, 6 Nov. 1574, 24 July 1577 and 14 Apr. 1579.

34.

Calculations by Rodríguez Salgado, 'The Court', 226, from the 'Diurnal' kept by Antonio Gracián.

35.

BZ 44/116–17, and HSA *Altamira* 1/I/4, Vázquez to Philip, and replies, 28 Feb., 3 Mar. 1575 and undated but 1578.

36.

DHME, V, 42, 81 and 89 ('Diurnal' entries for 11 July 1572, 5 Mar. and 5 Apr. 1573 respectively; BZ 141/11, Philip to Vázquez, 25 June 1577.

37.

CCG, IV, 558, Granvelle to Morillon, 11 May 1573; AA *Montijo caja* 34–1/72, Granvelle to duke of Villahermosa, 13 July 1576.

38.

BR Ms. II–2291, unfol., Pérez to Granvelle, 16 Apr. 1560; Groen van Prinsterer, *Archives*, 1st series I, 426, Chantonnay, Spanish

ambassador in Vienna, to Granvelle, 6 Oct. 1565.

39.

Paris, *Négociations*, 562, mémoire of 26 Sep. 1560; Douais, II, 338, Fourquevaux to Charles IX, 31 Mar. 1571; and Binchy, 'An Irish ambassador', 371, quoting the cardinal of Como to Nuncio Ormanetto, 2 July 1577.

40.

BR Ms II-2291/224-5, Córdoba to Granvelle, 3 Sep. 1560; Berwick y Alba, *Documentos escogidos*, 100-1, Córdoba to Alba, 1 Feb. 1571; AA 32/42, Córdoba to Prior Don Hernando de Toledo, 4 Aug. 1574.

41.

BL Addl. 28,350/233, and IVdeDJ 61/130, Philip to Hoyo, secretary of the Junta de Obras y Bosques, Dec. 1565 and Apr. 1567.

42.

DHME, V, 100.

43.

AHN Inq. libro 100/242, Philip to Quiroga, 1 Sep. 1574, holograph; IVdeDJ, 51/49, Philip to Vázquez, 30 Aug. 1575.

44.

IVdeDJ 61/19, Hoyo to Philip and reply, 22 May 1562; BZ 144/34, Philip to Vázquez, 10 Dec. 1574.

45.

Firpo, *Relazioni*, VIII, 669 (Donà); CCG, XI, 272, Granvelle to Margaret of Parma, 21 Sep. 1584; ASV NS 19/192, Novara to Rusticucci, 3 May 1587.

46.

BCR Ms 2417/39, Silva to Esteban de Ibarra, 13 Aug. 1589.

47.

Sánchez, *El monasterio de El Escorial*, 207-9, letters from the prior of El Escorial, 27 Aug. and 8 Sep. 1572.

48.

Escudero, *Felipe II*, 457 n. 1051, quoting a 'Relación' of Baron Dietrichstein, ambassador at Philip's court 1563-72; Donà, 319, letter to Venice, 3 July 1571.

49.

Riba, 105–6, Vázquez to Philip, and reply, 23 Apr. 1577; IVdeDJ 68/286, Vega to Philip II and rescript, 22 Aug. 1583.

50.

BL *Addl.* 28,263/34, IVdeDJ 51/ 178, and Escudero, *Felipe II*, 574, Philip to Vázquez, 23 May 1576, 6 May 1578, and 3 Apr. 1574.

51.

ARSI *Epistolae Hispaniae* 143/293–294v, holograph report by Acosta, 16 Sep. 1588.

52.

Donà, 39–40 and 198, letters to Venice, 6 June 1570 and 4 Feb. 1571.

53.

NA *SP* 70/143/29, Sir John Smythe to Walsingham, 5 Feb. 1577; IVdeDJ 53/5/15, Vázquez to Philip and reply, 27 Jan. 1576; Donà, 677–81, letter to Venice, 17 Apr. 1573; IVdeDJ 60/96, Philip to Pérez, undated but also 17 Apr. 1573.

54.

Serrano y Sanz, *Autobiografías*, 198; Mosconi, *La nunziatura*, 16–17, Novara to Rusticucci, 18 Oct. 1586.

55.

Douais, II, 18 and 21, letters to Charles IX and Catherine de Medici, 18 Nov. 1568; Donà, 393–4, letter to Venice, 26 Nov. 1571.

56.

Firpo, *Relazioni*, VIII, 257, Lorenzo Priuli in 1576; Sigüenza, 57.

Chapter Five: The king and God

1.

TMLM *Ms* 129978, Secret Instructions for Don John of Austria, 23 May 1568, draft corrected by Philip (slightly different from the text in Van der Hammen, *Don Juan de Austria*, fos 4–44).

2.

Lhermite, *Passetemps*, II, 130.

3.

DHME, II, p. 47, Codicil of 23 Aug. 1597.

4.

DHME, V, 37–8, Gracián's 'Diurnal' for 10 June 1572.

5.

BL Addl. 28,263/105–6, Vázquez to Philip and rescript, San Lorenzo, 6 Apr. 1577; Sigüenza, 71.

6.

IVdeDJ 55/IX/111, Philip to Mateo Vázquez, 26 July 1586; *BZ* 143/6 and 141/84, same to same, 4 Jan. 1588 and 19 Feb. 1586.

7.

ASVe SDS 12/44 and 74, Giovanfrancesco Morosini to the Doge of Venice, Madrid, 12 Aug. 1579 and 8 Feb. 1580; Sigüenza, 92 and 158. For the arrest of Don Carlos, see chapter 10; for that of Pérez, see chapter 14.

8.

AGS Estado 153/54, Gracián to Zayas, 9 Aug. 1571; *IVdeDJ* 67/287a, Vázquez to Philip and reply, 28 June 1574; Bouza, *Cartas*, 65, letter to his daughters [30 Mar.] 1584.

9.

CODOIN, VII, 366 (Memorias de San Gerónimo).

10.

AGS CC Libros de cédulas 321/248–9, 272–5, 184–186v, 299–301, 303 ('plegarías' between 1560 and 1568); Sigüenza, 69 (Moriscos); Bouza, *Imagen y propaganda*, 144–6 (prayer chain); *BL Eg.* 1506/16–17, Philip to Gaspar de Quiroga, bishop of Cuenca (and Inquisitor-General), 8 Mar. 1574.

11.

HSA Altamira 1/I/46, Diego de Covarrubias, president of the council of Castile, to Philip and rescript, 11 Sep. 1577. On the decision to break the peace in the Netherlands, see chapter 13.

12.

IVdeDJ 56/6/19, Vázquez to Chaves and reply, 24 June 1581; *HSA Altamira* 1/III/8, Chaves to Philip, 20 May 1587.

13.

Martínez Millán and Carlos Morales, *Felipe II*, 268–9, Chaves to Philip, 24 Oct. 1588 (about the need to investigate irregularities among the Jesuits of Spain); and Fernández, *Historia*, 278–9, same to same, 19 Mar. 1592.

14.

Calvete de Estrella, *Felicísimo viaje*, 663 (Vicente Álvarez); HSA *Altamira* 7/VI/36, ‘Traslado de una carta que Christóbal Vázquez de Ávila escribió’, 30 Aug. 1557.

15.

Sigüenza, 367; Estal, *Personalidad religiosa*, 159, noted ‘a tooth said to belong to St Lawrence with a holograph note by Philip II attached’. See chapter 19 on Philip’s reverence for relics during his final illness.

16.

PEG, V, 643, and VI, 149, Philip to Granvelle, 24 Aug. 1559 and 7 Sep. 1560; AGS *Estado* 527/5, Philip to Gonzalo Pérez, undated [Mar. 1565].

17.

BZ 166/92 and 100, rescripts on Hernando de Vega to Philip, 9 and 11 Nov. 1586 (rejoicing); chapter 10 on Fray Diego; AHN *Inq. libro* 284/107 (old fos. 96–7), Quiroga to Philip and rescript, 21 Apr. 1578; BL *Addl.* 28,262/558–9, Antonio Pérez to Philip, and rescript, undated but Oct. 1578.

18.

IVdeDJ 53/3/56 and BZ 144/36, Vázquez to Philip and reply, 13 May and 11 Dec. 1574.

19.

BPU *Ms Favre* 30/73v, Philip to Requesens, 20 Oct. 1573, copy of holograph original; IVdeDJ 37/155, Vázquez to Philip and reply, 22 Jan. 1576; AHN *Inq. libro* 101/325, Philip rescript to a consulta from the Suprema, 11 Jan. 1592.

20.

AHN *Inq. libro* 284/81 [modern fo. 85], and BL *Eg.* 1506/94, Quiroga to Philip and rescripts, 20 Oct. 1577 and 19 Nov. 1578. See chapters 13 and 14 on the role of Quiroga in formulating the king’s policy towards the Dutch.

21.

AGS *Estado* K 1530/53bis, Philip to Don Diego de Zúñiga, his ambassador in Paris, 18 Sep. 1572; Gachard, *La Bibliothèque Nationale à Paris*, II, 395–6, St Gouard to Charles IX, 12 Sep. 1572.

22.

AGS *CC Libros de cédulas* 321/248v–9, 272–5, 284–286v; González Novalín, *Historia de la Iglesia*, III–2, 21, Philip to Pius IV and his ambassador in Rome, 30 Nov. 1562; AGS *PR* 21/133, Philip's Instructions to the count of Luna, his envoy to the council, 26 Oct. 1562, holograph addition, copy.

23.

Fernández Terricabras, *Felipe II*, 105, Philip to the count of Luna.

24.

Novísima Recopilación de las leyes, I.i.13, pragmática of 12 July 1564 for Castile.

25.

Fernández Terricabras, 'Philippe II', 222–3 and 230, Dr Velasco to the vice-chancellor of Aragon, 25 July 1564, and Philip II to all cathedral chapters, 4 Dec. 1564.

26.

Fernández Terricabras, *Felipe II*, 123–31, Philip's instructions to his commissaries; Fernández Collado, 'Felipe II y su mentalidad reformadora', 463, Don Francisco de Toledo (the future viceroy of Peru) to Philip.

27.

AGS *Estado* 897/3, Philip to Cardinal Pacheco, 1 Jan. 1565; Fernández Terricabras, 'La reforma de las Ordenes', 193, Philip to Requesens, May 1569.

28.

Berwick y Alba, *Documentos escogidos*, 284–6, Philip to Granvelle, 10 July 1581, holograph.

29.

Hinojosa, *Felipe II*, 106–7, Ambassador Vargas to Philip, 29 Dec. 1559; Astraín, *Historia*, III, 703–8, Philip to Ambassador Olivares, 9 Dec. 1588.

30.

Philip's letters to Rome in favour of his nominees for benefices in Castile are registered in AHN *Consejos suprimidos: Libros de Iglesia*, 1–4.

31.

AMAE (P), *MDFDE* 237/59, Philip to Olivares, 30 Sep. 1585; Cloulas, 'La monarchie catholique', provides a list of pensioners.

32.

Serrano, II, 515, Requesens to Philip, 10 Dec. 1568; BCR *Ms* 2174/76v–77, Philip to Ambassador Zúñiga, 17 July 1569; and Serrano, I, 444, 'Memorial de los agravios'.

33.

Tellechea Idígoras, *Felipe II y el Papado*, II, 112, Philip to Gregory XIII, 10 Aug. 1580, holograph.

34.

Berwick y Alba, *Documentos escogidos*, 284–6, Philip to Granvelle, 10 July 1581, holograph.

35.

BMO, I, 42, Philip to Alba, 22 Jan. 1570; and 43–7, Alba to Philip, 23 and 24 Feb. 1570.

36.

AA 7/58, Philip to Alba, 14 July 1571, cyphered with decrypt, received in record time on 30 July.

37.

AGS *Estado* 153/68 and BL *Addl.* 28,336/70, Velasco to Zayas and to Espinosa, both on 27 July 1571; AGS *Estado* 153/72, Velasco to Zayas, 1 Aug. 1571; and *idem*, fo. 103, Feria to Zayas, 9 Aug. 1571.

38.

BMO, 1, 57–62, Philip to Alba, 4 Aug. 1571, and reply 27 Aug. 1571.

39.

CCG, XII, 339–41, Philip to Parma, 17 Aug. 1585; AGS *Estado* 165/2–3, Philip to Archduke Albert, 14 Sep. 1587 (message for the marquis of Santa Cruz); Oria, 210–14, Philip to the duke of Medina Sidonia, 1 July 1588.

40.

BZ 145/76, Mateo Vázquez to Philip and reply, 10 Nov. 1588; KML MSP: CR 6/174, Philip to Medina Sidonia, 15 Dec. 1590; IVdeDJ 51/1, Vázquez to Philip and reply, 8 Feb. 1591.

41.

Abad, 'Dos inéditos del siglo XVI', 332 (Bartolomé Torres).

42.

Márquez Villanueva, 'Giovan Giorgio Trission y el soneto de Hernando de Acuña'.

43.

The texts of the Masses by Escobedo and Rogier, and of Infantas's *Quasi stella matutina*, may be found in Sierra, *Música*.

44.

Porreño, *Historia*, 346–7, Don John to Margaret, 26 Oct. 1576.

45.

MHSI, LX: Ribadeneira, II, 492–3, Ruy Gómez to Pedro de Ribadeneira, SJ, 13 Apr. 1559; Fernández Álvarez, *La princesa*, 102–5, based on chap. XVII of Teresa's *Libro de las Fundaciones*.

46.

Rodríguez, *Álava*, 97, Álava to Alba, 17 Mar. 1568; AGRB Audience 1728/2/77, Alba to Count Bossu, 29 Aug. 1572.

47.

BZ 136/19, Pérez to Mateo Vázquez, 13 Nov. 1575 ('Yo me parto hoy ... a mi romería'); IVdeDJ 60/209–10, Pérez to Philip, 1 Jan. 1576; HSA *Altamira*, 1/II/52 (iv), Barajas to Mateo Vázquez, 15 Dec. 1584; TMLM Ms 660, 'Ciertas minutas de principio del año de 1587 sobre cosas de Inglaterra', by Idiáquez.

48.

IVdeDJ 51/31 and HSA *Altamira* 1/I/24, Vázquez to Philip, 31 May 1574 and 13 Aug. 1578.

49.

IVdeDJ 24/38, Ovando to Philip, 16 Jan. 1574, holograph; CCG, X, 331–2, Granvelle to Idiáquez, 21 Aug. 1583.

50.

Campanella, *Monarchie d'Espagne* (original Italian version written 1598–1605), 10–13.

51.

Clausewitz, *On War*, 119, 139.

Chapter Six: The king at play

1.

HSA *Altamira* 5/III/14, Vázquez marginal response, 8 Dec. 1585, to a letter from Juan Fernández de Espinosa.

2.

Ruiz, *A king travels*, 7.

3.

Firpo, *Relazione*, VIII, 438 and 507 (Soranzo and Cavalli).

4.

Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes*, I, 126.

5.

DHME, V, 58–60, from the ‘Diurnal’ of Antonio Gracián.

6.

AGPM CR 2/142v–3, patent for Juan Bautista de Toledo, 12 Aug. 1561 (noting the earlier order of 15 July 1559); Gachard, *La Bibliothèque Nationale à Paris*, II, 170, St Sulpice to Charles IX, 12 June 1564.

7.

IVdeDJ 61/386, Philip to Hoyo, with rescript, undated but Apr. 1565.

8.

IVdeDJ 61/85–6, Philip to Hoyo, Aug. 1565; AGS CSR 247/1 fo. 126, Juan Bautista de Toledo to Hoyo, 13 Aug. 1565, with royal rescript.

9.

AGS CSR 133/83, Philip to the executors of the emperor’s testament, Brussels, 27 July 1559.

10.

AGPM CR 2/99 and 125v–126, Philip to the General of the Jeronimite Order, 16 Apr. and 20 June 1561; AGS CSR 258/265, Jeronimite general to Philip, 1 Jan. 1562 (San Lorenzo de la Victoria became San Lorenzo el Real).

11.

DHME, I, p. 12 (Villacastín, 'Memorias'); BL Addl. 28,350/169, Philip to Hoyo, Sep. 1564.

12.

DHME, III, prints the 1569 'Cédula por la cual Su Majestad altera algunos capítulos de los de la instrucción de los que tiene dada para la obra del monasterio de Sant Lorenzo' and 'Instrucción para el gobierno y prosecución de la fábrica y obra de Sanct Lorenzo'.

13.

CODOIN, VII, 163–4, 'Memorias' of San Gerónimo; DHME, I, 20; Sigüenza, 452.

14.

Wilkinson Zerner, *Juan de Herrera*, 54.

15.

AGS Estado 153/54 and 77, Antonio Gracián and Dr Velasco to Zayas, both on 9 Aug. 1571.

16.

Mulcahy, *Philip II*, 50.

17.

[Eliot,] *Ortho-epia Gallica*, 44–5; Howell, *Epistolae*, section III, 115–17, to Sir T. S., undated but 9 Mar. 1623.

18.

Lhermite, *Passetemps*, II, 86–91, Villacastín to Lhermite, 4 Mar. 1600, followed by Lhermite's calculations.

19.

AGS CC 409/26, Fray Hernando de Ciudad Real to Philip, 9 Nov. 1571, with royal apostils.

20.

CODOIN, VII, 141 (San Gerónimo).

21.

Aguiló Alonso, *Orden y decoro*, 123–202; García Tapia, ‘El Escorial’, 420–1.

22.

CODOIN, VII, 20, observation by Fray Marcos de Cardona; IVdeDJ 61/1, Philip to Hoyo, undated but probably May 1563; BZ 146/69, Philip to Hoyo, undated but May 1567.

23.

AGPM CR 2/254, Philip cédula, 8 Nov. 1562; IVdeDJ 61/7, Philip to Hoyo, 26 Dec. 1561.

24.

Wilkinson Zerner, ‘Construcción de una imagen’, 332.

25.

IVdeDJ 61/105, Philip to Hoyo, 10 Feb. 1566; CODOIN, VII, 157, ‘Memorias’ of San Gerónimo.

26.

IVdeDJ 7/113, Don Luis Osorio to Mateo Vázquez, 13 Dec. 1584, and reply; AGP CR 7/66v, order of 19 Mar. 1588.

27.

Sigüenza, 102; Lhermite, *Passetemps*, I, 82–3.

28.

López Piñero, *Historia de la ciencia*, 91–2, citing Laguna, *Pedacio Dioscorides* (Antwerp, 1555) and Franco, *Libro de enfermedades* (Seville, 1569).

29.

Puerto Sarmiento, ‘Los “destilatorios”’, 434–6, quoting royal cédulas; Sigüenza, 392.

30.

IVdeDJ 61/306, 339 and 360, and BL *Addl.* 28,350/315–26, all undated billetes exchanged between Philip and Hoyo written over the winter of 1562–3.

31.

López Piñero, *Historia de la ciencia*, 47–48 (Ondériz), 289–91 (Zúñiga).

32.

See chapter 5 on the *Biblia regia*; and Marías Franco, 'Felipe II y los artistas' and Ramirez, *Dios arquitecto*, 215–41 and 249–51 on Philip's sponsorship of *In Ezechielem explanationes*.

33.

Royal order printed by van 't Hoff, *Jacob van Deventer*, 36.

34.

BNE Ms. 5589/64, 'Ynterrogatorio'.

35.

Rodríguez, *Álava*, 181, Philip to Don Francés de Álava, 28 May 1567.

36.

Herrera, *Institución de la Academia Real Matemática*, 1, 4 and 19.

37.

IVdeDJ, 61/131, Pedro de Hoyo to Philip, and rescript, undated but 1561; Riba, 207, Philip to Vázquez, 21 June 1579.

38.

Bouza, *Cartas*, 14 n. 27, prints the *Orden* submitted by Mendoza.

39.

Escudero, *Felipe II*, 576, and IVdeDJ 51/172, Philip to Vázquez, 10 Aug. and 21 and 26 May 1578.

40.

NA SP 94/1/19, Zayas to Antonio de Guaras, 7 Oct. 1577; IVdeDJ 55/IX/155, Philip to Vázquez, 8 Nov. 1586.

41.

Lhermite, *Passetemps*, II, 173–8.

42.

BL Addl. 28, 699/114, Vázquez to Philip, with rescript, 2 May 1577.

43.

FCDM AH R7–5, Philip to Feria, 18 Feb. 1558; PEG, V, 491, Philip to Granvelle and Ruy Gómez, Brussels, 19 Feb. 1559.

44.

IVdeDJ 53/5/140 and 53/6/39, Vázquez to Philip, with rescripts, 14 July 1576 and 13 July 1577.

45.

CODOIN, VII, 385; Martínez Hernández, *El marqués de Velada*, 334–6; Bouza, *Cartas*, 91, Philip to his daughters, 17 Sep. 1582, and note 196.

46.

IVdeDJ 51/189, Vázquez to Philip, 20 Apr. 1586, and reply; Bouza, *Cartas*, 181, Philip to Catalina, 10 June 1591.

47.

Bouza, *Cartas*, 51, 61 and 113, Philip to his daughters, 10 July and 23 Oct. 1581, and Easter 1584.

48.

Riba, 179, Philip to Vázquez, undated but 1578; IVdeDJ 55/XI/121–2 Vázquez to Philip and reply, 27 July 1588.

49.

AGS *Estado* 946/141a, Philip to the count of Olivares, ambassador in Rome, 31 Mar. 1585.

50.

DHME, V, 27; IVdeDJ 55/IX/93, Philip to Vázquez, 8 Dec. 1586; Bouza, *Cartas*, 85, Philip to his daughters, 1583.

51.

Bustamante García, ‘La arquitectura de Felipe II’, 492.

52.

Kamen, *Philip*, 55, 90, 222.

53.

Smith, *The life*, 19 (funeral oration for Magdalen, Viscountess Montague, née Dacre, by her confessor, to whom she had confided these details). Since Magdalen married in 1556, this incident took place in 1554–5. The ‘lewdnes’ may have been worse. The Latin original reads “vbi faciem suam forte ipsa lauabat”: *facies* can mean either ‘face’ or ‘body’: Smith, *Vita*, 38–9.

54.

Firpo, *Relazioni*, VIII, 438–9, Soranzo, Jan. 1565, repeated in William

of Orange's *Apology*: Duke, 'William of Orange', 29; Gachard, *Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris*, II, 177, St Sulpice to Charles IX, 7 Oct. 1564. Ruy Gómez may have been speaking of Isabel Osorio.

55.

Belda, 'Carta', 474–5, Zúñiga to Philip, 3 Dec. 1578. Zúñiga, son of Philip's stern governor with the same name, attended the king in the Netherlands and Spain until he went to Rome in 1567.

56.

Valente, *Un dramma*, 7–8, Cavaliere Bondi to Cardinal Farnese, 8 Feb. 1586.

57.

BL 192.f.17 (i), Lord Burghley's annotated copy of *Relación de la Felicísima Armada*; Yale University, Beinecke Library, *Osborn Shelves*, fo. 20, [João de Teixiera], 'The Anatomie of Spayne', 65: see *FBD*, 969–70, on the Portuguese original of this translation, written in 1598.

Chapter Seven: Getting a grip, 1558–1561

1.

AGS *Estado* 128/378, Philip to Juan Vázquez de Molina, 9 Dec, 1558, holograph postscript; FCDM *AH* R7-19, Philip to Feria, 25 Nov. 1558, holograph; Fernández Álvarez, *Tres embajadores*, 215–19, same to same, 28 Dec. 1558.

2.

CODOIN, LXXXVII, 80–5, Feria to Philip, 21 Nov. 1558 (Feria encoded much of this letter).

3.

NA *SP* 70/1, fo. 23, Elizabeth to Cobham, 23 Nov. 1558.

4.

FCDM *AH*, R7–19, Philip to Feria, 25 Nov 1558, holograph; *CODOIN*, LXXXVII, 83 and 93, Feria to Philip, 21 Nov. and 14 Dec. 1558.

5.

Fernández Álvarez, *Tres embajadores*, 215–19, Philip to Feria, 28 Dec. 1558; Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 133/188, Philip to Elizabeth, 27 Dec. 1558, holograph

6.

See, for example, NA *SP* 70/2 fo. 49, Philip to Elizabeth, 20 Jan. 1559.

7.

CODOIN, LXXXVII, 111, Feria to Philip, 29 Dec. 1558.

8.

González, 'Apuntamientos', 157–9, Philip to Feria, 10 Jan. 1559.

9.

FCDM *AH* R7–1 and 21, Philip to Feria, 10 and 28 Jan. 1559, both holograph.

10.

CODOIN, LXXXVII, 133–4, 'Puntos' by Feria for Philip.

11.

Ibid., 141, Philip to Feria, 23 Mar. 1559.

12.

Brunelli, *Emanuele Filiberto*, 101–3, report of a resolution by Philip's council on 26 Oct. 1558 – three weeks before Mary died.

13.

PEG, V, 585–7, Granvelle to Feria, 3 Apr. 1559.

14.

FCDM *AH* R7–23, Philip to Feria, 21 Mar. 1559, holograph.

15.

Tellechea Idígoras, *El Papado y Felipe II*, I, 85–6, Paul IV to Philip, 6 May 1559.

16.

FCDM *AH* R7–22, Philip to Feria, 11 Feb. 1559, holograph; *PEG*, V, 606, Philip to Granvelle, 24 June 1559.

17.

BR *Ms* II-2320/124, Granvelle to Juan Vázquez de Molina, 21 July 1559; NA *SP* 70/6/32v–33, Challoner to Elizabeth, 3 Aug. 1559, holograph.

18.

AGS *Estado* 137/227, Juana to Philip, 14 July 1559, decoded with the king's holograph comments.

19.

AGS *PR* 26/169–70, Philip's Instruction to Ruy Gómez and Dr Velasco and letter to Juana, both 23 July 1559.

20.

GRM, I, 444–6, Quijada to Philip, 28 Nov. 1558.

21.

PEG, V, 628–30, Philip to Granvelle, [29] July 1559.

22.

Ibid., 643, Philip to Granvelle, 24 Aug. 1559.

23.

TR, IV, 318–23, Valdés to Philip, 14 May 1558.

24.

Ibid., 434–6, Philip to Valdés and the Suprema, and GRM, I, 302 n. 1, Philip to Juana, both 'del Campo', 6 Sep. 1558.

25.

González Novalín, *Inquisidor General*, II, 214–21, Valdés to Paul IV, 9 Sep. 1558, together with the 'Relación'.

26.

AGS *PR* 29/33, Testament of Philip, London, 2 July 1557, naming 'la persona que yo oviere proveído por arzobispo de Toledo' to take over 'la administración y gobierno general' of Spain and 'regir y gobernar la persona del dicho príncipe' Don Carlos.

27.

TR, IV, 589–90, Philip to Juana, undated but Nov. 1558, copy.

28.

Ibid., 687–91, Fray Hernando de San Ambrosio to Carranza, Brussels, 5 Apr. 1559; *DH*, V, 183, Philip to Carranza, Brussels, 4 Apr. 1559.

29.

TR, IV, 680–3, Carranza to Philip, holograph draft, undated (but written shortly before his letter to the king dated 5 Apr. 1559, *ibid.*,

692–4).

30.

Ibid., 600–1, Paul IV to Valdés, 7 Jan. 1559; and 763–5, Suprema to Philip, 16 May 1559.

31.

Ibid., 831–2, Philip to the Suprema, 26 June 1559.

32.

Ibid., 889, Juana to Carranza, 3 Aug. 1559. For the arrest, with its undertones of *Monty Python*'s 'No one expects the Spanish Inquisition', see *DH*, II, 327–32 and *TR*, IV, 196–9.

33.

TR, IV, 696–7, 'Mandamiento' of Valdés to the university of Alcalá, 11 Apr. 1559.

34.

Serrano y Sanz, *Autobiografías*, 157, account by Diego de Simancas; Cabrera de Córdoba, *Historia*, I, 202.

35.

TR, IV, 969–72, Pragmática of 22 Nov. 1559.

36.

Ibid., 953–4 and 995–6, Feria to Bishop Quadra (his successor as Spanish ambassador in England), Mechelen, 4 Oct. 1559 and 21 Jan. 1560.

37.

DH, II, 358, Carranza's accusations against Valdés, 4 Sep. 1559.

38.

DH, V, 336–8, Carranza's response to new charges by Fiscal, 8 Jan. 1563.

39.

RAH *Proceso Carranza* 9/1804, fo. 83v, Philip's testimony on 12 Jan. 1560.

40.

DH, III, 404–5, Philip's testimony, 13 Oct. 1562.

41.

Tellechea Idígoras, *Felipe II y el Papado*, II, 44–5, 48 and 80, Philip to Gregory XIII, undated, but spring 1574 (holograph), 21 July 1574, holograph, and 11 June 1576.

42.

Cabrera de Córdoba, *Historia*, I, 204; *GRM*, II, 465–9, Juana to Charles, 8 Aug. 1558.

43.

GRM, I, 449–50, Quijada to Felipe, 13 Dec. 1558; *AGS Estado* 128/28, Philip to Quijada, undated minute apparently dictated to, and amended by, Francisco de Eraso. Italics added.

44.

Gachard, *Don Juan*, 51–2.

45.

Fernández y Fernandez de Retana, *España*, I, 602; Alvar Ezquerra, *Felipe II, la corte y Madrid*, 12, quoting Horozco.

46.

PEG, V, 673, Philip to Granvelle, 27 Dec. 1559; Alvar Ezquerra, *Felipe II, la corte y Madrid*, 19, royal cédula of 8 May 1561.

47.

AGPM CR 1/242 and 2/36–38v, royal cédulas of 14 Feb. 1556 and 22 June 1557; and 2/52v–55, Philip to Gaspar de Vega, 15 Feb. 1559; Gérard, *De castillo a palacio*, 12 and 73.

48.

CODOIN, XCVIII, 53–4, ‘Las condiciones con que verná Su Majestad en la tregua’, 5 Mar. 1559; *ibid.*, 57–9, Philip to count of Luna, his ambassador at the Imperial court, undated (but Apr. 1559); *AGS Estado* 1210/91, Philip to the governor of Milan, 8 Apr. 1559; and *AGS Estado* 1124/278–302, Instructions of Philip to his ministers in Italy, 15 June 1559.

49.

BNE Ms 5938/440–441v, ‘Divisa’ by Gabriel Rincón; Mameranus, *Carmen Gratulatorium*, an item still in the Escorial library.

50.

AGS Estado 1124/257, Don Bernat de Guimaran to Philip, 21 July

1559.

51.

BR Ms II-2319/16, Pérez to Granvelle, 6 June 1560.

52.

Paris, *Négociations*, 555, Laubespine to Catherine de Medici, 26 Sep. 1560.

53.

CMPG, II, lxii–lxiii, Philip to Margaret of Parma, 15 July 1562.

54.

AGRB *Audience* 475/84, Josse de Courtewille, in Madrid, to Viglius, in Brussels, 24 May 1563.

55.

BMB Ms *Granvelle* 8/189, Pérez to Granvelle, 19 Feb. 1564.

56.

IVdeDJ 61/1, Hoyo to Philip, undated (but probably May 1562).

Chapter Eight: ‘I would rather lose a hundred thousand lives if I had them’: keeping the faith, 1562–1567

1.

PEG, V, 674, Philip to Granvelle, 27 Dec. 1559; BR Ms II-2249, unfol., Gonzalo Pérez to Granvelle, 19 Nov. 1560; PEG, VI, 166, Granvelle to Philip, 12 Sep. 1560.

2.

Japikse, *Correspondentie*, I, 143–4, Egmont to Orange, 1 July 1559.

3.

Tellechea Idígoras, *Felipe II y el Papado*, I, 44, Philip to Paul IV, Brussels, 24 Apr. 1559, holograph.

4.

[Strada], *Supplément*, II, 267–8, Hornes to Eraso, 19 Dec. 1561. AGRB *Audience* 478/3, Philip to Hornes, 9 Feb. 1562, mentioned this letter, which proves that Eraso had shown it to him.

5.

AGRB *Audience* 475/84, Josse de Courtewille to Viglius, Madrid, 24 May 1563; BNF *Ms f.f.*, 15,587/3–7, Memorial of Limoges, citing the analysis of François Baudouin, 1563.

6.

CODOIN, IV, 307, Philip to Margaret, 23 Apr. 1564.

7.

AGRB *Audience* 779/30, minutes of the council of State, Brussels, 24 Mar. 1564.

8.

CCG, I, 27, Secretary Bave to Granvelle, 4 Dec. 1565.

9.

AGRB *Audience* 779/120, minutes of council of State, Brussels, 26 Jan. 1565, reporting news from Venice dated 14 Dec. 1565 that included ‘nouvelles venues de Constantinople du 3e de decembre passé’.

10.

CMPT, II, 51–3, Memorial of Egmont to Philip, and AGS *Estado* 527/5, Philip to Pérez, both 24 Mar. 1565.

11.

AGS *Estado* 527/5, exchanges between Philip and Pérez, 24–25 Mar. 1565.

12.

AGS *Estado* 527/4, ‘Instrucción al conde de Egmont’, 2 Apr. 1565.

13.

PEG, IX, 275, Granvelle to Polweiler, 12 June 1565; GCP, I, 349, Egmont to Philip, 9 Apr. 1565.

14.

GPGP, II, 474, and AGS *Estado* 146/147, Pérez to Philip and reply 4 and [10] Apr. 1565.

15.

Wauters, *Mémoires*, 268, account by Hopperus of Egmont’s report to the council of State, 5 May 1565.

16.

CMPT, I, 59, Margaret to Philip, 22 July 1565; *Cahier van der Essen* X/19, Armenteros to Pérez, 10 Oct. 1565.

17.

GPGP, II, 536, Pérez to Philip, 3 Sep. 1565, with rescript.

18.

Rodríguez-Salgado, 'Amor, menosprecio y motines', 218, Guzmán de Silva to Ruy Gómez, 24 Nov. 1565.

19.

CMPT, II, 258, Margaret to Philip, 19 July 1566.

20.

UB Leiden *Hs Pap* 3/2, Alonso de Laloo to count of Hornes, Segovia, 3 Aug. 1566.

21.

CMPT, II, 269–74, Philip to Margaret, 31 July 1566; AGS *Estado* 531/52–3, 'Registro de la scriptura que Su Magestad otorgó en el Bosque de Segouia a 9 de agosto 1566'; Serrano, I, 316–17, Philip to don Luis de Requesens, his ambassador in Rome, 12 Aug. 1566; CMPT, II, 313–15, Philip to Margaret, 9 Aug. 1566.

22.

Gilles de Pélichy, 'Contribution', 105–6, Egmont to Philip, 29 Aug. 1566; AGS *Estado* 530, unfol., Margaret to Philip, 27 Aug. 1566 (précis in GCP, I, 452–4); and CMPT, II, 326–32, same to same, 27 and 29 Aug. 1566.

23.

UB Leiden *Hs Pap* 3/4, Alonso de Laloo to count of Hornes, Segovia, 20 and 26 Sep. 1566.

24.

IANTT TSO: CG, livro 210/14–14v, Pereira to King Sebastian, 23 Sep. 1566; *Cahier van der Essen* XXXIV/18–19, Miguel de Mendivil to Margaret of Parma, 22 Sep. 1566.

25.

Cabrera de Córdoba, *Historia*, I, 358–63, and Osorio, *Vida y hazañas*, 331–42, describe the crucial debate on 22 Oct. 1566.

26.

La Roca, *Resultas*, 85–7.

27.

HSA Ms B 2010, Alba to 'Vuestra Señoría Ilustrísima' (Espinosa), 'Aranjuez, miércoles a las 8 de la noche' [= 16 Apr. 1567], holograph.

28.

All quotations that follow from AA 5/59, Philip to Alba, Madrid, 7 Aug. 1567, holograph original with the passages coded by Philip transcribed *en clair* by Alba's secretary – the only reason we now know the king's plans.

29.

Berwick y Alba, *Documentos escogidos*, 81, Alba to the bishop of Orihuela, 18 Sep. 1567, minute; *Epistolario*, I, 694, Alba to Philip, 24 Oct. 1567.

30.

Epistolario, I, 694, holograph royal apostil on Alba to Philip, 24 Oct. 1567; Serrano, II, 204, Philip to Pius V, 22 Sep. 1567.

31.

ADE, VII, 235–7, 'Parecer' of Alba, 11 Apr. 1565.

32.

AGS *Estado libro* 16/213–16, 'Coniuración del Marqués del Valle'; AGI *Justicia* 997, no. 4, r. 3, investigation of Don Gonzalo de Zúñiga, Madrid, 12 Sep. 1562; AGI *Patronato* 29 r. 13, 'Relación muy verdadera de todo lo sucedido', and r. 18, Juan de Vargas Zapata to Diego de Vargas, Puerto Rico, 1 Aug. 1562; *CODOIN América*, IV, 191–282, 'Relaciones' of the Aguirre rebellion.

33.

IANTT TSO: CG, livro 210/51v–53, Pereira to King Sebastian, 23 Mar. 1567; Douais, I, 204, Fourquevaux to Charles IX, 15 Apr. 1567.

34.

AGI *Patronato* 208, r. 4, Philip's Instrucción to his commissioners, copy, May 1567; AGS *Cámara de Castilla*, *Diversos* 6/50, 'Las personas que están pressos en la cárcel real' (s. f., but 1569); Flint, 'Treason or travesty', 42–4.

35.

CODOIN, CI, 357–8, Philip to Luis Vanegas de Figueroa, his special envoy to the emperor, 28 Jan. 1568, minute.

Chapter Nine: Family life – and death

1.

HHStA *Spanien Hofkorrespondenz*, Karton 1, Mappe 3/161 and 4/27 and 129, and Kamen, *Philip*, 62, Philip to Maximilian, 12 June 1550, 25 Sep. 1551, 24 Apr. and 17 July 1555.

2.

CODOIN, CIII, 251 and 257, Philip to Luis Vanegas and Baron Chantonmay, 31 July 1569, and to Vanegas, 2 Aug. 1569.

3.

CODOIN, XXVI, 563–4, Vanegas to Philip, 30 Sep. 1567; *CODOIN*, CX, 78, Philip to Monteagudo, 29 Sep. 1570.

4.

Galende Díaz and Salamanca López, *Epistolario*, 246–7 and 263–5, María to Philip, 3 Sep. and 29 Nov. 1573. Maria referred to her brother as ‘Your Highness’ because the children of Charles V always reserved ‘His Majesty’ for their father.

5.

CDCV, IV, 40, Charles to Philip, 30 Apr. 1554.

6.

DH, III, 407–8, sworn deposition of Juana, 26 Oct. 1562.

7.

IANTT *TSO*: CG 210/136–8, Pereira to Sebastian, Juana’s son, 19 and 21 Jan. 1568; González de Amezúa, *Isabel*, III, 412, Juana to Catherine de Medici, 2 May 1569.

8.

BL *Addl.* 28,354/542, Philip to Ladrada, 20 Dec. 1572; *CODOIN*, VII, 89, account of Fray Juan de San Jerónimo.

9.

González de Amezúa, *Isabel*, I, 229–37 and III, 515–20, describe the queen’s various entertainments.

10.

Paris, *Négociations*, 807–8, Mme de Vineux to Catherine de Medici, 31 Jan. 1562; Firpo, *Relazioni*, VIII, 396, ‘Final Relation’ of Paolo Tiepolo, 19 Jan. 1563.

11.

Rodríguez Salgado, “Una perfecta princesa”, II, 85, quoting Pereira to Sebastian, 21 June and 7 Aug. 1563. Pereira’s source was impeccable: his nephew Ruy Gómez.

12.

González de Amezúa, *Isabel*, III, 231–3, St Sulpice to Catherine, Monzón, 25 Nov. 1563.

13.

AGS PR 30/28, Isabel’s holograph testament, dated 27 June 1566.

14.

Douais, I, 6, Fourquevaux to Catherine, 3 Nov. 1565; González de Amezúa, *Isabel*, II, 346 n. 31, Fourquevaux to Charles IX, 26 Aug. 1566.

15.

Douais, I, 51, Fourquevaux to Catherine, 4 Feb. 1566.

16.

Cabié, *Ambassade*, 432–3, ‘Notes diverses’, Sep.–Oct. 1566; Douais, I, 110–12 and 117–18, Fourquevaux to Catherine, 18 and 26 Aug. 1566.

17.

González de Amezúa, *Isabel*, III, 378–90, descriptions of the queen’s illness and death.

18.

Ibid., II, 533 n., Philip to Catherine, 28 June 1569.

19.

Tellechea Idígoras, *El Papado y Felipe II*, I, 199–202, Pius V to Philip, 20 Dec. 1568, holograph.

20.

AA 7/75, Philip to Alba, 14 Apr. 1569, holograph.

21.

Berwick y Alba, *Documentos escogidos*, 99–103, Don Diego de Córdoba to Alba, 1 Feb. 1571; *CODOIN*, XLI, 245, Zayas to Arias Montano, 21 Apr. 1571; *BL Addl.* 28,354/230, 240 and 294, Philip to Ladrada, 10 June, 12 July and 24 Nov. 1571; AA 44/84, Dr Milio to Juan de Albornoz, Madrid, 4 Dec. 1571.

22.

AGPM 3/360v–361, royal cédulas dated 12 July 1572.

23.

Firpo, *Relazioni*, VIII, 721, ‘Final Relation’ of Alberto Badoero, late 1578.

24.

BL Addl. 28,354/422, Philip to Ladrada, 10 July 1572. None of these letters has survived: we only know of them through the references in the king’s correspondence with Ladrada.

25.

BL Addl. 28,354/314, 476 and 542, Philip to Ladrada, 17 Dec. 1571, 26 Sep. 1572 and 20 Dec. 1572.

26.

BL Addl. 28,354/490 and 492, Philip to Ladrada, 2 and 4 Oct. 1572.

27.

BL Addl. 28,354/25–6, Espinosa to Ladrada, 11 Apr. 1570; and 394–5, Philip to Ladrada, 17 May 1572; *BL Addl.* 28,342/322, Philip to Fray Buenaventura de Santibañez, chaplain of the infantas, 27 May 1581.

28.

IVdeDJ 51/170 and 21/576, Mateo Vázquez to Philip and rescript, 20 and 21 July 1575.

29.

El oro y la plata, 663, Philip to Francisco de Garnica, undated but 1575.

30.

IVdeDJ 22D No.30, Don Pedro Niño to Mateo Vázquez, 11 Oct. 1577.

31.

Bouza, *Cartas*, 88, Philip to the Infantas, 30 July 1582. By contrast,

after Catalina's departure in 1585 the king preserved all her holograph letters to him: they are today in BL *Addl.* 28,419.

32.

Bouza, *Cartas*, 77 and 85, Philip to the Infantas, 19 Mar. and 4 June 1582.

33.

Ibid., 116–17, Philip to Catalina, 18 June 1585. Cock, *Relación del viaje*, 145, notes that Catalina had cried her eyes out as she said farewell to her father a few days earlier.

34.

Bouza, *Cartas*, 120–1 and 157, Philip to Catalina, 17 July 1585 and 14 June 1588.

35.

Ibid., 99 and 109, Philip to the Infantas, 25 Oct. 1582 and 26 Oct. 1583.

36.

Ibid., 75 and 40–1, Philip to the Infantas, 5 Mar. 1582 and 1 May 1581.

37.

Ibid., 64 and 94, Philip to the Infantas, 20 Nov. and 25 Dec. 1581 and 1 Oct. 1582.

38.

Grierson, *King of two worlds*, 166, Philip to Granvelle.

39.

Khevenhüller, *Diario*, 286; *CODOIN*, VII, 364, 367 and 370; Sigüenza, 100–1.

40.

Bouza, *Cartas*, 68, 71 and 81–2, letter to the Infantas, 29 Jan., 19 Feb. and 7 May 1582. Philip certainly had an excellent memory for dates: he said farewell to his sister in 1548, when he left Spain, and saw her again briefly only in 1551 in Zaragoza and in 1556 in Brussels.

41.

Khevenhüller, *Diario*, 286–7.

42.

Tormo y Monzó, *En las Descalzas Reales*, 186–7, Margarita to Philip, undated.

43.

Khevenhüller, *Diario*, 287; Tormo y Monzó, *En las Descalzas Reales*, I, 187–90.

44.

Khevenhüller, *Diario*, 287–8. Charles V had also feared that marrying a teenage bride might kill Philip: chapter 1.

45.

Khevenhüller, *Diario*, 271.

46.

Tellechea Idígoras, ‘La mesa’ (2002), 186–7 and 201–2, ‘Serva Tadea’ to Philip, Rome, 8 Dec. 1560.

47.

BMO, II, 378, Philip to Parma, 19 Oct. 1586.

48.

MacKay, *The baker*, 154, Ana de Austria to Philip, Nov. 1594.

49.

Gachard, *Don Juan*, 192–3, Granvelle to Margaret of Parma, 13 Oct. 1579.

50.

AGS CSR 133/108 (total debts), 129 (cédula of July 1559) and 113, ‘consulta de descargos’ and rescript, 11 Feb. 1579.

51.

AGS DGT Inv. 24 903 No. 1, Inventory of the goods of Don Carlos, 9 Feb. 1568, audited on 6 Sep. 1586; CODOIN, XXVIII, 567–9, cédula to Diego de Olarte, 2 Apr. 1577.

Chapter Ten: The enigma of Don Carlos

1.

NA SP 70/101/10, Dr Man to William Cecil, San Sebastián, 6 Aug. 1568, italics added.

2.

Duke, 'William of Orange', 28; Anon., *Diogenes*, first published at Liège. Lieder, *The Don Carlos theme*, lists the different accounts of the prince's fate down to 1930. Schiller's *Don Karlos* may even have inspired the 'plot' of George Lucas's 1977 film *Star Wars*: see High, *Who is this Schiller now?*, 13–14.

3.

IANTT TSO: CG 210/136–7, Pereira to Sebastian, 19 Jan. 1568 ('ffoy ouvir missa a capella, e o principe con ele').

4.

My account of the arrest draws on four sources, the first two related to Ruy Gómez: IANTT TSO: CG 210/136–7, Pereira to Sebastian, 19 Jan. 1568; Gachard, *Don Carlos*, 689–90, 'Avviso d'un Italiano plático y familiar de Ruy Gómez'; *ibid.*, 674–8, Nobili to Duke Cosimo, 25 Jan. 1568, and *ibid.*, 684–7, 'Relación histórica' by a gentleman of the prince's household.

5.

IANTT TSO: CG 210/136–7 and 148v–150, Pereira to Sebastian, 19 Jan. 1568 and 11 Feb. 1568; Gachard, *Don Carlos*, 395, Charles de Tisnacq to Viglius, 31 Jan. 1568; Douais, I, 314, Fourquevaux to Charles IX, 22 Jan. 1568.

6.

Gachard, *Don Carlos*, 677, Nobili to Duke Cosimo de Medici, 25 Jan. 1568; IANTT TSO: CG 210/137–8, Pereira to Sebastian, 21 Jan. 1568.

7.

ASMa AG 583/164, Philip to duke of Mantua, 22 Jan. 1568; Douais, I, 318, Fourquevaux to Catherine de Medici, 22 Jan. 1568.

8.

AGS *Estado libro* 16/191, Philip to Queen Catherine, 20 Jan. 1568, copy by Juan de Verzosa (slightly different copy in IANTT *Miscelaneas Manuscritas*, 964/187–8). Cabrera de Córdoba, *Historia*, I, 409–10, printed the letter but asserted incorrectly that it was addressed to María and Maximilian and dated 21 Jan. 1568.

9.

Koch, *Quellen*, Dietrichstein to Maximilian, 7 Feb. 1568; ASF MP 4898/226v–228, Nobili to Duke Cosimo, 13 Apr. 1568.

10.

IANTT TSO: CG 210/146–50, Pereira to Catherine, 7 Feb. 1568 and to Sebastian, 16 Feb. 1568.

11.

AGS *Estado* 150/11–12, Philip to María, heavily corrected minute and fair copy, [19] May 1568.

12.

Rodríguez Ramos, 'Los comienzos', and personal communications from Dr Rodríguez Ramos.

13.

AGS PR 29/35, Codicil signed by Philip, Ghent, 5 Aug. 1559.

14.

CODOIN, XXVII, 207–10, Felipe to the corregidor of Gibraltar, 13 Sep. 1561, and reply.

15.

BAV VL 7,008/351 'Proceso de la beatificación y canonización de San Diego de Alcalá', testimony of Dr Diego López. I thank Andrew Villalon for this reference and for the translation.

16.

Gachard, *Don Carlos*, 110, Paolo Tiepolo to Doge of Venice, Madrid, 20 June 1562; CODOIN, XVIII, 557.

17.

HSA *Altamira* 13/1/10, Philip to Don García de Toledo, undated but summer 1563.

18.

Strohmayer, *Korrespondenz*, I, 203 and 231, Dietrichstein to Maximilian, 22 Apr. and 29 June 1564.

19.

Pérez Mínguez, *Psicología de Felipe II*, 106, quoting Philip to Alba, undated; Gachard, *Don Carlos*, 229 n. 1, Philip to Chantonnay, his ambassador in Vienna, 12 Sep. 1564.

20.

Douais, I, 321, Fourquevaux to Charles IX, Madrid, 5 Feb. 1568,

reporting a conversation with Ruy Gómez on 27 Jan.

21.

Firpo, *Relazioni*, VIII, 443–5; Álvarez de Toledo, *Alonso Pérez*, II, 279, Prior Don Antonio to Don García de Toledo, ‘early 1566’; Douais, I, 200, Fourquevaux to Charles IX, Madrid, 15 Apr. 1567.

22.

Douais, I, 220, Mémoire dated 30 June 1567; AGS *Estado* 657/39–40, 51 and 64, Chantonay to Philip, 17 Apr. 67 (received in Madrid 16 May); 9 July 1567 (endorsed by the king on 4 Aug.); and 30 Aug. 1567 (received 10 Nov. and endorsed by Pérez ‘to be seen while His Highness is present’) – the latest example I have found.

23.

BL *Addl.* 28,262/329, Pérez to Philip, undated, but spring 1567; *Cahier van der Essen* XXVI, fos. 20–21, Margaret of Parma to Don Carlos, 20 Apr. and 6 July 1567; AGS CC 387/2, Josse de Courtewille to Don Carlos, 16 June 1567.

24.

Gachard, *Don Carlos*, 672–3, Cavalli to the Doge of Venice, 11 Feb. 1568.

25.

Douais, I, 165–6, Fourquevaux to Charles IX, 4 Jan. 1567.

26.

AGS *DGT Inv* 24, leg. 903 No. 1, Inventory of 9 Feb. 1568; Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, ‘Lectura y bibliofilia’ (Morisot), and a personal communication dated 26 Mar. 2009 on *Theuerdank*. On the artefacts, see Cervera Vera, ‘Juan de Herrera’.

27.

CODOIN, XXVII, 138, testimony of Juan de Espinosa, who ‘was present and saw this happen’, as part of an audit of Lobón’s accounts in 1583.

28.

Douais, I, 257, Fourquevaux to Catherine de Medici, 24 Aug. 1567; van der Hammen, *Don Juan*, fos. 39–40, writing in 1627 (partly published in Gachard, *Don Carlos*, 321–2 and 335–6).

29.

CODOIN, XXVII, 82, 'Cuentas fenescidas'; AGS *DGT Inv.* 24, leg 903 No. 1, 'Cuentas con Antonio Fúcar'.

30.

Gachard, *Don Carlos*, 676–7, Nobili to Duke Cosimo, 25 Jan. 1568; ASMa AG 594, unfol., Roberti to duke of Mantua, 13 Apr. 1568.

31.

Gachard, *Don Carlos*, 684–6, 'Relación histórica'; van der Hammen, *Don Juan*, 40; ASMa AG 594, unfol., Roberti to duke of Mantua, 3 Mar. 1568, decoded folio.

32.

Douais, I, 322, Fourquevaux to Charles IX, 5 Feb. 1568; IANTT TSO: CG 210/137–8, Pereira to Sebastian, 21 Jan. 1568.

33.

All the letters in AGS CC 387 were written in 1567 except for one from Miguel López de Legazpi, which began 'I left New Spain at the end of the year 1564'. The presence of the same unctuous phrases in this letter, written from Cebu in the Philippines, proves that they were already in vogue before he left.

34.

In a brilliant piece of historical detection, Martínez Hernández, *El marqués de Velada*, 75–99, reconstructs the membership, interests and influence of the 'Academy'.

35.

Serrano, II, 299, Castagna to Alejandrino, 4 Feb. 1568, cyphered; Gachard, *Don Carlos*, 366, quoting a letter from Fourquevaux dated 8 Feb. 1568.

36.

Herrera y Tordesillas, *Historia general*, 681 (book I, xv. 2).

37.

Gachard, *Don Carlos*, 387, Philip to Alba, 6 Apr. 1568, holograph.

38.

IANTT TSO: CG 210/155v–156v, Pereira to Catherine, 25 Feb. 1568.

39.

MHSI Borgia, IV, 649, Lerma to Francisco de Borja, 1 Oct. 1568.

40.

Fernández Álvarez, *Felipe II*, 423, Philip to the university of Salamanca, 27 July 1568.

41.

Douais, I, 371, Fourquevaux to Charles IX, 26 July 1568; *MHSI Borgia*, IV, 649, Lerma to Borja, 1 Oct. 1568; Berwick y Alba, *Documentos escogidos*, 412, Dr Milio to Alba, 16 Aug. 1568; *CODOIN*, XCVII, 460, Zúñiga to Don Rodrigo Manuel, 28 Apr. 1568. The last three letters were all private, written to confidants, which makes them more reliable.

42.

González de Amezúa, *Isabel*, III, 54, Isabel to Fourquevaux, [19] Jan 1568; Douais, I, 319, Fourquevaux to Catherine de Medici, 22 Jan. 1568.

Chapter Eleven: Years of crusade, 1568–1572

1.

IVdeDJ 38/70, Espinosa to Philip, with rescript, undated but Nov. 1569.

2.

BL *Addl.* 28,704/270v, Espinosa to Alba, 4 Dec. 1571, register copy; AA 44/84, Dr Milio to Juan de Albornoz, Alba's secretary, Madrid, 4 Dec. 1571.

3.

CODOIN, XXXVII, 84, and *CODOIN*, IV, 497–506, Alba to Philip, 6 Jan. and 9 June 1568. Unless otherwise stated, all quotations in the next two paragraphs come from the second document.

4.

CODOIN, IV, 506–13, Alba to Felipe, 23 Nov. 1568.

5.

AA 6/75, Philip to Alba, 14 Apr. 1569.

6.

CODOIN, IV, 521–5, Philip to Alba, Córdoba, 4 Apr. 1570, minute, corrected by the king.

7.

Ibid., 533–8, Alba to Philip, Brussels, 18 Mar. 1570, with death sentence dated 4 Apr.

8.

Gachard, *Etudes*, 85.

9.

CODOIN, IV, 560–6 and 539–40, Philip to Alba, 3 Nov. 1570, and to Peralta, 17 Aug. 1570.

10.

The account in this and the following paragraph rests upon *CODOIN*, IV, 542–9, Instruction of Dr Velasco to Alcalde Arellano, 1 Oct. 1570; *idem*, 550–1 and 559–60, Peralta to Philip, Simancas, 10 and 17 Aug. 1570; *idem*, 554–9, Fray Hernando del Castillo to Dr Velasco, 16 Oct. 1570; and *idem*, 560–6, ‘Relación de la muerte de Montigni’ drawn up by Philip for Alba 2 Nov. 1570 and his covering letter dated 3 Nov.

11.

AGS *Estado* 542/88, holograph memorial written by Montigny, Simancas, 15 Oct. 1570; Gachard, ‘Floris de Montmorency’, 61–2; *CODOIN*, IV, 565–6, Philip to Alba, 3 Nov. 1570.

12.

Ramos, ‘La crisis indiana’, 11, quoting Dr Francisco Hernández de Liébana.

13.

Ibid., 8–9, opinion of Fresneda, and 25, Toledo’s summary of the junta’s discussions, Nov. 1568.

14.

Ibid., 52–3, quoting Toledo; AGNM CRD 1bis/20, registered the fifty or so royal cédulas issued between 30 Nov. 1568 and 11 Sep. 1569. Abril Castelló and Abril Stoffels, *Francisco de la Cruz*, II, 130–94, print the full text of the recommendations sent by the Junta Magna to Philip. See also Brendecke, *Imperium*, chap. 7 on the Junta’s goals and achievements.

15.

Martínez Millán and Carlos Morales, *Felipe II*, 119, quoting the royal cédula of 18 Nov. 1566. Fuchs, *Exotic nation*, 23, lists the prohibited

practices.

16.

IVdeDJ 38/70, Espinosa to Philip and rescript, undated but Apr. 1569.

17.

BL Addl. 28,354/45–6, Martín de Gaztelu to marquis of Ladrada, Córdoba, 26 May 1570. Édouard, *L'empire imaginaire*, 140, describes the royal entry into Córdoba on 22 Feb. 1570.

18.

Domínguez Ortiz and Vincent, *Historia*, 51, Instruction to Alonso de Carvajal, commissioner of Baza; Alcalá-Zamora, 'El problema', 342.

19.

Adams 'The genetic legacy', 732.

20.

Serrano, III, 251, Don Juan de Zúñiga to Philip, 7 Mar. 1570.

21.

IVdeDJ 21/43, Espinosa to Philip, with rescript, undated but Jan. 1571.

22.

Serrano, IV, 445, Philip to Don Juan de Zúñiga, his ambassador in Rome, 28 Sep. 1571, minute; Vargas-Hidalgo, *Guerra y diplomacia*, 767, Don John to Ruy Gómez, 16 Sep. 1571, holograph.

23.

Cervantes, *Novelas Exemplares*, prologue; García Hernán and García Hernán, *Lepanto*, 44, Doria on 9 Oct. 1571; BL Addl. 28,704/270v, Espinosa to Alba, 4 Dec. 1571, register copy; Lesure, *Lépante*, 151–2, orders from the Council of Ten to Admiral Venier, Venice, 22 Oct. 1571.

24.

Serrano, II, 360, Philip to Don Juan de Zúñiga, 8 Mar. 1568.

25.

Serrano, IV, 382, Castagna to Rusticucci, 9 July 1571.

26.

AA 7/58, Philip to Alba, 14 July 1571, cyphered with decrypt; BL *Addl.* 28,336/76, Dr Velasco to Espinosa, 9 Aug. 1571. See similar incredulous statements from other ministers at this time in chapter 5.

27.

Cabrera de Córdoba, *Historia*, II, 602; IVdeDJ 67/1, Don Luis de Requesens to Andrés Ponce de León, a prominent minister in Madrid, Jan 1574, copy, relating Alba's 'exit interview'.

28.

Galende Díaz and Salamanca López, *Epistolario*, 238–41, María to Philip, two letters dated 13 Feb. 1572.

29.

Groen van Prinsterer, *Archives*, 1st series III, 362, Orange to Count John of Nassau, 20 Feb. 1570.

30.

CCG, IV, 594–5 and AGS *Estado* 553/4–2, Philip to Alba, Feb. and 16 Mar. 1572, minutes.

31.

CCG, IV, 146–52, Morillon to Granvelle, 24 Mar. 1572.

32.

AGS *Estado* 553/94 and 99, Philip to Alba, 20 Apr. and 17 May 1572, minutes corrected by king.

33.

CCG, IV, 428, Morillon to Granvelle, 16 Sep. 1572; Groen van Prinsterer, *Archives*, 1st series III, 505, and IV, cii, Orange to John of Nassau, 21 Sep. 1572.

34.

Epistolario, III, 251 and 261, Alba to Philip, 28 Nov. and 19 Dec. 1572.

Chapter Twelve: Years of adversity, 1573–1576

1.

BPU *Ms. Favre* 30/30, Philip to Requesens, 30 Jan. 1573, copy of the holograph original.

2.

AA 8/45, Philip to Alba, 8 July 1573, received 19 Aug.

3.

AGS *Estado* 8340/242, Alba to Don John of Austria, 18 Sep. 1573.

4.

BPU Ms. *Favre* 30/71–4, Philip to Requesens, 20 Oct. 1573, copy of the holograph original.

5.

CODOIN, CII, 277–306, Philip's Instructions for Requesens, undated but 21 Oct. 1573.

6.

AGS *Estado* 554/146, Requesens to Philip, 30 Dec. 1573.

7.

AGS *Estado* 561/25, 'Consulta de negocios de Flandes' by Gabriel de Zayas, 24 Feb. 1574.

8.

AGS *Estado* 561/77, Philip to Requesens, 12 May 1574, minute; BRB *Réserve précieuse/Kostbare werken*, Hs. 1678A, General Pardon, signed 8 Mar. and promulgated 6 June 1574, original.

9.

HSA *Altamira* 3/II/12 Granvelle to Don Juan de Zúñiga, 6 Dec. 1573, copy; AGS *Estado* 561/25, vote of the count of Chinchón; CODOIN, LXXV, 236–40, Alba to Zayas, 8 July 1573.

10.

AGS *Estado* 554/89, Philip to Alba, 18 Mar. 1573.

11.

Gachard, *Don Juan*, 126–8, Don John to Margaret of Parma, Genoa, 4 May 1574.

12.

AA 33/156, Hernando Delgadillo to Juan de Albornoz, 9 July 1574; AGS *Estado* 559/104, Requesens to Philip, 12 Dec. 1574; HSA *Altamira* 3/V/15, Granvelle to Don Juan de Zúñiga, 23 Sep. 1574.

13.

AA 28/3, Alonso de Laloo to Juan de Albornoz, 9 Oct. 1574.

14.

AGS *Estado* 560/74 and 91, Requesens to Philip, 16 Sep. 1574, and Francisco de Valdés to Requesens, 18 Sep. 1574.

15.

AGS *Estado* 561/122, Philip to Requesens, 22 Oct. 1574, minute, with holograph corrections by Philip, based on the translation in Waxman, 'Strategic Terror', 344–7.

16.

AGS *Estado* 560/8, Requesens to Philip, 6 Nov. 1574; Pi Corrales, *España*, 89, 103 and 181–4, and 191–6.

17.

IVdeDJ 53/3/64, Philip to Vázquez, 17 May 1574 (on Menéndez's pessimism); Pi Corrales, *España*, 214–17, Menéndez to Pedro Menéndez Márquez, 8 Sep. 1574.

18.

AA 131/167, Philip to Covarrubias, holograph, undated, but apparently written just before IVdeDJ 21/233, 'Para las juntas de los presidentes', 19 June 1573, Vázquez draft of Philip's charge to the junta; IVdeDJ 76/530, and Carlos Morales, *Felipe II*, 131, Minutes of the Junta of Presidents, 24 June 1573.

19.

Martínez Millán and Carlos Morales, *Felipe II*, 168–9, Philip to Covarrubias, 4 and 23 Jan. 1574.

20.

IVdeDJ 76/491–503 and 507–9, Ovando's 'Relación' to Philip, 11 Apr. 1574, Easter Day. Drelichman and Voth, *Lending*, 110–11 and elsewhere, argue that the king's outstanding debts to his bankers in 1575 were less than 15 million ducats, a figure calculated only from the debts included in the great rescheduling operation known as the *Medio General* (chapter 13), excluding all other loans. They dismiss the higher estimates of Philip's debts made by his own treasury officials as 'a gross exaggeration' (*ibid.*, 14). Álvarez-Nogal and Chamley, 'Debt policy', 195, argue that even the rescheduled debt totals 'given by Drelichman and Voth are overstated', arguing instead that the total capital of loans outstanding in 1575 was 10.4 million ducats. I believe Philip's officials.

21.

BL Eg. 1506/18–19, Quiroga to Philip and rescript, 16 Mar. 1574.

22.

IVdeDJ 53/3/56, 51/30, 53/3/43, and 51/31, Philip to Vázquez, 13, 15, 24 and 31 May 1574. See chapter 5 for yet more complaints to the same minister during these desperate weeks.

23.

IVdeDJ 51/33, 53/3/87, and 53/3/77, Philip to Vázquez, 20 June, 4 and 18 July 1574.

24.

Pizarro Llorente, *Un gran patrón*, 352–4, citing consultas of the council of State and of the Suprema in Nov. 1575; BL Eg. 1506/54, Quiroga to Philip, 6 May 1577, with rescript.

25.

BZ 144/34, Vázquez to Philip and rescript, 10 Dec. 1574.

26.

Gachard, *Don Juan*, 128–30, Don John to Margaret of Parma, Trapani, 3 Oct. 1574.

27.

IVdeDJ 38/69, Philip to Vázquez, 19 Jan. 1575.

28.

IVdeDJ 24/103, Ovando to Philip, 25 Mar. 1575.

29.

Gachard, *Don Juan*, 131, Don John to Margaret of Parma, 19 June 1575; IVdeDJ, 44/119, Vázquez to Philip, and rescript, 10 May 1575.

30.

IVdeDJ 67/271 and 106, Requesens to the count of Monteagudo, Spanish ambassador at the Imperial Court, 6 Mar. 1575, and to Don Juan de Zúñiga, 9 July 1575.

31.

BZ 144/61, Vázquez to Philip, and reply, 31 May 1575.

32.

Carlos Morales, *Felipe II*, 154–5, Philip to Don Juan de Idiáquez, 8 Sep. 1575; and 191, Philip to all corregidores and judges of Castile.

33.

Ibid., 193, Martín de Gaztelu to Don Juan de Zúñiga, 9 Nov. 1575; HSA *Altamira* 7/III/29 Domingo de Zavala to Philip, Madrid, 17 Nov. 1575, copy; IVdeDJ, 37/72, Requesens to Zúñiga, 12 Nov. 1575.

34.

IVdeDJ 60/138–43, Pérez to Philip and rescript, 23 Mar. 1576.

35.

Carlos Morales, *Felipe II*, 264, Juan Fernández de Espinosa to Philip, 1577; IVdeDJ, 53/5/35, Philip to Vázquez, 22 Feb. 1576.

Chapter Thirteen: The crisis of the reign, 1576–1577

1.

AGS *Estado* 489, unfol., ‘Lo que se platicó y paresció en consejo destado a ix de mayo 1578’ with royal apostils; *GCP*, IV, 426–7, Philip’s notes for his final interview with Don John of Austria, Oct. 1576; AGS *Estado* 556/5, Alba to Philip, 8 Jan. 1573.

2.

Riba, 25–26, Vázquez to Philip, 21 Mar. 1576.

3.

Marañón, *Antonio Pérez*, 6; González Palencia, *Fragmentos*, 7.

4.

BL *Addl.* 28,262/568–70, Pérez to Philip, and rescript, undated but July 1573.

5.

Marañón, *Los Procesos*, 56, testimony of Jerónimo Díaz, 11 Aug. 1585; AGS *Estado* 1134/123, Don John to Pérez, Messina, 11 Nov. 1571; TMLM, Ms. 129960, Pérez to Philip, 30 Nov. 1574.

6.

IVdeDJ 38/62–75 (unfoliated carpeta), Vázquez to Philip and rescript, 25 June 1575; Vargas-Hidalgo, *Guerra y diplomacia*, 1002–3, Philip to Juan Andrea Doria, 29 July 1575.

7.

AGS *Estado* 570/133, Philip to Don John, 8 Apr. 1576, minute; *idem*, fos 140 and 150, Pérez to Escobedo, 8 Apr, 1576, minutes heavily corrected by the king.

8.

AGS *Estado* 570/149, Pérez to Escobedo, 8 Apr. 1576, minute, and fo. 133, Philip to Don John, 8 Apr. 1576.

9.

IVdeDJ 60/225–6 Pérez to Philip, undated but May or June 1576; and 36/38, same to same, 16 June 1576, with rescripts.

10.

BL *Addl.* 28,262/207, Antonio Pérez to Philip with rescript, 1 July 1576.

11.

ASF *MP* 2860/115–16 and 297–316, ‘Avisos’ from Genoa, 10 and 15 June 1576, and from Milan, 12–29 July 1576.

12.

CODOIN, XV, 547–53, Pérez to Escobedo, 16 Apr. 1576.

13.

AGRB *Gachard* 666/187, Don John to duke of Urbino, Milan, 8 Aug. 1576, copy.

14.

Belda, ‘Carta’, 475, Zúñiga to Philip, 3 Dec. 1578.

15.

GCP, IV, 346–7, patent for Don John and letters for Netherlands ministers, and *NA SP* 70/139 fo. 123, Philip to Queen Elizabeth, all signed by Philip on 26 Aug. even though dated 1 Sep. 1576 (see *FBD*, 1263, n 43).

16.

GCP, IV, 321–2, Don John to Philip, Barcelona Roads, 22 Aug. 1576, and the king’s reply, undated but 29 Aug.

17.

BL *Eg.* 1506/38–42 and 44–5, Quiroga to Philip, 24 Aug. (with rescript dated 29th) and 31 Aug. 1576 (with a rescript on the

following day).

18.

Gachard, *Don Juan*, 92, Margaret to Don John, 22 Aug. 1576.

19.

BL *Addl.* 28,263/62–3 and 53, Philip to Vázquez, 27 Oct. 1576, and 19 Sep. 1576.

20.

BL *Eg.* 1506/42 and 46–47v, Quiroga to Philip, 29 and 30 Sep. 1576, with rescripts.

21.

GCP, IV, 426–7, copies of two sets of notes in the king's hand, undated but Oct. 1576.

22.

Porreño, *Historia*, 427–8, Don John to Philip, Irún, 24 Oct. 1576, holograph.

23.

Kervijn de Lettenhove, *Relations politiques*, IX, 15–21, and GCP, V, 27–8, Instructions of Philip to Don John, 11 Nov. 1576, drafts.

24.

CODOIN, I, 298–9 and 303–4, Escobedo to Philip, St Dié in Lorraine, 28 Nov. 1576, and Luxembourg, 8 Dec. 1576.

25.

AGRB Gachard 666/297, Don John to the duke of Savoy, Bastogne, 19 Dec. 1576, copy.

26.

BL *Eg.* 1506/42 and 50, Quiroga to Philip, 29 Sep. and 3 Oct. 1576, with rescripts.

27.

Luna, *Comentarios*, 35 ('el oficio de espía doble').

28.

AHN *Inq. libro* 284/94 (new foliation 103), Quiroga to Philip, and rescript, 18 Mar. 1578; AGS *Estado* 569/150bis, Don John to Philip, 21 Nov. 1576, with apostils presumably written at least two weeks

later. Ungerer, 'La defensa', 133, notes that Pérez and Los Vélez both studied at Alcalá in 1558–9.

29.

AGS *Estado* 569/133–4, Don John to Philip, 6 Dec. 76, 'visto por los dos'; ASF *MP* 4910/178, Luigi Dovara to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 25 Feb. 1579.

30.

BL *Addl.* 28,262/599–601, Pérez to Philip, with rescript (undated, but probably Apr. 1577); Morel-Fatio, *L'Espagne*, 111, Don John of Austria to Don Rodrigo de Mendoza, 9 Dec. 1576.

31.

Gachard, *Don Juan*, 74, Don John to Margaret of Parma, 8 Nov. 1573; Fórmica, *Doña María*, 19, Octavio Gonzaga to Pérez, 20 Oct. 1578.

32.

BL *Addl.* 28,262/219–21 and 225–6, Pérez to Philip, 1 Jan. and 8 Feb. 1577.

33.

Porreño, *Historia*, 454, Don John to Philip, 22 Dec. 1576; *CODOIN*, I, 300–1, Escobedo to Philip, 10 Jan. 1577.

34.

AGS *Estado* 2843/3, Philip to Don John, 31 Jan. 1577.

35.

BL *Addl.* 28,262/236–237v, Pérez to Philip, with rescript, 12 Feb. 1577.

36.

BL *Addl.* 28,262/236–237v, *ut supra*.

37.

AGS *Estado* 570/65, Philip to Don John, 12 Feb. 1577.

38.

Gachard, *Don Juan*, 140–2, Don John to Margaret of Parma, Marche, 17 Feb. 1577.

39.

Voci, 'L'impresa', 381, cardinal of Como to Don John, 2 Apr. 1577;

and 423, same to Ormanetto, 12 Apr. 1577.

40.

Ibid., 424–5, Ormanetto to Como, 26 Apr. 1577.

41.

BL *Addl.* 28,262/256–7, Philip to Pérez, 4 Apr. 1577; Voci, ‘L’impresa’, 424–5, Ormanetto to Como, 26 Apr. 1577.

42.

BL *Addl.* 28,262/243–4 and 250–3, Pérez to Philip and rescript, 28 and 29 Mar. 1577; *GCP*, V, 282–8, Philip to Don John, 6 Apr. 1577.

43.

Griffiths, *Representative government*, 460, ‘Vraye narration des propos ... à Gheertrudenberghe’, an Orangist account of the conference held 13–23 May 1577.

44.

Porreño, *Historia*, 477–80, Don John to Philip, 26 May 1577. ARA *Staten Generaal* 11,915 contains numerous transcripts of intercepted and decoded letters from Escobedo and Don John from 1577 about England. See also BL *Cott.* Cal. C. V/97v–98, Escobedo to Philip, 9 Apr. 1577, coded original with decrypt and English translation.

45.

BPU *Ms. Favre* 28/185–7, Philip to Sessa, 28 Aug. 1577 (two letters, both originals); AGS *Estado* 1247/133, Philip to marquis of Ayamonte, 28 Aug. 1577, minute; AGS *Estado* 571/56, Philip to Don John, minute apparently drafted by Zayas on 27 Aug. and corrected by the king the following day (fo. 53), and sent 1 Sep. 1577.

46.

BL *Eg.* 1506/207–9, Quiroga to Philip, ‘Thursday’ [= 12 Sep. 1577], describing the council meeting of the day before, and AGS *Estado* 2843/1, ‘Parecer de los V del Consejo de Estado’, 11 Sep. 1577, both with rescripts.

47.

BPU *Ms. Favre* 28/195–6, Philip to Sessa; AGS *Estado* 571/88, Philip to Don John; and HSA *Altamira* 1/1/46), Diego de Covarrubias to Philip, with rescript, all dated 11 Sep. 1577.

48.

IVdeDJ 36/21, Don John to Zúñiga, 30 Sep. 1577.

49.

González Palencia, *Fragmentos*, 77–9, Pérez to Doña Juana Coello, 23 Feb. 1590. Mignet, *Antonio Pérez*, 280–5, explicitly denied that in 1577 Don John made contact with Guise; but AGRB *Audience* 1685/3, 1686/1 and 1779/2 all contain an extensive correspondence between the two men about supplying food and troops at this time.

50.

AGS *Estado* 572/142, Don John to Philip, 20 Nov. 1577; AHN *Inq. libro* 284/83 (new foliation 87), Quiroga to Philip, with rescript, 1 Oct. 1577.

51.

BNF *Ms. Esp.* 132/11, Philip to Juan de Vargas Mexía, 24 Jan. 1578.

Chapter Fourteen: Murder most foul?

1.

Marañón, *Los Procesos*, 186, testimony of Don Pedro de Mendoza, 25 Sep. 1589; ASVe *SDS* 11/65, Badoer to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 3 Apr. 1578; Valente, *Un dramma*, 55, Juan de Samaniego to the prince of Parma, 4 Apr. 1578; ASMo *CD Ambasciatori Spagna* 11, 1578, No. IX, Orazio Maleguzzi to the duke of Ferrara, 4 Apr. 1578. In their dispatches, all the Italian ambassadors used ‘Italian time’, in which the circadian cycle began half an hour after sunset; so when they stated that the murder of Escobedo occurred ‘a un’ hora di notte’, they meant ninety minutes after sunset – which in March, in Madrid, meant around 9 p.m.

2.

IVdeDJ 51/161, Philip to Vázquez, the Escorial, 1 Apr. 1578 (also in Muro, *Vida*, appendix 12); ASF *MP* 4910/57, Baccio Orlandini to Grand Duke of Tuscany, 2 Apr. 1578.

3.

ASMo *CD Ambasciatori Spagna* 11, 1578, No. X, Maleguzzi to duke of Ferrara, 12 Apr. 1578, minute.

4.

Marañón, *Los Procesos*, 23 and 201–2, Auto by Antonio Márquez, secretary of the tribunal, 29 Dec. 1589; and 207, ‘Traslado del papel

de Su Magestad que está escrito de su real mano', 4 Jan. 1590.

5.

Ibid., 217–18, 'Diligencia en el tormento con el secretario Antonio Pérez', 23 Feb. 1590; KB Hs. 128.b.3/12v–16, Escobedo to Pérez, 7 Feb. 1577, copy presented by Pérez to the Justicia of Aragon.

6.

Marañón, *Los Procesos*, 217–18, 'Diligencia en el tormento con el secretario Antonio Pérez', 23 Feb. 1590. A few hours later, Pérez sent his wife an almost identical account of what he had confessed after torture: González Palencia, *Fragmentos*, 77–9, Pérez to Doña Juana Coello, 23 Feb. 1590.

7.

HSA Ms B 1252/4, Alba billete, almost certainly addressed to Zayas, undated but probably 11 or 12 Sep. 1577.

8.

For the order to bring Orange 'dead or alive', see chapter 15; for Pérez, see chapter 18. For examples of other extrajudicial executions, see chapter 16.

9.

Marañón, *Los procesos*, 220, 'Declaración de Diego Martínez', 24 Feb. 1590.

10.

Ibid., 220, 'Declaración de Diego Martínez'; 116–21, 'Declaración de Antonio Enríquez', 30 June 1585; and 97, supplementary question to Enríquez on 1 Feb. 1590.

11.

Ibid., 121–2 (Enríquez), 221 (Martínez) and 65, 'Declaración de Martín Gutiérrez', 20 Dec. 85.

12.

Pérez, *Relaciones y cartas*, I, 272–3, 'Memorial que Antonio Pérez presentó'.

13.

Marañón, *Los procesos*, 161–8, Pérez to Philip, 3, 16, 23 Feb. and 17 and 26 Mar. 1589.

14.

Ibid., 46, testimonio of Castro, Lisbon, 5 June 1582.

15.

ASF MP 4910/177–8, Dovara to Grand Duke, 25 Feb. 1579.

16.

AGS *Estado* 574/66 and 79, Don John to Philip, 17 Feb. 1577, two holograph letters; BL *Addl.* 28,262/263–4, 266–9 and 546, Pérez to Philip, 5 and 6 Apr. 1577, and undated (but July 1577); AHN *Inq. libro* 284/83 (new foliation 87), Quiroga to Philip, with rescript, 1 Oct. 1577.

17.

Marañón, *Los procesos*, 227, ‘Declaración del Licenciado Bartolomé de la Hera’, 2 Mar. 1590; and 172, ‘Declaración de Doña Beatriz de Frías’, 18 Sep. 1589 (‘era un suçio’). Dadson and Reed, *Epistolario*, 77–84, 161, 210–11, 217–18, 233–4, 234–9 (the princess’s longest surviving letter), 241–2, 269–70, 271–3 and 278–9 print all of Ana’s known letters and commissions to Escobedo, starting in 1558.

18.

Marañón, *Los procesos*, 251–2, ‘Declaración’ of Favara, 22 Oct. 1590.

19.

Ibid., 215 and 217, ‘Diligençia en el tormento con el secretario Antonio Pérez’, 23 Feb. 1590.

20.

AGS *Estado* 570/139, Pérez to Escobedo, Apr. 1576, minute. The same happened the following month when Philip extensively revised letters to Escobedo purportedly written by Pérez: chapter 13.

21.

BNF *Ms. Esp.* 132/ 179–80 and 66, Pérez to Vargas Mexía, 26 Jan. 1579 and 15 June 1578.

22.

Cabrera de Córdoba, *Felipe II*, III, 1392, quoting a comment made by Quiroga in 1590.

23.

Pérez Mínguez, *Psicología*, 37–8, Pérez to Andrés de Prada, 15 Oct. 1578.

24.

Dadson and Reed, *Epistolario*, 403–4, Ana's warrant appointing Antonio Enríquez 'mi criado' as her 'contador', 20 Mar. 1581, backdated to 4 June 1580 'because that is when he began to serve me', and 530–1, salary increase from 1 Jan. 1583; BZ 142/7 bis, Vázquez to Philip II and rescript, 28 July 1578 (printed with some alternative readings in Muro, *Vida*, appendix 165).

25.

Riba, 177–8, Vázquez to Philip, 24 May 1578.

26.

Muro, *Vida*, appendix 14, Pedro Núñez to Vázquez, 26 Dec. 1578, and appendix 17, Dr Milio to Vázquez, 6 Jan. 1579, both referring to the anger of the princess.

27.

BZ 144/224, Philip to Vázquez, 15 Nov. 1578.

28.

IVdeDJ 51/181, Vázquez to Philip, the Escorial, 28 Dec. 1578.

29.

IVdeDJ 44/57–8, Vázquez to Philip and rescripts, 11 and 15 Apr. 1574.

30.

Martínez Hernández, 'El desafío', published these love letters, undated but from 1566, for the first time.

31.

CODOIN, VIII, 487–8, Alba cédula to Don Fadrique, Madrid, 2 Oct. 1578.

32.

Riba, 192–3, Vázquez to Philip, 30 Nov. 1578.

33.

HSA *Altamira* 1/1/101, Pérez to Philip with rescript, 2 Jan. 1579.

34.

CODOIN, VIII, 509–11, Pazos to Philip with rescript, 6 July 1579; Martínez Hernández, 'El desafío', and *idem*, *El marqués de Velada*,

163–78.

35.

Valente, *Un dramma*, 53, Bologna to Cardinal Farnese, 4 Aug. 1579; Muro, *Vida*, appendix 18, Vázquez to Dr Milio, Jan. 1579 (Milio acted as an intermediary between the secretaries).

36.

Muro, *Vida*, appendix 30, Pazos to Philip, with rescript, 7 Mar. 1579. This appears to be the first time Philip referred to the Pérez affair as something that affected his conscience.

37.

Ibid., appendix 31, Vázquez to Philip, with rescript, 16 Mar. 1579; ASF MP 4910/216, Dovara to the Grand Duke, 25 Mar. 1579; AST LM, 2, unfol., Carlo Pallavicini to the duke of Savoy, 29 Mar. 1579.

38.

CCG, VII, 352–3, and Mignet, *Antonio Pérez*, 104, Philip to Granvelle, 30 Mar. 1579; ASG AS 2416, unfol., Passano to Doge of Genoa, 6 June 1579.

39.

Sigüenza, 92–3.

40.

ASV NS 22/170, Segá to the papal secretary of state, 11 May 1579, reporting on his audience; BL *Addl.* 28,263/225–6, Vázquez to Philip with rescript, 21 June 1579.

41.

BZ 143/207–8, Vázquez to Philip, the Escorial, 24 June 1579; Muro, *Vida*, appendix 47, Instructions of Vázquez to the count of Barajas, 9 July 1579.

42.

The only known text of the princess's note appeared in Pérez, *Relaciones*, I, 113–15, a tainted source; but since many ambassadors summarized it in similar terms – see, for example: Valente, *Un dramma*, 53, Samaniego to Parma, 1 Aug. 1579; ASMo, CD AS 11, 1579, No. XXIII, Malaguzzi to Ferrara, 4 Aug. 1579 – I accept it as genuine. So do Dadson and Reed, *Epistolario*, 381–3.

43.

BZ 162/6 bis, Philip to duke of Infantado, 29 July 1579; CCG VII, 443, Granvelle to Margaret of Parma, 12 Sep. 1579.

44.

BZ 143/212, Vázquez to Philip, 26 July 1579.

45.

BZ 143/212, rescript of Philip to Vázquez, 26 July 1579; Marañón, *Antonio Pérez*, 445, citing Jerónimo Zurita; BZ 143/211, Vázquez to Philip with rescript, 26–27 July 1579.

46.

CODOIN, LVI, 212–14, Philip to Pazos, undated but 28 July 1579, holograph, and Pazos's petulant reply the following day: 'This morning at seven o'clock one of my servants brought me Your Majesty's note ...'

47.

Muro, *Vida*, appendix 53, Pedro Núñez to Vázquez, 1 Aug. 1579; Valente, *Un dramma*, 53, Bologna to Cardinal Farnese, 4 Aug. 1579

48.

ASMo CD AS 11, 1579 No. XXII, Maleguzzi to duke of Ferrara, 29 Aug. 1579, minute.

Chapter Fifteen: Years of triumph, 1578–1585

1.

BL Addl. 28,262/ 632–5v, Pérez to Philip, and rescript, 13 Aug.1578; Sigüenza, 86; CODOIN, VII, 229.

2.

AGS *Estado* 489, unfol., 'Lo que se platicó y paresció en consejo destado a ix de mayo 1578'.

3.

ASVe SDS 11/51, Alberto Badoer to Doge, 6 Jan. 1578, quoting a letter 'di pugno di Sua Maiestà'; AGS *Estado* 395/197, Philip to Silva, 31 May 1578, copy; CODOIN, XL, 87–8, Silva to Philip, 4 Oct. 1578.

4.

HSA *Altamira* 1/1/24, Vázquez to Philip and reply; AGS GA 88/244, Philip to Delgado; and BL Addl. 28,262/285–6, Philip to Pérez, and

rescript, all dated 13 Aug. 1578.

5.

BL Addl. 28,262/632-5v, Pérez to Philip, and rescript, undated [= 13 Aug. 1578].

6.

BL Addl. 28,262/632-5v, *ut supra*.

7.

CODOIN, XL, 137-8, 160 and 169-70, Moura to Philip, Lisbon, 26 Aug., 25 Sep. and 23 Oct. 1578.

8.

Fernández Conti, 'La Junta Militar', 292 n. 24, rescript of Philip on a consulta from Delgado, 26 Oct. 1578, enclosing plans from Alba and Santa Cruz; AGS GA 88/317, 362 and 353, Delgado to Philip, 30 Oct. and 1 and 13 Dec. 1578, each with a long royal rescript.

9.

CODOIN, XL, 143 and 196, Moura to Philip, 26 Aug. and 25 Nov. 1578; Fernández Collado, *Gregorio XIII*, 53-4, quoting Nuncio Segá's account of Philip's denial at an audience early in 1579.

10.

AGS GA 89/196, Delgado to Philip, undated but July-August 1579, with a long royal rescript; ASF *Urbino* I/185/19, Bernardo Maschi to duke of Urbino, 10 Jan. 1580.

11.

BSLE Ms &III.12, San Pedro, *Diálogo llamado Philippino*, fo. 5v (expertly discussed by Bouza, *Imagen y propaganda*, 75-83); CODOIN, XL, 198, Moura to Philip, Lisbon, 25 Nov. 1578.

12.

CODOIN, VI, 30-2, 78 and 350, Moura to Philip, 29 Nov. 1578, and Philip to Moura, 26 Jan. and 14 Apr. 1579.

13.

CODOIN, VI., 661, Philip to the duke of Osuna, his special envoy to King Henry, 24 Aug. 1579.

14.

AGS GA 94/26 and 28, Philip to Delgado, 30 Jan. 1580.

15.

Suárez Inclán, *Guerra*, 222, Moura to Philip, 4 June 1580; ASVe SDS 12/74, Morosini to Doge, 8 Feb. 1580; Kamen, *Philip*, 173, Philip to Don Juan de Zúñiga, 13 Feb. 1580; *CODOIN*, VIII, 516–19, Pazos to Philip, 15 Feb. 1580.

16.

Suárez Inclán, *Guerra*, 96–7 and notes, Philip to Moura, 16 Feb. 1580, with a copy of Delgado's billete.

17.

Porreño, *Dichos y hechos*, 29.

18.

CODOIN, XXXV, 61–2, Philip to Alba, Badajoz, 5 Aug. 1580, holograph.

19.

CODOIN, XXXII, 482 and 489, Alba to Philip, 28 and 30 Aug. 1580.

20.

CODOIN, XXXIII, 234, Philip apostil on a letter from Arceo to Zayas, Lisbon, 4 Nov. 1580.

21.

Velázquez, *La entrada*, fo. 69; IVdeDJ 56 carpeta 21, unfol., Vázquez to [Hernando de Vega], 17 Apr. 1581.

22.

Bouza, *Cartas*, 35, Philip to his daughters, 3 Apr. 1581; BL *Addl.* 28,357/498, cédula of Aug. 1581; Bouza, *Cartas*, 89 n. 192, letter of Gaspar de los Arcos, Tomar, 20 Mar. 1581.

23.

Rodríguez Salgado, *Felipe II*, 171, Don Juan de Zúñiga to Philip, 19 July 1581; AGS *Estado* 939/128 and 143, Philip to Zúñiga, Lisbon, 8 and 23 Oct. 1581.

24.

CODOIN, XXXII, 480–3 and 507–10, Alba to Philip, 28 Aug. 1580, with apostil, and Philip to Alba, 31 Aug. 1580.

25.

Freitas de Meneses, *Os Açores*, I, 82–4, and II, 66, Figueroa to Philip, 3 Aug. 1582.

26.

Muro, *Vida*, appendices 66 and 73, Hernando de Vega to Vázquez, 25 Aug. and 17 Sep. 1579; *ibid.*, appendix 64, Pedro Núñez to Vázquez, 25 Aug 1579; Pérez, *Relaciones y Cartas*, I, 122.

27.

Muro, *Vida*, appendices 104 and 116, Pazos to Philip, 19 Dec. 1580 and 17 Apr. 1581, with rescripts.

28.

Marañón, *Los procesos*, 46–51, testimony of Don Rodrigo de Castro and Don Fernando de Solís, 5 and 9 June 1582; *CODOIN*, LVI, 397–406, Pazos to Philip, 4 and 18 Nov. 1581, with rescripts; HSA *Altamira* 1/I/6, Mateo Vázquez to Philip, with rescript, 7 Sep. 1581.

29.

Riba, 217, Philip to Sancho Bustos de Villegas, 12 Feb. 1580, holograph; Bratli, *Philippe II*, 235, Philip to Salazar, 8 June 1581, also holograph.

30.

Marañón, *Los procesos*, 35–7, testimony of ‘Luis de Overa’ [= Luigi Dovara], Lisbon, 30 May 1582; Muro, *Vida*, 196–8, Philip to Rodrigo Vázquez, 27 Aug. 1582, minute (which explains why it survives, despite the royal injunction to burn the original).

31.

CODOIN, LVI, 419–20, Pazos to Philip, 8 Sep. 1582, with rescript; Muro, *Vida*, 196–200, Philip to the princess of Éboli, 8 Nov. 1582

32.

HSA *Altamira* 1/I/6, fos. 189 and 191, Mateo Vázquez to Philip and rescript, 7 Sep. 1582; Fernández Duro, *Conquista de los Azores*, 396–9, Instruction for Santa Cruz, the Escorial, 6 June 1583.

33.

IVdeDJ 51/105, Mateo Vázquez to Philip and reply, 22 Aug. 1583.

34.

ASMa AG 598, unfol., Lepido Agnello to duke of Mantua, Madrid, 6 June 1579; Bouza, *Imagen y propaganda*, 85–6.

35.

Keeler, *Sir Francis Drake's West Indian Voyage*, 245–6 and 315, 'A summarie and true discourse of Sir Francis Drake's West Indian Voyage' (1589).

36.

ASC 48/3, Santa Cruz to Philip, Angra, 9 Aug. 1583, draft, and Philip to Santa Cruz, 23 Sep. 1583 (partially printed in *BMO*, I, 406).

37.

NMM Ms PH 1B/435, Olivares to Don Juan de Zúñiga, 24 Sep. 1583, deciphered with royal holograph apostil.

38.

Benítez Sánchez-Blanco, 'De moriscos, papeles y archivos', 116–17, account by Don Juan de Idiáquez of the deliberations of a committee on the 'Morisco problem' in 1581–3.

39.

Massarella, *Japanese travellers*, 250.

40.

IVdeDJ 76/161–2, Vega to Philip and reply, 24 Mar. 1582, copy.

41.

IVdeDJ 68/306 and 286, Vega to Philip and rescripts, 8 June and 22 Aug. 1583.

42.

CCG, XI, 58–9 and 64, Granvelle to Philip, 3 Aug. 1584, and to Idiáquez, 4 Aug. 1584 (Anjou was also duke of Alençon); and HSA *Altamira* 5/V/3, Vázquez to Philip, with reply, 3 Aug. 1584.

43.

NA SP12/179/36–8, Examination of Pedro de Villareal, 13 June 1585 OS; and NA SP 12/180/59A, captured letter from Juan del Hoyo, merchant, 5 July 1585 NS.

Chapter Sixteen: 'The most potent monarch in Christendom'

1.

Salazar, *Política española*, 24; González Dávila, *Teatro*, 1; Feltham, *A*

brief character, 84–5; Camden, *Historie*, book IV, 131.

2.

Bratli, *Philippe II*, 222, Relation of Philippe de Caverel, Lisbon, 1582; Longlée, 48, to Henry III, 20 June 1584; CCG, X, 126, Granvelle to Bellefontaine, Madrid, 3 Apr. 1583.

3.

Sánchez Cantón, *Inventarios reales*, II, 41, 77, 115–21, 145 and so on; Bouza, *Cartas*, 57 and 88–9, Philip to his daughters, 2 Oct. 1581 and 30 July 1582.

4.

Lhermite, *Passetemps*, II, 116; AGPM 237, *Inventarios reales*, 3/278r–279v, ‘Las dibersas pieças de plata para servicio de la barbería’.

5.

Bouza, *Cartas*, 53–4 and 103, Philip to his daughters, 21 Aug. 1581 and 14 Feb. 1583; BZ 143/46 and 50, Vázquez to Philip, and reply, 16 and 20 Mar. 1588.

6.

IVdeDJ 53/5/35, HSA *Altamira* 1/1/19, HSA Ms B 228, and BL *Addl.* 28,700/151 and 155, Vázquez to Philip, and replies, 22 Feb. 1576, 17 Dec. 1584, 13 Jan. and 7 and 9 Feb. 1587.

7.

BL *Addl.* 28,357/13, Philip to Alba, 28 July 1573; IVdeDJ, 55/IX/217, Vázquez to Philip and reply, 17 Oct. 1588.

8.

DHME, V, 111; AHN *Inq. Libro* 100/551, Juan Ruiz de Velasco to Mateo Vázquez, 23 Aug. 1588.

9.

BL *Addl.* 28,354/490, marquis of Ladrada to Philip, and rescript, 2 Oct. 1572 (‘Terrible gente son los físicos’).

10.

BL *Addl.* 28,354/479–80 and 506, Ladrada to Philip, and rescripts, 27 Sep. and 16 Oct. 1572; IVdeDJ 7/95, Vázquez to Philip, and rescript, 24 Sep. 1590.

11.

Bratli, *Philippe II*, 222, 'Relation' by Philippe de Caverel; BZ 142/67, Philip to Vázquez, 3 Feb. 1584.

12.

HSA *Altamira* 1/II/52 (i) and 53, Vázquez to Philip, with replies, both dated 4 July 1584.

13.

BL *Addl.* 28,362/1, count of Barajas to Vázquez, 1 Jan. 1584.

14.

BAV *UL* 1115/108–9, 'Aviso' from Madrid, 10 Jan. 1587; Cabrera de Córdoba, *Historia*, III, 1172; Martínez Millán and Fernández Conti, *La Monarquía*, 318, quoting contemporary accounts.

15.

BL *Addl.* 28,361/110, corrected draft of the *Pragmática*, 11 Sep. 1586, returned to Mateo Vázquez who (sarcastically?) endorsed the file 'Coronets and courtesies'. Numerous drafts of the *Pragmática*, each one festooned with royal apostils, fill fos 31–145 of the same volume, even though (in retrospect) 'no importa nada'.

16.

IVdeDJ 55/XI/153, Vázquez to Philip and reply, 10 Aug. 1588; AHN *Inq. Libro* 100/551, Juan Ruiz de Velasco to Vázquez, 23 Aug. 1588.

17.

IVdeDJ 21/740 and 374, notes by Philip and Mateo Vázquez on a letter from the general of the Jeronimite Order, 12 Sep. 1589, and Jerónimo Gassol to Philip, and reply, 8 July 1591.

18.

IVdeDJ 51/175, and BZ 142/6, Vázquez to Philip, 29 Dec. 1577 and 4 Nov. 1580 (concerning Don Antonio de Padilla).

19.

Escudero, *Felipe II*, 536, Vázquez to Philip, and rescript, undated but 1577; BZ 80/540, Memorial from Francisco de Mendoza to Philip with rescript, Naples, 22 Dec. 1588; González Dávila, *Teatro*, 369–70, Dr Hernández de Liévana to Philip, autumn 1572.

20.

IVdeDJ 62/853, Philip to Vázquez, 23 Mar. 1575; BL *Addl.* 28,263/213–14, Vázquez to Philip, and rescript, 20 Feb. 1579.

21.

CODOIN, LVI, 293–4, Pazos to Philip, with rescript, 29 Feb. 1580.

22.

Morel-Fatio, 'La Vie', VII, 235 and 251.

23.

HSA *Altamira*, 1/I/44, Medina Sidonia to Vázquez, 29 Feb. 1588, and *idem*, 1/I/46, Vázquez to Philip, 8 Mar. 1588, with rescript.

24.

Martínez Millán and Carlos Morales, *Felipe II*, 227, Chaves to Mateo Vázquez, Mar. 1586.

25.

Hernando Sánchez, 'Estar en nuestro lugar', 286 n. 230, Philip to viceroy of Naples, 4 Oct. 1579; Encinas, II, 311–15 (an order reissued five times during the reign).

26.

Schäfer, *El consejo real*, I, 149–50, consulta of the council of the Indies, with rescript, 7 July 1583, concerning licenciado Salcedo.

27.

Cabrera de Córdoba, *Historia*, III, 1397.

28.

BL Eg. 1506/92–3 and 94, Quiroga to Philip and rescript, 15 and 19 Nov. 1578

29.

BL Eg. 1506/20, Quiroga to Philip and rescript, 17 Mar. 1574; AHN *Inq. libro* 101/226 and 208, consultas of the Suprema, 23 and 24 Nov. 1592, with rescripts.

30.

AGPM CR 3/164v–166 and 274, cédulas of 22 Dec. 1569 and 18 Oct. 1571; AGS CSR 275/2 fos 60, 74 and 87–8 (cédulas from 1569 about disciplining the Pardo poachers).

31.

Herrera y Tordesillas, *Historia general*, II, 46–7; Las Heras, 'Indultos', 129–30; Velázquez, *La entrada*, fos 79–81.

32.

BZ 142/201, Vázquez to Philip, 22 Jan. 1587; Arrieta Alberdi, 'Gobernar rescribiendo', 93, consulta of the council of Aragon, and rescript, 16 July 1588; IVdeDJ 21/586, Philip to Don Diego de Covarrubias, 14 Dec. 1575.

33.

AGS PR 29/35 codicil signed by Philip, Ghent, 5 Aug. 1559.

34.

AGS PR 26/143, Instruction to Ruy Gómez and the duke of Alburquerque, London, 13 Apr. 1557; Muro, *Vida*, 198–200, Philip to the princess of Éboli, 8 Nov. 1582.

35.

AHN *Inq. libro* 249/550v–551, royal cédula to Joan Sánchez, 30 May 1589, register copy. This volume contains hundreds of similar cédulas.

36.

ASMa AG 598 unfol., Lepido Agnello to duke of Mantua, 8 June 1580; IVdeDJ 21/148–57, correspondence of Vázquez with Philip, Jan.–Mar. 1583; CSPV, VIII, 174, Gradenigo and Lippomano to Doge and Senate, 25 June 1586. *FBD*, 790–2, lists the known attempts to assassinate the king.

37.

Sigüenza, 76; Muro, *Vida*, appendix 12, Esteban de Ibarra to Mateo Vázquez, undated but Apr. 1578.

38.

Iñiguez de Lequerica, *Sermones funerales*, sermon of Dr Aguilar de Terrones, fo. 7.

39.

Porreño, *Dichos y hechos*, 74; Jorzick, *Herrschaftssymbolik*, 47–8, Philip to the viceroy of Peru, 1573, and 62 n. 39, memorial to Philip, 2 Nov. 1593.

40.

NA SP 70/6 fo. 15, Challoner to Elizabeth, Ghent, 3 Aug. 1559, draft; *DHME*, IV, 4 (Sepúlveda, 'Historia'); Cock, *Relación*, 47, 52.

41.

Santullano, *Obras completas de Teresa de Jesús*, 1394, Teresa to Doña Inés Nieto [1576–7]; Donà, 75–8, letter to the Doge of Venice, 1 Oct. 1570; Iñiguez de Lequerica, *Sermones funerales*, sermon by Dr Terrones, fo. 12.

42.

AHN *Inq. libro* 100/242, 243, and 294, Philip to Quiroga, 26 July, 16 Feb. and Oct. 1576, all holograph; AHN *Inq. Libro* 101/325, consulta of the Suprema and rescript, 11 Jan. 1592; *ibid.*, fo. 695, Philip rescript to Licenciado Arenillas, 4 Dec. 1594.

43.

Donà, 340, letter to Venice, 1 Aug. 1571

44.

UB Leiden *Hs Pap* 3/3, Alonso de Laloo to the count of Hornes, 31 Aug. 1566; Firpo, *Relazioni*, VIII, 670, Final Relation of Donà, Jan. 1574.

45.

BL *Addl.* 28,264/26–7, Philip to Emmanuel Philibert, 9 Aug. 1557, holograph postscript; *CODOIN*, XCVIII, 483, Philip to the count of Luna, 8 Aug. 1563; AGS *Estado K* 1448/197, Philip to Don Bernardino de Mendoza, 28 July 1588.

46.

CODOIN, XXXV, 61, Philip to Alba, 2 Aug. 1580, holograph postscript; AGS *CJH* 324/27, ‘Gastos Secretos’ of Don Bernardino de Mendoza while ambassador in England, payment in Aug. 1578.

47.

AMAE (M) *AEESS* 11/28, Philip to the duke of Sessa, 5 Feb. 1592.

48.

Ugolini, ‘Le comunicazioni postali’, 321.

49.

Douais, II, 127–8 and 142, Fourquevaux to Charles IX and report attached, 31 Oct. 1569.

50.

Woltjer, *Friesland*, 3, count of Aremberg to Margaret of Parma, 15 Sep. 1566.

51.

AGS *Estado K* 1490/50, Philip to Emmanuel Philibert, 26 July 1557, holograph; AA 5/69, Philip to Alba, 7 Aug. 1567, holograph; AGS, *Estado* 561/122, Philip to Requesens, 22 Oct. 1574, minute.

52.

HSA Altamira 5/III/14, Vázquez to Juan Fernández, 8 Dec. 1585; BMO, III, 1274 and 1225, Philip to Santa Cruz, 21 and 10 Oct. 1587.

53.

Watts, 'Friction in future war', 91; and Jablonsky, *The owl of Minerva*, 33–6.

Chapter Seventeen: The 'Enterprise of England', 1585–1588

1.

BMO, I, 478, royal apostil on a letter from the count of Olivares to Philip, 4 June 1585, with rescript.

2.

BMO, I, 496 and AGS *Estado* 946/229, Philip to Olivares, 2 and 22 Aug. 1585.

3.

OÖLA KB 4/137, Khevenhüller to Rudolf II, 13 Oct. 1585; BR Ms II–1670/180, Philip to Licenciado Antolinez, 31 Oct. 1585.

4.

Villari and Parker, *La política de Felipe II*, 110–15, Zúñiga to Philip, undated but late 1585.

5.

CCG, XII, 133–5, Granvelle to Charles de Mansfelt, 29 Nov. 1585.

6.

IVdeDJ 23/385, Castro to Hernando de Vega, president of the council of the Indies, Seville, 15 Nov. 1585, together with the council's consulta to Philip dated 30 Nov. 1585, with royal rescript.

7.

BMO, I, 536–7, 'Lo que se responde a Su Santidad', undated but 24 Oct. 1585.

8.

BMO, 564–7, Santa Cruz to Philip, 13 Feb. 1586, and Philip and Idiáquez to Santa Cruz, 26 Feb. 1586 (February is the correct month, not ‘January’ as the volume states).

9.

BMO, II, 108–11, Parma to Philip, 20 Apr. 1586, and 195–6, ‘Lo que dixo Juan Bautista Piata’.

10.

HSA *Altamira* 7/II/24 ‘Memoria de algunas de las cosas que se han avisado pasan estos días en Madrid’, Mateo Vázquez, at the Escorial, to the count of Barajas, in Madrid [18 July 1586].

11.

BMO, II, 212, ‘Parecer’ of Don Juan de Zúñiga (June/July 1586). After the death of his father in Sep. 1586, Alexander Farnese, formerly prince of Parma, became duke of Parma.

12.

Heredia Herrera, *Catálogo*, I, 597, consulta of the council of the Indies, and rescript, 3 Sep. 1586.

13.

BMO, II, 305–7, Don Bernardino de Mendoza to Philip, 13 Aug. 1586 (with copious royal apostils) and 338–9, Philip’s reply, 5 Sep. 1586.

14.

BL *Addl.* 28,376/336, Andrés de Prada to Don Juan de Idiáquez, 17 May 1587; BL *Addl.* 28,363/116, Juan Ruiz de Velasco to Mateo Vázquez, 20 June 1587.

15.

BMO, III, 1967–8, Philip to Santa Cruz, 14 Sep. 1587.

16.

BMO, III, 1006–7, Philip to Parma, 4 Sep. 1587.

17.

BMO, III, 1069–70, Philip to Parma, 14 Sep. 1587.

18.

BMO, III, 1225 and 1274, Philip to Santa Cruz, 10 and 21 Nov. 1587.

19.

ASVe SDS 20, unfol., Lippomano to Venice, 14 Sep. 1587, enclosing a copy of Santa Cruz's letter of the 4th.

20.

BZ 143/87, memorandum by Philip, 7 June 1588; BZ 141/160, Philip to the count of Barajas, 18 June 1588, copy.

21.

OÖLA KB 4/311–12, Khevenhüller to Rudolf II, 13 July 1588.

22.

CSPV, VIII, 273, Lippomano to doge and Senate, 9 May 1587; BL Addl. 28,363/50, Zayas to Vázquez, 10 May 1587.

23.

Maura, 258–61, Medina Sidonia to Philip, 24 June 1588, repeating what he had written in February (in a letter not yet found).

24.

Oria, 152, Idiáquez and Moura to Medina Sidonia, 22 Feb. 1588.

25.

KML MSP: CR 5/82, Philip to Medina Sidonia, 11 Mar. 1588. See p. 289 above on the duke's attempt to secure favours from the king through blackmail.

26.

BMO, III, 1964, Bertendona to Philip, 15 Feb. 1588.

27.

BZ 142/171a, Philip's address to the Cortes, Jan. 1588, holograph; Oria, 152, Idiáquez and Moura to Medina Sidonia, 22 Feb. 1588.

28.

Fernández Duro, II, 9–10, Philip's Instruction to Medina Sidonia, 1 Apr 1588, minute.

29.

Maura, 258–61, Medina Sidonia to Philip, 21 and 24 June 1588.

30.

BZ 143/97 and 111, Philip to Vázquez, 18 and 28 June 1588.

31.

Oria, 210–14, Philip to Medina Sidonia, 1 July 1588.

32.

AGS *Estado* 455/320–1, Medina Sidonia to Parma, 10 June 1588, copy sent to Philip (with his comments).

33.

Canestrini and Desjardins, *Négociations*, IV, 737, Filippo Cavriana to the Tuscan government, Paris, 22 Nov. 1587; Laughton, *State Papers*, I, 358–62, Hawkins to Walsingham, 10 Aug. 1588 NS; AGS *Estado* 595/32, Idiáquez to Philip and reply, Aug. 1588.

34.

Van Meteren, *Historie*, book 15.

35.

Parker, 'Anatomy of defeat', 321, Don Alonso de Leyva to Juan Martínez de Recalde, 12 Aug. 1588. Magellan's fleet had taken three years to circumnavigate the globe, and few survivors saw Spain again in 1522.

36.

AGS *Estado* 2219/84 and 87, Philip to Parma and Medina Sidonia, 31 Aug. 1588; *idem*, fos 85–6 'Apuntamiento en materia de armada que Su Magestad mandó hazer para que se considere y resuelva entre el duque de Parma, su sobrino, y el duque de Medina Sidonia'; and *idem*, fo. 91, notes by Idiáquez dated 15 Sep. 1588.

37.

IVdeDJ 51/190, Vázquez to Philip, 4 Sep. 1588, enclosing a note from Pedro Nuñez written the previous day.

38.

Parker, 'Anatomy of defeat', 319, royal apostil on a note from Martín de Idiáquez, Oct. 1588; BZ 145/76, Mateo Vázquez to Philip, and rescript, 10 Nov. 1588.

39.

ASV NS 34/415–18 and 583–5, Novara to Montalto, 6 July and 8 Nov. 1588.

40.

Chapter Eighteen: Philip at bay, 1589–1592

1.

MHSI, LX: Ribadeneira, II, 105–11, Ribadeneira to Don Juan de Idiáquez, undated but autumn 1588.

2.

Ungerer, 'La defensa', published an annotated edition of the charges presented to Pérez in Madrid on 12 June 1584, and of his responses signed six days later. Quotations from pp. 100–4 and 148–9.

3.

Marañón, *Los procesos*, 57–9, Enríquez to Philip, Lérida, 16 Aug. 1584.

4.

AGS CJH 248/21/2, petition of Pérez to Philip, 25 Aug. 1587, with cédula of 8 Dec. 1584 on dorse.

5.

Marañón, *Los procesos*, 116–26, declaration of Enríquez, Monzón, 30 June 1585; AHPM tomo 1104/1364–1414, 'escriptura' dated 20 May 1588 concerning the auction in 1585.

6.

Marañón, *Los procesos*, 185, testimony of the count of Barajas, president of the council of Castile, 21 Sep. 1589.

7.

AGS CJH 248/21/2, petition of Pérez to Philip, 25 Aug. 1587; Marañón, *Los procesos*, 148–51, suit by Pedro de Escobedo against Pérez and Martínez for murder, presented to them 2 Sep. 1587.

8.

Marañón, *Los procesos*, 32–4, commission to Rodrigo Vázquez, undated but Aug. 1588.

9.

Ibid., 195–8, Chaves to Pérez, the Escorial, 5 and 18 Sep. 1589, notarized copies; González Palencia, *Fragmentos*, 71, 'Escrituras de concierto entre Antonio Pérez y Pedro [de] Escobedo', 29 Sep. 1589.

On the role and probable motives of Chaves, see Martínez Peñas, *El confesor*, 327–41.

10.

Marañón, *Los procesos*, 199–200, Philip's order to Rodrigo Vázquez to get this information from Antonio Pérez, and Vázquez's order to the guards, and Interrogation of Pérez, all 21 Dec. 1589.

11.

Ibid., 258–9, Auto by Pérez's judges, 14 May 1590.

12.

CODOIN, LVI, 454 and 466, part of the notarized account of the princess's confinement.

13.

Marañón, *Los procesos*, 197–8, Chaves to Pérez, 18 Sep. 1589, notarized copy.

14.

Pizarro Llorente, *Un gran patrón*, 362.

15.

AGS *Estado* 2851, unfol., 'Lo que se platicó en el Consejo de Estado a 12 de noviembre 1588', and consulta of 26 Nov. 1588 with Philip's holograph response; ACC, X, 233–43, Actas of 22, 23 and 30 Aug. 1588.

16.

ACC, X, 348–9, Acta of 7 Dec. 1588.

17.

ACC, X, 397–8 and 422–3, Acta of 8 Feb. 1589.

18.

BZ 143/203, Vázquez's proposal to the Junta de Cortes, 23 June 1589; Lilly Library, Bloomington, Indiana, *Bertendona Papers*, no. 21, Philip to Bertendona, 23 June 1589.

19.

AGS *Estado* 2219/197, Philip to Parma, 7 Sep. 1589.

20.

IVdeDJ 51/1, Vázquez to Philip, and rescript, 8 Feb. 1591.

21.

Bouza, 'Corte y protesta', 21–2, Proclamation of 29 Jan. 1591; and 30–1, quoting the confession of Juan de Soria.

22.

Luna, *Comentarios*, 29–30, prints the manifesto.

23.

Ruiz, *A king travels*, 156.

24.

CODOIN, XV, 464–5, 'Declaración de Diego de Bustamente', Jan. 1591. KB Hs 128.c.3 appears to be one of these thirty copies – perhaps the only one to survive.

25.

BL Eg. 1508/215–18, 'Relación de las causas y procesos de las personas que fueron condenadas', evidence against Tomás de Rueda and Nicolás Blanco, burned for their role in the riots of 24 May 1591.

26.

CODOIN, XII, 269, Fray Agustín Labata to Fray Andrés de Sanmillán, 20 July 1591; CODOIN, XV, 499, count of Morata to count of Chinchón, Zaragoza, 21 Aug. 1591.

27.

Luna, *Comentarios*, 178, Gandía to Idiáquez, undated but summer 1591; Lovett, 'Philip II, Antonio Pérez', 141, Junta Grande on 25 July 1591; AHN *Inq. libro* 101/226 and 208, consultas of the Suprema, 23 and 24 Nov. 1592, with royal rescripts dated 7 Dec.

28.

Lovett, 'Philip II, Antonio Pérez', 152, Junta Grande on 31 July 1591, and rescript; BL Eg. 1508/215–18, 'Relación de las causas y procesos de las personas que fueron condenadas en auto público de fee', evidence against Andrés de Naya, burned at the stake for his role in the riots of 24 Sep. 1591.

29.

Pidal, *Historia*, II, 201, Philip to the 'universidades' of Aragon, 15 Oct. 1591, and 233, to the deputies of the kingdom, 2 Nov. 1591.

30.

AHN *Inq. libro* 101/339 and 324–5, consultas of 2, 9 and 11 Jan. 1592, with royal rescripts.

31.

ACP *Bobadilla* B–7a, Bobadilla to Chinchón 1 Mar. 1592, with reply on the 10th.

32.

Gracia Rivas, *La ‘invasión’*, 157–8 and 165, Bobadilla to Philip and Chinchón, both 18 Mar. 1592.

33.

ACP *Bobadilla* B–7a, Bobadilla to Chinchón, 9 May 1592.

34.

AHN *Inq. libro* 101/283 and 264, consulta of the Junta of Aragon, 18 June and 9 Aug. 1592, with royal rescripts; BL *Eg.* 1506/180 and 186, Suprema to Philip, with rescripts, 31 Oct. and 7 Nov. 1592.

35.

Marañón, *Antonio Pérez*, 666–70, narrates the arrest, imprisonment and death of Villahermosa and the count of Aranda; quotations from the count of Luna’s *Comentarios*, and Céspedes y Meneses, *Historia apologética*.

36.

AHN *Inq. libro* 101/233, consulta of the Suprema, 7 Nov. 1592, and royal rescript.

37.

Lhermite, *Passetemps*, I, 200–1.

38.

AHN *Inq. libro* 101/226 and 208, consultas of the Suprema, 23 and 24 Nov. 1592, with royal rescripts dated 7 Dec.

39.

Lhermite, *Passetemps*, II, 206–8 (‘183 leagues’).

Chapter Nineteen: Towards the tomb – and beyond, 1593–1603

1.

Herrera, *Historia General*, III, 291; Bouza, ‘Servidumbres’, 166 (Velada

on 25 July 1590) and 174.

2.

Longlée, 272, to Henry III, 19 July 1586; Bouza, *Cartas*, 152, Philip to Catalina, 2 July 1587.

3.

Bouza, *Cartas*, 154–5, Philip to Catalina, 12 Mar. 1588; Longlée, 367, to Henry III, 30 Apr. 1588; BAV *UL* 1115/112, ‘Aviso’ from Madrid, 7 Feb. 1587.

4.

Lhermite, *Passetemps*, I, 257–8.

5.

BL *Addl.* 28,263/560–1, Vázquez to Philip, 6 Apr. 1591, and rescript; Tellechea Idígoras, *El ocaso*, 139, Caetani to Aldobrandini, 20 Oct. 1594.

6.

Tellechea Idígoras, *El ocaso*, 44–5 and 168–9, Caetani to Aldobrandini, 8 and 16 July 1596.

7.

Pérez Mínguez, *Psicología*, pp. 356–7, Gassol to Philip and rescript, 29 Sep. 1593.

8.

Cabrera de Córdoba, *Historia*, III, 1486–8, ‘La orden que se ha de guardar en la Junta que ahora he ordenado’, the Escorial, 26 Sep. 1593; Martínez Hernández, *El marqués de Velada*, 320–4.

9.

IVdeDJ 21/404, Philip to Moura, 29 Oct. 1594.

10.

AGS *Estado* 176, unfol., Philip to Don Martín de Padilla, count of Santa Gadea, 3 Oct. 1596.

11.

BL *Addl.* 20,929/104, Silva to Philip III, Apr. 1599.

12.

ACC, XII, 372–7, ‘Discurso’ of Rodrigo Vázquez de Arce, 23 Feb.

1593; *ibid.*, XVI, 166–7, Juan Vázquez de Salazar to Philip, 28 Apr. 1593.

13.

ACC, XII, 456, procurador of Seville, 19 May 1593; *ibid.*, XVI, 170, procurador of Burgos, summarized by Juan Vázquez de Salazar, 6 May 1593.

14.

ACC, XVI, 169 and 173, Philip to Vázquez de Salazar, 28 Apr. and 6 May 1593.

15.

ACC, XVI, 195–7, Philip to Vázquez de Salazar, 23 July 1593; Jago, ‘Taxation and political culture’, 52.

16.

Thompson, ‘Oposición política’, 45, Poza to Moura, 4 Apr. 1596.

17.

Céspedes del Castillo, ‘La defensa’, 403; ACC, XVI, 415–17, and XV, pp. 45–6, Philip to the Cortes, 5 July 1596.

18.

Thompson, ‘Oposición política’, 56, Philip to the Cortes, 27 Aug. 1596.

19.

BL *Addl.* 28,378/69–73v and 75–6, Poza to Moura, 9 and 13 June 1596.

20.

BL, *Addl.* 28,378/128–31, Poza to Moura, and rescript, 28/31 July 1596; Martínez Millán and Carlos Morales, *Felipe II*, 285, ‘Relación y tanteo de lo que Su Magestad deve’; Drelichman and Voth, *Lending*.

21.

Tellechea Idígoras, *El ocaso*, 183, Caetani to Aldobrandino, 30 Nov. 1596; RAG AB 604, Albert to Count Frederick van den Berg, Arras, 21 Oct. 1597. Compare the deleterious effects of the Decree of 1575 on the war in the Netherlands: chapters 12 and 13 above.

22.

Tellechea Idígoras, *El ocaso*, 183, Caetani to Aldobrandino, 30 Nov.

1596; ACC, XV, 272–3, Philip to Cortes, 28 Nov. 1596.

23.

BL Addl. 28,378/41–48v, rescript of Moura to Poza, 15 May 1596.

24.

Casey, 'Spain: a failed transition', 214 and 211.

25.

Alemán, *De la Vida del Pícaro Guzmán de Alfarache*, II, ii.

26.

HSA *Altamira* 18/IV/3c, Yepes to Philip, 1 July 1597; and 12/I/1, No. 13, Yepes to Moura, 27 May 1598.

27.

Carlos Morales, *Felipe II*, 291–310, describes the tortuous path to the general settlement (*Medio General*) agreed on 14 Nov. 1597 and published on 14 Feb. 1598. Drelichman and Voth, *Lending*, use the loan contracts in AGS *Contadurías Generales*, legajos 84–93, to calculate the total sovereign debt affected by the 1596 Default Decree at 7,048,000 ducats. By contrast, both Philip and Poza (head of the treasury) estimated the total debt early in 1596 at 14 million ducats and claimed that 'we have already spent all His Majesty's revenues until the year 1599' (pages 346–7 above) – a claim consistent with a total debt of 14 million, but not with 7 million. Now the surviving documents of the treasury of Castile (and Poza, like Drelichman and Voth, referred only to Castile) are a labyrinth, making certainty on such matters impossible; but it seems that AGS *Contadurías Generales*, legajos 84–93, contain details only on loans from bankers who agreed to lend again under the general settlement, not to all those affected by the Default Decree. Drelichman and Voth appear to be correct that the treasury imposed a 'haircut' of 20 per cent on the 7 million ducats rescheduled by the general settlement – but overlook the probability that the king also defaulted on the other 7 million. See p. 401 note 20 above for similar doubts concerning the Default Decree of 1575.

28.

Rodríguez Salgado, "Ni cerrando ni abriendo la puerta", 645 and 656, Philip to Albert, 29 July 1596 and 13 Apr. 1598.

29.

Tellechea Idígoras, *El Papado*, II, 258–64, Clement VIII to Prince Philip and to Albert and Isabella, 12 Apr. 1597.

30.

Bouza, *Cartas*, 154–5 and 165, Philip to Catalina, 12 Mar. 1588 (she married on 11 Mar. 1585), and 6 July 1589; *DHME*, IV, 181–3 (Sepúlveda's account).

31.

AGS *Estado K* 1567/64, Don Bernardino de Mendoza to Don Martín de Idiáquez, 14 Apr. 1588.

32.

AGS *PR* 29/47, 'Papel de Su Magestad Católica, que aya gloria, declarando que es su voluntad', undated but Mar. 1594.

33.

González Dávila, *Historia*, 17–18, Zúñiga to Philip, 1585.

34.

Martínez Millán and Carlos Morales, *Felipe II*, 224, bishop of Guadix to Mateo Vázquez, 15 Mar. 1586.

35.

ACA *CA* 36/325, consulta of the council of Aragon, 25 Mar. 1594; Tellechea Idígoras, *El ocaso*, 221 and 213, Caetani to Aldobrandini, 10 Sep. and 22 Jan. 1597; Danvila y Burguero, *Don Cristóbal*, 701, Don Juan de Silva to Moura, Jan. 1599.

36.

González Dávila, *Historia*, 26–30; Atarés, 'Consejos instructivos', 170–2.

37.

Cervera, *Testamento auténtico*, 109–16.

38.

AGS *PR* 29/37, 'Papel de Su Magestad Cathólica, que aya gloria, hecho a 5 de agosto de 1598'. *FBD*, Appendix III, explains why I consider this to be the 'other paper of advice' that Philip gave his son.

39.

Martínez Hernández, *El marqués de Velada*, 344 n. 126, Velada to Archduke Albert, 6 July 1597; Lhermite, *Passetemps*, II, 1.

40.

Feros, *Kingship*, 48, duke of Feria to Thomas Fitzherbert, 28 Feb. 1597 and 1 June 1598; Tellechea Idígoras, *El ocaso*, 256, 'Aviso' from Madrid, 11 July 1598.

41.

Martínez Hernández, *El marqués de Velada*, 354–5, Velada to Juan de Sosa, the Escorial, 10 Sep. 1598 – three days before Philip's death.

42.

Eire, *From Madrid*, 269, quoting Pérez de Herrera, *Elogio*; Sigüenza, 167; Tellechea Idígoras, *El ocaso*, 255–6, 'Aviso' from Madrid, 11 July 1598.

43.

Vargas-Hidalgo, 'Documentos', 410, from a Relation apparently sent by Moura to Archduke Albert.

44.

Tellechea Idígoras, *El ocaso*, 97 and 264–7, Caetani to Aldobrandini, the Escorial, 17 Aug. 1598, the same day as the audience; AGS PR 29/39, 'Papel de Su Magestad', 19 Aug. 1598 (on Charles V's Instruction of 1548, see chapter 2).

45.

Lhermite, *Passetemps*, II, 115–19.

46.

Sigüenza, 177; Lhermite, *Passetemps*, II, 123; Eire, *From Madrid*, 322–47.

47.

Sigüenza, 180.

48.

Lhermite, *Passetemps*, II, 145–7; Sigüenza, 189.

49.

Sigüenza, 189.

50.

Cervera de la Torre, *Testimonio auténtico*, 134; *Glorias efímeras* reproduces the thirteen surviving funeral canvases displayed in Florence.

51.

BR Ms II-2214/68, Juan Ramírez Freile to Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, 12 Sep. 1598; Fernández Álvarez, *Madrid bajo Felipe II*, 31, resolution of the Madrid city council, 13 Sep. 1598.

52.

Eire, *From Madrid*, 257 and 300–1; BR Ms II/2459, ‘Justas poéticas celebradas en Salamanca’.

53.

AM Palencia *Libro de Acuerdos, 1595–1600*, fos 362–3, resolution of 25 Sep. 1598; AM Cádiz Ms. 10.001, ‘Libro de Acuerdos’ 1596–9, fos 127–135v and 142–144v, resolutions of 22 Sep., 8, 19 and 26 Oct., and 23 and 27 Nov. 1598.

54.

García Bernal, ‘Las exequias’, 117–18, resolution of 17 Sep. 1598; Cervantes Saavedra, ‘Al tûmulo del Rey Felipe II en Sevilla’, based on the translation in Laskia Martin, *Cervantes*, 210.

55.

Carvajal y Mendoza, *Epistolario*, 98, to Isabel de Velasco, 15 Sep. 1598; AMAE (P) *MDFDE* 239/49–93v and 417–39, Ibañez de Santa Cruz, ‘Las causas de que resultó el ignorante y confuso gobierno que hubo en el tiempo del Rey nuestro señor, que sea en gloria’. See the discussion on this work in Feros, *Kingship*, 61–2.

56.

Álamos de Barrientos, *Discurso político*, 27–8, 31 (this tract, although unpublished until the nineteenth century, circulated widely in manuscript).

57.

Iñiguez de Lequerica, *Sermones funerales*, fos 85v–86, Ayala sermon on 15 Nov. 1598; Mariana, *De rege*, 359; González de Cellorigo, *Memorial*, 94.

58.

CSPV, IX, 346, Soranzo to Doge and Senate, 27 Sep. 1598; AGS *Estado* 840/166, Padilla to Felipe III, 10 Dec. 1601.

59.

Martínez Hernández, *El marqués de Velede*, 357, Velada to Juan de Sosa, 13 Sep. 1598; Cervera de la Torre, *Testimonio*, 130.

60.

González Dávila, *Historia*, 48; Quevedo, *Obras*, II, 438b; Bouza, 'Felipe II sube', 305; Antigua, *Desengaño*, 82–3 and 116–17.

61.

Daza, *Quarta parte*, 266–7.

62.

Ibid., 267 (arithmetic was clearly not Daza's strong suit: five years, not four, separated the king's death in September 1598 from the vision in September 1603); dedication and pp. 137–8 (on Charles).

Epilogue

1.

Iñiguez de Lequerica, *Sermones funerales*, sermon of Terrones, fos 16–17. (Porreño, *Dichos*, 21, quoted part of this sermon, with variations, but attributed it to Fray Antonio de León.)

2.

Douais, I, 204, Fourquevaux to Charles IX, 15 Apr. 1567.

3.

IVdeDJ 82/444 and 419, Sessa to Zúñiga, 28 Sep. 1600 and 9 Nov. 1602, minutes.

4.

Tellechea Idígoras, *El ocaso*, 105–7 and 286–8, 'Juicio sobre Felipe II' by Camillo Caetani, Madrid, 13 Sep. 1598; Serrano, I, 316–17, Philip to Requesens, 12 Aug. 1566; AGS *Estado* 2855, unfol., 'Sumario de los quatro papeles principales que dio el presidente Richardot' and 'Lo que Su Magestad es servido que se responda a los quatro papeles' (11 Sep. 1589).

5.

Diego Pérez de Mesa, *Política o razón de Estado*, quoted by Carlos Morales, *Felipe II*, 336.

6.

Kervijn de Lettenhove, *Relations politiques*, VII, 397, Thomas Wilson to Walsingham, 27 Dec. 1574.

7.

BZ 144/61, Vázquez to Philip, and reply, 31 May 1575.

8.

Galende Díaz and Salamanca López, *Epistolario*, 238–41, Empress María to Philip, 13 Feb. 1572.

9.

CCG, I, 314–18, Granvelle to Philip, 19 May 1566; AGS *Estado* 2843/7, consulta of the council of State, 5 Sep. 1577, opinions of the duke of Alba and Cardinal Quiroga.

10.

Levi, *The drowned and the saved*, 48.

11.

BMO, I, 62–4, Philip to Alba, 14 Sep. 1571.

12.

Herrera Oria, *La Armada*, 210–14, Philip to Medina Sidonia, 1 July 1588; Raleigh, *A history of the world*, 407. See also the similar analysis by the Venetian ambassador in 1587 of why Philip refused to heed his field commanders: pp. 313–14 above.

13.

BL *Addl. Ms* 28,336/76, Dr Velasco to Espinosa, 9 Aug. 1571.

14.

Elliott, 'Felipe II y la monarquía española', 43–4.

15.

IVdeDJ 61/325, Philip rescript to Pedro de Hoyo, undated (but early Aug. 1563); Cabié, *Ambassade*, 432–3, 'Notes diverses' by the French ambassador, Oct. 1566.

16.

AGNM *Mercedes* V/248–249v, Philip to Don Martin de Velasco, 2 Feb. 1561; BMO, I, 64, Philip to Alba, 14 Sep. 1571.

17.

BMO, III, 1274, Philip to Santa Cruz, 21 Oct. 1587. Brendecke, *Imperium*, provides many more examples of self-delusion: see especially chap. 7, 'Entera noticia'.

18.

Botero's *Dalla Ragion di Stato* (1589) and *Relationi universali* (1591) quoted by Gil, 'Visión europea', 79.

19.

Sigüenza, 99; [Eliot,] *Ortho-epia Gallica*, 44–5; ambassadors quoted by Hillgarth, *The mirror*, 96.

20.

Sigüenza, 408–11, an impressive analysis of the economic impact of 'El dinero que se ha gastado en esta fábrica'.

21.

Mulcahy, *Philip II*, 312 n. 2, marquis of Velada to count of Benavente, the Escorial, 25 Nov. 1590.

22.

ASV NS 19/192, Novara to Rusticucci, 3 May 1587; BCR Ms 2417/39, Silva to Esteban de Ibarra, 13 Aug. 1589.

Note on Sources

1.

Mercedes Noviembre, the organizing genius of the library, published a short history: *La Biblioteca de Francisco de Zabálburu*. For more details, see Llera Llorente, *La Biblioteca Francisco de Zabálburu*.

2.

Osma, *Instituto de Valencia de Don Juan*. Osma modelled the Instituto on the Hispanic Society of America, founded in 1904 by Archer M. Huntington, with whom he 'had a friendly rivalry' for acquiring material: Proske, *Archer Milton Huntington*, 16–17. It therefore seems an amazing coincidence that each man, unknown to the other, acquired an important part of the Altamira collection.

3.

Gayangos, *Catalogue*; Micheli, *Inventaire* (a catalogue modelled on that prepared by Gayangos for the British Museum collection). On the European story of the collection, see Andrés, 'La dispersión'.

4.

I thank Mitchell Coddington, John O'Neill and Patrick Lenaghan of the Hispanic Society of America for information, assistance with the

cataloguing, and general encouragement in the 'Altamira project'. See also Rodríguez-Moñino and Brey Mariño, *Catálogo*, III, 12–52 (on Sancho Rayón), 53–106 (on the marquis de Jerez de los Caballeros) and 158 (the sale contract for the 'entire library' of the marquis, 15 Jan. 1902). In addition, BR, AHN, the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh and the Biblioteca Menéndez y Pelayo in Santander all hold other fragments of the Altamira collection.

5.

Riba, *Correspondencia privada*, printed half of BL Addl. 28,263. Although he entitled it 'volume 1', Riba died soon after transcribing the material and no more volumes ever appeared.

6.

Heredia Herrera, *Catálogo*, printed an analysis of over 4,000 consultas and the full text of Philip's rescripts (vol. I covers 1529–91, vol. II covers 1592–9) – but only of consultas in AGI, not those in other collections.

7.

BL Egerton 1506, one of seven volumes of Inquisition papers purchased in 1856, contains consultas from Inquisitor-General Gaspar de Quiroga to Philip on a wide variety of issues 1574–95, with his holograph rescripts.

8.

AHN OM 3509–3512, entitled 'Papeles curiosos', are full of papers about Philip's plans to intervene in England and France. They should be in AGS *Estado*.

9.

AGS *Estado K*, the papers of the council of State concerning France, returned from Paris in 1942, have been heavily used. By contrast, documents stolen from other series, now filed in AGS *Estado* 8334–8343, have been little used, even though two detailed catalogues were made when they were still in Paris: Daumet, 'Inventaire'; and Paz, *Catálogo*. AMAE (P) still has photocopies of all the documents returned, as well as a few originals retained.

10.

To sample this wonderful resource, type PARES [Portal de Archivos Españoles] into your browser and choose the option 'Búsqueda Sencilla'. Under 'Buscar' type 'Felipe II', in 'fechas' enter '1597' and '1598', and select the option 'registros digitizados'. The next screen

offers different ‘archivos y fondos’, from which choose ‘Archivo de Simancas, Patronato Real’. Eight of the 66 documents displayed are the last documents ever signed by the king, in August 1598, discussed in chapter 19 above. Wherever you live, you can now read each document online, and print out whatever interests you.

11.

HHSTA *Hofkorrespondenz*, Kartons 1 and 2, contain letters from Philip and his sister Juana to their Habsburg relatives; Galende Díaz and Salamanca López, *Epistolario*, published María’s holograph letters to her brother in AA; BL *Addl.* 28,264 and AGS *Estado K* 1490 contain Philip’s holograph letters to the duke of Savoy, 1557–8. Giovanna Altadonna, ‘Cartas’, published 117 of his letters to Duke Charles Emmanuel of Savoy.

12.

FCDM AH 166 R7–20, Philip to Feria, 7 Dec. 1558; Allinson, *A monarchy*, chaps 3 and 4. Rayne Allinson and Geoffrey Parker are preparing a scholarly edition of Mary’s drafts of two letters to Philip.

13.

Bouza, *Cartas*, published 39 letters written 1581–5, mostly to both daughters, and 94 written to Catalina in 1585–96. Catalina’s letters, in BL *Addl.* 28,419, remain unpublished.

14.

Bouza Álvarez, ‘Guardar papeles’, discussed the history and size of their archive, and published the inventory of the 766 legajos and 54 libros left by Zúñiga at his death in 1586.

15.

March, *Niñez*, published many papers from the Arxiu about educating ‘Felipito’.

16.

The two ‘Recueils de la correspondance de Granvelle’, containing messages exchanged between the cardinal and Philip II and his closest advisers 1579–84, were BRB MS 9471–2 and 9473 until 1979, but in that year they became AGRB *Manuscripts Divers* 5459 and 5460, respectively. CCG, XII, published some of these documents, but with numerous errors of transcription. PEG and CCG published most of his correspondence in BRB, albeit with an important hiatus in 1564–5.

17.

The magnificent *Epistolario del III duque de Alba* published most of the letters written by the duke, but not those he received. *CODOIN* IV and XXXVII contain many royal letters to Alba while in the Netherlands; and *CODOIN* XXXII, XXXIII and XXXV contain many more written during the Portuguese campaign. AA *cajas* 5–8 contain the duke's correspondence with Philip and *cajas* 26–56 his correspondence with others, especially during his tenure as governor-general of the Netherlands, arranged alphabetically by correspondent.

18.

Maura Gamazo, *El diseño*, published excerpts from the royal letters now in Santa Barbara.

19.

See details in Dierickx, 'Les "Carte Farnesiane" de Naples'. Luckily, many more of Parma's papers survived than Dierickx feared and they may be consulted in ASN (albeit some are charred around the edges). Gachard's copies from ASN are in AGRB *Collection Gachard* 565, 572 and 666. Léon van der Essen copied many letters by and about Philip into his 'Cahiers'. Some are now in the university archives at Louvain-la-Neuve, but others remain in private hands.

20.

Fernández Álvarez, *Testamento*, 92–3. The three surviving letters (Fernández, *Historia*, 278–9; HSA *Altamira* 18/IV/3c and 12/I/1, No. 13) are discussed in chapters 5 and 19 above.

21.

Marañón, *Antonio Pérez*, 1040–2, listed the various editions of Pérez's work, and discussed them in chap. 30. Alfredo Alvar Ezquerro published a critical version of the 1598 edition of *Relaciones y Cartas*. *FBD* Appendix I explains why the source is tainted.

22.

Morel-Fatio, 'La vie'.

23.

Serrano y Sanz, *Autobiografía y memorias*, 151–210. See also Lynn, *Between court and confessional*, chap. 2.

24.

Tellechea Idígoras, *Fray Bartolomé Carranza. Documentos históricos*.

25.

Paris, *Négociations*; Cabié, *Ambassade*; Douais, *Dépêches*; Mousset, *Dépêches*; Brunetti and Vitale, *Corrispondenza*.

26.

State Papers Online: the Tudors, 1509–1603, Part II, provides not only the calendars in ‘searchable’ form but also a link to the digitized original of each document calendared.

27.

Firpo, *Relazioni*, VIII, 232–938; Serrano, *Correspondencia*; Voci, ‘L’impresa’; Mosconi, *La nunziatura di Spagna*; Tellechea Idígoras, *El caso*.

28.

Khevenhüller, *Diario*; Khevenhüller-Metsch and Probst-Ohstorff, *Hans Khevenhüller*.

29.

BNF Ms f.f. 16,104–16,108 contain St Gouard’s dispatches; IANTT TSO CG livros 209 and 210 are Pereira’s own registers of his correspondence. CSPV contains long English summaries of the dispatches from Venetian ambassadors in Spain that concerned England.

30.

Details in Kagan, *El rey recatado*.

31.

Kagan, ‘La Historia’, 105–6, quoting from Herrera’s own account of the audience, written in 1599.

32.

Orazio della Rena, *Compendio della vita di Filippo secondo re di Spagna* (BNF Ms Italien 446); see Volpini, ‘D’un silence’.

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Since more has been written about Philip II than about any other European ruler except Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler, a comprehensive bibliography of works about him would require a book in itself. The list below provides details only for printed works cited in the notes.

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Acknowledgements

I first saw the handwriting of Philip II in the Archivo General de Simancas in July 1966 and marvelled that anyone could read it. In those days, graduate students were expected to learn palaeography ‘on the job’ and, although I have never had formal instruction in the matter, after almost half a century ‘on the job’ I have made some progress – but only thanks to the archivists who have helped me out when a word or phrase defied me. My greatest debt, one common to all historians of Habsburg Spain, is therefore to the learned archivists of Simancas. In 1592, Philip II visited Simancas and stayed in the fortress. His valet, Jehan Lhermite from Antwerp, took a tour of the archive and reported that the documents ‘had been organized there so well that it is possible to find what one seeks immediately’.¹ Nothing had changed in 1966 when Ricardo Magdaleno (Director) and Asunción de la Plaza (Superintendent of the Reading Room) first welcomed me, nor yet in 2008 when I last took my leave of José Luis Rodríguez de Diego (Director) and Isabel Aguirre Landa (Superintendent of the Reading Room). Without these dedicated archivists, their colleagues and the ‘researcher-friendly’ method of archive management unique to Simancas, this book could never have been written.

From Simancas, in 1966 I went to Madrid and worked in the Biblioteca Nacional, the Archivo Histórico Nacional and the Instituto de Valencia de Don Juan. I have returned repeatedly to each of them since then, and also carried out research in the Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, the Biblioteca Real, the Real Academia de la Historia, the Archivo de la Casa de los

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Finally, I would like to thank six people without whom this book would not exist: Sir John Plumb, Ana Bustelo, Robert Baldock, Cameron Jones, Ruth MacKay and Sir John Elliott.

J. H. Plumb (as he then was) commissioned the precursor of this biography. I first met him in 1961, when he interviewed me for admission to Christ’s College, Cambridge, to read History. Little did I realize then what an impact he would have on my academic life. He taught me throughout my undergraduate career, setting the standards, in his own writing and teaching, to which I still aspire. Plumb never ‘let go’ of his students, and he later convinced the Fellows of Christ’s College to award me scholarships that financed fifteen months of dissertation research in European archives, and then to elect me to a four-year Research Fellowship, which gave me time to return to the archives and accumulate data to turn my thesis into a book and also to begin research on future books – three of which he commissioned: *The Dutch Revolt; Europe in Crisis 1598–1648*; and *Philip II*, which Little, Brown published in their ‘Library of World Biography’ in 1978. Without Plumb’s invitation, I might never have written a life of Philip; and if I had, it would certainly have taken a different form.

Although the Little, Brown edition of *Philip II* eventually went out of print, other publishers re-issued it. In each case, I provided a new introduction and an updated bibliography, but left the text much the same. Then in 2007, Ana Bustelo of Editorial Planeta invited me to produce a thoroughly revised edition, one that incorporated all the new primary and secondary material that had become available since 1978. We anticipated a volume perhaps twice the size of the original, but I produced a text almost five times as long and it appeared in 2010: *Felipe II. La biografía*

definitiva. Given the apparently inexhaustible interest of Spanish readers in Philip, the following year Ana asked if I would produce a shorter version of the book: one with a slimmed-down apparatus criticus and only half of the original text. Robert Baldock of Yale University Press also asked me to produce an English version. I found it relatively easy to slim down the apparatus criticus, but I found murdering half my text impossible. Luckily Cameron Jones of the Ohio State University and Ruth MacKay of Stanford took on this arduous task and showed my text no mercy. I could not have produced this book without them, and I stand amazed at their editorial skills.

My final debt is one shared by all who study early modern Spanish History. I first met J. H. Elliott in 1964 when he delivered a course of lectures in an undergraduate course at Cambridge. One of those lectures contained an idea that I found immensely attractive, how Philip made use of what became known as ‘The Spanish Road’ in trying to suppress the Dutch Revolt by force, and he helped me to turn the subject into my doctoral thesis. Over the past fifty years he has been an unfailing source of inspiration, wisdom and good advice, and he has also saved me from many foolish errors. I dedicate this new biography to Sir John Elliott, just as I dedicated its precursor in 1978, with gratitude, admiration and affection.

Geoffrey Parker

Cambridge – St Andrews – Urbana – New Haven – Columbus,
1966–2014

1.

Lhermite, *Passetemps*, I, 143.

Index

- Aalst (i), (ii)
- ‘Academy’ of the duke of Alba (i)
- Acosta, José de (i), (ii)
- Acuña, Hernando de (i)
- Acuña, Don Martín de (i)
- Africa (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv)
- Aguirre, Lope de (i), (ii) n. 32
- Álamos de Barrientos, Balthasar (i), (ii) n. 56
- Álava, Don Francés de (i), (ii)
- Alba, Don Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, third duke of: as royal councillor (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii); and the Netherlands (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix) n. 28, plate 28; and England (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii); and Portugal (i), (ii), (iii), (iv); archive of (i), (ii) n. 17
- Alba, Don Fadrique Álvarez de Toledo, fourth duke of (i)
- Albania (i)
- Albert, archduke (Philip II’s nephew) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
- Alcalá, Fray Diego de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
- Alcalá, Fray Julián de, (i), plate 45
- Alcalá de Henares (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)
- Alcalá, university in, *see* Complutense University
- Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, José (i)
- Alcázar, Madrid, *see* Madrid Alcázar
- Alcazarquivir, battle of (i)
- Alemán, Mateo (i)
- Alençon and Anjou, François Hercules duke of (i)
- Algiers (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)

Alkmaar (i), (ii)
 Almenara, Iñigo López de Mendoza, marquis of (i), (ii), (iii)
 Alpujarras, revolt of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix)
 Altamira archive (i), (ii), (iii) n. 4
 Álvarez, Vicente (i), (ii), (iii)
 Álvarez de Toledo, don Fadrique *and* Don Fernando de, *see* Alba, dukes of
 America (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii),
 (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv),
 (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii), (xxxiii),
 (xxxiv), (xxxv)
 Ana of Austria (Don John's illegitimate daughter) (i)
 Anguissola, Sofonisba (i), (ii), plates 19, 29
 Anjou, duke of *see* Alençon and Anjou
 Anne of Austria (Philip II's fourth wife) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii),
 (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii)
 Antigua, Sor María de la (i)
 Antonio, Don, Pretender to the Portuguese throne (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v),
 (vi), (vii), (viii)
 Antwerp (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), plates 7, 15, 16
 Aragon (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii),
 (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv),
 (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii), (xxxiii),
 (xxxiv), (xxxv); revolt of, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), plate 42; *see also* Pérez,
 Antonio
 Aragón, Hernando de, archbishop of Zaragoza and viceroy of Aragon (i)
 Aramaic (i), (ii)
 Aranjuez (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii),
 (xiv), (xv), (xvi)
 Arévalo (i), (ii)
 Arias Montano, Benito (i)
 Armada, Spanish (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi),
 (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii),
 (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii)
 n 57, (xxxiii) n. 12
 Armenteros, Judge (*alcalde de Casa y Corte*) (i)
 Army of Flanders, Spanish (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)
 Arras, bishop of, *see* Perrenot de Granvelle, Antoine
 Artois (i)
 Asculi, prince of (i), (ii)
 assassination attempts against Philip (i)
 Asturias (i)
 Atlantic (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii)
 Augsburg (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Augustine, Saint (i)

Augustus, Roman emperor (i)
Ávila (i), (ii), (iii)
Ávila, Juan de (i)
Ávila, Teresa de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
Ayala, Fray Lorenzo de (i)
Azores (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), plate 38
Aztec empire (i)

Babington, Anthony (i)
Badajoz (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
Badoer, Alberto (i)
Bahamas (i)
Barahona, Juan de (i), (ii) n. 13
Barajas (i)
Barajas, Don Francisco Zapata y Cisneros, count of, president of the
council of Castile (i), (ii)
Barcelona (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii)
Bayonne, conference at (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), plate 29
Béarn (i), (ii), (iii)
Berg, Count William van den (i), (ii)
Bergen, Jean de Glymes, marquis of (i), (ii)
Bergerac, peace of, (i)
Bertendona, Martin de (i), (ii)
Bible (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), plates 15 and 16
Bilbao (i)
Binche (i)
Bío Bío river (i)
Bizerta (i), (ii), (iii)
Blois (Blosius), Louis de (i)
Blomberg, Barbara (Don John's mother) (i), (ii)
Bobadilla, Don Francisco de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
Bolea, Bernardo de (i), (ii)
Borja, Francisco de, fourth duke of Gandía and later Jesuit General, (i),
(ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)
Bosque de Segovia, El (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
Botero, Giovanni (i)
Brabant, duchy of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)
Braganza, duke of (i)
Breda (i), (ii), (iii)
Brussels (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii),
(xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv),
(xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii), (xxxiii),
(xxxiv), (xxxv), (xxxvi), (xxxvii), (xxxviii), (xxxix), (xl), (xli), (xlii),
(xliii), (xliv), (xlv), (xlvi), (xlvii), (xlviii), (xlix), (l), (li), (lii), (liii), (liv),
(lv), (lvi), (lvii), (lviii), (lix)

Burghley, Lord, *see* Cecil, William

Burgos (i), (ii), (iii)

Burgundy, duchy of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)

Burgundy, county of, *see* Franche Comté of Burgundy

Cabezón, Antonio (i)

Cabrera de Córdoba, Luis (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix) n. 8,
plate 13

Cádiz (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix)

Caesar, Julius (i)

Caetani, Camillo (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)

Calais (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)

Calvete de Estrella, Juan Cristóbal (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)

Cambrai (i)

Campanella, Tommaso (i)

Canaries (i)

Cantabria (i), (ii), (iii)

Canto del mío Cid, *see* *Song of El Cid*

Cape Finisterre (i)

Cape Verde Islands (i)

Caraffa, Gian Pietro, *see* Paul IV

Carlos Lorenzo (son of Philip II and Anne) (i), (ii)

Carranza de Miranda, Fray Bartolomé (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii),
(viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi) n. 26; plate 26

Carlos, Don (son of Philip II and María Manuela), birth and upbringing (i),
(ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) n. 26; education of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv),
(v), (vi), (vii) n. 22, plate 35; marriage plans (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi);
as prince (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi); erratic behaviour, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv);
arrest and imprisonment of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii); and Isabel
de Valois (i), (ii), (iii); afterlife (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) n. 2,
plate 22

Caribbean (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)

Carvajal y Mendoza, Luisa de (i)

Casa de Campo (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)

Cascais (i), (ii)

Casey, James (i)

Castiglione, Baldassare (i)

Castile, kingdom of: core of the Spanish monarchy (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v),
(vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii),
(xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii);
census in (i); disease in (i), (ii), (iii); Moriscos in, (i), (ii); unification
with Portugal (i); unrest in (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix),
(x), (xi), (xii); *see also* Cortes of Castile

Castro, Fray Alonso de (i)

Castro, Don Rodrigo de, archbishop of Seville (i), (ii)

Catalina Michaela, infanta (daughter of Philip II and Isabel), (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv) n. 33, (xvi) n. 13, plate 32
 Catalonia (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Cateau-Cambrésis, peace of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii)
 Catherine de' Medici, queen regent of France (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)
 Catherine, queen of Portugal (Philip II's aunt) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Catholic monarchs, *see* Ferdinand the Catholic *and* Isabella the Catholic
 Caverel, Philippe de (i), (ii)
 Cazorla (i)
 Cebu, Philippines (i) n. 33
 Cecil, William, Lord Burghley (i)
 Cellorigo, *see* González de Cellorigo
 Cervantes, Miguel de (i), (ii)
 Céspedes del Castillo, Guillermo (i)
 Channel, English (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii)
 Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor (Philip II's father): inheritance (i), (ii); marriage (i), (ii), (iii); and mother (i), (ii); and Philip (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii) n. 2; illegitimate children (i), (ii), (iii); and England, (i); and Moriscos xx, (i); heritage of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), plates 3 and 8
 Charles IX, king of France (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)
 Charles, Archduke of Styria (i)
 Chaves, Fray Diego de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv) n. 9
 Chichimecas (i)
 Chile (i)
 China (i)
 Chinchón, Don Pedro de Cabrera, second count of (i)
 Chinchón, Don Diego Fernández de Cabrera, third count of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Cicero (i)
 Cifuentes, Don Juan Baltazar de Silva, sixth count of (i)
 Clausewitz, Carl von (i)
 Clement VIII, pope (i), (ii)
 Coello, Doña Juana (i), (ii), (iii) n. 6, *see also* Pérez, Antonio
 Cohen, Eliot (i)
 Coimbra (i)
 Coligny, Gaspard de (i), (ii)
 Como, cardinal of (i)
 Complutense University (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Compromise, the (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Comunero rebellion (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)

Constantinople (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi)
 Córdoba (i), (ii), (iii) n. 17
 Córdoba, Don Diego de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)
 Corfu (i)
 Cornwall (i)
 Corsica (i)
 Cortes of Castile (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii),
 (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii)
 Cortés, Don Martín, marquis del Valle (i), (ii)
 Corunna (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii)
 council of Castile (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi),
 (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii),
 (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv); *see also* Cortes of Castile
 council of Finance (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii)
 council of the Indies (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix)
 council of the Inquisition, *see* Suprema
 council of Italy (i), (ii)
 council of Trent, *see* Trent, council of
 council of Troubles (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 council of War (i)
 Covarrubias, Don Diego de (i), (ii)
 Cranmer, Thomas (i)
 Crete (i), (ii)
 Cyprus (i), (ii), (iii)

Dacre, Lady Magdalen (i), (ii) n. 53
 Danube river (i)
 David, king of Israel (i), (ii)
 Daza, Fray Antonio de (i), (ii) n. 62
 Default Decrees (*Decretos de Suspensión*) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii)
 Delgado, Juan (i), (ii), (iii)
 Den Brielle (i), (ii)
 Denmark (i), (ii)
 Descalzas Reales, convent of the (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii)
 Deventer, Jacob van (i)
 Diego, prince (son of Philip II and Anne) (i), (ii), (iii)
 Dietrichstein, Baron Adam von (i), (ii), (iii)
 Djerba (island of, also called Los Gelves) (i), (ii), (iii)
 Dominican Order (i)
 Donà, Leonardo (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), plate
 12
 Donlope, Miguel (i)
 Doria, Gian (Juan) Andrea (i), (ii), (iii)
 Dovara, Luigi (i), (ii), (iii)
 Dover (i), (ii)

Drake, Sir Francis (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii)
 Drelichman, Mauricio (i) n. 15, (ii) n. 20, (iii) n. 27
 Dudley, Lord Robert, later earl of Leicester (i), (ii)
 Duffy, Eamon (i)
 Dunkirk (i), (ii)
 Dutch Revolt (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii)

Éboli, Ana de Mendoza y de la Cerda, princess of (widow of Ruy Gómez de Silva) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix) n. 17, (xx); (i) n. 42; *see also* Pérez, Antonio

Edward VI, king of England and Ireland (i)
 Egmont, Lamoral, count of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii)
 Eire, Carlos (i), (ii)
 Eleanor, queen of France (Philip II's aunt) (i)
 El Greco (Domenikos Theotokopoulos) (i)
 Eliot, John (i), (ii)
 Elizabeth I, queen of England (Philip's sister-in-law): accession of (i), (ii), (iii); Philip seeks to marry (i), (ii), (iii), (iv); break with Rome (i), (ii), (iii); Philip makes peace with (i); and the Netherlands (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii); Spanish plans to depose (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii); attacks Spain (i), (ii), (iii), (iv); correspondence of (i)
 Elliott, Sir John (i)
 England, kingdom of, Philip's policy toward (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v); rise of Protestantism in, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi); under King Philip (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi); Spanish plans to invade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx); *see also* Elizabeth I, queen
 Enriquez, Antonio (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) n. 24
 Enriquez, Don Martín (i)
 Enterprise of England (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii)
 Erasmus, Desiderius (i), (ii)
 Eraso, Francisco de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) n. 39, (viii) n. 43, (ix) n. 4
 Ernest (Philip II's nephew) (i), (ii)
 Escobedo, Bartolomé de (i)
 Escobedo, Juan de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi) n. 44, (xvii) nn. 17, 20
 Escobedo, Pedro de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 El Escorial, *see* San Lorenzo de El Escorial
 Espinosa, Cardinal Diego de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv) n. 29, plate 30

Espinosa, Gabriel de (i), plate 34
Espinosa, Juan Fernández, *see* Fernández de Espinosa
Esquivel, Pedro de (i)
Essex, Robert Devereux, earl of (i)
Extremadura (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)

Farnese, Alexander, prince of Parma *see* Parma, Alexander Farnese
Ferdinand I, (Charles V's brother) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi)
Ferdinand the Catholic, king of Aragon (Philip's great-grandfather) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii)
Fernández de Espinosa, Juan (i), (ii)
Fernando, prince of Spain (first son of Philip and Anne of Austria) (i), (ii), (iii); plate 30
Fernando, Philip II's brother (i), (ii)
Feria, Don Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, count and later duke of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
Ficino, Marsilio (i)
Finale Ligure (i), (ii), (iii)
Flanders, province of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii); French invasion of, (i); religious state of (i), (ii), (iii); *see also* Netherlands
Florida (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii)
Flower, William (i)
Flushing (i), (ii)
Fonseca, Don Alonso de (i)
Fourquevaux, Raymond de Pavie, Baron (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii)
France, kingdom of: and Charles V (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii); and Philip II (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii), (xxxiii), (xxxiv), (xxxv), (xxxvi), (xxxvii), (xxxviii), (xxxix); and Dutch Revolt (i), (ii), (iii), (iv); religious situation in (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix); diplomatic relations with Spain (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) n 8, 9; peace with Spain (i), (ii)
Franche-Comté of Burgundy (i)
Francis I, king of France (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)
Francis II, king of France and Scotland (i)
Franco, Francisco (i), (ii) n. 28
Fresneda, Fray Bernardo de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
Freud, Sigmund (i)
Friesland, province of (i), (ii)
Fugger, Anton (i)

Galapagar (i)
 Galicia (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii)
 Gandía, Francisco de Borja, fourth duke of, *see* Borja, Francisco de
 Gandía, Carlos de Borja, fifth duke of (i)
 García de Toledo, Álvaro (i), (ii), (iii)
 Gassol, Jerónimo (i), (ii), (iii)
 Gayangos, Pascual de (i), (ii), (iii) n. 3
 Gaztelu, Martín de (i), (ii) n. 17
 Geertruidenberg (i)
 Gelderland (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Gelves, Los, *see* Djerba
 General Settlement of royal debts, *see* *Medio General*
 Genoa, republic of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x)
 Gérard, Balthasar (i), (ii)
 Gérard, Véronique (i)
 Germany (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi)
 Ghent (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii)
 Ghent, Pacification of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Gilbert, Sir Humphrey (i)
 Golden Fleece, Order of the (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), plates 8, 32
 Gómez de Silva, Ruy (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi),
 (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii),
 (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix) n. 54, (xxx) n. 11; *see*
 also Éboli, princess of
 González de Cellorigo, Martín (i)
 Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, José Luis (i), (ii) n. 14
 Gouda, (i), (ii), plate 17
 Gracián y Dantisco, Antonio (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Granada (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii)
 Granada, war of, *see* Alpujarras
 Granada, Fray Luis of (i), (ii)
 Granvelle, Cardinal, *see* Perrenot de Granvelle, Antoine
 Gravelines, battle of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Greece (i)
 Gregory XIII, pope (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii)
 Groenendaal, convent of (i), (ii), (iii)
 Guadalajara (i), (ii)
 Guadalupe (i), (ii), (iii)
 Guadarrama mountains (i), (ii), (iii)
 Guatemala (i)
 Guise, François of Lorraine, duke of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) n. 49
 Guzmán el Bueno, Don Alonso Pérez de, *see* Medina Sidonia
 Guzmán, Doña Eufrasia de (i)
 Guzmán, Doña Magdalena de (i)

Guzmán de Alfarache (De la vida del picaro), novel (i)

Guzmán de Silva, Diego (i)

Haarlem (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)

Hainaut (i), (ii)

Henry II, king of France (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)

Henry III, king of France (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)

Henry IV, king of Castile (i)

Henry IV, king of France and Navarre (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii)

Henry VII, king of England (i)

Henry VIII, king of England (i), (ii)

Henry, cardinal, regent and later king of Portugal (i)

Henry of Navarre, *see* Henry IV, king of France

Hernández, Francisco (i)

Herrera, Fernando de (i)

Herrera, Juan de (i), (ii), (iii)

Herrera y Tordesillas, Antonio de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)

Holbeek, Francis (i)

Holland, province of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv); *see also* Dutch Revolt and Netherlands

Holy League (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix)

Holy Roman Emperor, *see* Ferdinand I, Maximilian I, Maximilian II, Rudolf II

Holy Roman Empire (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii)

Hornes, Philippe de Montmorency, count of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix) n. 4

Howell, James (i), (ii)

Hoyo, Pedro de (i), (ii), (iii)

Hungary (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv)

Ibáñez de Santa Cruz, Íñigo (i), (ii), (iii) n. 55

Iconoclastic Fury (i), (ii), (iii)

Idiáquez, Don Juan de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) n. 38

Imperial Vicar (in Italy) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)

Inca (i), (ii); *see also* Peru

Incest (i)

Inquisition, Spanish (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii) n. 32, (xxviii) n. 7, plate 26

Inquisitor-General (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv); *see also* Espinosa, Diego de, Valdés, Fernando de, *and* Quiroga, Gaspar de

Insausti, assassin of Escobedo (i)

Ireland (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii),
 (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii)
 Isabel of France, queen of Castile (Philip II's third wife) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv),
 (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii)
 Isabella, Empress (Philip II's mother) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Isabella the Catholic, queen of Castile (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Isabella Clara Eugenia, infanta (daughter of Philip II and Isabel) (i), (ii),
 (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), plate 32
 Isle of Wight (i), (ii)
 Istanbul, *see* Constantinople
 Italy (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii); Philip II
 and (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii),
 (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv),
 (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii); culture of (i), (ii); support for the Enterprise of
 England, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv); and Antonio Pérez (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v); *see*
also Milan; Naples; papacy and Sicily
 Italy, council of, *see* council of Italy

 Jeronimite Order (i), (ii), (iii)
 Jerusalem (i), (ii), (iii)
 Jesuit Order (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Jesús, Teresa de, *see* Ávila, Teresa de
 John II, king of Castile (i)
 John of Austria, Don (Philip II's half-brother) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi),
 (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii),
 (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi) n. 49
 John, prince of Portugal (i), (ii)
 jousts, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), plate 6
 Juan, Honorato (i), (ii)
 Juana, princess of Portugal (Philip's sister) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi),
 (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii),
 (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii) n. 11
 Juana, queen of Castile (Philip II's grandmother) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v),
 (vi)
 Juana of Austria (Don John's illegitimate daughter) (i), (ii)
 Junta de Gobierno (i), (ii), (iii)
 Junta de Noche (i), (ii), (iii)
 Junta de Obras y Bosques (i), (ii)
 Junta de Policía (i)
 Junta Grande (i)
 Junta Magna (i), (ii), (iii) n. 14
 Junta of Presidents (i), (ii), n. 18
 Justiciar of Aragon (i), (ii), (iii)

 Kamen, Henry (i), (ii), (iii) n. 8

Kent (i), (ii)
 Khevenhüller, Hans (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), plate 30

 La Casilla (i), (ii), (iii)
 La Fresneda (i)
 La Mancha (i)
 La Rochelle (i), (ii)
 Ladrada, Don Alonso de la Cueva, marquis of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), plate 30
 Laloo, Alonso de (i)
 Lanuza, Juan de, Justiciar of Aragon (i)
 Larache (i), (ii), (iii)
 Laredo (i)
 Las Casas, Fray Bartolomé de (i)
 Las Infantas, Fernando de (i)
 Latin (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii),
 (xiv), (xv), (xvi)
 Latrás, Lupercio (i), (ii)
 Lavaña, Juan Bautista (i)
 Lepazpi, *see* López de Legazpi
 Leicester, earl of, *see* Dudley
 León, kingdom of (i)
 Leone, Pompeo (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), plate 22
 Lepanto, battle of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi),
 (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv)
 Lerma, Don Francisco Gómez de Sandoval y Zúñiga, third count of (i), (ii)
 Lerma, Don Francisco Gómez de Sandoval y Rojas, marquis of Denia and
 first duke of (i), (ii), (iii)
 Levi, Primo (i)
 Lhermite, Jehan (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii);
 plates 24, 25, 42, 44
 Lima, Peru (i)
 Lippomano, Hieronimo (i), (ii), (iii)
 Lisbon (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii),
 (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv),
 (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii)
 Liverpool (i)
 Llull, Ramon (i)
 Lombardy (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x); *see also* Milan
 London (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii),
 (xiv), (xv)
 Longlée, Pierre de Ségusson, lord of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 López de Legazpi, Miguel (i) n. 33
 López de Velasco, Juan (i)
 Loreto (i)
 Lorraine (i), (ii), (iii)

Los Cobos, Francisco de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix)
 Los Vélez, Don Pedro Fajardo, marquis of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) n. 28
 Louis IX, king of France (i)
 Low Countries, *see* Netherlands
 Loaysa Girón, García de (i)
 Lucas, George (i) n. 2
 Lucca, republic of (i), (ii), (iii)
 Ludolf of Saxony, 'The Carthusian' (i), (ii)
 Luna, Álvaro de (i)
 Luna, Don Francisco de Gurrea y Aragón, count of (i), (ii), (iii)
 Luther, Martin (i), (ii)
 Lutherans (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Luxemburg (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Lyons (i)

Machiavelli, Niccolò (i)
 Madrid (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii),
 (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv),
 (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii), (xxxiii),
 (xxxiv), (xxxv), (xxxvi), (xxxvii), (xxxviii), (xxxix), (xl), (xli), (xlii),
 (xliii), (xliv), (xlv), (xlvi), (xlvii), (xlviii), (xlix), (l), (li), (lii), (liii), (liv),
 (lv), (lvi), (lvii), (lviii), (lix), (lx)
 Madrid Alcázar (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii),
 (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii),
 (xxiv), plate 27
 Magellan, Fernando (i), (ii) n. 35
 Maleguzzi, Orazio (i)
 Mallorca (i)
 Malta (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Man, Dr John (i), (ii), (iii)
 Mandatos (i), (ii), (iii); *see also* Moriscos
 Manrique de Lara, Doña Inés (i)
 Mantua, duchy of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii)
 Manuel, king of Portugal (i)
 Manuel, Don Rodrigo (i), (ii)
 Marchena (i)
 Margaret of Parma, *see* Parma, Margaret
 Margarita, archduchess (Philip II's niece) (i), (ii), (iii)
 Margarita, archduchess (Philip II's daughter-in-law) (i), (ii)
 Margarita island (i)
 Margate (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Margot of Valois, princess of France (i), (ii), (iii)
 María, princess (daughter of Philip II and Anne) (i), (ii)
 María Manuela of Portugal, princess (Philip II's first wife) (i), (ii), (iii),
 (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii)

María, Holy Roman Empress (Philip II's sister) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi),
 (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii),
 (xix), (xx), (xxi) n. 8
 Mariana, Juan de (i)
 Marliano, Giovanni (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Martínez del Guijo, Juan, *see* Silíceo
 Martínez, Diego (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) n. 7
 Mary, duchess of Burgundy (Philip II's great-grandmother) (i), (ii), (iii)
 Mary, queen of Hungary (Philip II's aunt) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii),
 (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), plate 5
 Mary Stuart, queen of Scotland (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix),
 (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii)
 Mary Tudor, queen of England and Ireland (Philip II's second wife) (i),
 (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv),
 (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), plate 17, figure 6
 Mascarenhas, Doña Leonor de (i)
 Mauriño de Pazos, Don Antonio (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor (Philip II's great-grandfather) (i), (ii),
 (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) n. 26
 Maximilian II, Holy Roman Emperor (Philip II's brother-in-law) (i), (ii),
 (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv)
 Maximilian of Austria (Emperor Maximilian I's illegitimate son) (i), (ii)
 McNamara, Robert (i)
 Mechelen (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Medina Sidonia, Don Alonso Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno, seventh duke of
 (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv),
 (xv), (xvi) n. 23
 Medinaceli, Don Juan de la Cerda, duke of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
Medio General (i), (ii), (iii) n. 20, (iv) n. 27
 Mediterranean (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii),
 (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii),
 (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii),
 (xxxiii), (xxxiv), (xxxv), (xxxvi), (xxxvii), (xxxviii), (xxxix), (xl), (xli),
 (xlii)
 Melanchthon, Philip (i)
 Mendoza, House of (i)
 Mendoza, Doña Ana de, *see* Éboli
 Mendoza, Don Bernardino de (i)
 Mendoza, Diego de (i)
 Mendoza, Francisco de (i)
 Mendoza, Pablo de (i)
 Menéndez de Avilés, Pedro (i), (ii), (iii)
 Mérida (i)
 Messianic Imperialism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii)

Messina (i), (ii), (iii)
 Metz (i), (ii), (iii)
 Mexico, viceroyalty of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi),
 (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv) n. 33
 Michelangelo di Lodovici Buonarroto (i)
 Milan (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii),
 (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii); *see also*
 Lombardy
 Milford Haven (i)
 Miranda de Ebro (i)
 Mirandola, Pico de la (i)
 Moderation, the (i)
 Mombasa (i)
 Moncontour, battle of (i)
 Mondéjar, Don Luis Hurtado de Mendoza, marquis of (i), (ii)
 Mons (i), (ii)
 Montague, viscountess, *see* Dacre
 Montigny, Floris de Montmorency, baron of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi),
 (vii), (viii)
 Montmorency, Philippe de, *see* Hornes
Monty Python's Flying Circus (i) n. 32
 Montserrat (i), (ii)
 Mook, battle of (i)
 Mor, Antonis (i), (ii)
 Morillon, Maximilian (i), (ii)
 Moriscos (Spanish Christians of Moorish descent) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v),
 (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi); deportation of (i), (ii), (iii)
 Morisote, Luis de (i)
 Morosini, Giovanfrancesco (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Moura, Don Cristóbal de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x),
 (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi)
 Mulcahy, Rosemarie (i)
 Muñoz, Andrés (i), (ii)
 Muntanyeses of Aragon (i)
 Mur, Rodrigo de (i)
 Murcia (i), (ii)
 Murillo, Bartolomé Esteban (i)
 Muslims in Spain, *see* Moriscos

 Naarden (i), (ii)
 Naples (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii),
 (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv),
 (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx)
 Narváez, Luis de (i)
 Nassau, Count Louis of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)

Nassau, William of, *see* Orange

Navacerrada (i)

Navarre (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)

Navarre, Henry king of, *see* Henry IV of France

Netherlands, the: archives of (i), (ii); culture of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix); Charles V and (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi); England and (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix); France and (i), (ii); Philip II and (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii), (xxxiii), (xxxiv), (xxxv), (xxxvi), (xxxvii), (xxxviii), (xxxix), (xl), (xli), (xlii), (xliii), (xliv), (xlv), (xlvi), (xlvii), (xlviii), (xlix), (l), (li), (lii), (liii), (liv), (lv), (lvi), (lvii), (lviii), (lix), (lx), (lxi), (lxii), (lxiii), (lxiv), (lxv), (lxvi), (lxvii), (lxviii), (lxix), (lxx), (lxxi), (lxxii), (lxxiii), (lxxiv), (lxxv), (lxxvi), (lxxvii), (lxxviii), (lxxix), (lxxx), (lxxxii), (lxxxiii), (lxxxiv), (lxxxv), (lxxxvi); religious state of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v); *see also* Dutch Revolt; Flanders *and* Holland.

'New France', *see* Florida

New Spain, *see* Mexico

Newfoundland (i)

Norfolk, Thomas Howard, duke of (i)

North Sea (i)

Northwest Passage (i)

Olivares, Don Enrique de Guzmán, count of (i), (ii), (iii)

Olivares, Don Gaspar de Guzmán, count-duke of (i)

Oosterweel, battle of (i)

Oporto (i)

Oran (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)

Orange, William of Nassau, prince of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii), (xxxiii), (xxxiv) n. 54

Orléans, Charles of Valois, duke of (i), (ii)

Ormanetto, Nicholas (i), (ii), (iii)

Osorio, Doña Isabel (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) n. 54

Ottoman empire (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii), (xxxiii), (xxxiv)

Ovando, Juan de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), plate 36

Overijssel (i), (ii)

Oxford University (i)

Padilla, Don Antonio de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) n. 18

Padilla, Don Martín de (i), (ii)

Palencia (i)

papacy (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx)

Paracuellos de Jarama (i), (ii)

Pardo, El (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi)

Paris (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii)

Parma, Margaret, duchess of (Philip II's half-sister) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii)

Parma, Alexander Farnese, prince and duke of (Philip II's nephew), (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) n. 11

Pastrana, duchy of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)

Paul IV, pope (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix)

Pazos, Antonio Mauriño de, *see* Mauriño de Pazos

Perejón (i), (ii)

Perrenot de Granvelle, Antoine (bishop of Arras and later cardinal Granvelle) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii), (xxxiii), (xxxiv), (xxxv)

Penna, Doña Tadea de la (Philip II's half-sister) (i)

Pelayo, king of Spain (i)

Peralta, Don Eugenio de (i)

Pereira, Francisco (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)

Pérez, Antonio (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi); (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi),

Pérez, Gonzalo (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix)

Perpetual Edict (i), (ii), (iii)

Perpignan (i)

Persia (i)

Peru (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii)

Philip I, king of Spain (i)

Philip II, king of Spain:

PERSONAL: childhood and education, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), plates 2, 4; appearance and demeanour, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi); daily routine (i), (ii), (iii), (iv); health (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), plate 44; handwriting, (i), plate 5; sexual life, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) n. 53, (vii) n. 44; dress, (i), (ii); death and resurrection, (i), (ii), plate 45; distrust of others (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix); coldness, (i); curiosity, (i); diligence, (i), (ii); fairness (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi); fear of failure (i), (ii), (iii), (iv); inability to understand finance, (i), (ii),

plate 36; informality and protocol (i), (ii), (iii), (iv); intransigence, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv); love of solitude, (i), (ii); self-pity, (i), (ii)

RELATIONS WITH FAMILY: with parents, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii) n. 2, plate 3; with siblings, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi); with wives (i), (ii), (iii); (i); with mothers-in-law (i), (ii), (iii); with children (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), plate 32

INTERESTS: architecture (i), (ii), (iii), plates 20, 21, 27; books (i), figure 3; collecting (i), (ii), plate 14; cultural patronage (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix); gardens and nature (i), (ii), (iii); geography and cartography, (i), (ii); hunting and fishing, (i), (ii), (iii); mathematics, (i), (ii); music and dancing (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v); painting, (i), (ii), (iii), plate 4; science, magic, and the occult, (i), plate 24

RELIGION (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), plates 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 26

STYLE OF GOVERNMENT (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), plates 10, 11, 23, 28, 34, 41

AS SEEN BY OTHERS: (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), plates 7, 37

Philip III, prince of Asturias and later King Philip III of Spain (son of Philip II and Anne) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), plate 32

Philippines (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) n. 33

Picardy (i)

Pisuerga, river (i)

Pius IV, pope (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)

Pius V, pope (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii)

Pizarro Llorente, Henar (i)

Plantin Press (Antwerp) (i), (ii), plates 15, 16

Plautus (i)

Poitiers (i)

Pole, Reginald, cardinal (i), (ii), (iii)

Portsmouth (i)

Portugal (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii), (xxxiii), (xxxiv), (xxxv), (xxxvi), (xxxvii), (xxxviii), (xxxix), (xl), (xli), (xlii), (xliii), (xliv)

Poza, Don Francisco de Rojas, marquis of (i)

Prescott, William Hickling (i)

Proclamation on Etiquette (i)

Providential vision, *see* Messianic Imperialism

Pyrenees (i), (ii)

Quadra, Bishop Alvaro de la (i), (ii)

Quijada, Luis (i), (ii), (iii)

Quiroga, Gaspar de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi),
 (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi)
 Qu'ran (i)

Raleigh, Sir Walter (i), (ii)
 Red Sea (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Regensburg (i), (ii)
Relaciones topográficas (i)
 relics, religious (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) n. 15, plate 14
 Renard, Simon (i)
 Requesens, Doña Estefania de (i), (ii)
 Requesens, Don Luis de, Comendador Mayor of Castile (i), (ii), (iii), (iv),
 (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), plates 6, 35
 Reuchlin, Johannes (i)
 Ribadeneira, Pedro de (i), (ii), (iii)
 Ribagorza, county of (i), (ii), (iii)
 Ridolfi, Roberto (i), (ii), (iii)
 Rio Grande (i)
 Rhine river (i)
 Roberti, Emilio (i), (ii)
 Robledo (i)
 Rodríguez Ramos, Dr Prudencio (i)
 Rodríguez Salgado, María José, (i), (ii) n. 1
 Rogier, Philippe (i)
 Rome (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii),
 (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv),
 (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxI), (xxxii), (xxxiii),
 (xxxiv), (xxxv), (xxxvi), (xxxvii), (xxxviii), (xxxix), (xl), (xli), (xlii),
 (xliii), (xliv), (xlv), (xlvi), (xlvii), (xlviii)
 Rotterdam (i)
 Royal Navy (i), (ii)
 Rudolf II, Holy Roman Emperor (Philip II's nephew) (i), (ii)
 Rueda, Lope de (i)
 Rufo, Juan (i)
 Ruiz, Magdalena (i)
 Ruiz, Teofilo (i), (ii)
 Ruiz de Velasco, Juan (i)

Saint-Réal, César de (i)
 Salamanca (i)
 Salamanca, university of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Salazar, Tomás de (i)
 Salic Law (i)
 San Ambrosio, Fray Hernando de (i), (ii)
 San Agustín, Fray Julián de, *see* Alcalá, Fray Julián de

San Jerónimo, convent of (i), (ii)

San Lorenzo de El Escorial (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii), (xxxiii), (xxxiv), (xxxv), (xxxvi), (xxxvii), (xxxviii), (xxxix), (xl), (xli), (xlii), (xliii), (xliv), (xlv), (xlvi), (xlvii), (xlviii), (xlix), (l), (li), (lii), (liii), (liv), (lv), (lvi), (lvii), (lviii), (lix), (lx), (lxi), (lxii), (lxiii), (lxiv), (lxv), (lxvi), (lxvii), (lxviii), (lxix), (lxx), (lxxi), (lxxii), (lxxiii)

Sánchez, Joan (i)

Sánchez Coello, Alonso, (i), plates 31, 40, 43

Sandoval y Rojas, Don Francisco de, *see* Lerma, Don Francisco Gómez de Sandoval y Rojas

Sanlúcar de Barrameda (i), (ii)

Santa Cruz, Don Álvaro de Bazán, marquis of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv)

Santo Domingo (i), (ii)

São Miguel, Azores (i), plate 38

Sardinia (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)

Savoy, duchy of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx)

Savoy, Charles Emmanuel duke of (Philip II's son-in-law) (i), (ii), (iii)

Savoy, Catalina Michaela duchess of, *see* Catalina Michaela

Savoy, Emmanuel Philibert duke of (Philip II's cousin) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x)

Saxony (i), (ii), (iii)

Schiller, Friedrich (i), (ii) n. 2

Scilly Isles (i)

Scotland (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x) n. 4

Sea Beggars (i)

Sebastian, king of Portugal (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii)

Segovia (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi)

Seneca (i)

Sepúlveda, Juan Ginés de (i), (ii)

Serlio, Sebastian (i)

Sessa, Don Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, 3rd duke of (i), (ii)

Sessa, Don Antonio Fernández de Córdoba, 5th duke of (i), (ii)

Setubal (i)

Seville (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi)

Sicily (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii)

Sigüenza, Fray José de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix)

Silíceo, Juan Martínez de Guijo (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)

Silva, Don Juan de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)
 Simancas, archives and archivists of, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), figure 14
 Simancas, Diego de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi)
 Sixtus V, pope (i), (ii), (iii)
 Smythe, Sir John (i)
 Solomon, king of Israel (i), (ii)
Song of El Cid (i), (ii) n. 10
 Soranzo, Giovanni (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Southampton (i), (ii)
 Spain, *see* Aragon; Catalonia; Castile; Granada; Navarre *and* Valencia
 Spanish Road (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Spes, Don Guerau de (i), (ii)
 St Anne (i), (ii)
 St Augustine (i)
 St Bartholomew, massacre of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 St Lawrence (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi) n. 15
 St Quentin, battle of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi),
 plates 9, 17
Star Wars (i) n. 2
 Strozzi, Filippo (i), (ii)
 Stukeley, Thomas (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Suleiman the Magnificent, Ottoman sultan (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Suprema (Supreme council of the Inquisition), the (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v),
 (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix); *see also* Inquisition
 Sweden (i), (ii)
 Swiss Cantons (i), (ii)

Tagus river (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)
 Tarazona (i), (ii), (iii)
 Tavera, Cardinal Juan Pardo de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix)
 Tenth Penny tax (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)
 Terceira island (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Terence (i)
 Terrones, Dr Aguilar de (i), (ii)
 Thames river (i), (ii), (iii)
Theuerdank, autobiography of Emperor Maximilian I (i), (ii), (iii) n. 26
 Thompson, I. A. A. (i)
 ‘Three Graces’ (taxes on the church in Castile) (i), (ii)
 Tisnacq, Charles de (i), (ii), (iii)
 Titian (i), (ii), plate 31
 Toledo (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii),
 (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv),
 (xxv), (xxvi), (xxvii), (xxviii), (xxix), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii)
 Toledo, House of (i), (ii), (iii)
 Toledo, Juan Bautista de (i)

Toledo, Doña María de (i)
 Tomar (i), (ii), plate 37
 Tordesillas (i), (ii)
 Toro (i), (ii)
 Toul (i)
 tournaments, *see* jousts
 Tracy, James (i) n. 8
 Trastámara, Prince Juan of (i), (ii), (iii)
 Trent, council of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii)
 Tridentine Reforms (i), (ii)
 Tripoli (i), (ii), (iii)
 Tunis (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix)
 Tunisia (i)
 Turégano (i)
 Turks (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi); *see also* Ottoman empire
 Tuscany, grand dukes of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)

 Ugolini, Giovanni (i)
 Ulloa, Doña Magdalena de (i), (ii)
 universities, *see* Complutense University; Oxford University; Salamanca; Valladolid and Wittenberg
 Utrecht (i), (ii), (iii)

 Valdemorillo (i)
 Valdés, Don Fernando de (i), (ii)
 Valdés, Francisco de (i) n. 14
 Valencia (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii)
 Valladolid (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi)
 Vallés, Dr. (i)
 Valsaín, *see* Bosque de Segovia
 Vargas, Diego de (i) n. 32
 Vargas-Hidalgo, Rafael (i)
 Vargas Mexía, Juan de (i)
 Vargas Mexía, Francisco de, tutor of Philip II (i)
 Vargas Mexía, Francisco de, ambassador (i), (ii), (iii)
 Vargas Zapata, Juan de (i) n. 32
 Vaucelles, truce of (i)
 Vázquez, Mateo: and Philip (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx), (xxi), (xxii), (xxiii), (xxiv), (xxv) n. 15; coordinator of junta system (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v); and Escobedo murder (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)

Vázquez de Arce, Rodrigo (i), (ii), (iii)
 Vázquez de Molina, Juan (i)
 Vázquez de Salazar, Juan (i), (ii), (iii)
 Vega, Hernando de (i), (ii)
 Velada, Don Gómez Dávila, marquis of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Velasco, Isabel de (i) n. 55,
 Velasco, Don Luis de (i)
 Velasco, Dr Martín de (i), (ii), (iii)
 Venice, Venetian Republic, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x),
 (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi)
 Verdi, Giuseppe (i)
 Verdun (i)
 Vervins, peace of (i)
 Vienna (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Villacastín, Fray Antonio de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v)
 Villahermosa, Don Fernando de Aragón y Borja, duke of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Viñas, Antonio de las, *see* Wyngaerde
 Virgil (i), (ii)
 Vitruvius (i)
 Vives, Juan Luis (i)
 Voth, H.-J., *see* Drelichman

 Walcheren (i), (ii)
 Wales (i)
 Walsingham, Francis (i)
 Waterford (i)
 Watson, Robert (i)
 Wenceslas (Philip II's nephew) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), plate 30
 West Indies (i)
 Wilkinson Zerner, Catherine (i), (ii)
 William the Conqueror, duke of Normandy and king of England (i)
 Wilson, Thomas (i)
 Wittenberg, university of (i)
 Wyngaerde, Anton van den (i), (ii), plate 27

 Yepes, Fray Diego de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)
 Yuste (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii)

 Zapata de Chaves, Luis (i)
 Zaragoza (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii)
 Zavala, Domingo de (i)
 Zayas, Gabriel de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii)
 Zúñiga, Don Baltasar de (i)
 Zúñiga, Don Diego de (i)
 Zúñiga, Don Francés de (i), (ii) n. 4

Zúñiga y Avellaneda, Don Juan de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii),
(ix), (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv), (xvi), (xvii), (xviii), (xix), (xx)
Zúñiga y Requesens, Don Juan de (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii),
(ix), (x), (xi) n. 55, (xii) n. 14
Zealand (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii)
Zutphen (i), (ii), (iii)